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Abstract 
This thesis argues that the ‘rule of law’ was not followed in colonial and post-federation 
Australia in relation to a fundamental principle of the common law. According to the 
rule in Calvin’s Case (1608), no person born as a ‘subject’ in any part of the King’s 
dominions could be an ‘alien’. This was the legal position in Australia from the 
reception of English law until well after federation.  
In colonial and post-federation Australia the racial meaning of ‘alien’ was consistently 
used in political and legal contexts instead of its proper legal meaning. In legislation and 
parliamentary debates, cases and prosecutions, inter-colonial conferences and 
conventions it was employed to refer not merely to those who were ‘aliens’ under the 
common law but also to people regarded as ‘aliens’ in the broader or racial sense of the 
word, especially those of non-European background. Chinese and Indian settlers, 
Pacific islanders and even indigenous Australians were treated as ‘aliens’ in Australia 
even if under British law they were actually ‘subjects’ of the Crown and not ‘aliens’ at 
all in the accepted legal sense.  
In the 1820s and 1830s the New South Wales Supreme Court thought it inconceivable 
that ‘barbarous’ indigenous inhabitants could ‘owe fealty’ or allegiance to the British 
Crown,  considering their legal position analogous to that of ‘foreigners’ or ‘strangers’. 
In debates on exclusionary legislation in the 1870s and 1880s, parliamentarians in the 
Australian colonies portrayed all Chinese settlers as ‘aliens’, despite acknowledging that 
many came from Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements or other British possessions. 
Immigrants from British India were generally treated the same way. Delegates to 
Australia’s constitutional conventions in the 1890s, including prominent legal figures, 
repeated this mistake. And in the 1900s Pacific islanders born in Australia as British 
subjects were deported as ‘aliens’ with the approval of the Australian High Court. The 
misuse of ‘alien’ in this case contributed to a defective judgment still cited today in 
support of the Commonwealth’s claims to extensive exclusionary power.   
Between federation and the Second World War, Queensland’s dictation test legislation 
and industrial awards regulating various occupations provide many examples of the 
misuse and manipulation of the term ‘alien’ in a legal context. In prosecutions under 
these laws the word was used as a weapon against non-Europeans whether they were 
‘aliens’ under the law or not.   
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Commentators both in the early years of federation and in more recent times have failed 
to identify the misuse of ‘alien’– and have made the same error themselves. This 
mistake is critical because of the continued force of the term in Australian law. The 
Commonwealth’s sweeping power to define who shall be citizens of Australia and to 
exclude, detain indefinitely without trial and deport ‘aliens’ is still justified by reference 
to colonial and post-federation cases and constitutional convention debates where 
‘alien’ was incorrectly used in its racial sense contrary to the rule of law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Interviewer: ‘You want to feel like an Australian, but you feel that other people 
constantly see you as a Cambodian…’  
Brother: ‘Yes, It’s very hard because physically you’re Asian and you’re automatically 
not Australian – you’re an alien’.1 
Sir Edward Coke and the common law of aliens 
Justice Windeyer of the High Court of Australia said the rule of law and other ‘greatnesses’ 
of the Australian legal system owe much to the legacy of Sir Edward Coke (1552–1634),2 
arguably ‘the most famous and influential figure in English legal history’.3 According to Sir 
William Holdsworth: 
What Shakespeare has been to literature, what Bacon has been to philosophy, what the 
translators of the Authorized Version of the Bible have been to religion, Coke has been to the 
public and private laws of England.4 
Holdsworth credited Coke with ‘remoulding the medieval common law in such a way that it 
was made fit to bear rule in the modern English state.’5 As Shaunnagh Dorsett says, ‘Coke 
attempted to impose a unity and structure on English common law and to translate medieval 
law to modern…Under Coke, the once fragmented common law became the ‘law of the 
land’.6  
This thesis argues that the ‘rule of law’ was not followed in colonial and post-federation 
Australia in relation to a fundamental principle of the common law prescribed by Coke 
himself. In Calvin’s Case (1608), Coke - as Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas - 
                                                 
1
  Trevor Batrouney and John Goldlust, Unravelling Identity. Immigrants, Identity and Citizenship in 
Australia (Common Ground 2005) 74-75.     
2
  Sir Victor Windeyer, ‘A Birthright and Inheritance, The Establishment of the Rule of Law in 
Australia’ (1962) 1 University of Tasmania Law Review 635, 654. 
3
  Damian Powell, ‘Coke in Context: Early Modern Legal Observation and Sir Edward Coke’s 
Reports’ (2000) 21(3) Journal of Legal History 33, 33, citing S.E. Prall (ed) The Puritan 
Revolution: A Documentary History (1968) 306.  
4
  Ibid, citing Sir William Holdsworth, Some Makers of English Law (Cambridge, 1938) 132. For a 
contrasting depiction of Coke’s contribution to English law, see Enid Campbell, ‘Thomas Hobbes 
and the Common Law’ (1958) 1 Tasmanian University Law Review 20.   
5
  Shaunnagh Dorsett, ‘ “Since Time Immemorial”: A Story Of Common Law Jurisdiction, Native 
Title And The Case Of Tanistry’ (2002) 26(1) Melbourne University Law Review 15, 37, citing 
Holdsworth, above n 4, 132.  
6
  Ibid 37-38. Coke is also remembered for entrenching the rule that sovereign power is exercisable 
subject to the law. Robertson states that Coke’s writings ‘convinced generations of lawyers that 
Magna Carta was part of the common law, and guaranteed the independence of the judiciary as 
guardians of the limits of the king’s power’. Geoffrey Robertson, ‘Magna Carta remains pillar’, 
Canberra Times (Canberra), 12 June 2015, 4. 
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laid down the guiding principle for legal membership of the British Empire for the next three 
and a half centuries, namely: ‘they that are born under the obedience, power, faith, ligealty, or 
ligeance of the King, are natural subjects, and no aliens’.7  
As its entry in the Oxford English Dictionary shows, the word ‘alien’ has widely varied 
meanings, including: 
- a legal meaning, i.e. ‘One who is a subject of another country than that in which he 
resides. A resident foreign in origin and not naturalized, whose allegiance is thus due 
to a foreign state’  
- a normal or common meaning, i.e. ‘A person belonging to another family, race, or 
nation; a stranger, a foreigner’  
- a science fiction meaning, i.e. ‘An (intelligent) being from another planet, especially 
one far distant from the Earth; a strange (usually threatening) alien visitor’. 
The various dictionary meanings of ‘alien’ are clearly related. All refer in some way to 
people or things who are ‘not one of us’. ‘Alien’ in a legal sense, however, has some clear 
markers: a subject or citizen of another country, a resident who has not been ‘naturalised’ and 
- somewhat more vague but still central to the concept in modern Australian jurisprudence - a 
person who owes ‘allegiance’ to a foreign state. By contrast, in its more common, broader 
sense, ‘alien’ does not depend on formal legal markers but on subjective cultural or personal 
perceptions of who ‘belongs’. In this sense someone who merely ‘belongs to another family’ 
can be seen as an ‘alien’.8 More commonly - and most significantly for the purpose of this 
work - a person regarded as belonging to some other ‘race’ or ‘nation’, whatever their formal 
legal status, can be seen as an alien in this broader sense.  
According to the rule in Calvin’s Case, no person born as a ‘subject’ in any part of the King’s 
dominions could be an ‘alien’. This was the legal position in Australia from the reception of 
                                                 
7
  Calvin v. Smith or the Case of the Postnati (‘Calvin’s Case’) (1608) 7 Coke Report 1a, 5b; 77 Eng. 
Rep. 377, 383. For the facts and analysis of Calvin’s Case, see Keechang Kim, ‘Calvin’s case 
(1608) and the law of Alien status’ (1996) 17:2 Journal of Legal History 155 and Polly J Price, 
‘Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608)’ (1997) Vol 9, Iss. 1, Art. 2. Yale 
Journal of Law & the Humanities, 73. As Kim says, the case ‘provided the opportunity to discuss 
and settle the question of the legal status of Scotsmen in England after the accession of James 1’ (at 
155). As he notes, ‘the political importance of the case made it one of the most elaborately argued 
cases in the common law history. All justices of the King’s Bench and Common Pleas, the Barons 
of the Exchequer and Sir Francis Bacon, the King’s Counsel, participated in the argument’ (169 
n 4).    
8
  Or even, in Australia, a sporting team from another State. In September 2008 The Age described 
non-Victorian Australian Football League clubs as ‘aliens’ when highlighting the lack of success of 
those teams in the season which had just finished, stating ‘here’s another good stat for all of us who 
have been sick and tired of the sight of those “aliens” from the north and west. Officially, 2008 was 
the worst year for interstate clubs since…1997’. ‘Sport’, The Age, 23 September 2008, 12. 
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English law until well after federation. As six judges of the High Court observed in Nolan 
(1988), the term ‘alien’ could not have been used in the colonial era: 
…to identify the status of a British subject vis-a-vis one of the Australian or other colonies of 
the British Empire...At that time, no subject of the British Crown was an alien within any part 
of the British Empire…The British Empire continued to consist of one sovereign State and its 
colonial and other dependencies with the result there was no need to modify either the 
perception of an indivisible Imperial Crown or the doctrine that, under the common law, no 
subject of the Queen was an alien in any part of Her Majesty’s dominions.9  
Under the common law people were either ‘subjects’ or ‘aliens’. As Coke said, ‘every man is 
either alienigena, an alien born, or subditus, a subject born’.10 The creation of the 
Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 did not alter this position. As Guy Aitken and Robert 
Orr note: 
The Constitution does not contain any reference to Australian citizenship. Indeed, at the 
advent of federation in 1901, and for a long time after that, there was no such concept. All 
persons in Australia were either British subjects or aliens.11 
As this thesis argues, however, in colonial and post-federation Australia the racial meaning of 
‘alien’ was consistently used in political and legal contexts instead of its proper legal 
meaning. In legislation and parliamentary debates, cases and prosecutions, inter-colonial 
conferences and conventions it was employed to refer not merely to those who were ‘aliens’ 
under the common law but also to people regarded as ‘aliens’ in the broader or racial sense of 
the word, especially those of non-European background. Chinese and Indian settlers, Pacific 
islanders and even indigenous Australians were treated as ‘aliens’ in Australia even if under 
British law they were actually ‘subjects’ of the Crown and not ‘aliens’ at all in the accepted 
legal sense.  
In the 1820s and 1830s the New South Wales Supreme Court thought it inconceivable that 
‘barbarous’ indigenous inhabitants could ‘owe fealty’ or allegiance to the British Crown,12 
                                                 
9
  Nolan  v Minister For Immigration And Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178, 183 (Mason C.J. 
Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey JJ). Emphasis added.  
10
  Calvin’s Case 77 ER 383, 397. See Kim, above n 7, 165ff in relation to the uncertainty about when 
the distinction between ‘aliens’ and ‘subjects’ under English law began. However this dates at least 
to an Act of Parliament in 1335, see House of Lords Record Office, ‘Citizenship: a history of 
people, rights and power in Britain’,  www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/citizenship. See also 
Singh v Commonwealth  (2004) 222 CLR 322, [59] to [116] (McHugh J) for an extensive account of 
the origins and development of the law regarding ‘aliens’ in Britain and Australia.    
11
  Guy Aitken and Robert Orr, Sawer’s The Australian Constitution (Australian Government Solicitor, 
3
rd
 ed, 2002) 48. Emphasis added. At least until 1949, there was no deviation from this principle in 
Australia’s statutory law. See eg Nationality Act 1920 (Cth) s 5(1). 
12
  R v Ballard, [1829] NSWSupC 26, 13 June 1829, Macquarie University Division of Law, Decisions 
of the Superior Courts of New South Wales, 1788-1899, 
www.law.mq.edu.au/research/colonial_case_law/nsw/cases/case_index/1829/r_v_ballard_or_barrett
/  
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considering their legal position analogous to that of ‘foreigners’ or ‘strangers’.13 In debates 
on exclusionary legislation in the 1870s and 1880s, parliamentarians in the Australian 
colonies portrayed all Chinese settlers as ‘aliens’, despite acknowledging that many came 
from Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements or other British possessions.14 Immigrants from 
British India were generally treated the same way.15 Delegates to Australia’s constitutional 
conventions in the 1890s, including prominent legal figures, repeated this mistake.16 And in 
the 1900s Pacific islanders born in Australia as British subjects were deported as ‘aliens’ with 
the approval of the Australian High Court.17 The misuse of ‘alien’ in this case contributed to 
a defective judgment still cited today in support of the Commonwealth’s claims to extensive 
exclusionary power.18  
Amongst the Australian States, it was in Queensland where governments, legislators, courts 
and officials found the word ‘alien’ most useful after 1901, not least as a way of excluding 
Chinese and other non-Europeans from major agricultural industries such as sugar and 
bananas. Between federation and the Second World War, Queensland’s dictation test 
legislation and industrial awards regulating various occupations provide many examples of 
the misuse and manipulation of the term ‘alien’ in a legal context.19 In prosecutions under 
these laws the word was used as a weapon against non-Europeans whether they were ‘aliens’ 
under the law or not.20  
Commentators both in the early years of federation and in more recent times have failed to 
identify the misuse of ‘alien’– and have made the same error themselves. This mistake is 
critical because of the continued force of the term in Australian law. The Commonwealth’s 
sweeping power to define who shall be citizens of Australia and to exclude, detain 
indefinitely without trial and deport ‘aliens’ is still justified by reference to colonial and post-
                                                 
13
  R v Murrell and Bummaree [1836] NSWSupC 35, 5 February 1836, Macquarie University Division 
of Law, Decisions of the Superior Courts of New South Wales 1788-1899,  
www.law.mq.edu.au/research/colonial_case_law/nsw/cases/case_index/1836/r_v_murrell_and_bum
maree/. Also cited as R. v Jack Congo Murrell [1836] 1 Legge 72.  
14
  See Chapter Two.  
15
  See Chapters Three and Four. 
16
  See Chapter Three.  
17
  Robtelmes v Brenan (1906) 4 CLR 395.  
18
  See Chapter Five. 
19
  See Chapter Six.  
20
  See Chapter Seven. 
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federation cases and constitutional convention debates where ‘alien’ was incorrectly used in 
its racial sense contrary to the rule of law.21  
Australia and the rule of law 
‘There are moments in history which are turning points. Now is such a time. Australia 
can stand up and protect the rule of law or become an international pariah, living 
isolated at the end of the world, forever in fear of others’.22 
The common perception remains that the Australian society created by British colonisation 
was built on the rule of law.  
Dr Nandini Chatterjee has observed that ‘In what historians call the “second British empire” 
– centred on Africa and Australasia – law was supposed to be Britain’s particular boon to 
previously benighted societies’.23 This was a core belief at the time of the European 
settlement of Australia. In 1795 Governor Hunter of New South Wales declared: 
…no man within this Colony can be put out of the power or lose the protection of the laws 
under which we live, from the meanest of His Majesty’s subjects up to the Commander-in-
Chief or first Magistrate, we are all equally amenable to and protected by the laws.
24
 
In 2001 the Chief Justice of the Australian High Court, Murray Gleeson, acclaimed the role 
of Sir Francis Forbes (first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales) in 
establishing the rule of law in the colony.25 Justice Windeyer also praised Forbes as ‘the main 
architect of the reconstruction of the legal institutions of the Australian colonies’.26 Others 
say Forbes’ role in embedding the rule of law as the ‘foundation stone of today’s Australian 
                                                 
21
  See Chapter Two referring to Toy v Musgrove (1888) 14 VLR 349 cited in Ruddock v Vardalis (the 
Tampa case) (2001) 110 FCR 491, 541 (French J); Ex parte Lo Pak (1888) 9 NSWLR(L) 221 and 
Ex parte Leong Kum (1888) 9 NSWLR(L) 250 also cited by French J at 541; Chapter Three 
referring to Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 CLR 322, 345-346, where Justice McHugh cited the 
debate over John Quick’s proposal to include a power over citizenship at the 1898 constitutional 
convention in Melbourne; and Chapter  Five, referring to Robtelmes v Brenan (1906) 4 CLR 395 
cited in Ruddock v Vardalis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 495, 498 (Black CJ), 543 (French J) and Plaintiff 
M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship (the indefinite 
detention case) (2013) 251 CLR 322, 329 n 19 (JT Gleeson SC, Solicitor-General for the 
Commonwealth). See also Schlieske v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 84 ALR 
719, 725 (Wilcox and French JJ).  
22
  Malcolm Fraser and Barry Jones, ‘Perverse migration bill shreds the rule of law’, The Age, 7 
November 2014, 22.  
23
  Nandini Chatterjee, ‘Law and the British Empire’, Privy Council Papers Online, 
www.privycouncilpapers.org/contexts/law-and-british-empire/.  
24
  Windeyer, above n 2, 665, citing Historical Records of Australia, Series 1, Vol 1, 604-643.  
25
  Murray Gleeson, ‘Courts And The Rule Of Law’ (Paper presented at Rule of Law Series, 
 University of Melbourne, 7 November 2001) 
www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/gleesoncj/cj_ruleoflaw.htm.   
26
  Windeyer, above n 2, 654. 
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constitutionalism’ entitles him to ‘the same place in Australian history as…the great Chief 
Justice John Marshall in American history’.27 In 1827 Forbes declared that: 
Every man, who has read Blackstone’s Commentaries, knows that it is laid down as a given 
proposition, that the English laws in force, at the time of a British Colony ‘being planted’, are 
in force in the Colony as the birthright of the subject.28  
The same year Forbes wrote to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies stating that 
supervision of the Court by the military governor was ‘inconsistent with the nature of a 
Supreme Court … the judicial office…stands uncontrolled and independent, and bowing to 
no power but the supremacy of law’.29 Chief Justice Gleeson remarked approvingly that this 
‘assertion of the rule of law was made by a colonial Chief Justice, in a remote part of the 
British Empire, writing some 50 years before A.V. Dicey’.30  
According to Cameron Stewart, Dicey’s 1885 exposition of the rule of law ‘was accepted in 
English (and Australian) legal discourse as authoritative and it remains so today’.31 As this 
thesis explains, however, central tenets of Dicey’s formulation – including that regular law is 
supreme over arbitrary power and the idea of legal equality32 - were not followed by colonial 
and post-federation political and legal institutions in Australia in relation to the law on 
‘alienage’.   
The ‘rule of law’ remains a contested concept.33 In 2007, Lord Bingham, Senior Law Lord of 
the United Kingdom, noted that ‘well-respected authors have thrown doubt on its meaning 
and value’.34 Professor Meyerson explains the contest between a ‘formal’ or ‘thin’ conception 
of the rule of law ‘which places no constraints on the content of law and is therefore 
                                                 
27
  Ian Holloway, Simon Bronitt and John Williams, ‘Rhetoric, Reason and the Rule of Law in Early 
Colonial New South Wales’, in Hamar Foster, Benjamin L Berger and A R Buck (eds), The Grand 
Experiment (UBC Press 2014) 78, 85, 88.  
28
  Windeyer, above n 2, 667, citing Historical Records of Australia, Series IV, vol 1, 746 (Forbes CJ, 
12 Nov 1827).  
29
  Gleeson, above n 25, citing J M Bennett (ed), Some Papers of Sir Francis Forbes at 143.  
30
  Ibid.   
31
  Cameron Stewart, ‘The Rule of Law and the Tinkerbell Effect: Theoretical Considerations, 
Criticisms and Justifications for the Rule of Law’, (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 135, 140.  
32
  A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed Macmillan,1959) 188, 
193. See also Stewart, 140-141.  
33
  As Holloway, Bronitt and Williams explain: 
 ‘On the one hand, the rule of law is presented by some scholars as a pivotal concept, providing 
authority and legitimacy for the exercise of state power and paving the way for representative 
and democratic systems of government. On the other hand, the rule of law is presented as an 
ideological tool, serving only to legitimate or mask oppressive systems of governance and 
class oppression’.  
 Holloway et al, above n 27, 80.  
34
  Lord Thomas Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ (2007) 66(1) Cambridge Law Journal 67, 68.  
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compatible with great iniquity in the law’ and a ‘substantive conception’ that also involves 
‘moral constraints on the exercise of state power’.35 As Keith Mason explains, Dicey’s ‘rule 
of law’ assumes law consists of rules which are ‘prior to particular cases, more general than 
particular cases, and applied to particular cases’.36 This concept of the ‘rule of law’ is 
‘compatible with the existence of morally bad general rules’.37 As this thesis argues, key 
institutions in colonial and post-federation Australia mostly failed to comply with the rule of 
law even in this formal or ‘thin’ sense with respect to established rules on alien status.  
According to David Neal, contemporary discussions about the ‘rule of law’ have ‘importantly 
different connotations from those which it had for seventeenth and eighteenth century English 
people’: 
For English settlers in New South Wales, conflicts over the extent of the governor’s powers – 
a governor who stood in the place of the king in the colony but wielded more power than any 
king since James 1 – conjured up seventeenth-century demons about royal tyranny.38 
John McLaren observes that at the time of the European settlement of Australia, ‘the rule of 
law…was a highly tensile notion. Its meaning varied depending on who was employing it and 
for what purpose’.39 Nevertheless, as Neal explains, the rule of law ‘occupied a central place 
in the political ideology of late eighteenth-century England. It was from this political 
culture…that the white settlement of Australia was launched’.40 As he states: 
…courts were provided and politics in the colony soon took on an English form which 
stressed the rule of law as the measure of legitimacy. Ideas which were already prominent in 
English politics took on heightened importance in a penal colony where there were so few 
other means of political expression.
41
 
Indeed the rule of law in early New South Wales was said to have at least three elements: 
[1] general rules laid down in advance, [2] rational arguments from those principles to 
particular cases, and, at least in a developed form, [3] a legal system independent of the 
executive for adjudication of disputes involving the general rules.
42 
                                                 
35
  Denise Meyerson, ‘The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers’ (2004) 4 Macquarie Law 
Journal 1, 2.  
36
  Keith Mason, ‘The Rule of Law’, in P D Finn (ed), Essays on Law and Government Vol 1 
Principles and Values (Law Book Co 1995) Chapter 5, 115, 115-116. 
37
  David Neal, The Rule of Law in a Penal Colony (Cambridge University Press 1991) 67. 
38
  Ibid 64.  
39
  John McLaren, ‘The Uses of the Rule of Law in British Colonial Societies in the Nineteenth 
Century’ in Shaunnagh Dorsett and Ian Hunter (eds), Law and Politics in British Colonial Thought. 
Transpositions of Empire (Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 71, 71. 
40
  Neal, above n 37, 75.  
41
  Ibid 83. 
42
  Ibid 67.  
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There is, interestingly, disagreement about when the rule of law in a formal or ‘thin’ sense 
became embedded in the political and legal culture of colonial New South Wales. On the one 
hand, according to Neal: 
The core components of the rule of law model – general laws, legal forms of argument and 
courts – gained a foothold in the colony along with the colonists; they were soon put to 
use…The courts, in particular, established a crucial bridgehead for the development of a 
fully-fledged version of the rule of law and for the transformation of the penal colony.
43
 
On the other hand, Holloway, Bronitt and Williams argue that: 
…the modernist project associated with the rule of law mindset cannot be said to be fully 
formed in colonial Australia until after the arrival of lawyers such as Francis Forbes in the 
early 1820s…It was not until 1824, when the present Supreme Court of New South Wales 
was established, that the real debate over the nature of the rule of law began to take place in 
Australia.
44
 
Holloway and his fellow authors credit Forbes with instilling the spirit of English law in 
colonial Australia: 
…what did happen — though in 1824, not 1788 — was that a court was created with all of 
the authority of the English common law courts.  This meant not that the substantive law in 
New South Wales would be the same as in England, for it never had been, but that the legal 
dynamic would be the same. To put it another way, Australia did not receive English law, but 
it received - and this serves as the foundation stone of today’s Australian constitutionalism - 
English legal culture.
45
 
Importantly, they note Forbes’ view that only in exceptional circumstances could English law 
be tailored to the colonial setting and that any qualification had to be proportionate.46 They 
cite an 1831 case where Forbes argued that the common law rule of ‘felony attaint’ (which 
prevented convicts from testifying) should be maintained in colonial New South Wales 
despite the shortage of witnesses this might cause: 
To determine this most delicate and important question, we must look to the spirit of the law 
of England, and satisfy ourselves whether the rule of law…be a rule founded in reason, and 
only admitting of a deviation, upon grounds of extreme necessity, and not sanctioning a 
departure any further than such necessity will justify.
47
 
                                                 
43
  Ibid 86. 
44
  Holloway et al, above n 27, 80, 87.  
45
  Ibid 85.  
46
  Ibid, 88, 97.  
47
  Ibid, 96-7, citing R v Farrell, Dingle and Woodward (1831) 1 Legge 5. The other judges in this 
case, Justices Stephen and Dowling, held that a convict ‘could be a competent witness in the colony 
although this was not strictly in accord with the English common law on the subject’. Alex C 
Castles, ‘The Reception and Status of English Law in Australia’ (1963) 2(1) Adelaide Law Review 
1, 9. As Castles says, this was a ‘limited exception’ where the unenacted English common law 
yielded to special conditions in New South Wales.  
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Despite differences over exactly when a ‘government of laws, not of men’48 was transported 
to colonial Australia, it appears to be accepted therefore that by the late 1820s and the first of 
the examples in this thesis, there was at least a ‘thin’ or ‘formal’ rule of law in place requiring 
courts independent of executive government to apply established rules to particular cases, 
with only necessity of colonial circumstance justifying proportionate deviation from 
fundamental tenets of English law. 
As the thesis illustrates, however, there was little attempt to follow established rules of 
English law in colonial and post-federation Australia when it came to determining the legal 
status of non-European inhabitants. Notwithstanding historical acclaim for his role in 
implanting the rule of law in colonial Australia, this included the New South Wales Supreme 
Court under Chief Justice Forbes in relation to the status of indigenous Australians (see 
Chapter One).  
The Common Law as Birthright 
Belief in the rule of law as a foundation for modern Australia is accompanied by reverence 
for the unenacted or ‘common’ law (that part of English law comprising case precedent and 
custom rather than legislation). Indeed the common law has been described as the ‘source of 
all legal authority’ in Australia.49 Justice Windeyer referred to ‘the old and well-known 
principle of the common law that Englishmen going out to found a colony carried the law 
with them to their new home’, observing that:  
…today lawyers look to the Statute of 1828 as the good root of title of our inheritance of the 
law of England. But we must not think of it as the source of that inheritance. The source is the 
common law itself. The law of England had come to Australia with the First Fleet, forty years 
before 1828.
50
 
As the High Court of Australia affirmed in Mabo (1992): 
…once the establishment of the Colony was complete on 7 February 1788, the English 
common law, adapted to meet the circumstances of the new Colony, automatically applied 
throughout the whole of the Colony as the domestic law…within the Colony, both the Crown 
and its subjects, old and new, were bound by that common law.
51
 
                                                 
48
  The famous description of the rule of law from leading American revolutionary John Adams. John 
Adams, Novanglus Essays, No. 7. See www.john-adams-heritage.com/quotes/. 
49
  H Patapan, ‘Australian Federalism: An Innovation in Constitutionalism’, in A Ward & L Ward 
(eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to Federalism (Ashgate Publishing, 2009) 485, 488. 
50
  Windeyer, above n 2, 636. The ‘Statute of 1828’ is the Australian Courts Act 1828 (Imp). 
According to Justice Windeyer, the 1828 Act ‘did not introduce the law of England in Australia, for 
it was already here. The only question was how much of it was here’ (at 667). Uncertainty about 
how much of the English common law was ‘applicable’ to the Australian colonies was resolved by 
the 1828 Act which incorporated into Australian law all relevant laws and statutes in force in 
England on 25 July 1828.  
51
  Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 80 (Deane, Gaudron JJ).  
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The initial reception of English law in colonial Australia, according to former Justice Michael 
Kirby, ‘flowed without much distinction into the assumptions of precedent’.52 While the 
doctrine of precedent was only consolidated later in the nineteenth century,53 there was a 
‘general disinclination on the part of Australian courts to take into account special local 
conditions in deciding whether the general principles of unenacted law should apply’.54 As 
Castles notes: 
..a strong sense of unity was maintained between the unenacted law of England and 
Australia…[E]ven aside from the precedent making authority of the Privy Council, the 
Australian judiciary, to this day, places great weight on the authority of decisions handed 
down by the higher English courts.55 
By the latter part of the nineteenth century, it was unquestionable that courts in colonial and 
post-federation Australia, as part of the British legal hierarchy, had to adhere to the principles 
of English common law. As Justice Kirby said:  
Until the 1970s and 1980s the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London was the 
final court of appeal for Australians and at the apex of our legal system. As such, in respect of 
any legal principle essential to the case, decisions of the Privy Council were binding upon all 
courts, both federal and state, throughout Australia.
56 
Except where there were differences caused by the uniqueness of Australia’s situation,57 
courts in Australia could not deviate from legal interpretations determined by the Privy 
Council. In practice this extended also to rulings by the House of Lords (in its capacity as the 
final appeal court for the domestic English legal system). As Professor Leslie Zines 
commented: 
…from the beginning it was probably inconceivable that an Australian court would, on an 
issue of a general principle of the common law, refuse to follow the House of Lords, even 
though it was recognised from an early date, that ‘technically’ the only decisions of a court in 
England that were binding were those of the Privy Council.
58
 
As Professor Zines noted, the Privy Council itself declared that the House of Lords ‘is the 
supreme tribunal to settle English law, and that being settled, the Colonial Court, which is 
                                                 
52
  Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Australia and New Zealand’ in Louis Blom Cooper, Brice Dickson and 
Gavin Drewry (eds), The Judicial House of Lords 1876-2009 (Oxford University Press, 2009) 339 
(Chapter 19(a)), citing P E von Nessen, ‘The Use of American Precedents by the High Court of 
Australia, 1901–1987’ (1992) 4 Adelaide L Rev 181, 182. 
53
  Alex C Castles, An Australian Legal History (Law Book Co, 1982), 448.   
54
  Castles, ‘The Reception and Status of English Law in Australia’, above n 47, 9, 10.  
55
  Ibid 9. 
56
  Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Precedent - Report On Australia’ (Speech to International Academy of 
Comparative Law Conference, Utrecht, The Netherlands, 17 July 2006) 2-3.  
57
  See p 11. 
58
  Leslie Zines, ‘The Common Law In Australia: Its Nature And Constitutional Significance’ (2004) 
32 Federal Law Review 337, 340.  
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bound by English law, is bound to follow it’.59 Professor Paul Finn observed that the ‘Anglo-
centric orientation’ of Australian law was further bolstered by the Privy Council which 
insisted it was ‘of the utmost importance that in all parts of the Empire where English law 
prevails, the interpretation of that law by the Courts should be as nearly as possible the 
same’.60 As Justice Kirby says: 
In the 19th century and throughout much of the 20th century great weight was also placed on 
maintaining uniformity within the English common law or ‘the Common Law’ as it was 
usually described.
61
 
Legal historian Alex Castles explains that not all English common law was transferable to 
colonial Australia:  
…special district customs recognised by unenacted law in England were not part of the body 
of law which could be transported to colonies…local colonial courts would need to make 
judgments on whether unenacted law was sufficiently general in its import to be 
receivable...62  
For instance, Castles identifies ‘a special system of landholding in Kent called gavelkind’ and 
‘rules applied in England’s ecclesiastical courts’ as esoteric aspects of English law held not to 
be receivable in Australia.63   
Importantly, the common law was regarded not merely as guiding precedent for judicial 
decisions but also as the ‘birthright’ of subjects of the British Crown. Justice Windeyer noted 
that until ‘Charters of Justice’ were granted for New South Wales and Van Dieman’s Land in 
1823, there were complaints of bias in favour of the military in the judgments of officers who 
sat in the Civil and Criminal Courts: 
…there were complaints that in the judicial arrangements of the Colony Englishmen abroad 
were being deprived of rights that Englishmen enjoyed at Home…It was a claim to enjoy 
ancient rights and lawful liberties. It embodied a concept – implicit and not analysed, but 
basic – of the common law as the ultimate foundation of British colonial institutions, a belief 
that not even Parliament could properly deprive British subjects anywhere of their 
birthright.
64
  
As Justice Kirby affirmed, ‘English law did not simply provide a foundation for Australian 
and New Zealand law…In large part, English law was viewed as part of the precious 
birthright of the settlers’.65 Justice Windeyer explained further that: 
                                                 
59
  Ibid, citing Robins v National Trust Co [1927] AC 515, 519.  
60
  Paul Finn, ‘Statutes and the Common Law’, (1992) 22 Western Australian Law Review 7, 9, citing 
Trimble v Hill (1879) 5 App Cas 342, 345. 
61
  Kirby, ‘Australia and New Zealand’, above n 52, 339. Emphasis in original. 
62
  Castles, An Australian Legal History, above n 53, 501. 
63
  Ibid. 
64
  Windeyer, above n 2, 653.  
65
  Kirby, ‘Australia and New Zealand’, above n 52, 339. Emphasis added.  
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The origin of that principle lies far back in the Middle Ages, in the doctrine, widespread in 
feudal Europe, of allegiance of subjects to their sovereign. A subject could not divest himself 
of his allegiance, except by becoming the subject of another sovereign. So that, wherever they 
went, men were bound by their allegiance and carried the law of their allegiance with them as 
a personal law. It was their birthright. It was also the measure of their duty.
66
 
Subject status as ‘birthright’ 
Calvin’s Case established that all people born in the territory of the King of England ‘were to 
enjoy the benefits of English law as subjects of the King’.67 The case ‘began a three-century 
period in which the rule determining citizenship in the English-speaking world, a rule based 
on place of birth, was self-consciously the product of judicial decisions’.68 As Professor Price 
of Emory University explains: 
Remarkably, the rule of birthright citizenship derived from Calvin’s Case remained a status 
conferred by the common law, as opposed to statutory or constitutional law, for centuries. 
Until 1898 in the United States, and as late as 1949 in Britain, there were still some cases in 
which the determination of nationality depended upon the common-law rule of birth within a 
territory.
69  
The principle of ‘birthright’ nationality or subject status set down in Calvin’s Case was not 
altered under English law at least until after World War Two70 and under Australian law not 
until 1986.71 As Parry said with respect to the imperial British Nationality and Status of 
Aliens Act 1914:  
The Act of 1914, in providing that any person born within the dominions and allegiance of the 
Crown should be deemed to be a British subject, merely put into statutory form a rule that had 
for centuries been a rule of the common law…The rule embodied the principle of the jus soli 
– of the attribution of nationality on the basis of place of birth irrespective of parentage or 
                                                 
66
  Windeyer, above n 2, 636.  
67
  Polly Price, above n 7, 74. 
68
  Ibid 75. 
69
  Ibid 74. 
70  This rule was not altered by any British legislation until the British Nationality Act 1948 (UK) after being 
affirmed by the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914 (UK). See Geoffrey Sawer, ‘National 
Status of Aborigines in Western Australia’, Report of Select Committee on Voting Rights of Aborigines 
(Parliament House, Canberra 1961) Appendix III. For the 1948 changes, see Clive Parry, Nationality and 
Citizenship Laws of the Commonwealth and Republic of Ireland (Stevens & Sons, 1957) 92ff; cf Kim 
Rubenstein, ‘From this time forward...I pledge my loyalty to Australia: Loyalty, Citizenship and 
Constitutional Law in Australia’ in Victoria Mason and Richard Nile (eds), Loyalties (Network Books 
2007) 23.  
71
  The principle of ‘birthright’ nationality remained the law in Australia until section 10 of the 
Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (now section 12 Australian Citizenship Act 2007) was amended by 
section 4 of Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1986, with effect from 20 August 1986. Under 
the current law, birth in Australia only entitles a person to citizenship if a parent is themselves a 
citizen or permanent resident at the time of the birth or the person remains ‘ordinarily resident’ in 
Australia for ten years after their birth. See also Peter Prince, ‘We are Australian – The Constitution 
and Deportation of Australian-born Children’, Research Paper no 3, 2003-04 (Parliamentary 
Library, Canberra 2003) 10-14.    
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race. It involved that the son of a Chinese national, born in the colony of Hong Kong, was as 
much a British subject as the son of English parents, born in the United Kingdom.
72
 
Australia’s Nationality Act 1920 also adopted this common law principle in statutory form 
when it re-enacted the imperial 1914 Act as Commonwealth law. Section 6 deemed ‘any 
person born within His Majesty’s dominions and allegiance’ to be a natural-born British 
subject. Consistent with the common law, an ‘alien’ was defined under section 5 as ‘a person 
who is not a British subject’. 
This meant that any person born in the various colonies and dominions of the British Empire 
acquired the imperial nationality of ‘British subject’, sharing common ‘allegiance’ to the 
English sovereign with every other such person. As the High Court affirmed in Singh (2004): 
There is no doubt that after Calvin’s Case, at common law, subject to exceptions for children 
of foreign diplomats and children of occupying armies, any person born within the British 
Dominions (whatever the nationality of that person’s parents) was a natural-born British 
subject.
73
   
Despite the clear position under the law, this thesis argues that starting with the New South 
Wales Supreme Court under Chief Justice Forbes in the 1820s and continuing into 
Queensland until the Second World War or later, the ‘precious birthright’ of the common law 
- and hence the rule of law itself - was routinely ignored in determining whether inhabitants 
of Australia were ‘aliens’ or were entitled to ‘birthright nationality’ as natural-born subjects 
of the British Crown. 
‘Alien’ as a concept 
The principal concept in the legal notion of ‘alien’, as inherited and applied in Australia from 
British common law, is straightforward. Since Calvin’s Case the fundamental meaning of 
‘alien’ under the common law, a citizen of another state, has remained unchanged. As the 
High Court said in Nolan (1988):
 
 
As a matter of etymology, ‘alien’ from the Latin alienus through old French, means belonging 
to another person or place. Used as a descriptive word to describe a person’s lack of 
relationship with a country, the word means, as a matter of ordinary language, ‘nothing more 
than a citizen or subject of a foreign state’.74 
In relation to the broader, non-legal concept of alien, as Linda Bosniak has observed: 
                                                 
72
  Parry, Nationality and Citizenship Laws, above n 70, 151. Emphasis added.  
73
  Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 CLR 322, 389 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon JJ). Emphasis added.  
74
  Nolan v Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178, 183 (Mason C.J. 
Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey JJ), citing Milne v Huber 17 Fed. Cas. 403, 406.  
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…there is, in fact, no essential alien. Alienage is inevitably tied up with race and gender, as 
well as with sexual orientation and national origin and religion and disability, in ways that can 
heighten disadvantage or can minimize or ameliorate it.
75
 
This was true in nineteenth and early twentieth century Australia, when non-Europeans were 
categorised as ‘aliens’ whether or not they came within that term in a legal sense. Race, 
national origin, religion and perceived differences in standard of living were factors, as were 
gender and even supposed sexual practices.76 As Bosniak also observes:  
The classic example of the ameloriative case in the U.S. context is that of the lawfully present 
northern European alien, whose privileged race and national origin often figure more 
significantly than non-citizenship in his or her social experience.
77
 
This was also true of colonial and post-federation Australia, where Germans, Scandinavians 
and other settlers from northern Europe – all ‘aliens’ in a legal sense under Australian law – 
were nevertheless exempt from restrictive legislation prohibiting ‘aliens’ from a range of 
occupations and activities.78  
Despite the clarity of the common law for centuries, the broader, non-legal meaning of the 
word ‘alien’ persistently influenced the exercise of power in Australia. The concepts of 
‘otherness’, of being a ‘stranger’ and ‘foreigner’, were merged into understandings of 
‘belonging to’ another nation. The fact that the same word has different but overlapping 
general and legal meanings allowed key political and legal figures in colonial and post-
federation Australia to be less than precise in their use of the term. Indeed the ambiguous 
nature of the word made it a valuable political and legal tool in the White Australia era and in 
the pre-federation lead up to that era.79 The term was routinely used to target people seen as 
‘aliens’ in a racial not legal sense. It was particularly useful for legislators of the day because 
the ideas of ‘foreignness’ or ‘otherness’ at its heart matched the attitude of ‘White Australia’ 
towards non-European residents.80  
                                                 
75
  Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien, Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton 
University Press 2006) 134. 
76
  See, for example, Chapter Two in relation to allegations of the routine practice of sodomy amongst 
Chinese settlers.  
77
  Bosniak, above n 75, 210 n 48.  
78
  See, for example, the sections on ‘White Aliens’ in Chapter Four, ‘Desirable versus undesirable 
aliens’ in Chapter Six and exemptions under Queensland’s alien and dictation test laws in Chapter 
Seven.   
79
  Although its origins date to the resentment of white miners about ethnic Chinese on colonial 
goldfields in the 1850s, official accounts describe the White Australia policy as formally being in 
place from federation until its last vestiges were removed in 1973. 
https://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/08abolition.htm. 
80
  See Chapters Four and Six in particular. 
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Aliens and allegiance  
Allegiance to the Crown acquired by birth on British territory, and not racial, religious or 
other characteristics, distinguishes a ‘subject’ from an ‘alien’.81 As three judges said in Singh:   
…the alien ‘belonged to another’. Often that was expressed by reference to the concept of 
allegiance and often it was expressed in terms that, by their definitions, assumed that the 
world could be divided into two groups.  Either one was a British subject or one was an 
‘alien’. And those groups were defined by reference to the nature of the allegiance they 
owed.
82
 
Throughout the period considered by this thesis - and continuing until this day - an ‘alien’ in 
a legal sense is defined as a person who owes ‘allegiance’83 to some power other than the 
sovereign of Australia. As Chief Baron Macdonald of the Court of Exchequer said in 
Daubigny v Davallon (1794): 
…now the word alien is a legal term, and amounts to as much as many words; an alien must 
be alien né… It implies being born out of the liegeance of the King, and within the liegeance 
of some other state.
84
 
In Ame’s Case (2005), the High Court of Australia confirmed the common law on this issue 
has not changed in the four hundred years since Calvin’s Case and that the defining 
characteristic of an ‘alien’ remains the ‘owing of allegiance to a foreign sovereign power’.85  
There are different types of allegiance under the common law with varying rights and 
obligations. As Sir John Salmond, inaugural Professor of Law at the University of Adelaide, 
explained in 1902, ‘natural’ or ‘natural-born’ subjects owe permanent and personal 
allegiance to the sovereign. They are permanently bound by the bond of fealty and in return 
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  JW Salmond, ‘Citizenship and Allegiance’ (1902) 18 LQR 49, 51, citing Forsyth’s Cases and 
Opinions in Constitutional Law, 262. See also Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 CLR 322, 395 
(Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
82
  (2004) 222 CLR 322, 395 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ).  
83
  The concept of allegiance has its origins in feudal times. As Salmond noted, ‘allegiance’ is a 
corruption of ligeance (ligentia) derived from liege (ligius) meaning ‘absolute or unqualified’. A 
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Stepney Election Petition; Isaacson v Durant (1886) LR 17 QBD 54, 66. See Clive Parry, British 
Nationality (Stevens & Sons, 1951) 7. So ‘allegiance’ took on its modern meaning - fidelity or 
loyalty owed from a subject to the Crown. Salmond, above n 81, 51. 
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  Daubigny v Davallon (1794) 2 Anstr. 462, 468. Emphasis in original.  
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  Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, ex parte Ame; (2005) 222 
CLR 439, 458. See Peter Prince, ‘Mate!: citizens, aliens and ‘real Australians’: the High Court and 
the case of Amos Ame’, Research Brief no 4, 2005-06 (Parliamentary Library, Canberra 2005).   
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are permanently entitled to the King’s protection. This was an enduring status and applied 
even beyond the realm of England. ‘Alien subjects’, on the other hand, owed merely 
temporary and local allegiance while residing in the King’s dominions. As long as this 
residence continued, such people stood within the King’s protection and owed him 
‘correlative allegiance’. They had to obey the King’s law and submit to royal government and 
jurisdiction, but unlike natural subjects could withdraw from these obligations at any time. 
Beyond the realm of England they were not answerable to the King.86  
A critical point for this thesis is that under the common law a foreigner or ‘outsider’ living in 
the King’s territory is not a ‘natural subject’ and owes merely temporary or local allegiance, 
whereas a child of such a person born in the King’s dominions is a ‘natural-born subject’87 
and cannot be classified as an ‘alien’ legally. In Calvin’s Case Sir Edward Coke set out the 
classic common law rule regarding ‘natural-born subjects’: 
There be regularly…three incidents to a subject born. 1. That the parents be under the actual 
obedience of the King. 2. That the place of his birth be within the King’s dominion. And, 3. 
The time of his birth is chiefly to be considered; for he cannot be a subject born of one 
kingdom that was born under the ligeance of a King of another kingdom.88 
As Coke’s statement indicates, temporary or local allegiance (‘actual obedience’) on the part 
of the parent(s) was sufficient to confer the status of ‘natural-born subject’ on locally-born 
children. As the United States Supreme Court said in 1830:  
Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children even of aliens 
born in a country, while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government, 
and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth.
89
 
In 1898 the US Supreme Court again applied the principle from Calvin’s Case when it 
declared that ethnic Chinese born to alien parents in the United States were citizens at birth: 
Every citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and 
the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction, of the United States. His 
allegiance to the United States is direct and immediate, and, although but local and temporary, 
continuing only so long as he remains within our territory, is yet, in the words of Lord Coke, 
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  Salmond, above n 81, 50.  
87
  As Salmond noted, ‘To this day English law has derogated in no way from the feudal principle that 
a man of alien parentage born in England is a British subject’. Ibid, 53 n 1. However, locally born 
children of those not subject to the sovereign’s jurisdiction, such as diplomats or a member of an 
invading army, would not qualify as natural born subjects under this principle. 
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  7 Co. Rep 1a, 18a, 18b; 77 ER 377, 399. Cited by the High Court in Nolan (1988) 165 CLR 178, 
189 (Gaudron J); Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391, 429 (McHugh J) and 482 n 320 (Kirby J); and Te 
and Dang (2002) 193 ALR 37, 49 (Gaudron J), 62-63 (Gummow J).  
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  Inglis v Sailor’s Snug Harbour (1830) 28 US 99, 164.  
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in Calvin’s Case ‘strong enough to make a natural subject, for if he hath issue here, that issue 
is a natural-born subject’.90 
Birth within the dominions of the Crown was by far the most important way in which a 
person became a British subject. As Salmond noted in 1902, factors such as race or ‘blood’ 
were irrelevant and place of birth was all that mattered:  
He may be by blood a Frenchman or a Chinaman, but if he first saw the light on British soil 
he is a British subject. Conversely if he is born beyond the boundaries of the empire, he is 
judged an alien, though he may be an Englishman by blood and parentage.91 
While there were some exceptions to this absolute rule,92 as Parry observed in British 
Nationality (1951): 
…before 194993 a person born in British territory was prima facie, and in all but a very 
limited number of cases, a British subject at and from his birth, and a person born out of 
British territory was prima facie, and save in a limited number of cases, not a British subject 
at and from his birth.94 
A person’s place of birth created permanent and indelible loyalty or allegiance to the 
sovereign of the land. Under the common law, individuals could not revoke their allegiance 
and take up another nationality of their own accord.95 This created an underlying tension with 
the other main method of becoming a ‘subject’, namely ‘naturalisation’.96   
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  United States v Wong Kim Ark 169 US 649, 693 (1898). The common law rule from Calvin’s Case 
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Aliens and naturalisation 
The strict notion of allegiance as ‘absolute or unqualified’ affected the perception and legal 
treatment in Australia of ‘naturalised’ subjects (those who had formerly owed allegiance to 
another country). According to Salmond, naturalisation was ‘an agreement by which an alien 
is received into the permanent allegiance of the Crown’.97 While colonial parliaments could 
naturalise foreigners, the effect was limited to that territory.98 Consequently, as Salmond 
noted in 1902: 
A man may be a British subject in one part of the empire, and an alien in another part.  In 
New Zealand he may be an Englishman, and in England a Frenchman. In Victoria he may 
                                                                                                                                                        
history of naturalising foreigners, Britain had refused to accept that its own subjects could become 
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owe permanent allegiance to the British Crown, and on crossing the border into New South 
Wales he may find himself an alien.
99 
  
In other words, any person naturalised under the laws of an Australian colony became a 
‘British subject’ but only within that particular colony. This position changed with federation. 
In the Naturalization Act 1903 (Cth), the new Commonwealth Parliament granted subject 
status across the federation as a whole to any person naturalised under the law of a former 
Australian colony.
100
  
An enduring theme in law and popular perception is that ‘naturalised’ subjects are not the 
equal of their ‘natural-born’ counterparts. Historically, ‘naturalised’ subjects lacked the full 
rights and privileges of ‘natural subjects’. In the United Kingdom they could not be granted 
Crown land or become a Privy Councillor or Member of Parliament, and their children born 
overseas were not considered British nationals. While the Naturalisation Act 1870 removed 
most of these restrictions for the United Kingdom,101 the various British Dominions, 
including the Australian colonies, continued to discriminate between different classes of 
British subjects.102 Underlying this difference in perception and legal treatment was the view 
that naturalised subjects lacked the degree of loyalty or allegiance inherently acquired by 
those born within the territory of the sovereign. This had a particular effect on the legal 
position of non-European settlers in Australia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Not 
only were they seen as ‘aliens’ in the common or racial meaning of the word, but the process 
of naturalisation was considered insufficient to give them allegiance to Australia and the 
                                                 
99
  Salmond above n 81, 58.  
100
  As well as to any person naturalised under a law of an Australian State between 1901 and the 
commencement of the 1903 Act on 1 January 1904. Section 4 of the 1903 Act stated that ‘A person 
who has before the passing of this Act obtained in a State or in a colony which has become a State a 
certificate of naturalization or letters of naturalization shall be deemed to be naturalized’. Once this 
federal act came into force, naturalisation of ‘aliens’ could occur only under Commonwealth and 
not State law. A limited form of common naturalisation had been introduced shortly before 
federation. At the insistence of Victoria and Queensland, the Federal Council of Australasia enacted 
the Australasian Naturalisation Act 1897 which provided for granting of certificates to naturalised 
persons of European descent, which meant that if they moved to another Australasian colony which 
was a member of the Council and complied with any residency conditions applying there, they were 
deemed to be naturalised in that other colony. Parry, Nationality and Citizenship Laws, above n 70, 
528. The effect of this legislation was reduced, however, since the largest Australasian colony, New 
South Wales, as well as New Zealand, were never members of the Federal Council.  
101
  Naturalization Act 1870 s 7. 
102
  For example, section 12 of Queensland’s Aliens Act 1867 stipulated that naturalised ‘Asiatics and 
Africans’ ‘shall not be capable of becoming a member of the Executive or Legislative Council or 
Legislative Assembly’. This provision was not repealed until the enactment of the Aliens Act 1965 
(Qld).   
20 
 
British Empire, justifying their continued treatment as ‘aliens’ even if they had formally 
become ‘subjects’ of the Crown.103  
In turn this led to a curious paradox in relation to naturalisation in colonial and post-
federation Australia. On the one hand many Anglo-Celtic lawmakers believed that non-
European settlers (especially Chinese migrants) - regarded as ‘alien’ because of their different 
culture and ethnic background - could only become British subjects and legal members of the 
community through the formal process of naturalisation. There was a refusal to accept that 
people who were so ‘alien’ in the perception of white Australian society might already be 
‘non-aliens’ under British law by virtue of their birth in a British colony or dominion.  
On the other hand, white colonists feared naturalisation as a mechanism by which non-
Europeans could infiltrate British society and undermine the racial purity and way of life of 
the white community. Around the time of federation, for example, the government of South 
Australia decided it would not ‘grant any more letters of naturalization to Asiatic aliens’ 
unless formally requested to do so by the House of Assembly.104 During a parliamentary 
debate in 1903, one member opposed the naturalisation of a Palestinian man who had run a 
successful hawker’s business in South Australia for the last fourteen years because:  
Asiatic peddlers in the country districts were not only a pest, but in some cases were almost a 
source of danger to lives…Where were they to draw the line if they naturalized men like that? 
Asiatics swarmed around the country like ants, to the great disadvantage of white 
storekeepers, who could not possibly compete with them…it would encourage other Asiatics 
to swarm over the country. He was not one of those who said “Australia for the Australians”, 
but he believed in Australia for white men. It was on those lines he opposed the 
naturalization.
105
  
Anxiety that naturalisation enabled those seen as less than human (‘pests’,‘ants’) to infiltrate 
or ‘swarm’ across Australia, together with a refusal to accept a legal process converting 
‘alien’ non-Europeans into loyal British subjects, is an example of how race was more 
important than the rule of law in colonial and post-federation Australia.  
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Australians as British subjects 
As late as 1947 Wade and Phillips contended that the whole of the British Commonwealth 
and Empire was ‘united by the one tie of allegiance to the Crown, and all its nationals enjoy 
the status of British subjects, wherever they may be, by reason of their common 
nationality’.106 As Justice Higgins said in Potter v Minahan (1908): 
All the King’s subjects are members of one great society, bound by the one tie of allegiance 
to the one Sovereign, even as children hanging on to the ropes of a New Zealand swing. The 
top of the pole is the point of the union: Calvin’s Case.107  
At least until the creation of Australian citizenship by legislation in 1949, the nationality of 
Australians in a constitutional or formal legal sense was solely that of ‘British subject’. As 
the High Court said in Attorney-General for the Commonwealth v Ah Sheung (1907), ‘we are 
not disposed to give any countenance to the novel idea that there is an Australian nationality 
as distinguished from a British nationality…’.108 Similarly, Justice Higgins in Potter v 
Minahan rejected the idea that there was ‘an Australian species of British nationality’, stating 
emphatically that: 
I cannot find any foundation for these contentions. Throughout the British Empire there is one 
King, one allegiance, one citizenship. I use this last word, not in the Roman or in the 
American sense, but only because there is no suitable abstract noun corresponding to the word 
‘subject’ (natural-born or naturalized).109  
Helen Irving notes that as the Australian colonies moved towards federation, there was much 
discussion of ‘citizenship’: 
In the 1890s, the word ‘citizen’ appears again and again, in speeches, in the press, in the rules 
and charters of organisations, and in debates about political entitlement. We find the rhetoric 
of citizenship attached in particular to the federation movement.
110
 
Although Australians used the term ‘citizen’, the only legal category of membership under 
imperial law at this time was ‘British subject’. As Irving says, ‘the citizens were, minimally, 
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British subjects, either by birth or naturalisation’.111 In terms of practical (as against legal) 
membership, Irving notes ‘being a British subject was not enough: “coloured” subjects from 
Hong Kong or India, for example, had difficulty being considered “citizens” in Australia’.112 
Importantly, as Justice Higgins indicated in Potter v Minahan, the legal identity of 
Australians as British subjects was shared with inhabitants of other British possessions. Any 
natural-born or naturalised inhabitant of the various British colonies and dominions across the 
world - whatever their racial background and whether they were in Africa, Asia, the Pacific 
Islands or Australasia - shared the imperial nationality of ‘British subject’, with a common 
allegiance to the King of England. In other words, all those living in Australia born as 
subjects in the United Kingdom or a British imperial possession or naturalised in an 
Australian colony were ‘British subjects’ and could not - by definition and at least until 
26 January 1949
113
 - be legally treated as ‘aliens’ in the various Australian jurisdictions.114 As 
Justice McHugh explained in Re Patterson (2001), ‘prior to the completion of the 
evolutionary process that made the United Kingdom a foreign power, the Parliament could 
not have asserted that British subjects, living in Australia, were aliens’.115  
It followed that while there were many other factors which in practice determined if a person 
became a member of the Australian community, the only formal legal test until after World 
War Two was whether a person was a ‘subject’ or an ‘alien’. If a person was a British 
subject, he or she could not, under the law applying in Australia, be an ‘alien’.  
This distinction was, however, routinely ignored by key figures in colonial and post-
federation Australia who described and treated non-European settlers as ‘aliens’ even if they 
were legally British subjects, undermining the very rule of law upon which the society was 
founded.  
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Aliens and racial discrimination  
‘…as long as human societies have assumed and perpetuated the idea that there are 
distinct races across the world, much misery has resulted. Today we understand there 
are no distinctions to be made among peoples on the basis of race. We are a human 
race. While we do not share a uniform culture, language, religion and ethnicity, we do 
share one characteristic: we are members of a single race’.116 
Australia played a prominent role in global racial discrimination in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. After Japan’s proposal for ‘racial equality’ to be included in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations was defeated at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference,117 the 
British Foreign Office warned of the danger for world order, observing that the issue: 
…primarily concerns the following countries: Japan, China, British India, United States of 
America…Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa. The first three countries demand 
the right of free immigration and freedom from discrimination disabilities for their nationals 
in the territories of the last five countries. The question can be regarded from an economic or 
from a political point of view, but in essence it is a racial one.
118
 
Coinciding with the unprecedented immigration of the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the emergence of ‘Social Darwinism’ allowed lawmakers in ‘white men’s countries’ such as 
Australia to rationalise racial discrimination against non-whites.119 As Lauren argues, 
‘Europeans eagerly seized upon this biological conception of survival of the fittest and used it 
to advance further the idea of a struggle for existence among the races of mankind’.120 
Arguments of racial struggle based on Darwinian concepts justified (and were reinforced by) 
European imperial conquests in Africa, Asia and the Pacific.121 Key political figures in 
Australia were strongly influenced by social Darwinists including E.A. Freeman, the ‘pre-
eminent English historian of race’.122 As Lake and Reynolds observe, Freeman preached that 
‘history was the story of Anglo-Saxon triumph’. They note that his ‘extravagant Saxonism’: 
…presented in numerous public lectures and books, had a major impact on historical thinkers 
and political leaders of the late nineteenth century, especially in the young countries of the 
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United States and Australia, where English-speaking peoples were keen to identify with their 
long ‘race history’.123 
The word ‘alien’ was a significant part of the discriminatory terminology used to describe 
non-white inhabitants in nineteenth and twentieth century Australia. As John Docker has 
observed, wherever European colonists went in the world and despite the little time they may 
have been in a new place, they were not: 
…aliens or outsiders from distant continents but the immediate rightful settlers at home in 
this their new home with the confidence to do immediate injury to those already there or not 
from Europe or not from the right part of Europe: people who [could] be immediately 
designated by the new settlers as aliens or outsiders or not belonging.124 
Promulgated by colonial leaders in Australia as an appropriate description of Chinese, Indian, 
Pacific islander and other non-white settlers, the term ‘alien’ became justification in itself for 
discrimination. Non-Europeans were ‘alien’ or different in the eyes of the Anglo-Celtic 
community, so they could also be treated differently. In this way ‘alien’ was an important 
language or discourse tool used to reinforce the dominance of the white community. As Bloor 
and Bloor state: 
We do not claim…that discourse is the only factor – or even the main factor – in the 
establishment or maintenance of dominant groups. For that we might look to wealth, class, 
political control, military strength, and so on, but there is no doubt that dominance is practised 
and reproduced through language.
125 
In discussing the language of colonial government in Australia, Bruce Buchan emphasises 
‘the ways in which the conceptual language spoken by the colonists framed their 
understanding of the policies and techniques of government they adopted’.126 According to 
Buchan:  
…when colonists used terms drawn from the traditions of Western political thought, such as 
‘government’, ‘property’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘society’, ‘savagery’ or ‘civilization’, they did not 
use them simply as descriptions. Rather, these terms formed part of a wider discourse in 
which moral and political claims about themselves and others were advanced.
127
 
This thesis demonstrates that in colonial and post-federation Australia the term ‘alien’ was 
also part of a ‘wider discourse’ in which not only moral and political but also legal claims 
about Anglo-Celtic colonists and others were advanced. Portrayal of non-Anglo-Celtic 
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‘others’ as ‘aliens’ in a racial sense influenced the policies and techniques of government in 
Australia before and after federation. This included incorrectly treating all non-Europeans as 
‘aliens’ in legislation, prosecutions and other legal contexts - despite the inconsistency of 
such an approach with the concept of ‘alienage’ under the rule of law.  
Notwithstanding their different beginnings, the Australian colonies developed a common 
discriminatory discourse in relation to the word ‘alien’. This was shown most clearly at the 
1890s constitutional conventions where representatives from the various Australasian 
colonies uniformly employed the phrases ‘alien races’ and ‘coloured aliens’ to describe 
people of non-European origin.    
The ambiguity of the word ‘alien’ made it especially valuable for discrimination in law. This 
was particularly the case in Queensland after federation. Contrary to current understanding,128 
there remained a justified fear in Queensland until well after World War One that royal assent 
would be withheld for legislation contravening the imperial policy against open 
discrimination.129 The following dilemma confronted imperial authorities towards the end of 
the nineteenth century: 
[Racist] sentiments from self-governing territories found much sympathy in the corridors of 
power in London but also proved to be a source of public embarrassment, especially when the 
statements involved people from within the empire itself. Any open discrimination would 
belie the stated Imperial philosophy of the equality of all British subjects, provoke liberal 
opposition at home, and cause great indignation in areas like India.
130 
As Quick and Garran documented, in 1896 the Australian colonies intended to extend 
restrictive legislation aimed at Chinese immigrants to all ‘coloured races’ because of 
‘increasing immigration of Indians, Afghans, and other Asiatics, many of whom were British 
subjects’. Laws to this effect passed by New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania did 
not receive royal assent.131 In 1899 legislation passed by the Canadian province of British 
Columbia preventing Japanese working in coal mines met a similar fate.132 In 1903 Joseph 
Chamberlain, Secretary for the Colonies, expressed Britain’s strong objection to the new 
Commonwealth Government’s Post and Telegraph Act 1901, which permitted only white 
labour to be used in any official mail contract.133 While royal assent was not withheld, 
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enactment of this legislation led to termination by the British of joint arrangements with 
Australia for the carriage of mail. In a blunt dispatch admonishing the new federal parliament 
for passing the statute, Chamberlain set out the history of the imperial commitment to non-
discrimination in legislation.134 This public castigation135 of Australia’s parliament by a 
senior imperial statesman emphasises the strength of the British objection to explicit racial 
discrimination. However this is not to suggest the British Government opposed racial 
discrimination in practice. Britain’s concern was for its international relations (and relations 
within its empire) rather than an absolute commitment to non-discrimination on the grounds 
of race. But to avoid antagonising Britain’s Indian subjects and to protect its developing 
relationship with Japan, imperial authorities intervened - where they thought it was in their 
interests to do so - to prevent openly prejudicial laws put forward by colonial and dominion 
parliaments from being enacted.  
As discussed further in Chapter Six, in conjunction with the education or ‘dictation’ test 
borrowed from the new Commonwealth, the term ‘alien’ was an important linguistic 
mechanism used in Queensland legislation until well after federation to avoid imperial 
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rejection of discriminatory laws. This racially neutral legal term was used for discriminatory 
purposes despite the inconsistency with its meaning under the ‘British’ common law. 
Aliens as threat  
Various groups of inhabitants were classed as ‘aliens’ in Australia if they were ‘different 
from’ the Anglo-Celtic colonisers and especially if they were seen as any form of threat. 
When key figures in colonial and post-federation Australia referred to ‘aliens’ they invariably 
raised the menace such people posed to the security, health, labour or living standards of the 
Anglo-Celtic population. Indeed, it seemed almost a pre-requisite for particular groups of 
‘outsiders’ to be regarded as a danger before they were categorized as ‘aliens’.  
In the early decades of European settlement aboriginal people were seen as a threat and 
labelled as ‘aliens’ by prominent colonial figures. According to Peter Bayne: 
Many settlers in violent contact (or, as was often said, at war) with the Aborigines held the 
view that the Aborigines were not to be regarded as British subjects. Sometimes they were 
regarded as ‘enemy aliens’ to justify the use of force against them. Some senior officials, such 
as the explorer Thomas Mitchell, certainly took this view and acted upon it.
136
 
In 1836 Mitchell, then Surveyor-General of New South Wales, conducted an expedition in 
which a large number of Aborigines were killed. Bayne states that Mitchell’s report ‘caused 
consternation at the Colonial Office…due to the fact that Mitchell regarded the Aborigines as 
“Aliens with whom war can exist, and against whom HM’s Troops may exercise belligerent 
right”.137  
However the main groups regarded and targeted as ‘aliens’ in colonial and post-federation 
Australia were the non-European settlers who arrived from the 1850s onwards. In 1919 the 
Queensland Court of Industrial Arbitration held three days of hearings in Cairns to consider 
an application from the Australian Workers Union (AWU) for the exclusion of ‘coloured 
aliens’ from the sugar industry. When the Southern District Secretary of the AWU, Frederick 
William Martyn, was asked by Justice McCawley who the union meant by ‘aliens’, he replied 
‘Chinese, Japanese, Afghans, etc., and issue of mixed parentage, excepting American 
negroes. That is our rule’.138 When the judge queried whether that amounted to ‘preference 
for American negroes’, Mr Martyn said it did not because ‘they are not a menace’.139 In other 
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words, unlike workers of Asian origin, the number of ‘American negroes’ in the Queensland 
sugar industry was insufficient to threaten the employment or labour conditions of white 
workers. Therefore, black Americans were not categorised by the AWU as ‘aliens’ who 
should be excluded from the industry. 
The importance of a perceived threat to white living standards in the categorisation of non-
Europeans as ‘aliens’ was shown in a 1913 proposal from a Queensland parliamentarian that 
‘coloured aliens’ could remain in the sugar industry if they received equal pay. As the 
Morning Bulletin reported: 
Then came a suggestion for a solution of the difficulty from the Labour benches. It was to the 
effect that if the Government decreed that the coloured aliens were to receive equal pay to the 
whites no objection could be raised to their remaining in the country! Fancy such a proposal 
coming from the party which a short time before had been accusing Government supporters 
of ‘loving’ the coloured races. It seems after all that it was not the coloured aliens but the 
rates of pay which they desired to see dealt with.140 
A report in Brisbane’s Courier Mail from the 1948 Empire Parliamentary Conference 
demonstrated the enduring perception of ‘coloured aliens’ as a threat to the living standard of 
white workers in Australia:  
The ‘White Australia’ policy…was embodied in one of the first Acts of Federal Parliament in 
1901…It arose from economic conditions following the entrance of aliens, particularly 
Asiatics, to Australia in the previous century…The problem of foreign labour became acute in 
the Victorian gold-rush days of the 1850s. It was then claimed that Australian living standards 
were being lowered by Chinese. Queensland later in the 19th century had two experiences — 
an influx of Chinese to northern gold fields, and introduction of Kanaka labour from the 
Solomons to the sugar fields.
141
 
According to the newspaper, Queensland Premier Edward Hanlon ‘played a leading part in 
discussions on British Commonwealth racial problems’ at the 1948 Conference, emphasising 
‘how black labour in the sugar industry resulted in Australians walking the streets 
unemployed, and a Chinese ‘invasion’ had similar dire economic effects’.142 
There was a deep-set belief on the part of the white community in Australia that ‘coloured 
aliens’ not only undermined working conditions and living standards but also threatened the 
health of white society. An editorial in the Worker following a bubonic plague outbreak in 
1900 brought these elements together:   
The advent of the plague…forces to the front again the burning question of alien and coloured 
immigration. The debasing influence of coloured servile aliens must now become a large part 
of the important question of sanitation and health. Asiatics and kanakas are of a different 
civilisation to ours, we cannot blend with them, unless at the cost of degrading our race to their 
                                                 
140
  ‘The White Australia Principle’, Morning Bulletin (Rockhampton), 7 July 1913, 6. 
141
  ‘First Parlt. set policy’, The Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 21 October 1948, 1.  
142
  ‘Hanlon in “Black v White” debate.’, The Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 21 October 1948, 1.  
29 
 
bestial level. They are noted for their filthy and unclean habits, being satisfied to live in a much 
lower hygienic plane than the lowest members of our civilisation, and their peculiar 
susceptibility to dirt diseases makes their presence now a danger of greater gravity than ever… 
We may, with success, enforce cleanliness on our own people, but the task of enforcing it on 
coloured aliens is impossible, and especially in a country like Australia. We cannot have Health 
Boards and Health Inspectors on every sugar plantation or farm to look after the coloured 
aliens and their ways…143  
The Worker warned that if bubonic plague broke out ‘amongst the aborigines, Kanakas, 
Chinese, Japs, and Hindoos…we may well cry, “May the Lord have mercy on us” for our 
neglect of nature’s laws, for the plagues of Asia will have none’.144 
More fundamentally, the very presence of ‘coloured aliens’ threatened the existence of 
‘White Australia’. For the Anglo-Celtic establishment, the prospect of a blending of white 
and coloured races, or ‘miscegenation’, caused particular anxiety. An 1896 editorial in a 
Western Australian newspaper entitled ‘The Alien Danger’ declared: 
By admitting the colored alien now we are tying our hands, or at least storing up much future 
trouble…The blending of the European and Asiatic is not desirable, and with ‘free’ colored 
labor that is bound to occur…the Chinese are not desirable citizens, and we in these colonies do 
not desire to raise up a race of almond eyed, whitey-brown people, with few good 
characteristics, but possessing the concentrated vices of the Occident and Orient.
145
 
In 1901 Alfred Deakin, first Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, urged the 
passage of legislation enabling deportation of Pacific islanders because their continued 
presence, in his view, would irreparably: 
…impair the principle of a ‘White Australia’. If these people were allowed to settle 
permanently without any restriction of any kind as to their occupation or supervision, they 
might become a source of real danger. The marked disparity between the number of men and 
women suggests that alliances with persons of other races…will be continued and multiplied to 
the danger of that purity of race, the preservation of which is one of the objects of the 
legislation.
146
  
Similarly, in 1902 John Watson, leader of the Federal Labor Party, warned in an article titled 
‘A White or Piebald Australia’ that: 
In the Northern Territory of South Australia…we find the Chinese largely outnumber the white 
population; and in Queensland…(t)aking adults, the proportion is 1 alien to 11.3 whites; but, 
more significant still, if adult males only are taken into account, the proportion is 1 alien to 6.6 
whites. Who will say it is not a menace that already every seventh man in Queensland is a 
coloured alien?
147 
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Reporting Mr Watson’s remarks, a Sydney paper declared ‘Our white hearts recoil from 
miscegenation, and our common sense teaches us that amalgamation means degradation’.148 
As the West Australian declared in 1913: 
While the deep-seated repugnance to miscegenation persists among the white peoples, the 
coloured alien must always be refused freedom of entry. The growth in a country of an alien 
element virile and capable, but which could not be absorbed, would create an impossible 
situation.
149
 
As McGregor notes, there was also fear of interbreeding between ‘alien coloured races’ and 
indigenous Australians.150 
Contrary to the rule of law, protection against and if possible removal of the perceived 
menace posed by ‘coloured aliens’ was more important than respect for the legal status of 
non-European British subjects who were not aliens under the law applying in Australia. 
Existing literature 
Historical and legal commentators on colonial and post-federation Australia have not 
identified that a society that supposedly revered the ‘rule of law’ ignored the law in labelling 
non-European settlers and even indigenous Australians as ‘aliens’. Henry Reynolds observes 
that frontier violence against Australia’s aboriginal population involved scant respect for the 
rule of law:  
How did so many people who were nominally British subjects end up dead without having been 
arrested, charged, tried or sentenced and the circumstances of their death presented to a 
coroner?...How had it happened in colonies that venerated the rule of law, where members of 
the legal profession wrapped themselves in the robes and mystique of the common law? So 
much about the frontier conflict was against both the spirit and the letter of the law, and not the 
law now but the law then.151 
The same was true in relation to who was regarded as ‘belonging’ in colonial and post-
federation Australia. When categorising inhabitants as ‘aliens’, ‘foreigners’ or ‘outsiders’, the 
British colonisers paid little attention to the common law. The widespread and enduring 
misuse of the term ‘alien’ in Australia played a significant role in determining which groups 
of people were allowed to fully participate in national life. It follows that a failure to identify 
and discuss the misuse and manipulation of this term is an important omission from the legal 
and racial history of Australia. This thesis aims to fill that gap. 
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One of the most notable examples is John Quick and Robert Garran’s Annotated Constitution 
of the Australian Commonwealth published in 1901. According to Emeritus Professor of Law 
Leslie Zines from the Australian National University, this was ‘a most remarkable work of 
over 1,000 closely printed pages…it is a classic study, invariably called simply ‘Quick and 
Garran’, and referred to as an authority by counsel and judges to this day’.152 Its respected 
status meant this work had the capacity to influence government and legal decisions. Had 
Quick and Garran noted the misuse of ‘alien’ in the colonial era and used the word correctly, 
further misapplication of the term might have been prevented or at least reduced. Like many 
delegates at the 1890s constitutional conventions, however, Quick employed the word ‘alien’ 
with its racial not legal meaning, incorrectly suggesting that ‘coloured races’ and ‘aliens’ 
were interchangeable terms.153 As discussed in Chapter Three, Quick and Garran made a 
similar mistake in their 1901 work when explaining the ‘aliens’, ‘races’ and ‘immigration’ 
powers in the new Constitution.  
Myra Willard’s History of the White Australia Policy to 1920 - described as the ‘standard 
work’ on the subject154 - retains iconic status in the history of race relations in Australia. 
Phillip Griffith says this was ‘the pioneering history, regarded as sufficiently authoritative 
that there was no new book-length account for over half a century’.155 However this book 
also perpetuates the view that all non-European settlers were ‘aliens’ whose presence 
threatened Australia’s living standards and fledgling democracy. There is no reference in 
Willard’s book to the legal meaning of ‘alien’. According to Willard, all ‘Asiatics’ were 
‘aliens’ and remained so after settling in Australia: 
To preserve the unity of their national life, a people can admit emigrants from alien races only 
if within a reasonable time they show a willingness and a capacity to amalgamate ideally as 
well as racially with them…The Chinese in Australia, for instance, tended to congregate into 
communities of their own, living their own life uninfluenced by the ideas and customs of the 
people amongst whom they had settled. In other words, they remained aliens…It seemed to 
Australians that the reason why immigrant Asiatics, especially the Chinese, remained aliens in 
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ideas and habits, was to be found in the antiquity of Eastern civilisation and its dissimilarity to 
the Western.
156
 
Willard does not identify that any non-European inhabitant with British subject status was 
necessarily not an ‘alien’ under the law. While she recognised that settlers from the Indian 
sub-continent were subjects,157 she did not identify that other non-Europeans might also have 
this status. She wrote that ‘the great majority of Chinese immigrants came from the British 
Crown Colonies of Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements’,158 but did not appreciate or 
acknowledge that settlers born in those colonies were British subjects. Instead she said the 
Chinese were ‘a people who seemed to remain permanently alien, and one therefore that 
could not share in aspirations that were beginning to assume a distinctly Australian 
character’.159 Despite her acceptance that at least some Asian settlers were subjects, she 
adopted the discourse that non-Europeans were a ‘resident alien people’ posing a threat to 
Australian society and government:  
A considerable number of alien non-European people in Australia would injuriously affect 
Australian industrial life…their very commercial and industrial virtues made them dangerous 
competitors for Australians, because their standard of living was much lower…Political 
inclusion of alien peoples like those from Asia would, under a representative system of 
Government, destroy that unanimity on national matters which is essential to the general 
welfare of a community, and if their numbers became large, it would be the deliberate giving 
away of the Australian political birthright.
 160
 
Like Willard, G.A. Oddie in The Chinese in Victoria 1870-1890 (1959) said that while 
Chinese settlers were often forced to conform to white European society, they remained 
‘thoroughly alien in their attitudes, habits and beliefs’.161 Ian Welch titled his PhD thesis 
Alien Son: The Life and Times of Cheok Hong Cheong, 1851-1928, but did not examine 
whether the subject of his thesis was an ‘alien’ under Australian law. Welch did not critique 
the portrayal of Chinese settlers as ‘aliens’. As he said, ‘the Colony of Victoria had a 
European identity against which the Chinese were seen to cast an alien shadow’.162 Even 
landmark works in Australian legal history assumed Chinese and other non-European 
inhabitants were ‘aliens’. In The Making of the Australian Constitution (1972) – praised for 
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‘its meticulous attention to a large body of evidence on the Federal deliberations, its 
comprehensive grasp of a long and complex process, its lucid analysis and its precision of 
exposition’163 -  prominent historian J.A. La Nauze said colonial legislation discriminated 
‘against Chinese and other coloured aliens resident in Australia’.164  
In 1974 Charles Price published The Great White Walls are Built, Restrictive Immigration to 
North America and Australasia 1836-1888, the next major history of ‘White Australia’ 
following Willard’s 1923 work. Price referred to the British subject status of many Chinese 
settlers, stating that ‘by 1888 it seemed clear that many Chinese immigrants had been either 
born or naturalised in British territories such as Hongkong and Singapore and therefore 
possessed British citizenship’.165 However, the proper description for legal membership under 
British law was ‘subject’ not ‘citizen’ and it is not accurate to state that naturalisation in 
another British colony conferred subject status in Australia. Nonetheless, as Price 
acknowledged, many Chinese did have full legal membership as British subjects either 
through birth in British territory or by naturalisation in an Australian colony. But Price did 
not question the use by prominent colonial figures of the term ‘alien’ as an accurate 
description for all Chinese residents in Australia. Both Price and Oddie note Victorian 
Premier Gillies’ statement to the Imperial Parliament in 1887 that the Chinese in Australia 
were ‘not only an alien race, but remain aliens’.166 Based on such remarks, Price makes the 
important observation that ‘the colonies eventually decided that racial homogeneity and 
national unity were more important than British citizenship [sic], and that Chinese remained 
eternally Chinese no matter what their citizenship was’.167 However neither Price nor Oddie 
indicate any appreciation of the legal meaning of ‘alien’, let alone the routine misuse of this 
term in Australia.168 Hence neither recognises that such statements by Gillies (and similar 
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claims by Henry Parkes and other prominent colonial figures)169 were - in relation to many 
Chinese inhabitants - contrary to the law applying in Australia.   
Evans, Saunders and Cronin’s Race Relations in Colonial Queensland (1975), described as a 
‘pioneering classic in the study of Australian race relations’,170 falls into the same discourse. 
Throughout this book the authors wrongly use the terms ‘alien’ and ‘coloured alien’ to refer 
to all non-indigenous coloured people in Australia, despite this being incorrect as a matter of 
law.171 They note claims that Pacific islanders were British subjects, but refer to them as 
‘alien, servile workers who could provide regulated, cheap and tractable labour’.172 In 
particular they use ‘Chinese’ and ‘alien’ as interchangeable terms. For example, they refer to 
calls from the anti-Chinese league in the lead-up to the 1888 Queensland elections that ‘only 
those candidates who guaranteed to legislate against the aliens should be supported’ and the 
consequent ‘rush amongst political aspirants…to find “all constitutional means and others if 
necessary to keep Chinese out of Queensland”’.173 They observe that: 
Acts of larrikinism against coloured aliens increased sharply, and on the 11th May a full scale 
riot occurred in the centre of Brisbane. A crowd estimated at 1,000 rampaged through the 
Chinese quarters smashing the windows of their shops and terrorizing individual aliens they 
caught in the streets.
174
 
An appreciation that a significant proportion of Chinese settlers were not ‘aliens’ but British 
subjects is an important contribution of this thesis,175 not identified in Evans, Saunders and 
Cronin’s discussion of key events in Queensland’s colonial history. This includes their 
account of restrictions imposed on ‘Asiatic or African aliens’ in the 1870s176 and the failure 
of the court system to protect Chinese residents under British law.177 
In Race Relations in Australia (1982), A.T. Yarwood and M.J. Knowling comment that: 
Also of national significance was the refusal of Royal Assent to Queensland’s 1876 Goldfields 
Bill, which imposed a discriminatory licence fee on resident Asiatic and African aliens. Refusal 
                                                 
169
  See Chapter 2. 
170
  R L Evans, K E Saunders, K Cronin, Race Relations in Colonial Queensland (University of 
Queensland Press, 3rd ed, 1993) end paper, citing Ann McGrath, Australian Journal of Politics and 
History.  
171
  For example, see ibid 258, 259, 262-266, 269.   
172
  Ibid 150. Emphasis added.  
173
  Ibid 315. Emphasis added. 
174
  Ibid 315. Emphasis added.  
175
  See Chapter Two. 
176
  Evans, Saunders and Cronin, above n 170, 268-269.  
177
  Ibid 276.  
35 
 
was related to possible breaches of the Convention of Peking and the absence of exemption for 
British subjects of Chinese race.
178
 
Yarwood and Knowling do not analyse the use of the phrase ‘Asiatic and African aliens’ in 
this Queensland legislation. Consequently they do not make the point that ‘British subjects of 
Chinese race’ would not have required an exemption had the term ‘alien’ been applied with 
its proper legal meaning.  
Similarly, in Topsawyers: the Chinese in Cairns 1870 to 1920 (1984), Cathie May notes that 
in 1912 the ‘Leases to Aliens Restriction Act prohibited Chinese from leasing more than five 
acres of land each’.179 While the policy intention behind this Act was indeed to exclude 
Chinese settlers from agriculture in Queensland,180 the law itself imposed restrictions merely 
on ‘aliens’, with no reference to race or ethnic origin.181 Hence the key point that such 
restrictions were unlawfully imposed on Chinese residents with British subject status is not 
identified by May.182 In the same way, Barry York in his article ‘The Chinese in Australia: 
exclusions and admissions, 1901-1957’ highlights the purpose of the dictation test provision 
in the Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act 1901, ‘namely: to keep out alien races, 
especially Asian peoples, in keeping with the efforts of the former Australian colonies’.183 
Writing in 1993, York uses the same discourse of ‘alien race’ employed by many key figures 
in colonial and post-federation Australia without noting that under British and Australian law 
the legal status of ‘alien’ was not governed by race.  
An important recent addition to the racial history of Australia, discussed in Chapter 2, is 
Kevin Wong Hoy’s Becoming British Subjects 1879-1903: Chinese in North Queensland 
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(2006).184 Hoy identifies the use of ‘alien’ to denigrate Chinese Australians.185 More 
significantly, however, the word ‘alien’ was used by key political and legal figures not only 
to denigrate but also discriminate against Chinese and other non-European inhabitants, 
despite their awareness that many such people were British subjects and not ‘aliens’ under the 
common law. Hoy suggests Chinese settlers had to be naturalised or born in one of the 
Australian colonies to have British subject status in Australia,186 stating that ‘a subject from 
one part of the Empire was not necessarily recognised as such in another’.187 However under 
the common law natural-born British subjects retained this status wherever they went in the 
Empire. Hoy notes that only 110 Chinese settlers were naturalised in Queensland between 
1876 and 1903,188 observing that ‘naturalised persons never achieved the unassailable status 
of subjects who were born British’.189 But there were a far greater number of Chinese settlers 
in Queensland who were natural-born subjects through birth in Hong Kong, Singapore and 
other British colonies.190 These people had ‘birthright nationality’ as subjects of the British 
Crown. Far from being ‘unassailable’ their subject status was routinely ignored. In colonial 
and post-federation Queensland, not only naturalised but also natural-born British subjects of 
Chinese and other non-European origin were regarded and treated as ‘aliens’, despite  not 
having this status under the law.  
A similar omission of the relevant law affects Bruce Buchan’s analysis of legal belonging in 
Empire of Political Thought: Indigenous Australians and the Language of Colonial 
Government (2008). Buchan refers to Alastair Davidson’s claim that the legal doctrine of 
terra nullius ‘caused immense complications for Aboriginal people, whose citizenship should 
have been automatic according to the British rules of citizenship’.191 According to Buchan: 
This view poses some serious problems…not least in the dubious assertion that the British in 
1788 possessed “rules” by which “citizenship”…could be accorded to Indigenous peoples…the 
very assumption that the British had uniform ‘rules’ of citizenship in 1788 is as problematic as 
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the assertion that the notion of citizenship could be extended to the Indigenous peoples of 
Australia.
192  
But the British did have ‘uniform rules’ for legal belonging or ‘citizenship’ that remained 
unchanged from 1608 until after World War Two. Under these rules the indigenous peoples 
of Australia were as much entitled to ‘birthright nationality’ through birth in the territory of 
the sovereign as other members of the British Empire. Buchan misunderstands the relevant 
legal principle when he states:  
What made one a subject under British statutes was being born within the territories of the 
British sovereign (jus soli) and being born of parents who were themselves free ‘British 
subjects’ (jus sanguinas).193 
However under the common law any person born on British territory was a ‘natural-born’ 
subject and not an ‘alien’, whether the parents were British subjects or not.194 Contrary to 
Buchan’s assertion, therefore, ‘citizenship’ – or at least British subject status – should indeed 
have been (and was as a matter of law) automatic for any indigenous person born after 1788 
in that part of Australia claimed by the British.  
Alison Bashford and Catie Gilchrist’s article on ‘The Colonial History of the 1905 Aliens 
Act’ (2012)195 is an example of the danger of historians focussing on ‘alien’ legislation 
without identifying the legal meaning of ‘alien’. The article concerns the influence of 
restrictive colonial immigration legislation on the United Kingdom’s Aliens Act 1905. The 
statute defined an ‘immigrant’ as an ‘alien steerage passenger’196 but contained no definition 
of ‘alien’. As a matter of law, the common law meaning therefore applied. However the fact 
that ‘alien’ had a set legal meaning which for centuries had been central to imperial 
membership law is not engaged with by the authors.197   
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Similarly, in a PhD thesis on alien legislation in Australia, Alien Acts: The White Australia 
Policy, 1901 to 1939 (1999),198 Paul Jones includes just one sentence on the different 
meanings of ‘alien’, stating that ‘the generic Alien was…unevenly excluded. In some cases 
this would mean any non-British person; in others, it implied persons not specifically 
naturalised in Australia’.199 However in its non-legal, racial sense, ‘alien’ was more 
commonly used as a label for people of non-European, not simply non-British ethnic origin. 
European settlers, especially those from the north of the continent, were not generally 
regarded or treated as ‘aliens’. In addition, the many natural-born British subjects of Asian 
origin who came to Australia had no need to be ‘specifically naturalised’. Despite this, they 
were subject to ‘alien’ legislation, including prosecution, when they should have been beyond 
the scope of such laws. Jones does not address this issue and states that with changes to the 
Commonwealth’s immigration legislation after the First World War, ‘in both the policy and 
administrative spheres, associations of “aliens” with “coloureds” developed’.200 There was of 
course, as this thesis argues, legal difficulty with such an approach, namely that alien status 
under the law was not based on the colour of a person’s skin.  
In Unravelling Identity. Immigrants, Identity and Citizenship in Australia (2005), Trevor 
Batrouney and John Goldlust state that: 
Equally important, in the context of the normative notions of citizenship, was the introduction 
of the term ‘alien’ (meaning ‘belonging to another’), which first appeared in the 
Commonwealth Nationality Act (1920).201 
Two decades before this, however, the term ‘alien’ had already been included in the 
Commonwealth Constitution as a source of legislative power.202 This is not to mention, 
moreover, its continued use by the courts since Calvin’s Case three centuries before to define 
someone not entitled to legal membership of the British Empire.  
Ann-Mari Jordens in Redefining Australians. Immigration, Citizenship and National Identity 
(1995) comments that:  
A nation’s understanding of itself is revealed by the categories of people it regards as foreign, 
as alien, as ‘other’. From 1948 to 1987 the Nationality and Citizenship Act defined an alien as 
‘a person who does not have the status of a British subject and is not an Irish citizen or a 
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protected person’. That is, the image of Australians enshrined in Australian citizenship 
legislation was that of an Anglo-Celtic people.203  
After the Second World War there remained many British subjects of Asian, African and 
Pacific islander origin. ‘British’ in this statutory context did not mean ‘white’ or ‘Anglo-
Celtic’ but merely a ‘subject of the British Crown’. Based on the language of the statute, 
therefore, if there was an ‘image of Australians’ enshrined in the 1948 citizenship legislation, 
it was not one of an ‘Anglo-Celtic people’.   
In her article ‘Aliens: The Outsiders in the Constitution’ (1996), Belinda Wells observes that:  
The Australian Constitution confers a power to legislate with respect to ‘aliens’. ‘Alien’ is a 
term of ancient origin, which connotes ‘belonging to another person or place’. The term is 
regarded by the High Court as synonymous with the term ‘non-citizen’, yet it carries with it far 
more sinister overtones. Referring to a person as an alien ‘calls attention to their “otherness”, 
and even associates them with non-human invaders from outer space’.204 
While Wells identifies the multiple meanings of ‘alien’, her article does not address the 
extensive use of the term in nineteenth and twentieth century Australia to denigrate, 
discriminate against and prosecute non-European inhabitants, many of whom were not 
‘aliens’ under the law. Nor does she examine whether it is appropriate to retain a term with 
such pejorative connotations and negative history both as a source of extensive 
Commonwealth power and as the key concept against which constitutional membership of 
the nation is determined.205  
In the same vein, Michele Langfield’s article entitled ‘“White aliens”: the control of 
European immigration to Australia 1920 - 1930’206 contains no definition of the term ‘alien’ 
and does not discuss whether people labelled as ‘white aliens’ were in fact ‘aliens’ under the 
law. The distinction between different ‘types’ of aliens is grappled with in One of Us? A 
Century of Australian Citizenship (2002), where David Dutton includes sections on ‘The 
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Dangers of Aliens’ and ‘Aliens Reconsidered’.207 These sections examine the perception and 
treatment in Australia of ‘enemy aliens’ during the two world wars and the inter-war period. 
Dutton notes that ‘the definition of enemy alien was rigidly applied to all people born within 
the boundaries of enemy states. The fact of naturalisation was mostly considered 
irrelevant.’208 However it was not only naturalised subjects who were treated as enemy aliens. 
According to Christine Piper, for example, ‘one hundred Australian-born Japanese’ were 
interned as ‘enemy aliens’ during World War Two.209 The point could therefore have been 
made that neither ‘natural-born’ nor naturalised subjects could lawfully be subject to 
internment and other restrictions210 on the basis that they were ‘enemy aliens’.   
Moreover, Dutton does not include in his discussion the extensive use of the term ‘alien’ in 
colonial and post-federation Australia as a mechanism for discrimination against and 
unlawful treatment of non-Europeans.211 His book does not address the issue that any person 
with British subject status, whatever their racial or ethnic origin, was - until 1948 at least - a 
full member or ‘citizen’ under the law in Australia. As he says:  
Legal discourse in British jurisdictions was slow to reformulate the relations between Crown, 
state, society and citizen along national lines, particularly since national forms remained in 
tension with imperial frameworks.
212
 
However, while British (and Australian) law on nationality and membership may have been 
slow to change, it is the argument of this thesis that a society governed by the ‘rule of law’ 
was obliged to adhere to this law.  
This section has shown that those writing on ‘belonging’, ‘identity’ and ‘citizenship’ in 
colonial and post-federation Australia have not addressed an essential starting point, which is 
central to this thesis. Once British sovereignty had been proclaimed over Australian territory, 
the common law inherited from the United Kingdom determined legal membership. Either a 
person was a ‘subject’ or an ‘alien’. After Calvin’s Case in 1608, there was no change in this 
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law for three and a half centuries. Historical and legal commentators in Australia have not 
included critical evidence showing the rule of law was less important than race in 
determining who could participate in national life as legal members of the community.  
Contrary to longstanding principles of the common law, all non-Europeans, especially 
Chinese but also people of other ethnic backgrounds, were regarded and treated as ‘aliens’ 
whether they were legally subjects of the Crown or not. Why this has not been a focus of 
modern Australian history is discussed later.213 This omission is now fully addressed in this 
thesis, contributing to our historical understanding of membership as a matter of law and 
practise in Australian history, with implications for constitutional law to the present day.  
Structure and content 
This thesis follows a largely chronological order, examining the main groups of people 
regarded and treated as ‘aliens’ in Australia’s history, at variance with the rule of law. It 
covers a period of a little over a hundred years, from early New South Wales Supreme Court 
cases in the 1820s until roughly the Second World War.  
In the 1820s and 1830s the New South Wales Supreme Court, contrary to the common law, 
could not bring itself to declare that indigenous Australians had equal legal status as subjects 
of the Crown and were not ‘aliens’ under British law. The arrival of Chinese settlers in 
considerable numbers from the mid-nineteenth century was portrayed as an ‘alien’ threat to 
Anglo-Celtic society despite many coming from British colonies in Asia. The right of 
hundreds of millions of Indian subjects to move freely within the British Empire caused 
anxiety about ‘alien races’ at the 1890s constitutional conventions. And Pacific islanders who 
had been part of the Queensland community for a generation were expelled as ‘aliens’ in the 
early 1900s when the new federal Government implemented its ‘White Australia’ policy.   
Queensland is a particular focus for this thesis after 1901. Immediately after federation the 
State was a key battleground for White Australia. Coloured labour had been imported for 
agricultural industries from the 1860s amid claims that white men could not work in the 
tropics.214 Chinese and other non-Europeans were drawn to Queensland goldfields later in the 
nineteenth century than in other Australian colonies. In addition, Chinese settlers played a 
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key role in opening up north Queensland for the sugar, banana and other industries.215 By the 
time of federation Pacific islanders, ethnic Chinese and other non-European settlers were 
well-established in the north Queensland community.216 The significant non-European 
involvement in agricultural industries seen as important for the local and Australian economy 
attracted the scrutiny of imperial authorities. Legislation with overt discrimination that might 
offend Britain’s Indian subjects or its new ally Japan faced a real risk of imperial rejection. 
Contrary to existing accounts, potential refusal of royal assent remained an important factor 
for Queensland until the 1920s or later.217 Queensland lawmakers deliberately used the word 
‘alien’ as a language tool to avoid rejection of discriminatory legislation.   
The history set out in this thesis is important, not least because it adds to the story of 
discrimination in this country and links it to the central constitutional role still played by the 
term ‘alien’.218 In twenty-first century Australia the word ‘alien’ remains a fundamental 
marker of ‘belonging’. It remains the case that only ‘non-aliens’ have full membership of the 
Australian community under the Constitution.
219
 Contrary to popular belief, becoming a 
‘citizen’ does not guarantee constitutional membership of the nation. The legal status of 
‘citizen’ has existed in Australia since 1949 but is merely a creation of legislation and is not 
recognised in the Constitution. In addition, the Commonwealth retains wide-ranging 
legislative power over ‘aliens’. According to Justice McHugh in Re Patterson (2001): 
…as long as a person falls within the description of ‘aliens’, the power of the parliament to 
make laws affecting that person is unlimited unless the Constitution otherwise prohibits the 
making of the law.
220
 
The lack of restraint on use of the ‘aliens’ power reared its head again in 2015 with proposed 
new laws stripping dual citizens of their Australian citizenship. As the explanatory 
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memorandum for the Australian Citizenship (Allegiance to Australia) Amendment Bill 2015 
states:  
…the Bill introduces three new ways in which a person, who is a national or citizen of a 
country other than Australia, can cease to be an Australian citizen…The principal source of 
power for a person’s Australian citizenship ceasing is the alien’s [sic] power in section 51(xix) 
of the Constitution.
221
  
Chapter One examines early New South Wales Supreme Court cases about the murder of 
one indigenous inhabitant by another. It was claimed the Court had no jurisdiction because 
neither attacker nor victim were ‘subjects’ of the King, so could not be ‘subject to’ or under 
the protection of British law. Commentators such as Lisa Ford, Bruce Buchan and Henry 
Reynolds note the Supreme Court’s reference to Calvin’s Case in considering whether 
indigenous people were ‘aliens’ or ‘subjects’. However, like the Court itself, these authors do 
not apply the key membership principle from that case. It was significant, as these writers 
say, that the Supreme Court used a conceptual concept of subject status (involving reciprocal 
obligations of allegiance and protection of rights) derived from seventeenth and eighteenth 
century Enlightenment philosophers. The Court thought aborigines not capable of exercising 
rights and liberties as ‘subjects’ because of their ‘savage’, ‘barbarous’ and ‘uncivilised’ way 
of life. Of greater importance, however, was that the Supreme Court ignored the longstanding 
legal membership rule laid down by Coke in Calvin’s Case. Once the British proclaimed 
sovereignty over New South Wales, any person born within the territory was a natural-born 
British subject. Contrary to this common law rule, the Court emphasised the social 
characteristics of indigenous people when considering if they were ‘aliens’ or ‘subjects’. The 
disregard shown by Chief Justice Forbes and his fellow judges for the rule of law and their 
focus on non-legal factors foreshadowed the way non-European inhabitants of Australia were 
characterised as ‘aliens’ for the rest of the period covered by this thesis.     
Chapter Two considers the portrayal of Chinese settlers as ‘aliens’ in nineteenth century 
colonial Australia. Leading political figures including Queensland Premier Sir Samuel 
Griffith (later first Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia) and ‘father of federation’ Sir 
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Henry Parkes222 promulgated the view that the Chinese were ‘alien’ across all measures of 
comparison with ‘Her Majesty’s subjects’. In fact many were subjects from Hong Kong and 
other British colonies in Asia and not ‘aliens’ at all under the law applying in Australia. 
Modern histories of the Chinese in Australia have not addressed this key point. Evans, 
Saunders and Cronin in Race Relations in Colonial Queensland (1993), for instance, use the 
term ‘alien’ and ‘coloured alien’ to refer to all Chinese and other coloured settlers despite the 
fact many were not aliens according to the law.223 Inter-colonial conferences in 1881 and 
1888 on the ‘Chinese question’ and the ensuing debates in colonial parliaments about 
exclusionary legislation show how misuse of the term ‘alien’ became embedded in the 
political discourse during this period. Bigotry, racism and a failure to respect the common 
law meant settlers of Chinese descent were seen as indelibly foreign or ‘alien’ because of 
their race. Legal cases from this period demonstrate a presumption that any person who 
looked Chinese could not be a British subject. Even official census records failed to 
accurately register the number of Chinese British subjects in Australia. Similarly, key 
parliamentary reports assumed all inhabitants of ethnic Chinese origin had been born in 
China and were of Chinese nationality. The extent to which ‘alien’ was misused at this time 
made its further misapplication inevitable in the lead up to federation.  
Chapter Three discusses the constitutional convention debates of the 1890s. Delegates to the 
conventions, including the leading lawyers from the Australian colonies, referred extensively 
to the danger posed by ‘alien races’ and ‘coloured aliens’. ‘British Indians’ (with the same 
right as other subjects to travel freely across the Empire) were a key concern. Samuel 
Griffith, Chairman of the 1891constitutional drafting committee, said they were an ‘alien 
race’ to be excluded from Australia. The proper legal meaning of ‘alien’ was never explained 
at any of the conventions, causing delegates to misunderstand the role of major law making 
powers. The ‘races power’ (along with the ‘immigration and emigration’ power) was seen as 
the main means for regulating and excluding ‘coloured aliens’. But this left little room for the 
‘naturalization and aliens’ power itself. Now considered a source of extensive 
Commonwealth authority, during the conventions it was regarded merely as a technical 
provision about the process of naturalisation. Even in debates about formal membership of 
the new Commonwealth, the word ‘alien’ was used in its racial not legal sense. Chairman of 
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the judiciary committee in 1897-98, Josiah Symon QC, for example, opposed citizenship for 
‘persons owing allegiance to the Queen’ because such people in his view included ‘aliens’.224  
Chapter Three also considers John Quick and Robert Garran’s Annotated Constitution of the 
Australian Commonwealth (1901), still regarded as an authoritative source of constitutional 
interpretation. Along with other delegates, Quick used ‘alien’ during the conventions as a 
synonym for ‘coloured races’ he wished to see excluded from the new federation. Contrary to 
the established law, Quick and Garran’s 1901 work also employed the term ‘alien’ in a racial 
not legal sense when explaining the ‘races’ power in section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution, the 
‘aliens’ power itself in section 51(xix) and the ‘immigration power’ in section 51(xxvii).   
Chapter Four examines use of the term ‘alien’ at the federal and state level after 1901. 
Commonwealth lawmakers passed the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 to keep ‘coloured 
aliens’ out of Australia. The Commonwealth also enacted domestic restrictions on coloured 
inhabitants (including indigenous Australians). But the vast majority of internal restrictions 
on those regarded as not ‘belonging’ were imposed at State or Territory level. Legal 
mechanisms varied between the States. South Australia’s Northern Territory Mining Act 
1903 prohibited ‘Asiatic aliens’ from working on any new goldfield. Western Australia’s 
Firearms and Guns Act 1931 prevented any ‘Asiatic or African alien or person of Asiatic or 
African race claiming to be a British subject’ from holding a firearms license. In both cases 
‘alien’ was intended to be read and applied using its racial, non-legal meaning.  
Chapter Five highlights the role of Samuel Griffith in the expulsion of Pacific islanders from 
Queensland after federation. Their removal had been a key aim for Griffith as Queensland 
Premier in the 1880s and 1890s. In 1906 as Chief Justice of the High Court in Robtelmes v 
Brenan,225 Griffith said it was ‘indisputable’ they were ‘aliens’ who could forcibly be 
expelled from the country. However their status was very disputable. Some had been born in 
Britain’s South Pacific colonies, others in Australia itself. Many came from the Solomon 
Islands, British New Guinea and the Gilbert Islands, all British protectorates. There were also 
those from the New Hebrides (under joint British and French protection from 1878).226 Later 
British and Australian legislation recognised that people under the protection of the Crown 
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were neither subjects nor ‘aliens’. In Robtelmes, none of this concerned the High Court, 
which looked in a cursory way at the law concerning ‘aliens’. Like Griffith, fellow judges 
Barton and O’Connor had pre-determined positions on the islander issue. In many ways, the 
High Court’s defective decision in Robtelmes represented the culmination of decades of 
misuse of the term ‘alien’ by key Australian political and legal figures. 
Chapters Six and Seven look at the use of ‘alien’ after federation as a legal tool for 
exclusion in Queensland. In conjunction with the education or dictation test borrowed from 
the Commonwealth, the term ‘alien’ was used in a deliberate and calculated way by 
Queensland authorities to exclude non-Europeans from key economic and other activities.  
Chapter Six examines the dictation test and alien legislation for Queensland’s sugar and 
banana industries, aimed particularly at inhabitants of Chinese ethnic origin. As 
parliamentary debates indicate, the dictation test and ‘alien’ mechanisms were employed 
together to avoid rejection by imperial authorities. The debates show the legal meaning of 
‘alien’ was understood but that race was more important than the rule of law for Queensland 
lawmakers. Government ministers stated openly that the legislation was directed at those 
regarded as ‘aliens’ in the racial sense of the word, i.e. all non-Europeans, especially Chinese 
Australians. They also said people ‘of European descent’ who were aliens under the law 
would not be subject to the legislation. As this shows, racial factors were more significant 
than nationality or allegiance in determining who would be treated as legal members of the 
Queensland community. 
Chapter Seven considers ‘alien’ prosecutions across North Queensland after the First World 
War. Employers of Chinese, Indian and Malay workers – many of whom were British 
subjects - were prosecuted for unlawfully engaging ‘coloured aliens’. There was little or no 
regard for the proper legal meaning of ‘alien’. Contrary to former Commonwealth Solicitor-
General K.H. Bailey’s view that such laws were ‘not really being enforced’,227 these 
prosecutions helped ensure the exclusion of ‘undesirable races’ from the State’s key 
agricultural industries. The chapter considers the case of See Chin, one of the biggest 
employers in the Australian sugar industry, charged with ‘employing coloured aliens’ under 
the Sugar Cultivation Act 1913. His unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court of Queensland 
provides an example of the continued misuse of ‘alien’ and other nationality related terms in 
this period of Australian history.  
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Coverage and argument 
This thesis does not purport to be a comprehensive examination of all possible references to 
‘aliens’ by key political and legal figures over the century or more of Australian history that it 
covers. For example, it only briefly considers use of the terms ‘white alien’ and ‘enemy 
alien’. While those labels were used for the purpose of exclusion and deportation, especially 
after World War One, for the most part those described in such a way were legally aliens 
under the law applying in Australia. There were exceptions - for example, settlers from the 
British colony of Malta were labelled, along with other southern Europeans, as ‘white aliens’ 
despite their legal status as British subjects.228 In addition, settlers of German descent – even 
if natural-born or naturalised subjects and no matter how long they had lived in Australia – 
were interned as ‘enemy aliens’ during both world wars and even deported afterwards.229 
While some European inhabitants with British subject status were wrongly regarded and 
treated as ‘white’ or ‘enemy’ aliens, misuse of the term ‘alien’ in relation to non-European 
British subjects was far greater. Despite the significant proportion of settlers in Australia with 
Chinese, Indian or Pacific islander ethnic background who were British subjects, all were 
regarded as ‘coloured aliens’, including for the purpose of major Commonwealth and State 
exclusionary legislation. The thesis is primarily about these people, although it also looks at 
the labelling of aboriginal inhabitants of Australia, who were considered and treated as 
‘aliens’ more routinely than some commentators have assumed.  
The central argument in this thesis, therefore, is the lack of regard for the rule of law in a 
society which supposedly revered it. Anglo-Celtic lawmakers disregarded the legal meaning 
of ‘alien’, instead using the word in its ‘ordinary’, non-legal, racial sense. In this way the 
boundaries of colonial and post-federation Australian society were enforced contrary to the 
law. People who were not aliens under the law were treated as if they were; others who were 
aliens in a legal sense were treated as if they were not. Imperial concepts of legal membership 
laid down in Calvin’s Case as part of the binding common law were ignored. The birthright 
entitlement to subject status and the protection of the common law itself was wrongly denied 
to non-European subjects of the British Crown. These people were unlawfully categorised as 
‘aliens’ and excluded from full participation in the community. In contrast, white European 
settlers who were not British subjects received preference and were exempt from ‘alien’ laws.  
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The term ‘alien’ was an important language tool in the creation and maintenance of White 
Australia. The discourse and description of non-European inhabitants as ‘aliens’ reinforced 
the dominance of the Anglo-Celtic community and supported the political philosophy of key 
figures. Parkes, Griffith and others thought Chinese and other non-Europeans were 
irredeemably ‘alien’, so had no place in a society where all men were equal before the law.230 
More than this, however, the dual meaning of the word made it an important device for legal 
exclusion. The perception that Pacific islanders were ‘aliens’ in a racial sense allowed the 
High Court to authorise their forced removal under the ‘aliens power’ even though many 
were British subjects. In Queensland the word ‘alien’ was deliberately used as an ostensibly 
neutral term in legislation intended to have a discriminatory effect. Such laws had significant 
consequences for those they were directed against. As explained in the chapters that follow, 
the term ‘alien’, along with other methods such as the education or dictation test, contributed 
materially to the establishment and continuation of a racially exclusive society and its legacy 
is present to this very day.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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CHAPTER ONE Indigenous Australians: ‘aliens in their own 
country’? 
‘Back in 1972, the embassy was a bold response to what was seen as a deeply 
inflammatory speech by Prime Minister Billy McMahon, dashing long-cherished hopes 
for land rights….On the very night of his speech, four men – Billy Craigie, Tony 
Coorie, Michael Anderson and Bertie Williams – drove to Canberra and planted the 
beach umbrella. They declared it the site of the Aboriginal embassy, explaining that 
because McMahon had relegated them to the status of aliens in their own country, they 
needed their own representation’.231 
Bruce Buchan explains the importance of language in situating aboriginal Australians in the 
new colonial order after European settlement: 
…colonists in Australia…constructed images of the Indigenous peoples they found already 
inhabiting the land based on a series of concepts associated with European understandings of 
‘savagery’ and ‘civilisation’…descriptions of Indigenous peoples as ‘savages’ with no ‘society’ 
or a limited ‘government’ also operated as a foundation for advancing claims about how they 
should be treated in the new colonial order. Consequently, the ongoing struggle of Indigenous 
peoples for genuine recognition of the continuity of their evolving identities has been one 
fought as much against the language as against the institutions of colonization.232  
The legal status of indigenous Australians, as determined by the New South Wales Supreme 
Court from the 1820s to 1840s, set the scene for the treatment of other non-European ethnic 
groups throughout the period covered by this thesis. Chief Justice Sir Francis Forbes 
proclaimed the ‘supremacy of law’233 but in a series of cases concerning indigenous 
inhabitants the Supreme Court disregarded the law with respect to ‘aliens’ and membership. 
Under common law principles unchanged from Calvin’s Case, the aboriginal people of New 
South Wales were subjects with equal legal status and not ‘aliens’. However the Court 
ignored this law, categorising indigenous people using the type of non-legal descriptions set 
out by Buchan. Similar language was later used to target other racial groups as ‘aliens’ in 
colonial and post-federation Australia.  
Rebellious subjects or foreign enemies? 
Some commentators say it was quickly accepted that under English law aborigines born in 
Australia under the sovereignty of the English king were British subjects and not ‘aliens’. But 
early New South Wales cases where Supreme Court judges could not bring themselves to 
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declare that people they saw as ‘barbaric’ had equal subject status with white settlers indicate 
this was not so. Indeed, as late as the 1960s Western Australia retained legislation treating 
aborigines as non-subjects (in other words, as ‘aliens’) unless they applied for a ‘certificate of 
citizenship’ under State law. This was only granted if, amongst other things, the applicant had 
practised the ‘manner and habits of civilised life’ for at least two years, could ‘speak and 
understand the English language’ and was ‘not suffering from active syphilis, leprosy, 
granuloma or yaws’.234  
Commentators such as Peter Bayne, and Chesterman and Galligan, argue that after European 
settlement Australia’s aborigines were soon acknowledged as ‘subjects’ and not ‘aliens’ but 
that recognition of their formal status did not assist them, with substantial denial of their 
rights and entitlements under various pieces of legislation both before and for many decades 
after federation.235 In Bayne’s view, Australia’s colonial courts accepted that annexation of 
New South Wales as a British possession on 26 January 1788 (and the later annexation in 
1827-1829 of Western Australia) meant these territories became ‘settled colonies’ of the 
Crown.236 In relation to the status of the indigenous people, the consequence was that:  
The land became dominions of the Crown, and thus, by a rule of the common law, all those 
born in the dominions were British subjects. Therefore, those Aboriginal people resident in the 
colonies at the time of annexation are regarded as having become British subjects.
237
 
Bayne states that in the early years of the new settlement there was a muddled view of the 
legal status of aboriginal inhabitants,238 but ‘by 1836…in the New South Wales colony, it 
was settled at the highest official levels that for all purposes the Aborigines were to be 
regarded as British subjects’.239 Bayne cites the New South Wales Supreme Court’s decision 
in R v Murrell (1836),240 arguing that from this time it was accepted that ‘the Aborigines were 
in the eyes of the common law, entitled to the same rights as other subjects of the Crown’ 
(although he notes that ‘so far as the application of the law to them was concerned, the 
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principle of legal equality was, from the middle of the nineteenth century, abandoned in most 
other respects’).241 As discussed below, however, in fact the Supreme Court in Murrell did 
not conclude that aboriginal people were subjects of the British Crown.  
Chesterman and Galligan note that ‘there had been some debate in the early nineteenth 
century between colonial officials and the British Colonial Office as to whether Aborigines 
were British subjects’.242 However, they state in relation to the Port Phillip Protectorate which 
existed from 1839 to 1849 as part of the colony of New South Wales, that: 
Aborigines in Victoria occupied the special position of ‘protected persons’ rather than citizens. 
Although Aborigines were, by virtue of birth in one of the King’s dominions, British subjects 
who were subject to the law, they were not entitled to the benefits of citizenship.
243
 
Use of the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘citizenship’ in this context is misleading since there was no 
such thing as colonial ‘citizenship’ and no Australian citizenship in a formal sense until 1949. 
Moreover, as the Bonjon case discussed below shows, the New South Wales Supreme Court 
did not agree that aborigines in the Port Phillip area were subject to British law. In particular, 
the Supreme Court could not decide whether the indigenous inhabitants of the Port Phillip 
Protectorate and the colony of New South Wales as a whole were British subjects or ‘aliens’.  
At this time in New South Wales the formal legal status of aboriginal inhabitants was not at 
all settled in the way that Bayne, and Chesterman and Galligan, suggest. As Bruce Kercher 
notes, ‘the legal status of Aborigines was the subject of passionate debate among the 
colonists and imperial officials for a hundred years’.244 Henry Reynolds refers to the tradition 
that ‘the Aborigines had from the very first day of settlement been British subjects’, but says 
that ‘in the colonial period many people argued that this was a legal fiction that stood in the 
way of a clear understanding of the relations between settlers and indigenes’.245  
Bruce Buchan notes that there was ‘continuing confusion over the legal status of Indigenous 
peoples’ during the time of Governor King (1800-1806). King directed that any injustice or 
wanton cruelty against aborigines should be dealt with ‘in the same manner as if’ this had 
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been committed against ‘any of His Majesty’s Subjects’. As Buchan says, ‘although seeming 
to recognise Indigenous peoples as “British subjects”, the term ‘as if’ carried an important 
proviso’.246 Lisa Ford observes that Governor Brisbane’s declaration of martial law in 1824 
‘declared war on Aborigines as British subjects in rebellion against their rightful government. 
As such, it contained within it a new assertion of governmental jurisdiction over Aborigines 
as British subjects’.247 According to Ford, however, the Governor’s declaration: 
…did not answer the question of Aboriginal subjecthood definitively. It seemed instead to have 
reflected the peculiar bent of his new attorney-general. Metropole and colony remained deeply 
ambivalent about the status of indigenous people.
248
 
It may be that when compared to his colleagues in the colonial administration, recognition of 
the subject status of aboriginal people was indeed the ‘peculiar bent’ of New South Wales 
Attorney-General Saxe Bannister.249 As explained below, however, recognition of this status 
was the only interpretation available under British law. 
Reynolds notes the decision in 1825 to treat aborigines as if they were foreign enemies 
against whom war could be waged. Secretary for the Colonies Lord Bathurst directed 
Governor Darling of New South Wales and Governor Arthur of Tasmania that they must: 
…understand it to be your duty, when such disturbances cannot be prevented or allayed by less 
vigorous measures, to oppose force by force, and to repel such Aggressions in the same manner 
as if they proceeded from the subjects of any accredited State.250 
As Buchan said in relation to Governor King, the words ‘as if’ contain an important 
qualification. Bathurst’s statement seems to recognise that aborigines were not foreigners or 
‘aliens’, instead directing the Governors to treat them ‘as if’ they were. Understandably, the 
directions caused ‘much confusion among officials as to the legal status question’.251 
Moreover, the practical effect on aborigines was no different whether they were regarded as 
if they were ‘British subjects in rebellion’ or foreign enemies at war with Britain. As with 
Governor Brisbane’s declaration, Lord Bathurst’s direction provided authority for the use of 
military force against indigenous people. As Reynolds explains: 
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By 1825 it had become apparent to both the imperial and colonial governments that the 
Aborigines were not going to melt away or be peacefully absorbed within the two settler 
colonies. The response of the imperial government was to treat the hostile tribes as foreign 
enemies against whom war could be waged. This is a crucial factor in understanding Arthur’s 
use of martial law and his implementation of the Black Line. At every step he took to escalate 
the conflict he was careful to read Bathurst’s instructions to his executive council.252  
For more than a hundred years there was an ongoing state of warfare with hostile aboriginal 
tribes who resisted invasion of their homelands and were treated by colonial authorities ‘as if’ 
they were foreign enemies. As Reynolds notes, it was apparent to the Protector of Aborigines 
for the Port Phillip district that ‘although they have been taken under the British power, and 
are declared subjects of the British Crown, it is entirely without their knowledge and 
concurrence’.253 This remained the situation on the edges of European settlement throughout 
the colonial period. Given the ever-present violence on the Queensland frontier in the second 
half of the nineteenth century:  
…few colonists subscribed to the view that hostile Aborigines were rebellious subjects. To 
most people on the frontier they were enemies who were engaged in a war for control of the 
territory. The same views, expressed during the 1850s, were common currency forty years 
later…It seemed the height of folly to suggest that their enemies were British subjects and 
should be treated as such.
254
  
This view of indigenous Australians as ‘enemies’ or foreigners laid the foundation for 
continued treatment of other non-European British subjects as the ‘alien Other’.  
The New South Wales Supreme Court and indigenous legal status 
As Buchan says, ‘by the early 1840s it was clear that the legal status of Australia’s 
Indigenous inhabitants was still prey to much confusion’.255 A central cause was the 
ambivalence of the New South Wales Supreme Court on the issue. Despite the clear principle 
laid down in Calvin’s Case, in cases from the 1820s to the early 1840s the Supreme Court 
was unable to decide whether Australia’s indigenous people were ‘natural-born subjects’ or 
‘aliens’. The Court’s confusion arose partly from the uncertainty about the mode of 
acquisition of the Australian colonies and hence what law applied to the indigenous 
inhabitants. But its analysis was also strongly affected by a perception that native inhabitants 
belonged to a different and inferior civilisation and were unworthy of equal legal status with 
English subjects of the Crown. The focus on such non-legal factors, rather than the criteria of 
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birth and allegiance laid down by British common law, became an enduring theme for groups 
regarded as ‘aliens’ in the emerging Australian nation. 
Uncertainty about indigenous status  
The uncertainty in the New South Wales legal community about the status of indigenous 
people was demonstrated in Lowe’s Case (1827), where a jury of seven military officers 
acquitted Lieutenant Lowe of the murder of an aboriginal man in the Hunter Valley.256 Lowe 
engaged ‘two of the best defence barristers in the colony’ to represent him.257 Dr Robert 
Wardell argued that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction because the indigenous victim had 
no status recognised by British law: 
I ask what this aboriginal native is with regard to the British Sovereign, and in contemplation of 
the law of England. Is he an alien enemy? He is not, because his tribe is not in hostilities with 
the British Sovereign. Is he an alien friend? He is not, because his tribe may be, and in fact is in 
a state of public hostility with individual subjects of the British Sovereign, and because no 
friendly alliance has ever been entered into. He is not a subject of the British King, because his 
tribe has not been reduced under his Majesty’s subjection, and because there has been no treaty, 
either expressed or understood, between his country and that of the British King, and because in 
fact there could be no treaty between him as a member of the commonwealth and the British 
King.
258 
Lowe’s other barrister, William Charles Wentworth, also said the Court had no jurisdiction 
because the aboriginal inhabitants were neither ‘subjects’ nor ‘aliens’. The aborigines, he 
suggested, barely deserved recognition as ‘people’ at all: 
…these people, by the law of nature, are not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court…they are 
men, no more subject to punishment by our code, than a set of idiots or lunatics…Here are a set 
of natives one degree just above the beasts of the field - possessing no understanding beyond a 
confused notion of right and wrong, and that is all. Men, who are certainly in such a state of 
barbarism and ignorance, that they could not be legally sworn in any Court of Justice.
259 
As Lisa Ford explains, Chief Justice Forbes and Justice Stephen: 
…seemed to prevaricate about whether Aborigines could be tried without a mixed jury of 
Aborigines and British subjects, or whether they could be tried at all as British subjects when 
they were denied access to many of the benefits of British law…In law, the question rested on a 
determination that Aborigines were not aliens under the protection of the colony. In common 
law, aliens under the protection of the Crown were entitled to be tried by a mixed jury of an 
equal number of Englishmen and their countrymen.260 
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As Ford says, the Supreme Court avoided a decision about whether the aboriginal victim was 
a subject or alien by declaring that in either case he was ‘protected by British territorial 
jurisdiction or, at the very least, by British jurisdiction to try a British citizen’ (or 
‘subject’).261 This approach shielded the Court from properly accepting the rule of law in this 
situation, which would have demanded the indigenous victim be identified as a British 
subject. 
‘Internal’ indigenous cases: Ballard, Murrell and Bonjon. 
A more difficult issue confronting the New South Wales Supreme Court during this period 
was whether it could hear matters solely involving aboriginal people. As Ford says, ‘as late as 
1834, high-ranking members of the colonial administration contended over whether or to 
what degree Aborigines and their crimes fell within the purview of British law’.262   
Contrary to the law, the Court could not bring itself to say that indigenous people were 
British subjects and therefore within its jurisdiction. According to Ford: 
…the officers of the Crown and the new Supreme Court together invented jurisdiction over 
Aboriginal Australians in New South Wales…The court wrought a revolution in the theory and 
practice of jurisdiction in New South Wales…a revolution grounded in the logic of 
territoriality.
263
 
But the Supreme Court had no need to ‘invent jurisdiction’ over indigenous people within the 
boundaries of the colony of New South Wales. Under the established common law, any 
person ‘habitually resident’ or born in territory annexed by the British in 1788 had the status 
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of a subject under English law, and was within the jurisdiction of colonial courts on that 
basis.  
R v Ballard (1829),264 R v Murrell (1836)265 and R v Bonjon (1841)266 were all cases requiring 
the New South Wales Supreme Court to consider the legal status of aborigines. Each 
concerned the alleged murder of one indigenous inhabitant by another. Pondering its 
jurisdiction, the Court failed to conclude aborigines were subjects not aliens as required by 
law. 
Damen Ward explains the broader imperial context of these cases: 
Disputes over the operation of courts in relation to indigenes were…of wider importance in 
colonial politics. By the late 1830s, colonial governors were increasingly asserting a general 
territorial political authority and the general (statutory) territorial jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court. The notion that indigenous peoples within colonies were not fully subject to the 
authority of the Crown’s courts was increasingly unacceptable to governments.267 
The approach in British colonies to jurisdiction over internal indigenous violence contrasted 
to that in the United States. Paul McHugh identifies that:  
In the United States the jurisdictionalism of the colonial era represented by the Royal 
Proclamation (1763) was transmuted by the court of  Chief Justice Marshall into a doctrine of 
residual tribal sovereignty. The British rejected that approach and lurched from episode to 
episode in the second quarter of the nineteenth century towards a more absolutist and 
thoroughgoing concept of Crown sovereignty over tribal peoples. This process came about 
mostly through the need to define more precisely the Crown’s criminal jurisdiction over the 
tribes as British settlement spread in the post-Napoleonic period.
268
 
More generally, debates about the jurisdiction of colonial courts over Aboriginal ‘crime’ 
formed part of a ‘much deeper discourse around the conditions under which indigenous 
people  would be accommodated in settler societies’.269 
In Murrell, Mr Stephen, counsel for the accused, argued that the New South Wales Supreme 
Court had no jurisdiction because neither his client nor the aboriginal victim were ‘subjects of 
the King’, so they could be neither ‘subject to’ or under the protection of the King’s laws:270 
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No man, without he was a subject of his Majesty, could be tried by the laws of Great Britain; 
this man was not so, but had been long residing here before the country was taken possession 
of.
271
 
The Court rejected the argument that it lacked jurisdiction because the aborigines involved 
were not British subjects.272 However as Bruce Kercher notes, it did not decide that 
Australia’s native inhabitants were subjects under British law: 
Contrary to a common misconception, the case is not authority for the proposition that all 
Indigenous people in New South Wales were automatically British subjects.
273
  
Justice Dowling in Ballard did not believe the aboriginal race could owe allegiance as 
subjects to the British Crown: 
Amongst civilized nations this is the universal principle, that the lex loci, shall determine the 
disputes arising between the native and the foreigner. But all analogy fails when it is attempted 
to enforce the laws of a foreign country amongst a race of people, who owe no fealty to us, and 
over whom we have no natural claim of acknowledgement or supremacy’.274 
In the same case Chief Justice Forbes thought the Supreme Court could not have jurisdiction 
because ‘I am at a loss to know how, or upon what principle this court could take cognizance 
of offences committed by a barbarous people amongst themselves’.275 In Murrell Justice 
Burton said the practices of the indigenous people: 
…are only such as are consistent with a state of grossest darkness & irrational superstition 
and…are founded entirely upon principles particularly in their mode of vindication for personal 
wrongs upon the wildest most indiscriminatory notions of revenge.
276
  
In Justice Burton’s view the rules of indigenous society could not be regarded as ‘laws’: 
It cannot be said…that these practices are ‘the actual laws of the Country’ & that they remain 
until conquest or cession and a change of laws by the King. They are to be regarded only in the 
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light of the lewd practices entitled not to so much respect as the Brehon laws of the Wild 
Irish.
277 
 
On this basis Justice Burton rejected the argument that aboriginal people were beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because they were part of a sovereign entity controlled by 
their own system of law: 
I do not think therefore that the aboriginal natives of this Colony were or are entitled to be 
considered as Independent States governed by laws which civilized men can recognise…& 
respect & consequently that the reasoning founded upon that assumption fails.
278  
In Bonjon Justice Willis adopted opposite reasoning, stating that: 
…the Aborigines must be considered and dealt with, until some further provision be made, as 
distinct, though dependent tribes governed among themselves by their own rude laws and 
customs. If this be so, I strongly doubt the propriety of my assuming the exercise of jurisdiction 
in the case before me.
279
  
However Justice Willis shared Burton’s opinion about the level of civilisation of the 
aboriginal people. While he said imperial authorities had been influenced by incorrect 
statements about the primitive way of life of the aborigines, nevertheless in his view the 
indigenous people of Australia were ‘wretched beings’ and an ‘unhappy race’, comprising ‘a 
vast and hitherto neglected, oppressed, and deeply injured multitude…’.280  
In each case the Supreme Court gave indications of what it thought the legal status of 
Australia’s indigenous inhabitants might be under the common law. Justice Burton in Murrell 
referred to the principles set down by Lord Coke in Calvin’s Case, noting that under English 
law the indigenous inhabitants of Australia ‘must be either subjects or aliens’.281 He said the 
murdered aborigine was entitled to the protection of the British Crown in the same way as ‘an 
alien living therein under the King’s Peace’.282 In contrast Justice Willis in Bonjon said that 
the aborigines ‘cannot be considered as Foreigners in a Kingdom which is their own’ and 
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that, at least in relation to ‘protection from the aggressions of the colonists’, they were 
‘entitled to be considered and treated…as if they were British subjects’.283 Both judges in 
Ballard agreed that it was the British settlers and not the aborigines who were the ‘foreigners’ 
or outsiders in Australia. 284  
But the Supreme Court was unable to decide what the legal status of Australia’s aborigines 
actually was under the common law. In Ballard and Bonjon the Court did not conclude that 
the native people were British subjects despite declaring they were not ‘foreigners’. Indeed in 
Ballard, as Bruce Kercher notes, Justice Dowling ‘seemed to agree that Aborigines were not 
British subjects’.285 In Bonjon Justice Willis said the aborigines were ‘distinct though 
dependent allies, not British subjects’.286 Justice Burton in Murrell recognised there were 
only two choices under the common law, but thought it legitimate to apply the thinking of 
Swiss jurist, Emmerich de Vattel, 287 indicating that indigenous inhabitants were akin to 
‘strangers’ who had entered the territory of the sovereign and were subject to the laws of New 
South Wales so long as they remained within the Colony.288  As Henry Reynolds says: 
Burton…up-ended the Willis view that the ‘colonists, and not the aborigines are the foreigners’. 
His argument also begged the question of where the Aborigines had come from if they were 
legally equivalent to foreigners who had entered the society from outside unless, of course, he 
conceded that unsettled ‘Aboriginal’ Australia was in effect a foreign country. But this 
proposition, which made sense of colonial reality, could not be sustained while the overarching 
theory remained that British sovereignty reached to the farthest corners of the continent.
289
 
While Reynolds exposes the flaw in Justice Burton’s logic, more significantly Burton’s 
judgment in Murrell was contrary to established law. And as Reynolds himself might say, 
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‘not the law now but the law then’.290 In other words, if ‘British sovereignty reached to the 
farthest corners of the continent’, under the law applying at the time the Supreme Court had 
to recognise indigenous inhabitants as subjects of the British Crown and could not lawfully 
treat them as ‘foreigners’, ‘strangers’ or ‘aliens’.  
Social not legal factors 
Lisa Ford points out that from the 1820s ‘Anglophone settler polities’ such as New South 
Wales and Georgia in the United States shared philosophical works such as Vattel’s Treatise 
on the Law of Nations (1758), ‘peddling a powerful synthesis of neo-Lockean legal and racist 
thought about indigenous people in North America and Australasia’.291 But according to 
Ford, in the landmark Murrell judgment which ‘ended in the juridicial death of Aboriginal 
people in Australia’: 292 
…nineteenth-century notions of race and savagery did not determine the outcome of the case. 
They merely provided ‘scientific’ bases for a new juridicial science of perfect settler 
sovereignty.
293
 
This depends what ‘outcome’ of the Murrell case is being referred to. As the earlier 
discussion shows, ‘notions of race and savagery’ were an important factor in the Supreme 
Court’s failure in Murrell, Bonjon and Ballard to find that aborigines had equal legal status as 
subjects of the Crown. In Murrell and Bonjon, the Supreme Court especially focussed on the 
social characteristics of the aboriginal inhabitants  (particularly their level of ‘civilisation’) 
rather than the common law criteria of birth and allegiance - because the former issue was 
seen as central in determining the extent to which English law applied in the colony. As 
explained below, this depended on whether New South Wales was an uninhabited country 
settled by the colonisers or an occupied territory conquered by the British. The Court had 
difficulty deciding that question. Drawing on Vattel, however, it found that the aboriginal 
people did not properly cultivate the land so as to be regarded as inhabiting or being in 
possession of the territory on which they lived. Both Justice Burton in Murrell and Justice 
Willis in Bonjon quoted with approval the principle from Vattel’s Law of Nations that: 
…those who pursue an erratic life, and live by hunting rather than cultivate their lands, usurp 
more extensive territories than with a reasonable share of labour they would have occasion for, 
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and have, therefore, no reason to complain if other nations, more industrious, and too closely 
confined come to take possession of a part of those lands.
294
  
Justice Burton used a mixture of this extract from Vattel and his own words, referring to 
‘they who refusing to cultivate the earth choose to lead an idle & wandering life instead’.  
Applying Vattel’s principle to the case before him, Justice Burton declared that:  
…it will immediately be seen that the aboriginal natives of this Colony, had not at the time of 
first settlement of the English so appropriated the territory as to…exclude others of the 
common family of mankind from so doing, & that consequently they had not acquired the 
rights of domain & empire.
295
 
As Lisa Ford observes: 
…by the end of the eighteenth century, Enlightenment philosophy had created a new 
ideological universe – a universe in which Australian aborigines were a people so savage that 
they were unable to claim property or to constitute a political society.
296
 
It is consistent with the theory that aboriginal people did not properly cultivate or occupy the 
land so as to deserve acknowledgment in the eyes of the colonisers as a ‘civilised people’ that 
the judges could not recognise them as either ‘subjects’ or ‘aliens’, despite having only those 
two choices under British law. Indeed, some of the discussion in these cases suggested that 
the Supreme Court thought aborigines might not have been human or a ‘people’ at all (see, 
for example, the comment noted above by Justice Willis that aborigines were ‘wretched 
beings’ and by Justice Burton that they lived in ‘grossest darkness’). This was a theme 
repeated in later attitudes in colonial and post-federation Australia towards Chinese and other 
non-European settlers. The idea that Australia’s indigenous people were less than human was 
expressed by prominent colonial figures in other settings. Demonstrating his consistency on 
this issue, one of the barristers from Lowe’s Case, William Charles Wentworth, stated in 
1844 when opposing a bill in the New South Wales Legislature to allow aboriginal evidence 
in court proceedings, that it was: 
…quite as defencible [sic] to receive as evidence in a Court of Justice the chatterings of the 
ourang-outang as of this savage race, and he for one would as soon vote in favour of a Bill for 
that purpose as for the present measure.
 297 
The clearest evidence that ‘notions of race and savagery’ did in fact influence judgments in 
these indigenous cases is the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Ballard that aborigines were a 
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‘barbarous’ people incapable of owing the ‘fealty’ or ‘allegiance’ characterising a subject of 
the Crown under British law. This was directly at odds with the rule of law. 
Mode of acquisition and legal status 
Uncertainty about the mode of acquisition of New South Wales affected the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of the legal status of the colony’s indigenous inhabitants. This issue may have been 
relevant in deciding whether aboriginal people were subject to the Court’s jurisdiction 
(although the outcome in Murrell suggests it was not).298 However in relation to the legal 
status of the native people, the only relevant fact was that Great Britain had ‘acquired’ (or at 
least claimed to exercise sovereignty over) the colony of New South Wales, not the particular 
mechanism by which this ‘acquisition’ had been achieved.   
By the nineteenth century, there were clear legal precedents in relation to what law applied in 
the case of different forms of acquisition. As Blackstone said in his Commentaries on the 
laws of England, ‘if an uninhabited country be discovered and planted by English subjects all 
the English laws then in being, which are the birth right of every English subject, are 
immediately there in force’.299 Similarly, in Blankard v Galdy (1673) the court said that ‘in 
the case of an uninhabited country newly found out by English subjects, all laws in force in 
England, are in force there…’.300 In contrast, the situation of a ‘conquered’ territory was 
different. As Lord Mansfield CJ stated in Campbell v Hall (1774), ‘a country conquered by 
the British arms becomes a dominion of the King in the right of his crown, and, therefore, 
necessarily subject to the legislature, the Parliament of Great Britain’. In such cases English 
law does not apply automatically. Instead, ‘the laws of a conquered country continue in force 
until they are altered by the conqueror’.301 
Justice Willis in Bonjon declared that the Australian situation did not fit accepted precedents, 
stating that: 
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Colonies …are acquired by conquest; by cession under treaty; or by occupancy. This colony 
stands on a different footing from some others for it was neither an unoccupied place, nor was it 
obtained by right of conquest and driving out the natives, nor by treaties [i.e. by cession].302 
In the notes prepared for his judgment in Murrell, Justice Burton also recognised the lack of 
authority about the acquisition of the Australian colonies, stating that ‘I admit that Our own 
law writer Blackstone does not include in his statement of the mode in which Plantations & 
Colonies are established the precise case of relation to this colony’.303 As John Hookey says: 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court in the Murrell case did not hold that Australia was a settled 
colony. If anything, the reasons of Burton J are consistent with [defendant counsel] Stephen’s 
submission that the colony was neither conquered, ceded, nor settled.
304  
Bruce Kercher refers to ‘the ambiguity of the legal position of Aborigines’ caused by 
confusion over the mode of acquisition in the early years of the New South Wales colony: 
The assumption of both local officials and those in London was that New South Wales had 
been acquired by peaceful settlement of an empty land, rather than by conquest or cession by 
the original occupiers. From the colonists’ viewpoint this was merely a technical distinction, 
but from the Aborigines’ viewpoint, the difference was crucial. In a settled colony, they became 
British subjects from the moment the occupation began.
305
 
According to Kercher: 
…if the Aborigines had been classified as enemies in a conquest rather than subjects in a settled 
colony, they might have been accorded some dignity and a morally strong claim to retain some 
of their pre-existing rights. One makes treaties with one’s enemies, not with fellow subjects.306 
However it is not correct to say that Australia’s aborigines might still have been considered 
under the common law as enemies (and therefore ‘aliens’) if the colony of New South Wales 
was regarded as ‘conquered’ and not ‘settled’. It would only be if the territory inhabited by 
aboriginal tribes was regarded as ‘unconquered’ that they could be treated, as Mitchell 
asserted, as ‘aliens…against whom H.M.’s Troops may exercise belligerent right’. As 
Salmond pointed out, under the common law once an enemy’s territory had been conquered 
the population no longer answered to the former ruler but owed allegiance to the new 
sovereign. This principle of English law was set down in Campbell v Hall where Lord 
Mansfield declared that ‘the conquered inhabitants once received under the King’s protection 
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become subjects, and are to be universally considered in that light, and not as enemies or 
aliens’.307  
While it was unclear about the precise mode of acquisition of the colony, the New South 
Wales Supreme Court was in no doubt that sovereignty over the land in which the indigenous 
people lived belonged to Britain.  
As Justice Burton said in Murrell: 
The Sovereignty of the Country thus belonging to the English nation – it is next to be 
considered in what light are the Aboriginal natives to be regarded. [B]y the law of nations they 
can belong only to one of two classes – Subjects or Strangers…308 
In Bonjon, Justice Willis noted that after the first fleet of British convicts landed at Sydney 
Cove in January 1788:  
…at a meeting of the whole colony, formal possession was taken of that part of New Holland 
which extends from York Cape to the South-eastern Cape, and from the coast to the 135° of 
east longitude; a country, to which was given the denomination of New South Wales, much 
more extensive than all the British dominions in Europe.
309 
On this basis there should have been no question that inhabitants of the vast colony of New 
South Wales were British subjects. As Professor Salmond observed in 1902, in contrast to 
Roman law, which decreed that occupants of conquered lands remained ‘peregrini’ or 
‘aliens’, under English feudal and common law inhabitants of acquired territories became 
subjects owing allegiance to the British sovereign. If the King of England acquired new 
territories – whether by cession, conquest or occupation (or by some other method) – the 
inhabitants of these territories ‘cease to be aliens and become forthwith British subjects’.310 
This is consistent with customary international law on the succession of states. As Professor 
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Brownlie states, ‘the evidence is overwhelmingly in support of the view that the population 
follows the change of sovereignty in matters of nationality’.311 According to Lord McNair:  
The normal effect of the annexation of territory by the British Crown, whatever may be the 
source or cause of the annexation, for instance, a treaty of cession, or subjugation by war, is 
that the nationals of the State whose territory is annexed, if resident thereon, become British 
subjects…312 
Similarly Clive Parry concludes that: 
In general it rested with the Crown to decide how far it would exercise the somewhat ill-defined 
powers it derives from international law. In the absence of any regulation of the matter by the 
Crown…it might be presumed that nationals of the former sovereign resident in the territory 
annexed became British subjects ipso facto and without any special act of allegiance or 
election…313 
The above analysis demonstrates this principle was routinely avoided by the Supreme Court 
when it came to the formal legal status or nationality of aboriginal Australians. 
Applicable law and legal status 
When discussing these cases in the New South Wales Supreme Court, Reynolds, Ford and 
Buchan each indicate that the legal status of indigenous inhabitants was dependent on 
whether they were subject to British or some form of local law. In support of this argument, 
each author refers to remarks by Sir Edward Coke in Calvin’s Case about the extension of 
English law to newly acquired territory.314 Ford highlights Coke’s statement that if a 
‘Christian King’ conquers the kingdom of an ‘infidel’, then the laws of the infidel are 
abrogated.315 She notes that by the eighteenth century this formula was: 
…translated by many to mean that North America was held by fictive conquest under English 
and later British law. Yet, importantly, insofar as it purported to determine indigenous legal 
status, Coke’s maxim was never put into legal practice...316  
Buchan says the problem of asserting sovereignty over multiple legal systems was: 
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…addressed in Calvin’s Case (1608) in which it was determined that the monarch alone could 
decide whether one were an enemy alien (the subject of a monarch at war with England), an 
alien friend (the subject of a monarch at peace with England), a denizen (a person made a 
subject by royal charter) or a natural born subject (born of parents who were themselves 
subjects of the English monarch). Sir Edward Coke argued in Calvin’s Case that English law 
(and hence subject status) automatically extended across lands conquered by the English 
monarch. Francis Bacon…was of the opinion that the English monarch must first expressly 
declare ‘conquered’ peoples to be British subjects. Despite the difference, Calvin’s Case 
appeared to extend the status of ‘British subject’ to all people born within the territory (and 
colonies) of the British sovereign.
317
  
Such statements, however – as with the judgments of the Supreme Court itself – fail to 
identify the starting point for determining the legal status of indigenous inhabitants. Calvin’s 
Case did not allow the ‘monarch alone’ to determine subject or alien status. Instead it set 
down common law principles for legal membership that even the monarch was required to 
follow. It was not the case under this law that a person was only a natural-born subject if his 
or her parents were also British subjects. In particular Calvin’s Case did not make subject 
status dependent on first determining that English law had been extended to the people of a 
conquered territory. In Calvin’s Case Sir Edward Coke said explicitly that allegiance (and 
hence subject status) was a matter of ‘natural law’ and was not dependent on ‘judicial or 
municipal’ law: 
…first that the ligeance or faith of the subject is due unto the King by the law of nature: 
secondly, that the law of nature is part of the law of England: thirdly, that the law of nature was 
before any judicial or municipal law: fourthly, that the law of nature is immutable…By this law 
of nature is the faith, ligeance, and obedience of the subject due to his Sovereign or 
superior…Now it appeareth by demonstrative reason, that ligeance, faith, and obedience of the 
subject to the Sovereign, was before any municipal or judicial laws…For that government and 
subjection were long before any municipal or judicial laws…For that it had been in vain to have 
prescribed laws to any but to such as owed obedience, faith, and ligeance before, in respect 
whereof they were bound to obey and observe them …318 
As Professor Price states, ‘Coke…resoundingly rejected the idea that the allegiance owed at 
birth was tied to municipal law. Instead, Coke maintained that it was required by the divine 
law of nature.’319 Keechang Kim notes that the focal issue in Calvin’s Case was: 
…whether allegiance was a bond of subjection institutionalised by the law of the kingdom or 
archetypal submission grounded upon the law of nature…the overwhelming majority of the 
judges (12 out of 14) and Lord Chancellor Elsemere concurred in the opinion that allegiance 
was grounded upon the law of nature; and, therefore, it ought not to be confined within the 
kingdom of England…A founding stone of the British Empire was now securely laid upon the 
law of nature.
320
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In other words, Calvin’s Case established as part of the common law that allegiance and 
subject versus alien status was a matter of natural law and was not dependent on what 
particular system of laws and rules applied. As Professor Price says, ‘Coke’s report of 
Calvin’s Case emphatically placed acquisition of birthright status in the realm of the law of 
nature…Calvin’s Case settled the issue into a rule of common law’.321 She notes the 
importance of this rule for early United States cases:  
Calvin’s Case and its aftermath illustrate the tenacity of a legal doctrine accorded ‘natural law’ 
status in the late medieval period, long after the political and social situation prompting its 
formulation changed. Calvin’s Case, born of natural law in a feudal system, was the bridge for 
adoption of the jus soli in the United States. Courts in the early United States firmly grasped 
Calvin’s Case and used it precisely to define the relationship of allegiance owing by birth.322 
In contrast, courts in colonial and post-federation Australia did not ‘firmly grasp’ the 
common law principle of birthright allegiance or subject status set down in Calvin’s Case. 
The Supreme Court of New South Wales in the indigenous cases referred to above failed to 
apply the long established common law in this area.  
Sovereignty and birthright subject status 
Recent works on sovereignty and the extension of territorial jurisdiction over indigenous 
Australians and other native people in the British Empire have not discussed the common law 
principle of birthright allegiance laid down by Coke in Calvin’s Case. Consequently, what 
British sovereignty should have meant for the status of indigenous Australians under British 
law – and what this might in turn have signified for jurisdiction – has not been properly 
critiqued. 
In Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law. A History of Sovereignty, Status and Self-
Determination (2004), Cambridge University Professor Paul McHugh discusses the legal 
status of aboriginal people across the British Empire. However, he does so without any 
reference to the ongoing significance of the principle of birthright allegiance or subject status 
set down in Calvin’s Case.323 Associate Professor Lisa Ford in Settler Sovereignty, 
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Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-1836 describes Calvin’s 
Case as ‘long abandoned by the courts of the United Kingdom’,324 despite its continued 
importance for legal membership under American, British and Australian law.325 Similarly, in 
an important article drawing parallels between colonial cases and modern litigation in the 
Australian High Court, Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh also refer to Calvin’s Case, 
but only in relation to the obiter statement on abolition of the ‘Brehon law’ of the Irish.326 
Each of these contributions discusses the nineteenth century indigenous cases in the New 
South Wales Supreme Court.327 As McHugh states, the judgment of Justice Burton in Murrell 
‘rested entirely on the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown’.328 However the omission of 
any discussion of Coke’s enduring principle of birthright allegiance and nationality means 
these works do not assess what this ‘assertion of sovereignty’ should have meant for the legal 
status of the indigenous population of Australia.  
Whether the British properly acquired sovereignty over the Australian continent, there is no 
doubt that domestic courts had to operate on this basis. Justices Deane and Gaudron 
explained in Mabo (1992) that there were problems about establishment of the colony of New 
South Wales in 1788 ‘in so far as the international law of the time’ was concerned: 
…contemporary international law would seem to have required a degree of actual occupation 
of a ‘discovered’ territory over which sovereignty was claimed by settlement and it is scarcely 
arguable that the establishment by Phillip in 1788 of the penal camp at Sydney Cove 
constituted occupation of the vast areas of the hinterland of eastern Australia designated by his 
Commissions.
329
 
Critically, however, they went on to say that: 
…in so far as the establishment of British sovereignty is concerned, those problems do not exist 
for the purposes of our domestic law. Under British law in 1788, it lay within the prerogative 
power of the Crown to extend its sovereignty and jurisdiction to territory over which it had not 
previously claimed or exercised sovereignty or jurisdiction…The validity of such an act of 
State…could not be challenged in British courts.330 
Dorsett and McVeigh dispute the British claim to territorial sovereignty over eastern 
Australia in 1788 on the basis of international law, stating that ‘symbolic acts of possession, 
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such as raising the ﬂag, were insufﬁcient to confer sovereignty’. In their view, ‘jurisdiction 
was asserted, although sovereignty had not yet been acquired. As the settlers pushed out from 
Sydney Cove, towards the Blue Mountains and beyond, sovereignty followed in their 
wake’.331 They criticise the High Court’s decision in Mabo for perpetuating ‘jurisdictional 
spaces and places created through colonisation’.332 Similarly, Ford states that the High Court 
in Mabo ‘refused to inquire into the fiction of settler sovereignty’.333  
However, as noted above, Justice Burton in Murrell and Justice Willis in Bonjon did not 
question British sovereignty over New South Wales. The High Court in Mabo confirmed this 
was the correct approach in domestic courts under British law. Moreover, as noted earlier,334 
the High Court in Ame (2005) also confirmed that the common law on alien status had not 
changed in the four centuries since Calvin’s Case. Proper analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Ballard, Murrell and Bonjon requires consideration of the combined significance 
of these two areas of law for indigenous legal status and jurisdiction in colonial New South 
Wales.  
The New South Wales Supreme Court ignored the common law criteria for determining 
subject versus alien status set down in Calvin’s Case – despite considering the case in 
relation to the issue of jurisdiction. 
In Murrell, Justice Burton focussed on Coke’s statement in Calvin’s Case that ‘when an alien 
that is in amity cometh into England…he is within the King’s protection; therefore so long as 
he is here, he oweth to the K a local obedience or ligeance’.335 Hence, according to Burton, 
even if the indigenous inhabitants were aliens, ‘then they are subject as long as they reside in 
the Colony to the laws, & must conform to them – they owe a temporary allegiance like all 
other aliens’.336 Despite having Coke’s dicta from Calvin’s Case laid out before him, Justice 
Burton (and the other judges – Chief Justice Forbes and Justice Dowling) failed to apply the 
principle from that case that any person born within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the 
British Crown was a ‘natural-born’ subject and not an alien.  
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In Justice Burton’s view, once the British had proclaimed sovereignty over and taken 
possession of New South Wales, the local aboriginal people owed, at the least, ‘local’ or 
‘temporary’ allegiance to the British monarch.337 As Coke said, if a parent within the 
sovereignty of the Crown owed such allegiance, this was ‘strong enough to make a natural 
subject, for if he hath issue here, that issue is a natural-born subject’.338 In an advisory 
opinion in 1830 concerning the legal status of a man born to French parents on board a 
British ship, Chief Justice Forbes himself noted that:  
Had the Parents been on the Land, within the Dominions of the Crown of Great Britain, at the 
moment of P. Demestre’s being born, there could be no question but that he would be a Native 
Subject of His Majesty; the law upon this point is stated by a text Writer of Authority in the 
following manner:- ‘The issues of an Alien, born within the Realm, are accounted Natural 
Subjects, in which respect, there is not any difference between our Laws and those of France. In 
each Country, Birth confers the rights of Naturalization’.339 
As Professor Geoffrey Sawer informed a Parliamentary Committee in 1961, under the 
common law ‘every aboriginal native of Australia born in Australia after [annexation]… 
became a British subject by birth; his race was irrelevant, and there were no other 
circumstances capable of qualifying the allegiance’.340  
Despite the focus in Murrell on Calvin’s Case and the prior acceptance by Chief Justice 
Forbes of the relevant legal principle, the Supreme Court failed to apply the established law 
in relation to the status of the indigenous inhabitants. As Henry Reynolds has said, the 
decision in Murrell: 
…cast a long shadow over Australian jurisprudence. The total disregard for Aboriginal law 
propelled the courts away from any concept of legal pluralism and helped undermine traditional 
authority all over the continent.
341 
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But if there was a ‘total disregard’ for Aboriginal law in Murrell, there was also a total 
disregard for British law. That is what makes Murrell and similar cases even more significant 
than commentators have said to date. Reynolds himself cites Coke in Calvin’s Case - using 
‘obiter’ statements by Coke to dispute that the British had sovereignty over Australia.342 The 
key point that such commentators have not considered, however, is that under the enduring 
common law on legal membership of the Empire, once the British had proclaimed 
sovereignty what followed was subject and not alien status for indigenous inhabitants of the 
colonised territory. According to Lisa Ford, in Murrell: 
Burton… resolved a decade of uncertainty about whether indigenous people were aliens or 
subjects of Great Britain. He argued that they were neither. He categorized them instead…as 
‘perpetual inhabitants…who have received the rights of perpetual residence. These are certain 
of citizens of an inferior order, & are united & subject to Society without participating in all its 
advantages’. As such they could be denied fundamental rights as subjects and defendants, yet 
still fall within the purview of British sovereignty and common law.
343
  
While Ford is correct in her analysis of Burton’s findings and the consequences for aboriginal 
people, Justice Burton did not ‘resolve the uncertainty’ about the legal status of indigenous 
inhabitants; instead he perpetuated it. Burton’s categorisation of indigenous people was 
contrary to the law. Ford also states that: 
Settler jurisdiction…displaced neither Aboriginal customary law nor frontier settler violence. 
Despite Murrell, Aboriginal communities on New South Wales peripheries continued to 
regulate themselves for generations to come…The real significance of Murrell, then, was not 
what it changed about jurisdictional practice, but the way that it defined settler sovereignty by 
subordinating indigenous people and their law.
344 
In fact, indigenous people and indigenous law were subordinated by the case of Murrell 
because the Supreme Court ignored established legal principle. Under British law indigenous 
people were entitled to equal legal status with British settlers. The failure of the Supreme 
Court (led by a Chief Justice who proclaimed the rule of law) to apply guiding legal 
precedent laid down centuries before is the real significance of Murrell. 
Conceptual subjects and legal aliens 
While they do not consider compliance of the New South Wales Supreme Court with 
established law on membership and aliens, the analysis by Ford, Reynolds and Buchan helps 
explain why the Court could not bring itself to declare that aboriginal people were subjects 
with equal legal status. Buchan notes that: 
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Official discourse of this period…implies that the Indigenous people were not regarded as 
having the same status or rights as white, European ‘British subjects’. This is because the very 
concept of the ‘British subject’…entailed a particular view of the subject as a rights-bearing 
individual…in a mutual relationship of rights and obligations with the British sovereign. 345  
Buchan notes the influence of seventeenth and eighteenth century Enlightenment 
philosophers (Grotius, Milton, Hobbes, Filmer) on the intellectual concept of ‘the subject’.346 
According to these philosophers, a subject’s allegiance was ‘conditional on the effective 
fulfilment of the duties of sovereignty, namely, the protection of the rights and liberties of 
free subjects’.347 As Ford observes, Justice Burton in his judgment in Murrell: 
…mixed Enlightenment stadial logic with law. If savagery came in many stages, Burton 
reasoned that indigenous Australians occupied too low a stage to profit by legal recognition of 
their customs and institutions.
 348
  
In other words, since the Supreme Court thought aboriginal people too ‘uncivilized’ or 
‘savage’ to have rights and liberties worthy of protection, they could not owe any reciprocal 
obligation of allegiance and the Court could not recognise them as subjects of the Crown.  
While this helps illuminate the thinking behind the Supreme Court’s judgments, a critical 
point is that such reasoning was contrary to the law. In these cases the Supreme Court 
confused the conceptual idea of a ‘subject’ with the legal distinction between a ‘subject’ and 
‘alien’. According to Buchan:  
By the early eighteenth century…British political discourse had come to be characterised by a 
notion of the subject as a rights-bearer whose legal status could be conceptualized in terms of a 
contractual relation binding the sovereign and the people. 349  
While subject status could be conceptualised like this, it was not determined in this way 
under the law. As Justice Windeyer noted, when the law of England arrived with the 
foundation of New South Wales, there was ‘no element of social contract’.350 The idea of 
subject status as a contract-like relationship of mutual obligations may have been true in a 
philosophical sense. It was also at least partly true in practice. For example, breaking of the 
‘contract’ by the sovereign through a failure to honour the ‘rights and liberties’ of subjects 
could lead to rebellion. But under the common law it was not the case that allegiance and 
subject status were conditional on protection by the sovereign. Failure by the sovereign to 
effectively protect his or her subjects or respect their rights and liberties did not end the 
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relationship of ‘subjecthood’ and convert subjects into ‘aliens’. Allegiance was owed not to 
the sovereign in person but to the Crown as a political entity.
351
 Moreover, under the law set 
down in Calvin’s Case, from the moment of birth a ‘natural-born subject’ owed permanent 
and indelible allegiance to the sovereign.  
Allegiance owed by a subject arose from natural and not contract law. As Keechang Kim 
notes, the argument put forward in Calvin’s Case by Coke and Sir Francis Bacon (Solicitor-
General to King James 1) was based on the following statement by a sixteenth century 
Elizabethan writer: 
…legiaunce…is the bonde of faith swallowinge up all others, and the greatest amongst 
creatures, religion to the Creator reserved, due by the lawe of god and nacions from the subject 
to the prince…This legiaunce hath bin from the beginning between prince and subjects by the 
Lawe of nations.
352
 
Similarly Professor Price points out that the most important constitutional aspect of Calvin’s 
Case was: 
…its support for the idea that a King ruled by the law of nature, thereby requiring “natural” 
allegiance of all subjects wherever they may be located. The case emphasized the allegiance 
due to a sovereign solely by virtue of the circumstances of birth; the inquiry was never 
concerned with conscious choice of allegiance or membership in a corporate body’.353  
As Salmond pointed out, a subject was permanently bound by the bond of fealty, and in 
return was permanently entitled to the protection of the Crown.354 While protection was an 
entitlement in return for allegiance, this does not mean allegiance was conditional on 
protection or that allegiance and subjecthood would cease if rights and liberties were not 
protected.  
To understand how the New South Wales Supreme Court ignored the rule of law, it is 
important to consider legal precedent and not merely the Enlightenment philosophies behind 
the Court’s thinking. In 1837 in response to Surveyor-General Mitchell’s treatment of 
aborigines as ‘aliens with whom war can exist’, Secretary for the Colonies Lord Glenelg 
pointed out to New South Wales Governor Sir Richard Bourke that: 
Your Commission as Governor of N.S. Wales asserts H.M.’s Sovereignty over every part of the 
Continent of New Holland which is not embraced in the Colonies of Western or Southern 
Australia. Hence I conceive it follows that all the natives inhabiting those Territories must be 
considered as Subjects of the Queen, and as within H.M.’s Allegiance. To regard them as 
Aliens with whom a War can exist, and against whom H.M.’s Troops may exercise belligerent 
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right, is to deny that protection to which they derive the highest possible claim from the 
Sovereignty which has been assumed over the whole of their Ancient Possessions.
355  
If the legal status of ‘subject’ involved a ‘social contract’ with the King or Queen with 
allegiance conditional on protection, Glenelg could not have concluded that the assertion of 
sovereignty over Australian territory in itself made the native inhabitants subjects of the 
Crown and not aliens. Glenelg took this view because it was the long established position 
under the common law. The Supreme Court’s error was not to apply the established law in a 
similar way, mistaking social philosophies for legal precedent when considering the status of 
aboriginal people.  
The omission of discussion in recent works about territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction in 
the British Empire of the relevant connection with Coke’s principle on birthright nationality 
from Calvin’s Case means those scholars have not properly assessed the compliance of the 
New South Wales Supreme Court with the rule of law. By the time Ballard, Murrell and 
Bonjon were heard by the Supreme Court, the colony had adopted - in no small part due to 
the determination of Chief Justice Forbes himself - the rule of law at least in a formal or 
‘thin’ sense (under which courts independent of executive government were supposed to 
apply established legal principles to particular cases).    
As noted in the introduction to this thesis, not all English common law was transferable to 
Australia. Colonial courts had to determine ‘whether unenacted law was sufficiently general 
in its import to be receivable’.356 In contrast to arcane examples such as ‘gavelkind’ and rules 
for ecclesiastical courts not applicable beyond unique and specific English circumstances, it 
would be difficult to find a rule intended to be more ‘general in its import’ than Coke’s 
common law principle for membership of the British Empire. On this basis, it was not open to 
the New South Wales Supreme Court to reject the overarching principle of imperial 
membership set out in Calvin’s Case. While the doctrine of precedent may not have been 
consolidated until later in the nineteenth century, there is no reason why Coke’s rule on 
birthright nationality and imperial membership should not have been regarded, to use Forbes’ 
own words, as one of those ‘essential principles of English law’ that could only be departed 
from on ‘grounds of extreme necessity’.   
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Lord Glenelg succinctly stated the relevant common law rule. Once sovereignty had been 
asserted over New Holland, the indigenous people inhabitants ‘must be considered as 
Subjects of the Queen’. Forbes himself stated the applicable rule in his opinion in de Mestre 
(1830).357 Justice Burton in Murrell also cited principles of allegiance from Calvin’s Case.358 
David Neal concludes that ‘for the original inhabitants of the colony, the Aborigines’, the rule 
of law in New South Wales in the Forbes era ‘provided cold comfort’. As he says: 
For the white free settlers, convicts and emancipists, it provided a measure of protection against 
power from the top, and eventually was the instrument through which their claim to political 
status was realised; for the Aborigines, its authority stood behind their forceful dispossession, 
its protections proved largely illusory, its courts were closed to Aboriginal testimony, and its 
principles denied the existence of their own laws…legal rules…could mean little without the 
mechanisms and the will to realise the protections promised by the rule of law…Aborigines 
were excluded from the rule of law just as surely as they were from their land.
359 
Consistent with Neal’s assessment, the indigenous cases in the New South Wales Supreme 
Court discussed above involved a refusal to apply established principles of membership and 
alienage law that had remained unchanged for centuries.  
Conclusion: aliens, foreigners and strangers 
The uncertainty in these cases about the status of the native inhabitants arose partly from 
confusion about the mode of acquisition of the Australian colonies. But it was also due to 
confusion between legal and non-legal notions of belonging and ‘foreignness’ and an 
unwillingness to apply the correct legal meaning of terms such as ‘subject’ and ‘alien’ dating 
back to Calvin’s Case in 1608. In these cases the Supreme Court employed non-legal terms 
such as ‘foreigner’ or ‘stranger’, contrary to the ‘subject’ versus ‘alien’ dichotomy set down 
in Calvin’s Case. In Ballard and Bonjon, the Supreme Court said that the colonists and not 
the aborigines were the ‘foreigners’,360 confusing ‘foreign’ in the general or common sense of 
the word (British settlers were plainly ‘foreign’ in this sense when compared to the 
indigenous inhabitants) with the issue of who was ‘foreign’ or ‘outside’ the British system of 
law as applicable in the Australian colonies.361  
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In international law at the time the ‘foreigner’ was a respected figure who did not match the 
Supreme Court’s perception of Australia’s indigenous people. Eve Lester explains that there 
has been: 
…an historical favouring of the foreigner as international law’s (colonising Christianising 
European) insider  - international law’s “self” – over the (citizen/resident) barbarian outsider  - 
its “other”.362  
As Lester says, in the nineteenth century the European ‘foreigner’ was ‘an imperializing 
inside-self, conquering and claiming the coastlines of the uncivilised “barbarian” outside-
other, armed with and enabled by a host of self-proclaimed rights’.363 In these terms, from the 
perspective of the Supreme Court in Ballard and Bonjon, the British settlers were the 
‘foreigners’ inside or belonging to the colonial establishment, and the aborigines were the 
barbarian outsiders who did not belong, even in their own land. 
In Murrell Justice Burton equated ‘aliens’ with ‘strangers’, suggesting the accused be treated 
as if he were in the latter category, confusing Blackstone’s definition of an ‘alien’ as a 
‘stranger-born’, meaning a person born out of the jurisdiction, with a mere ‘stranger’ in a 
non-legal sense, i.e. an ‘outsider’ or someone who was ‘not one of us’. Burton seemed to 
regard the phrase ‘subject or stranger’ as equivalent in legal terms to ‘subject or alien’. 
Referring to the accused, Burton said he ‘ought to be amenable to the laws of the Country 
(w)here the offence was committed whether he be a Subject or a Stranger.’364 The mistake 
Burton made in terms of the common law was that someone who was merely a ‘stranger’ 
might nevertheless be a British subject and not an ‘alien’ in a legal sense. There is no 
question that Australia’s aborigines were regarded and treated as ‘strangers’. As Justice 
Holdroyd said in M’Hugh v Robertson (1885): 
From the first the English have occupied Australia as if it were an uninhabited and desert 
country. The native population were not conquered, but the English government and afterwards 
the colonial authorities, assumed jurisdiction over them as if they were strangers who had 
immigrated into British Territory, and punished them for disobeying laws they could hardly 
understand, and which were palpably inapplicable to their condition.
365
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While Australia’s indigenous people were ‘strangers’ from the perspective of the Anglo-
Celtic colonisers, under the common law they were also ‘subjects’ and not ‘aliens’ because of 
their birth on territory claimed by the English King and/or by virtue of the acquisition of their 
homeland by the British sovereign.  
The misuse in these cases of terms such as ‘subject’, ‘alien’, ‘foreigner’ and ‘stranger’ was 
connected with the Supreme Court’s view of indigenous society. They saw native inhabitants 
as inferior and uncivilised, and perhaps not as human or ‘people’ at all. The judges were 
uncomfortable with the idea that aborigines could have the legal status of ‘natural-born 
subjects’ owing personal allegiance to the English monarch and permanently bound by a 
bond of ‘fealty’ or loyalty to the British sovereign. 
Over the next century in imperial and post-federation Australia, the failure to properly apply 
common law definitions of membership became more prominent, not least through 
application of the term ‘alien’ to any person regarded as not ‘belonging to’ the dominant 
Anglo-Celtic colonial society.   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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CHAPTER TWO Chinese Australians: ‘the stranger within your 
gates’ 
Robert Ding appeared on Channel Nine’s A Current Affair this week conducting an 
auction in Mandarin. The article was named ‘Chinese buyers taking over the housing 
market…The article blamed booming house prices on Chinese investors…“I’m a true-
blue Australian ... been here for 43 years... if I buy a property, does that make me a 
foreign investor?”366 
Chinese Australians and the rule of law 
The main targets of the term ‘alien’ in colonial and post-federation Australia were those of 
ethnic Chinese origin. A belief that Chinese Australians were inherently ‘alien’ in a racial 
sense not only led to restrictive or exclusionary laws but also affected perceptions of their 
legal status. Key figures in colonial Australia understood that Chinese settlers from British 
colonies in Asia367 were ‘British subjects’ having equal status under imperial law, with the 
right to travel freely within the Empire,368 and that they were not ‘aliens’ in a legal sense. But 
this did not stop them regarding and treating all Chinese settlers as ‘aliens’.  
Numbering almost 40,000 by the 1860s369 - including about one-sixth of the recorded male 
population370 - Chinese settlers played an important role on the Australian goldfields and in 
agriculture and mining in northern Australia, as well as by establishing key businesses in the 
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south of the country.371 However even today the Chinese are not generally accepted as one of 
the founding settler communities of modern Australia. As Professor John Fitzgerald says, the 
‘Big White Lie’ in Australia is that the Chinese did not belong here: 
The cultural legacy of White Australia is powerful and persistent…[The] challenge is to embed 
Chinese-Australian stories in Australian history to the point of demonstrating that so-called 
anti-Chinese attitudes were not anti-Chinese at all but anti-Australian, even in White 
Australia.
372
 
The failure to accept the role of the Chinese community in building modern Australia is due 
both to the considerable reduction in their presence under the White Australia Policy 
(formally implemented by the new Commonwealth government from 1901)373 and because 
they were persistently classed as the ‘aliens’ or ‘outsiders’, despite having as much right as 
other settler groups to be seen as ‘belonging’ or as ‘one of us’. Sophie Couchman observes 
that:   
Despite the sojourning character of their immigration, Chinese Australians were settlers and an 
integral part of the colonisation of Australia. At the same time they were also excluded from the 
imaginative construction of the Australian nation…the Australian nation was imagined and 
built around the exclusion of Chinese and other ‘coloured’ peoples…this had a real and very 
painful impact on the lives of Chinese Australians.
374
 
As Adam McKeown notes, ‘the significance of the Chinese in Australian history lies not only 
in their numbers, but also in their ideological use as the Other in formulations of Australian 
identity’.375 Professor Kim Rubenstein observes that the ‘fear and antagonism toward Chinese 
aliens forged a particularly “Australian” sense of nationhood’.376 Many, however, were not 
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aliens under the law. Moreover, as Fitzgerald says, Chinese Australians, whatever their origin 
and legal status, belonged as much as other settler groups. 
Like Couchman, Fitzgerald says the exclusion of people of Chinese descent was central to 
nation building in Australia. This was of particular importance in the lead up to federation in 
creating the image of a new Australian nation ‘able to exercise its independence by shutting 
its gates to non-Whites’, especially the Chinese.377 As Fitzgerald says: 
Inadvertently, people of Chinese descent helped to shape the national imaginary of the country 
from which they were excluded, and indirectly to shape the national vision of what this new 
country was to be, or to become.
378
 
Of course, such an image did not accord with the role Chinese settlers anticipated for 
themselves in the new Australia. Chinese Australians: 
…saw themselves as part of exciting new developments in the Australian colonies, and were 
puzzled that others could not make room for them in a shared vision of Australia. The Chinese-
Australian vision was one of a new nation in which all ‘races’ would be counted equal.379 
Couchman notes that little notice was taken of the specific origin of ethnic Chinese settlers. 
In English language records of the time:  
Regardless of their birthplace, residents of Chinese background were morphed together into 
anonymous stereotypes that were part of a racist ideology which permeated Australian society 
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Often authors of these records made little attempt to 
even identify the names of individuals discussed – they were simply ‘a Chinaman’, ‘John 
Chinaman’ or ‘Charlie’. By denying these people their individuality, society was able to create 
a dichotomy whereby ‘the Chinese’ could be shaped as an undesirable element, the antithesis of 
‘an Australian’. This provided a justification for denying them a place in Australia.380 
As discussed below, even official census records failed to properly record the birthplace of 
ethnic Chinese residents. Similarly, colonial parliamentary reports, cited by contemporary 
historians for the origin of ethnic Chinese settlers, were not intended to provide any such 
record. The number of Chinese inhabitants in colonial and post-federation Australia with 
British subject status through birth in a Crown colony or dominion was greater than census 
records indicate. However even the inaccurate colonial and Commonwealth census records 
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show that a significant proportion  (at least one third) of Chinese Australians were British 
subjects and not ‘aliens’ under the law.  
Because they were seen as ‘outsiders’ or the ‘other’, Chinese Australians were labelled as 
‘aliens’ by the Anglo-Celtic community. As Kevin Wong Hoy states, ‘during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, the term ‘alien’ was used to denote a foreigner or outsiders, but it 
was also employed by those hostile to the Chinese as a term of racial denigration’.381 As 
noted in the Introduction, a critical point not raised by Hoy or other commentators on the 
Chinese in Australia during the colonial period (Willard, Price, Oddie, Yarwood and 
Knowling, Evans, Saunders and Cronin) is that the word ‘alien’ was applied in parliamentary 
debates, legislation and cases to many inhabitants of ethnic Chinese origin who legally 
‘belonged’ as British subjects.  
While the way the Anglo-Celtic community encountered ethnic Chinese settlers varied from 
colony to colony,382 the use of ‘alien’ was generally similar amongst the different Australian 
territories. Key lawmakers used the threat of invasion, disease and degradation of white 
living standards to depict the Chinese as an ‘alien race’. Bigotry and racism were underlying 
factors in this portrayal of Chinese Australians. Legislation and cases from this period 
reflected the assumption that all Chinese were ‘alien’, often leaving Chinese British subjects 
with an impossible task to prove otherwise.  
Political and legal figures in colonial and post-federation Australia described Chinese 
inhabitants as inherently ‘alien’ despite their awareness that many were natural-born British 
subjects and not ‘aliens’ under the law. Queensland Attorney-General Samuel Griffith 
brushed aside a formal reminder from imperial authorities that many Chinese settlers were 
British subjects. He also ignored statements from parliamentary colleagues that ‘alien’ was a 
legal not racial term.383 New South Wales Premier Sir Henry Parkes played a major role in 
spreading fear of ‘Chinese aliens’ amongst the white community. Parkes understood many 
Chinese residents were subjects of the British Crown but said exclusion of such ‘pestilent’ 
aliens was more important than obedience to the law.384 Griffith, Parkes and their political 
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colleagues embedded the misuse of ‘alien’ in colonial Australia. This inevitably fed into the 
constitutional convention debates of the 1890s and led to further misuse after federation. 
This chapter looks first at census records and parliamentary reports which did not distinguish 
properly between ‘alien’ and ‘British subject’ ethnic Chinese. This meant there was no 
accurate record of how many inhabitants of Chinese origin had equal legal standing as 
subjects of the Crown. The chapter then shows that, as with colonial attitudes towards 
indigenous people discussed in Chapter One, perceived racial and social differences were 
more important than the law in categorising Chinese Australians as ‘aliens’. Next the chapter 
describes the role of colonial leaders such as Samuel Griffith and Henry Parkes in 
promulgating a view of ethnic Chinese as an ‘alien race’. Finally the chapter examines how, 
contrary to the rule of law, British subject Chinese faced a presumption that they were 
‘aliens’ in legislation and in the courts.  
The chapter shows that in colonial Australia executive, legislative and judicial 
pronouncements all played into a discourse of alienage overriding the common law meaning 
regarding Chinese Australians. Each fed into the other in defying the rule of law when it 
came to the correct identification of Chinese Australians and a proper legal assessment of 
whether they were aliens or not. This has implications for modern constitutional law, not least 
in relation to colonial era cases still uncritically cited in support of a far-reaching 
Commonwealth power over ‘aliens’.  
Census figures and British Chinese  
Analysis of colonial and post-federation census records suggests they contributed 
significantly to the ‘big white lie’ that ethnic Chinese did not belong in Australia. In 
particular, by failing to record the birthplace of ethnic Chinese inhabitants they understated 
the number who legally belonged as British subjects and could not lawfully have been 
regarded or treated as ‘aliens’.  
Victoria 
Census records in colonial Australia failed to accurately differentiate between settlers from 
Imperial China and those of Chinese ethnic origin born in British colonies. Victoria’s 1871 
census, for example, recorded 17,826 male and 31 female ‘natives of China’ resident in the 
colony. The census noted that: 
83 
 
The Chinese were not all born in China. The returns show that 24, viz 12 males and 12 females, 
were born in this colony. Seventy-two of them also, all males, were born in the British colony 
of Hong Kong, and were therefore British subjects by birth.385 
In this document the census recognises that Chinese settlers born in Hong Kong were natural-
born British subjects. However the recorded number is questionable considering the imperial 
links and transport connections between that colony and Australia.386 In 1881 Victoria’s 
Government Statist provided an explanation for the low number of natural-born British 
subjects of ethnic Chinese origin in official census records: 
Of the 11,869 Chinese males returned – which include half-castes – 126 were set down as being 
born elsewhere than in the Chinese Empire, viz: 81 in Victoria, 4 in New South Wales, 38 in 
the British Possession of Hong Kong, and 2 in that of Singapore, and 1 in the Portuguese 
Possession of Macao…It is probable that many more of the Chinese were born in Hong Kong, 
and possibly a few more in Macao, it being almost certain that some of the sub-enumerators did 
not realize the necessity of noting the distinction between British or Portuguese China, and 
China proper.387 
This suggests that despite the large ethnic Chinese populations in Great Britain’s colonies in 
the Far East and Southeast Asia, those responsible for collecting census figures in the 
Australian colonies assumed any settler of Chinese appearance had been born in China itself. 
The above extract indicates that only in rare cases did the ‘sub-enumerators’ realise the 
importance of recording the birth of such people in a British colony. Therefore, as the 
Government Statist said, the number of Chinese British subjects who settled in Australia in 
the colonial period appears to have been greatly understated in official census returns. This 
appears to be confirmed by the 1891 Victorian census which included a table that ‘contains a 
statement of the country of birth of all the Chinese living in Victoria in 1891’. Of the 9,377 
people of Chinese race recorded as living in Victoria, only three were listed as born in the 
Straits Settlements (Singapore, Penang, Malacca), with none recorded as having a place of 
birth in Hong Kong or other British colonies.388  
The 1891 Victorian census did record the increasing number of Chinese residents born in 
Australia, reporting that ‘876, viz., 103 of pure and 773 of mixed race, were born in Victoria; 
and 17, viz., 2 of pure and 15 of mixed race, in other Australasian colonies’.389 But in contrast 
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to the 1871 census, there was no accompanying statement that these people had the legal 
status of British subjects (and were not aliens) by virtue of their birthplace. 
New South Wales 
The Registrar-General for New South Wales observed in his report on the 1871 census for 
that colony that:  
At the previous Census the information obtained about the Chinese population was limited 
almost entirely to their gross number. In order to arrive at better results on this occasion, a 
larger number of interpreters were appointed to accompany the collectors who had to visit 
localities where Chinese were congregated. Thus, while in 1861, when the Chinese element 
numbered nearly 13,000, only 5 interpreters were engaged; in 1871, when their number had 
decreased to 7,220, 21 interpreters assisted in gathering the information. The result has been 
very satisfactory, as will be seen by the large decrease of numbers in the column devoted to 
“Unspecified “ throughout the compiled tables, if compared with the Census Returns of 
1861.
390  
Despite the resources devoted to questioning the Chinese population, it appears neither the 
collectors nor the interpreters were instructed to ask where individual Chinese settlers came 
from. In its table on ‘nationality’ listing the birthplaces of inhabitants, the 1871 census only 
includes - apart from the British isles and ‘foreign countries’ - the general heading of other 
‘British possessions’, with no specific reference to colonies such as Hong Kong or the Straits 
Settlements.391 In other words, there is no record in the census of how many of the Chinese 
inhabitants came from such colonies.  
The 1881 New South Wales census recorded the number of ‘British subjects’ born in various 
places, including the Australian colonies, the British Isles (including Ireland), New Zealand  
and Fiji, as well as ‘Other British possessions’. Again, however, there is no record of specific 
numbers from British colonies in Asia. The census also recorded the number of residents 
born in ‘foreign countries’. While countries such as the United States, France, Belgium, 
Russia etc were listed by name, the census merely recorded that 10,205 ‘Chinese’ were 
resident in the colony, without specifying what country these residents were born in.392 The 
1891 New South Wales census recorded 13,157 residents born in the ‘Chinese Empire 
(including Tartary)’, including 126 who had become British subjects by naturalisation. It also 
listed numbers born in different places in the ‘British Empire’, but listed only 64 residents 
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born in Hong Kong and 50 in the Straits Settlements, figures which (as for Victoria) appear 
too low.393 The census also recorded approximately 1,000 ‘Chinese half-castes’ in New South 
Wales.394 While the census made no reference to their legal status, most if not all would have 
been British subjects as a consequence of their birth in the colony. 
Unlike Victoria’s census reports, neither the 1871, 1881 nor 1891 New South Wales census 
reports referred to the British subject status of ethnic Chinese people born in British colonies 
nor to the importance of distinguishing between ‘British China’ and ‘China proper’ in 
relation to place of birth. Even in Victoria, recognition by the Government Statist in 1881 of 
the importance of this information for the legal status of inhabitants did not result in accurate 
figures in later census records on the number of Chinese settlers with British subject status.  
Given the lack of any reference to this issue in the New South Wales census reports, it is 
reasonable to conclude that, as for Victoria, the authorities did not know how many ethnic 
Chinese residents were British subjects (and therefore not ‘aliens’) under the law applying in 
the colony. 
Queensland 
The 1861 Queensland census recorded 538 Chinese settlers in the colony,395 with the number 
growing to 3,305 by the time of the 1871 census.396 Table XII of the 1871 census listed: 
…by Electoral Districts and Census Districts the Chinese (with whom Japanese, if any, are 
included), Polynesians, prisoners, lunatics, and inmates of charitable institutions, all of whom 
would be deducted from the gross population in any electoral scheme.
397
 
This table indicates the standing in the Queensland community of the Chinese, Japanese and 
‘Polynesians’ (i.e. Pacific islanders, in fact largely ‘Melanesian’ in origin), grouping them 
with members of society deprived of their freedom or regarded as less than equal. In addition 
the recording of ethnic or racial origins was so imprecise that ‘Japanese’ were included in the 
number of ‘Chinese’ for the purpose of Table XII. Similarly, Table XXIX (Birth Places of the 
Population) gave a combined figure for inhabitants born in ‘China and Japan’.398 There is no 
                                                 
393
  New South Wales, Census of New South Wales 1891 (Charles Potter, Government Printer, Sydney 
1894) Table IV, http://hccda.anu.edu.au/pages/NSW-1891-census-02_439.  
394
  Ibid, Ages Table 1, ‘Number of Persons, Males and Females, at each Period of Age’. 
http://hccda.anu.edu.au/pages/NSW-1891-census-02_2.  
395
  Queensland, Third Census of the Colony of Queensland 1868 (James C. Beal, Government Printer, 
Brisbane, 1869) Table M ‘Table showing the number of the population, by native country, in 1861, 
1864, and 1868’ http://hccda.ada.edu.au/pages/QLD-1868-census-02_21. 
396
  Queensland, Census of 1871 (James C. Beal, Government Printer, Brisbane).  
397
  Ibid http://hccda.ada.edu.au/pages/QLD-1871-census_01-02_8.  
398
  Ibid  http://hccda.ada.edu.au/pages/QLD-1871-census_01-05_174.  
86 
 
indication in the 1871 census of any attempt to record the number of ethnic Chinese 
inhabitants born in British colonial possessions in Asia.399  
Queensland’s 1871 census declared that ‘neither Chinese nor Polynesians can, as a general 
rule, be looked upon as permanent settlers in the Colony’, observing that amongst the 
Chinese inhabitants there was only one woman.400 But contrary to this, it also highlighted 
marriage between Chinese male settlers and white women, remarking that ‘it must be borne 
in mind…that in not a few cases Chinamen are married to European wives, it is popularly 
supposed chiefly Irish, but really the English predominate’.401 The census omitted to mention 
that children of such marriages were British subjects - and not aliens - by virtue of their birth 
in the colony.  
The 1881 Queensland census stated that the number of inhabitants ‘born in China’ had 
increased to 11,253 but again reflected no understanding that some Chinese settlers came 
from British colonies in Asia, including no record of birth in such places.402  
South Australia 
South Australia’s 1881 census recorded the number of inhabitants ‘born in British 
Possessions’. However, as in New South Wales, the census only provided figures for people 
born in the British Isles, the Australian colonies and New Zealand together with unidentified 
‘Other British Possessions’.403 The census listed 4,151 inhabitants born in China, stating that 
2,734 were residents of the Northern Territory, with another 1,070 ‘in transit on board vessels 
at Port Darwin, the remainder (347), being in South Australia proper’.404 There was no 
recognition of the importance for the legal status of Chinese settlers of recording birth in 
Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements or other British possessions in Asia.  
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Commonwealth census reports 
The first Commonwealth census in 1911 only partly rectified the failure of colonial censuses 
to record the number of ethnic Chinese residents with British subject status. The 1911 census 
recorded 22,753 ‘full blood’ and 3,019 ‘half-caste’ Chinese as residents of Australia.405 5,187 
of the ‘full-blood’ Chinese and 3,009 (i.e. all except ten) of the ‘half-caste’ Chinese were 
listed as British subjects by birth, parentage or naturalisation. In other words, according to the 
official census 8,196 - or approximately 32 per cent - of Chinese residents in Australia were 
British subjects. 
However while the 1911 census recorded that practically all the ‘half-caste’ Chinese British 
subjects gained their subject status – as might be expected – through birth in Australia, nearly 
three times as many ‘full-blood’ Chinese were listed as having become British subjects by 
naturalisation as were subjects by place of birth.406 Given the obstacles faced by Chinese 
settlers seeking naturalisation in Australia, especially in the later colonial period, the recorded 
number of subjects by birth in the 1911 census appears disproportionately low. According to 
Cronin, only 0.8 per cent of the estimated 20,000 Chinese who arrived in the colony of 
Queensland succeeded in complying with required qualifications and obtained 
naturalisation.407 Only 110 Chinese people were naturalised in Queensland between 1876 and 
1904.408 Nearly 3,000 Chinese people were naturalised in Victoria between 1870 and 1887,409 
but Victoria refused to naturalise Chinese people after that date.410 In South Australia 
naturalisation of ‘Asiatic aliens’ required the specific approval of the House of Assembly. In 
1903 the Chief Secretary of South Australia observed that ‘For many years every 
Government that had been in power had practically refused all Asiatics. He did not know of 
an exception’.411 
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After federation, under section 4 of the Naturalization Act 1903 (Cth) settlers of Chinese 
origin already naturalised in one of the former Australian colonies were deemed to be British 
subjects,412 but section 5 prohibited ‘aboriginal natives of Asia, Africa, or the Islands of the 
Pacific, excepting New Zealand’ from becoming subjects.413 As Paul Jones points out, this 
meant that people of non-European background, including Chinese settlers, were in practice 
‘barred from naturalisation under Australian law from 1903’.414 
This suggests that the number of natural-born subjects of ethnic Chinese origin may again 
have been understated in the Commonwealth’s 1911 census, probably because - as noted by 
the Victorian Government Statist in 1881 - census collectors assumed that persons of Chinese 
appearance had been born in ‘China’, not recognising the importance in terms of legal status 
of recording birth in a British colony or dominion.  
The 1936 Year Book for the Commonwealth of Australia prepared by the Bureau of Census 
and Statistics included tables comparing the number of ‘persons of Chinese race’ and the 
number of ‘Chinese persons of foreign nationality’ in Australia in the 1921 and 1933 
censuses. According to the Year Book, in 1921 there were 17,157 persons of Chinese race 
plus 3,669 ‘half-caste’ persons of Chinese race in Australia. In that year there were 13,799 
‘Chinese persons of foreign nationality’ in Australia.415 This means, based on official figures, 
there were 3,358 persons of (full) Chinese race in Australia in 1921 who were not of ‘foreign 
nationality’, in other words who were British subjects. In addition, practically all of the ‘half-
caste’ persons of Chinese race are likely to have been - as the 1911 census indicated - British 
subjects through birth in Australia. Hence according to official figures as recorded in the 
Year Book, out of almost 21,000 full or half-caste ‘persons of Chinese race’ in Australia in 
1921, nearly 7,000 (or one-third) had British subject status and were therefore not aliens 
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under the law applying in the country. On the same basis, in 1933 around 6,500 or some 45 
per cent of the 14,349 persons of Chinese race in Australia were British subjects and not 
aliens in a legal sense.416 
Apart from showing the effect of the White Australia Policy in dramatically reducing the 
overall number of Chinese in Australia, even the official figures from the 1911, 1921 and 
1933 censuses - which probably understated the number of those born in British colonies and 
dominions - indicate that a substantial proportion of ‘persons of Chinese race’ in Australia 
were British subjects and not ‘aliens’.  
The colonial and Commonwealth census information set out above shows a lack of regard for 
the legal significance of birth in territory, and this continues into research and writing in 
modern times. For example, an article by Andrew Markus entitled ‘Government Control of 
Chinese Immigration to Australia, 1855-1975’ includes a table purporting to show the 
number of Australian residents born in ‘China, Hong Kong and Taiwan’ at every census from 
1861 to 1996. There are no residents recorded as having been born in Hong Kong until the 
1947 census.417   
In summary, colonial and post-federation census records did not accurately record the 
number of British subjects of ethnic Chinese origin in Australia. For census officials 
assumptions based on race overrode considerations of legal status. It was assumed that all 
inhabitants of ethnic Chinese origin had been born in China and were of Chinese nationality. 
There was little or no recognition of the different standing under the law of ethnic Chinese 
inhabitants born in British colonies, naturalised as British subjects in Australian colonies or 
born in Australia to Chinese fathers. Census collectors and those instructing them did not 
recognise the importance in terms of legal status of recording birth in a British colony or 
dominion. It is reasonable to conclude therefore that the number of Chinese British subjects 
in late colonial and post-federation Australia was understated in official census figures. 
However even official census figures indicate that a considerable proportion (at least one-
third) of Chinese settlers living in Australia during this period were British subjects and not 
‘aliens’ under the law applying in the country.  
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The failure to properly identify Chinese Australians with legal subject status resulted from 
confusion about who was an ‘alien’ under the law. In turn this contributed to a continuing 
presumption in colonial parliaments and the courts, contrary to the rule of law, that all ethnic 
Chinese inhabitants were ‘aliens’. 
Colonial parliamentary reports  
Apart from census records, other official sources in relation to the origin of Chinese settlers 
include inquiries conducted by colonial parliaments. In 1857 and 1868 Victoria’s Parliament 
commissioned reports on the Chinese population in that colony. According to Geoffrey Serle, 
these are ‘the two main sources on the Chinese in Victoria in this period’.418  
In 1857 when Chinese businessman Lowe Kong Meng was asked by the Select Committee on 
Chinese Immigration ‘From what part of China do the Chinese now in the Colony chiefly 
come?’, he replied ‘All from Canton; they are all Canton people… Some from country and 
some from town’.419 In his 1868 report to the Victorian Parliament, the Reverend William 
Young said that: 
The Chinese who emigrate from China to this country are chiefly from the province of Canton. 
They generally belong to the rural agricultural population, spread over the country from 70 to 
about 150 miles south of Canton, and perhaps about the same distance westward of Hong Kong 
and Macao.420 
The 1868 report is an important source for contemporary accounts of the origin of Chinese 
migrants to Australia in the colonial era. Yong (1966)421 and Choi (1975) 422 both refer to this 
report. In turn Ryan (1995) refers to Yong and Choi for her conclusion that after gold was 
discovered in Australia in 1850: 
By far the majority of Chinese migrating from Hong Kong to the eastern colonies of Australia 
were Cantonese, from the thirteen counties on the fertile delta of the Pearl River, in Kwantung 
Province.
423 
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Similarly, Serle (1968) - in turn cited by Charles Price (1974)424 – refers to the above 
statement by Reverend Young when claiming that most of the Chinese who came to Victoria 
in the 1850s were from the area south of Canton and west of Hong Kong.425 
However neither the 1857 nor the 1868 reports provide any kind of definitive record of the 
number of ethnic Chinese settlers from different places of origin, nor is there any indication 
that the reports were intended to be read in that way. Both Lowe Kong Meng and Reverend 
Young were reporting on migrants ‘from China’. Kong Meng said all such people were ‘from 
Canton’, but he was a British subject himself, having emigrated four years before from the 
colony of Penang.426 While Reverend Young said Chinese settlers in Victoria were chiefly 
from Canton province, the figures in the 1868 report do not in themselves substantiate this 
claim. Of the 11 districts in Victoria for which numbers of Chinese residents are provided in 
the report, there is only one where there is any reference to migrants from Canton province.427 
Moreover, the 1868 report itself indicates the existence of British subject Chinese in colonial 
Victoria, referring to settlers originally from Singapore,428 others naturalised in Victoria429 
and ‘between 50 and 60’ Chinese settlers married to European women with an estimated 130 
locally born children (who were therefore natural-born British subjects).430 
According to Price, by the 1880s nearly 90 per cent of Chinese in Victoria came from the 
four districts south of Canton, with more from other areas of China itself. Price cites Yong 
and Choi in making this assessment.431 Yet Price also states, inconsistently, that a major issue 
at the 1888 ‘Inter-Colonial Conference on the Chinese Question’ (discussed below) was that 
‘it seemed clear that many Chinese immigrants had been either born or naturalised in British 
territories such as Hong Kong and Singapore and therefore possessed British citizenship’.432  
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Histories of colonial Victoria which have drawn, directly or indirectly, on the 1857 and 1868 
reports to Victoria’s parliament have therefore continued the confusion about the origin of 
ethnic Chinese resident in the colony and how many could properly be regarded as ‘aliens’ 
under the law.  
Imperial queries about legal status  
Importantly, legal advice to the imperial government confirmed the British subject status of 
ethnic Chinese residents in colonial territories which were major departure points for 
emigration to nineteenth century Australia.  
The colony of Hong Kong was a particular focus. As Phillip Mar observes: 
From the mid 19th century, Hong Kong was a major embarkation point for southern Chinese 
emigration to much of the Pacific, including Australia. At least 6 million Chinese emigrants 
apparently passed through Hong Kong to various parts of the world up to 1939. Shipping 
statistics tell us that some 10,500 departed from Hong Kong for Melbourne in just eleven 
months up to September 1855 at the height of gold rush emigration.
433
 
After the original acquisition of Hong Kong in 1842 under the Treaty of Nanking, its territory 
was twice expanded - under the Treaty of Beijing in 1860 (Kowloon) and the Convention for 
the Extension of Hong Kong Territory in 1898 (New Territories). Clive Parry explains the 
general rule regarding acquisition of British nationality in such circumstances: 
On the annexation of territory by the Crown before 1949 all subjects of the former sovereign 
resident in such territory became British subjects unless other provision regarding their 
nationality was agreed to, proclaimed, or enacted by the Crown.
434
 
Since there was no relevant statutory provision435 and no agreement to the contrary in the 
treaties of 1842, 1860 or 1898,436 the residents of Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New 
Territories became British subjects on the date of annexation of the relevant territory. This 
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was confirmed by lawyers to the British government in an 1898 opinion obtained by Mervyn 
Jones: 
Hong Kong acquired new territory, under a lease for 99 years from the Chinese Government, in 
1898…The British Government was advised by the Law Officers of the Crown that ‘persons 
inhabiting the new territory who were before the cession Chinese subjects are to be regarded as 
British subjects for all purposes as from 16th April 1899’. The latter was the date of the actual 
taking over (annexation) of the territory.
437
 
In other words, according to an official legal opinion to the British government, after cession 
of territory from China the inhabitants became subjects of the British Crown under imperial 
law. Contrary to the law, however, Australian authorities and key political figures continued 
to label and treat ethnic Chinese people from Hong Kong and other British territories in Asia 
as ‘aliens’.  
‘Always an alien people’ 
Racial prejudice and not the common law determined the standing of ethnic Chinese residents 
in the eyes of the white colonial community in Australia. Settlers of Chinese descent were 
seen as indelibly foreign or ‘alien’ because of their race. In her paper on ‘mixed race’ 
children born in Australia (who were, therefore, ‘natural-born’ British subjects), Kate Bagnall 
highlights an 1881 newspaper article which declared:  
The two races are so opposite that they cannot exist together. One must make room for the 
other. If they were, say, Russians who came to settle among us, whether they took wives from 
our circle or brought their own wives with them, their children would be white, and we should 
soon be one people. But with the Chinese the case would be different. No matter who the 
child’s mother was, or where he was born, he would be a Chinese still.438  
In 1888 the President of the Victorian Trades Hall Council said that ‘any Chinaman 
who…retained his pigtail was still a Chinese subject’.439 This might suggest that Chinese 
settlers who ‘abandoned their pigtails’ could become accepted in the colonial Australian 
community. Indeed, Bagnall refers to ‘four markers of identity…through which mixed 
Chinese Australians might be able to negotiate…their identity as the Other’, including 
appearance, education, language and naming.440 But adopting the clothing and mannerisms of 
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European settlers did not ensure acceptance by Anglo-Celtic colonial society. In 1888 the 
Government Resident of the Northern Territory declared that:  
…the Chinese will always be and remain foreigners, as were the Moors in Spain, and the Turks 
in South-Eastern Europe. As they were, and are distinct and separate races, so the Chinese will 
always be an alien people…The wearing of slop clothes and felt hats is but a superficial 
recognition of European surroundings. In Sydney and Melbourne, as well as in Port Darwin, the 
Chinese is a Chinese and he holds fast to his national habits and customs.
441
 
Colonial leaders in nineteenth century Australia showed little respect for the legal status of 
Chinese British subjects. The dominant view was that it made no difference if settlers of 
ethnic Chinese origin were ‘natural-born subjects’ from Australia or another British colony or 
‘naturalised subjects’, they should all be regarded and treated as ‘aliens’. Premier of South 
Australia Sir Thomas Playford said birth as a British subject should carry no weight in the 
case of the Chinese, declaring that ‘a Chinaman was not the less a Chinaman because he was 
born under the British flag in Hongkong or Singapore’.442 Victorian Premier Gillies reported 
to the Imperial Parliament that ‘the Chinese, from all points of view, are so entirely dissimilar 
as to render a blending of the two peoples out of the question’. They were, he said, ‘not only 
an alien race, but remain aliens’,443 explaining that ‘naturalised British subjects are still 
Chinese and are as objectionable as if they were to come from the centre of China’.444 Such 
views from the colonial leadership, completely at odds with established legal principle, 
ensured racial prejudice continued to disrupt the law on ‘alienage’ in Australia. 
The Chinese ‘threat’ 
In the minds of white colonial politicians, there were many factors in addition to different 
skin colour or race justifying their portrayal of Chinese Australians as ‘aliens’ - including the 
different civilisation, religion and clothing of Chinese settlers; their supposedly lesser 
aspirations for political and labour rights; the poorer living conditions they were allegedly 
satisfied with; their supposed prevalence to, and role in spreading, disease; the transient 
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nature of some Chinese migrants; and the relative lack of women amongst Chinese 
arrivals.445  
Above all, there was the notion of a threat. Chinese settlers were seen by the Anglo-Celtic 
colonisers of Australia as a threat to the security of the country, to their standard of living and 
health, and, of course, to the racial purity of the emerging ‘white Australian’ nation. There 
were repeated references to a horde of hundreds of millions of ‘alien’ Chinese about to 
swamp Australia, and to how unfair it was that people from an ‘alien race’ should be able to 
charge less for their labour, thereby depriving white settlers of an honest living.  
In 1876 the Hon W.H. Yaldwyn told the Queensland Legislative Council about the threat 
posed by the Chinese: 
We were near neighbours to a teeming mass of Chinese - nearly 400,000,000 of them were 
separated from us by a narrow stretch of placid ocean. It was a stern struggle for existence in 
that closely packed country, and the advantages possessed by a rich and sparsely inhabited 
colony like Queensland must be only too apparent to them. The peaceful invasion had begun; it 
was idle to think that it would cease. It behoved the rulers of this colony to step boldly forward 
and slaughter the giant whilst he was young and his bones were soft. Let them take a high hand 
and forbid those people to land upon our shores…it was now our duty to refuse to allow this 
fair colony to be overrun by the offscourings of the Chinese Empire. Queensland was like a 
young and vigorous forest-tree, giving promise of a magnificent maturity; but a parasite was at 
its root, insidious in its approach, inevitable as fate; it grew on and on, and unless pruned away 
with a ruthless hand, the noxious growth would involve the whole fabric in decay and death.
446
 
The small size of the white colonial population in Australia relative to the vast populace of 
China produced an abiding fear of imminent invasion. According to David Walker, ‘the 
Chinese presence in the colonies stirred many Australian anxieties…They suspected 
Australia might be on a great Chinese flood plain’.447 As Charles Pearson declared in 1881 in 
a debate in the Victorian Legislative Assembly on the Chinese Influx Restriction Bill, the 
‘mere natural increase’ in China’s vast population in a single year: 
…would be sufficient to swamp the whole white population of the colony. Australia was now 
perfectly well known to Chinese; communication between the two countries was thoroughly 
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established; and in the event of famine or war arising in China, Chinamen might come here at 
any time in hordes.
448
 
There was also a pervasive fear amongst the white community about infection from Chinese 
arrivals who were often wrongly blamed for introducing disease. In 1877 the Vice-President 
of Queensland’s Executive Council wrote to the Chief Secretaries of the other Australasian 
colonies claiming that smallpox was a ‘practical evil connected with the unrestricted 
immigration of Chinese’.449 In 1881 Mr O’Connor declared in the New South Wales 
Parliament that: 
We were within a comparatively short distance of an overcrowded, poverty-stricken nation, 
which was anxious to find an outlet for millions of its inhabitants…How could we expect an 
Englishman to compete with small-pox and other pestilential diseases which the Chinese 
introduced with them?...We must take care…that our civilisation was not broken down by the 
influx of one of the most demoralising races on the face of the earth.
450
 
The same year the South Australian Register warned that ‘we cannot be indifferent to the 
mischief of a possible Mongolian invasion…we cannot be regardless of the introduction of 
such fell diseases as leprosy and smallpox’.451 
As Greg Watters comments, it is surprising that the historiography of Australia’s nineteenth 
century engagement with China has ‘neglected the importance played by contamination 
fears’: 
…given the belief, held by many Australians at the time, that the Chinese were a diseased and 
dirty people. This image prefigured the first significant contacts between Australians and 
Chinese and it continued to be popularly accepted, despite conflicting evidence, throughout 
much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries…Contamination anxieties introduced a 
stridency and phobic quality to Australia’s challenge of facing China.452 
As well as invasion and disease, there was a particular fear of the threat to white prosperity 
and labour standards posed by ‘alien’ Chinese workers. In 1886 the Sydney Bulletin pointed 
to the United States where ‘ignorance of the Mongolian Octopus in San Francisco permitted 
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the nuisance to spread’, observing that ‘men do not like Mongolian neighbours, and as there 
was a difficulty in getting tenants for buildings near the Chinese quarter, the aliens were 
enabled to buy up more houses …and so the colony spread’.453  The article painted an image 
of sub-human Chinese creatures draining the source of life from honest white workers, 
declaring:  
[F]rom this Chinese quarter, slave labour stretches forth a grimy sinewy hand to clutch the 
bread for which free and honest men and women would willingly work. Shoemakers, 
laundrymen, cigar-makers, cabinet-makers, and other tradesmen slave away there in narrow and 
pestiferous dens from dawn until midnight working out their own enfranchisement, and by the 
price of their freedom pauperising, and in a manner enslaving, those citizens who formerly 
were free…454  
In 1888 Mr Cotton warned the South Australian Parliament about restricting ‘the field of 
work for our own laboring classes by putting them into competition with the hordes of an 
alien race’.455 Premier Thomas Playford said Chinese storekeepers in the Northern Territory: 
…had beaten the European storekeepers and merchants out of the field...The Chinamen would 
work for a European at 6s per day, but would work for his own countrymen for 3s per day. 
How on earth could a European stand against such competition? The Chinaman did not work 
the European out by fair means….The English laborer would have to work for the same rate of 
wages as the Chinese or leave the country. He could not possibly support himself and his wife 
and family on the wages that a Chinaman would live upon.
456
 
Playford lamented that ‘we simply stand by’ and let the riches of the Northern Territory ‘flow 
into the coffers of the Chinese Empire’, agreeing it was ‘folly…to let this alien people quietly 
carry them away’.457  
Perceptions of Chinese Australians as different or ‘alien’ in a racial sense were so deep-set 
that extreme claims could influence official colonial policy. 
Bigotry and Chinese Australians  
As Bill Hornadge explains, because Chinese migrants were almost invariably male and lived 
together in camps, they were accused by Europeans ‘with vivid imaginations’ of the routine 
practice of sodomy, which became known in colonial Australia as the ‘Chinese Vice’.458 This 
allegation was used to justify exclusionary laws aimed at Chinese settlers. In 1862 Secretary 
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for the Colonies Lord Newcastle stated, when advising Queen Victoria not to refuse assent to 
New South Wales legislation restricting the immigration of Chinese settlers, that: 
Her Majesty’s Government cannot shut their eyes to the exceptional nature of Chinese 
Immigration, and the vast moral evil which accompanies it. The entire absence of women 
among the immigrants, their addiction to the peculiar vices thence arising, their paganism and 
idolatrous habits must make them, where they bear any considerable proportion to the general 
population, a misfortune to any Colony situated as are the Australian colonies. In New South 
Wales the Chinese Immigrants amount…to about 21,000, or about 1 in 16 of the whole 
population, and…a very much larger proportion of the adult males. I could not advise Her 
Majesty to refuse her assent to a measure which the Legislature of New South Wales consider 
necessary to protect the Colony against so undeniable an evil.459  
In 1876 Queensland Premier George Thorn used a similar justification when introducing the 
Goldfields Act Amendment Bill, intended to exclude Chinese settlers from Queensland 
goldfields. According to Premier Thorn: 
It was very well known that the presence of the Chinese was very detrimental on the northern 
gold fields…it was also well known to honourable members that the Chinese were not from 
their degraded habits a desirable class on the northern gold fields.460  
These irrational presumptions about behaviour amongst ethnic Chinese settlers are a clear 
example of racial prejudice feeding into law through colonial legislation.  
Racism and legal standing 
The equal standing under the common law of ethnic Chinese British subjects living in 
Australia was ignored or lost in the depiction by white British lawmakers of all Chinese as 
inferior and ‘alien’ in a general, non-legal sense. When Victoria’s Legislative Assembly was 
asked in 1881 to deny non-subject Chinese the right to vote, Mr R.M. Smith observed that ‘it 
was worth consideration that almost every Chinese immigrant to Victoria came from Hong 
Kong’.461 Any migrant born in Hong Kong or ‘habitually resident’ there at the time of its 
colonisation was a British subject with equal legal status and not an ‘alien’ under imperial 
and Victorian law.462 Yet in the same debate another speaker not only refused to recognise 
Chinese as equal subjects but claimed they were weak and barely human, declaring that: 
…there never could be any competition between a rice-eating man and a beef-eating man…In 
fact, a Chinaman was a mere dumb animal – he was never anything but a Chinaman, and never 
could be anything else…It would be less objectionable to drive a flock of sheep to the poll than 
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to allow Chinamen to vote. The sheep, at all events, would be harmless. To claim for Chinamen 
the right to have a voice in the making of the laws of this country was a monstrous absurdity
.463
 
Lawmakers in the Australasian colonies commonly used animal or other derogatory terms to 
describe Chinese settlers. Another member of the Victorian parliament said that ‘the 
Chinamen who were in the habit of crossing the border were simply a lot of wretched 
mongrels…What did the colony want with Chinamen at all?’464 Mr V. Solomon, an 
influential Northern Territory member in the South Australian Parliament and a key figure in 
the local anti-Chinese campaign (which served his business interests),465 stated in 1888 that: 
The Australian population is Anglo-Saxon, and does not mean to be swallowed up in its youth 
by a flood of immigration from the densely populated territories of China…He would only 
remind members of two other pests, with regard to which it would have been better had we 
taken action at the outset - sparrows and rabbits (Hear, hear). Were we to wait until the country 
was overrun with Chinese and then take action?
466
 
The description of Chinese in sub-human terms was combined with the assertion they looked 
so alike it was impossible to tell one from another. When wrongly accusing Chinese 
immigrants of bringing smallpox to Sydney in 1881, Vice-President of the New South Wales 
Executive Council Sir John Robertson declared that: 
Our medical men cannot be to blame for the introduction of diseases under these circumstances. 
How can they examine carefully such a number of men who are so much alike to each other as 
pease [sic] or sheep, and cunning as a wagon-load of monkeys?467 
The claim that Chinese could not be distinguished from each other was used to oppose 
exemptions from restrictive entry laws for Chinese settlers who were long-term Australian 
residents and/or British subjects. In 1881 a member of the Victorian Legislative Assembly, 
Major Smith, said that giving a Chinese resident an exemption certificate when he 
temporarily left the colony: 
…would open the door to fraud…a Chinaman having left the colony with a certificate, who 
could say, when it was again presented, that it was in the hands of the same man? Who, in the 
vast majority of cases, could distinguish one Chinaman from another? Even to photograph a 
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likeness of the holder of a certificate upon the face of the document would be no real 
safeguard.
468
 
Mr Chubb told the Queensland Parliament in 1884 that certificates of exemption for existing 
residents should be done away with:  
It has been said, and with a good deal of truth, that Chinamen resemble each other as much as 
peas, and for that reason the country has very often been defrauded to a large extent by 
Chinamen obtaining these certificates of exemption and passing them on to fellow-
Chinamen.
469
 
Similarly, Victorian Premier Duncan Gillies wrote to Governor Loch in April 1888 stating 
that one reason it was easy for naturalisation certificates to be used fraudulently was because 
the ‘similarity in personal appearance (at least to the European eye) of all Chinese’ meant ‘it 
was almost impossible for the Customs authorities to detect the imposture’.470 
Fear of the fraudulent use of exemption or naturalisation certificates by Chinese who 
lawmakers regarded as less than human and claimed to be unable to tell apart led to some  
extreme proposals. In 1876 the Queensland Postmaster-General asked ‘how were Chinamen 
already in the colony to be distinguished from those who were to arrive? They would have to 
be marked somehow’.471 Another member, Mr McDougall, ‘concurred…as to the 
impossibility of distinguishing the Chinamen’, suggesting that the solution was to ‘square 
their tails and brand them’.472 In 1881 Mr R.M. Smith told the Victorian Parliament, when 
criticising provisions in the Chinese Influx Restriction Bill, that: 
…it would be quite in accordance with the spirit of some portions of the Bill to suggest that 
every Chinaman leaving Victoria should be branded on some portion of his body, or subjected 
to some painful mutilation by which he could be ever afterwards identified.
473
 
Bigoted views of the sub-human character of Chinese settlers and the idea that they could not 
be distinguished from each other meant many lawmakers in colonial Australia regarded all 
Chinese as the ‘alien’ or the ‘Other’, both in a racial sense and legally. In 1886 at ‘one of the 
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largest public meetings ever held in Port Darwin’,474 Mr Solomon supported a protest by 
businessman W.E. Adcock against the importation of Chinese for mining and railway 
projects in the Northern Territory. Ignoring the subject status of arrivals from British 
colonies, Mr Adcock said this meant ‘hundreds of thousands of pounds wrung from the sweat 
and hard toil’ of Territory pioneers would be ‘given away to aliens… the coolie offscourings 
of Hongkong and Singapore’.475   
Such bigoted views were not limited to backbenchers or minor political players but were also 
held by the leading politicians of the day. 
Samuel Griffith and ‘alien’ Chinese 
Queensland’s Attorney-General in 1876 was Samuel Griffith, later Premier of Queensland for 
two periods, President of the Federal Council of Australasia, chairman of the 1891 drafting 
committee for the new federal constitution and first Chief Justice of the High Court of 
Australia. In these various capacities he was a central figure in the regulation of ‘aliens’ in 
Australia for three decades. In his biography of Griffith, Roger Joyce makes numerous 
references to his subject’s ‘deep-seated belief in the rule of law’.476 Throughout his period in 
public office, however, Griffith paid scant regard to the law about the term ‘alien’.  
Clause 2 of Queensland’s Goldfields Act Amendment Bill 1876 stated that ‘No Asiatic or 
African alien shall be permitted to mine upon any gold field until two years after the 
proclamation of such gold field’. According to Attorney-General Griffith:  
...the most important feature of the Bill was that it would discourage a large influx of Chinese 
emigration to the colony…the Bill related entirely to gold fields; to aliens who were in the habit 
of rendering absolutely worthless the land in which they had no interest.
477
 
In the Legislative Council the Post Master-General suggested that all of the new arrivals on 
the goldfields were subjects of the Chinese Empire (and therefore ‘aliens’ under British law). 
According to the last census, he said: 
…nearly seven thousand Chinamen congregated on the Palmer gold field…their numbers 
were…increasing almost daily, for every steamer that arrived from the north brought a large 
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number of Chinese immigrants to this colony. Unless Parliament was prepared to hand over to 
the Emperor of China the whole of our northern territory, it must do something at once.
478
 
Leader of the Opposition Arthur Palmer pointed out, however, that settlers from British 
colonies in Asia, including many Chinese immigrants, were ‘British subjects’ and not ‘aliens’ 
and that it would be unjust to require such people to prove their status under imperial law: 
He would like to know how the Government were going to treat the Chinese immigrants from 
Hong Kong – those undesirable immigrants as the honourable Premier had called them; they 
were British subjects….How again were the Government going to treat the natives of British 
India – were they aliens? (An honourable member: “No”)…that being the case, the onus of a 
man proving that he was not an alien would be thrown upon himself. Was that law or justice, or 
what was it? Why the Bill was a perfect farce from beginning to end.
479
 
The longstanding President of the Legislative Council Maurice O’Connell said that in his 
view ‘the right to mine on the goldfields of this colony was an inherent right of British 
subjects’, stating that: 
He…did not know why the legislature should…draw a distinction between Asiatic and African 
aliens and those from the Continent of Europe or elsewhere…(W)hy the African or Asiatic 
alien should be selected for charge, in preference to the Frenchman, or German, or Russian, 
was not, he thought demonstrable.
480
 
When Governor Sir William Cairns referred the 1876 Bill to Imperial authorities, Secretary 
for Colonies Lord Carnarvon withheld approval. He said Great Britain opposed such 
‘exceptional legislation intended to exclude subjects of a State’ (China) it was at peace 
with.481 He also expressed his ‘regret that the Legislature of Queensland should now have 
thought it necessary to enact a measure of this character’, stating that the law was one of 
‘extraordinary nature, whereby the rights of Her Majesty’s subjects, not residing in the 
colony, may be prejudiced’.482 As he said: 
…there are now, as Governor Cairns very properly points out to Ministers, growing and grown 
up in Hong Kong, Labuan and the Straits Settlements, large numbers of British subjects of 
Chinese origin; and these persons, in virtue of their birth-right, have acquired the status of 
natural-born British subjects.
483   
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Lord Carnarvon’s statement, prompted by criticism of the Bill by Governor Cairns,484 
amounted to a recognition by imperial authorities both that there were British subjects of 
Chinese origin in Queensland and that their ethnic or racial background should not debar 
them from the privileges of subject status. In the Queensland Legislative Assembly, John 
Macrossan warned that ‘in passing a law to keep out all aliens they must bear in mind that 
there were a large number of Chinese in Hongkong who were not aliens’.485 Attorney-
General Griffith responded by quoting a report from the United States Congress describing 
‘swarms’ of Chinese immigrants entering that country as a race ‘alien in all its tendencies’, 
saying all he had read in that report was applicable to Queensland. 486 In his view, ‘the 
Government would be wanting in its duty to the British race if they did not do all in their 
power to prevent this colony from becoming a dependency of the Mongolian Empire’.487  
Despite the explicit objection of Lord Carnarvon, Griffith refused to accept that Chinese 
settlers from British colonies should be treated as British subjects in Queensland, declaring 
that ‘it was not their desire to see the colony turned into a gigantic Singapore or 
Hongkong’.488 According to Griffith: 
No doubt the civilization of those places might be all very well in its way; but opinions differed 
on that subject, and the Government did not desire to see the country governed, or a state of 
society established, upon principles similar to those which prevailed in these two dependencies 
of the British Empire.
489
 
Legislative Council President O’Connell was concerned by loose use of the term ‘alien’ on 
the part of the Attorney-General and other parliamentarians in the goldfields legislation 
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debate.490 In one of the few statements by an official figure during the colonial or post-
federation periods explaining the proper legal meaning of the word, O’Connell noted that all 
‘alien meant was, that the person to whom it applied was not a subject of the British 
sovereign’. However, in a scathing comment directed at the willingness of his political 
colleagues, not least Attorney-General Griffith, to substitute prejudice for imperial law, he 
observed that despite its established meaning under the common law: 
…from the legal knowledge which had been laid before the [Parliament], it appeared that the 
real signification of the term alien depended not on whether persons were subjects of the 
Queen, but whether we liked them or not.491 
O’Connell’s comment sums up the way the term ‘alien’ was used by key figures in colonial 
and post-federation Australia. Rather than respecting the word as a common law term with a 
straightforward legal meaning, it was employed as a convenient linguistic tool to denigrate 
members of disliked ethnic groups, especially Chinese Australians, whether they were aliens 
under the law or not.  
Henry Parkes and ‘obedience to law’  
Sir Henry Parkes – an iconic figure in modern Australian history as the ‘father of 
federation’492 - was another prominent colonial politician who misused and manipulated the 
word ‘alien’ as a derogatory label for Chinese settlers. As records from inter-colonial 
conferences and debates in the New South Wales Parliament show, racial exclusion was more 
important to Parkes than following the law, not least in relation to the term ‘alien’.  
From the time he was first elected to the Legislative Council of New South Wales in 1854, 
Parkes was critical of Chinese immigration. The Report of the Committee on Asiatic Labour 
released that year by the New South Wales Parliament was prompted in part by expressions 
of concern from Parkes about the prevalence of disease amongst Chinese ‘coolies’ and their 
willingness to accept inferior labour conditions. The final report found little evidence of 
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problems in either respect.493 Parkes was accused of inciting fear of Chinese settlers for his 
own political purposes and to build support for the idea of federation. In 1881 when Parkes as 
New South Wales Premier urged Parliament to support anti-Chinese laws, Legislative 
Council member Mr Piddington observed that ‘the Government, wishing for a popular cry, 
gave way to people out of doors, and made political capital by the measure’.494 In 1895 
President of the Tasmanian Legislative Council Adye Douglas said a federal union required: 
…outside pressure to bring it into operation…Now the only outside pressure talked about in 
New South Wales when we were in Sydney was by Sir Henry Parkes, and that was that we 
were afraid of the Chinese. They were going, he said, to seize upon Australia if it did not go in 
for Federation. 
495
 
Parkes played a central role in promulgating use of the term ‘alien’ as a description of the 
inherent nature of Chinese Australians. In public comments he made little distinction between 
Chinese settlers from British colonies and those from China itself. In a major speech to the 
‘working men’ of Mudgee in 1878, Parkes spoke of the threat to Australia’s ‘British 
character’ posed by ‘alien’ Chinese, warning that: 
…the Chinese belonged to a nation too numerous for us to sanction a wholesale immigration 
from, because we were not to admit a people who were aliens to us in language, blood, and 
faith…496 
Intercolonial Conference 1881 
In the 1880s Parkes presided over two inter-colonial conferences on the ‘Chinese question’. 
At the first conference in January 1881 he initiated a formal ‘remonstrance’ to the Secretary 
for the Colonies, Earl Kimberley, objecting to Western Australia’s use of public money to 
import Chinese labourers.497 Signed by the leaders of all colonies except Western 
Australia,498 the remonstrance stated that: 
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The objection to the Chinese is not altogether one of prejudice of color or race, but is founded 
in a rational view of the dangers to these British communities which might in the course of time 
flow from a people numbering more than 400,000,000, whose language, laws, religion and 
habits of life are alien to those of Her Majesty’s subjects in Australasia, and whose 
geographical position makes the danger more imminent.
499  
In this statement, Parkes and other colonial leaders put their names to a description of 
Chinese people as ‘alien’ across all measures of comparison with ‘Her Majesty’s subjects’. 
They ignored the fact that, as Lord Carnarvon had reminded the Queensland Parliament in 
1877, many Chinese residents were themselves subjects of the Crown through birth in a 
British colony or in Australia itself.500 Such endorsement by political leaders of the ‘alien’ 
character of the Chinese inhabitants of Australia inevitably influenced public perceptions and 
attitudes. In July 1881 tin miners petitioned the New South Wales Parliament declaring that 
they viewed ‘with alarm the great increase in the number of Chinese arriving in this Colony’, 
claiming that Chinese labourers ‘at present outnumber the male European population on these 
mines’: 
…although their labour being cheap, it is profitable to the few, it is not so to the country at 
large; and it is manifestly unfair that a race alien in blood, religion, customs, and every way, 
should be allowed to enter in such numbers as to seriously injure men who are struggling to 
obtain an honest and respectable living for themselves and their families.
501  
The 1881 conference agreed to ‘uniform legislation on the part of all the colonies to restrict 
the influx of Chinese.’ Parkes presented a model bill prepared for this purpose.502  He urged 
the New South Wales Parliament to pass the law because of the threat posed by ‘alien 
Chinese’, referring to: 
The four hundred millions of this human hive; the danger to the institutions and character of the 
country that would arise from the introduction of swarms of aliens, who would not amalgamate 
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with our race nor assist in building up an empire here; the dissatisfaction that the working 
classes might righteously feel to see their walks of labour crowded upon by a people who 
would work like slaves and live on next to nothing; the great popular voice, which demanded 
that this question should be settled by law…503 
In particular he used fear of disease, including an additional clause in the Chinese Influx 
Restriction Bill requiring ships arriving with any Chinese passenger to be quarantined for at 
least 21 days - whether there was any sickness on board or not.504 Strong opposition in the 
Legislative Council eventually forced Parkes to drop his quarantine provision.505  But leading 
New South Wales politicians continued to use anxiety about disease to support the exclusion 
of Chinese settlers under Parkes’ proposed legislation. Vice-President of the Executive 
Council and former Premier Sir John Robertson blamed the Chinese for a recent outbreak of 
smallpox in Sydney: 
There is no country from which we are so liable to receive small-pox, leprosy, and other 
diseases as from China…All reasonable men will think, having a regard to the state of the 
Chinese in Sydney, that the disease came from China…506 
The 1881 debate in New South Wales, however, revealed more support for Chinese 
Australians than similar parliamentary debates after 1900.507 As Fitzgerald observes, the 
place of the Chinese in Australia ‘was more readily acknowledged under British colonial rule 
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than in White Australia after federation’.508 In the Legislative Council Mr J. Smith said it was 
‘nonsense to talk of our being overwhelmed by hordes of Chinese’, observing that ‘we shall 
have ample opportunity to prevent an inundation without treating the Chinese as rattlesnakes 
or crocodiles’.509 His colleague Sir Alfred Stephen referred to treaties between Great Britain 
and the Chinese Empire allowing freedom of movement, and also reminded the Parliament 
that royal assent for Queensland’s 1876 goldfields legislation had been refused because of the 
many Chinese born in Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements ‘who are British subjects’.510  
Despite some vocal opposition to Parkes’ legislation,511 the New South Wales Parliament was 
determined to act against Chinese ‘aliens’. The final New South Wales law severely restricted 
Chinese migration by imposing a landing or ‘poll’ tax of £10 per head on Chinese immigrants 
and a limit of one Chinese passenger per 100 tons of the ship’s tonnage.512 As Mr O’Connor 
said in the Legislative Assembly, ‘…this Bill had been brought forward in response to the 
voice of the country to effect that object – to throw every obstacle we could in the way of any 
further influx of this alien race’.513 There was an exemption for British subjects who could 
provide evidence of their status,514 but as Parkes declared: 
As I have explained on several occasions, the Bill is not simply one to regulate Chinese 
immigration; its object is to put a stop to it. The whole tendency of the Bill is to surround the 
traffic with such restrictions as will put an end to it. We do not want the Chinese to come here 
in the proportion of one to 50 tons of ship’s tonnage, or one to 100 tons; in fact, we do not want 
them here at all.515  
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Parkes explained that Chinese settlers should be kept out because they had no place in a 
society where all men were equal before the law. In his view Chinese could never have equal 
legal status: 
I desire to see all persons who come here put on an equal footing, and it is because I cannot 
place Chinese on a footing of equality with ourselves that I wish to restrict their coming 
here…516 
Even if Chinese settlers had taken all steps formally available to them to become full legal 
members of the community, they were still regarded as ‘foreigners’ or outsiders whose 
presence undermined the British character of society. As one of Parkes’ colleagues, Mr 
Garrett, declared when supporting the prohibition in the new legislation on ownership of land 
by Chinese settlers naturalised as British subjects under New South Wales law:  
He defended the provision on the highest grounds of national policy. It was unwise to amend 
our naturalisation law as we had done, as it gave too wide a scope for foreigners to acquire a 
partnership in the nationality. Any naturalised subject could, without competition, take up 640 
acres of land…We should not be justified in discarding all safeguards to the preservation of the 
national character…If we allowed foreigners to join in the partnership in the nationality, we 
should not preserve the character of the country as we wished to do.517 
For Parkes and his colleagues, any Chinese immigrant naturalised as a British subject 
remained a ‘foreigner’. In other words, naturalisation was not respected as a formal legal 
means for welcoming new subjects into the imperial family, but feared as a mechanism by 
which foreigners or aliens could infiltrate British society.518 This was consistent with Parkes’ 
lack of respect for formal nationality status more generally. Despite including an exemption 
for Chinese British subjects in his legislation, Parkes persisted in portraying Chinese 
Australians as ‘alien’ in every respect even though many were not ‘aliens’ as a matter of law.   
‘Inter-Colonial Conference on the Chinese Question’ 1888 
In 1888 fears of the ‘infiltration’ of Chinese into the Northern Territory (administered at that 
time by the colony of South Australia) embarrassed the South Australian government into 
organising another inter-colonial conference, again presided over by Sir Henry Parkes.519 
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Members of the South Australian parliament questioned the need for the conference.520 Mr 
Horn said unnecessary alarm had been spread about the Chinese population in the Northern 
Territory by the government administrator: 
The whole of this absurd scare was caused chiefly by a panic-stricken telegram sent down by 
the Government Resident of the Northern Territory, who said that 400 Chinamen were to be 
sent to the MacDonnell Ranges ruby fields.
521
 
The Chief Secretary of South Australia said a telegram had also been received from 
Queensland Premier Sir Samuel Griffith522 expressing ‘great alarm’ about reports of a 
‘contemplated large immigration of Chinese’ to the Northern Territory. Griffith urged South 
Australia to use its existing laws to restrict or delay the landing of Chinese and, if these were 
not sufficient, to recall Parliament at an early date to deal with this ‘question of extreme 
urgency’. South Australia, he said, would have the ‘moral support of all the rest of Australia’ 
and their ‘warm gratitude’ if it did so.523 The New South Wales Colonial Secretary backed 
Griffith’s call, ‘expressing sympathy with any well-devised scheme to arrest the excessive 
immigration of Asiatic or African aliens into the northern part of Australia’.524 
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The ‘Inter-Colonial Conference on the Chinese Question’ held in Sydney from 12 to 14 June 
1888 included prominent colonial politicians soon to play a major role in preparing a new 
federal constitution, including Alfred Deakin from Victoria and Charles Kingston from South 
Australia. A committee comprising Deakin, Kingston and influential Queensland figure John 
Macrossan was set up to draft a representation to the Imperial Government and to prepare 
another model bill for adoption by the Australasian colonies with additional restrictions on 
entry of Chinese.525 Macrossan had warned the Queensland Parliament a decade before that 
many Chinese were not ‘aliens’ under British law.526 But for Macrossan and his colleagues 
racial exclusion was more important than respect for legal status. In 1884 he proclaimed:  
I have done more to keep Chinese out than any other man in the colony…I am well-known all 
over the colony as being opposed to Chinese…Every man who knows me knows that I am 
opposed to Chinese, and have been opposed to them all my lifetime, and will be opposed to 
them…So great do I think the evil of allowing Chinese to come to the country that I would not 
allow one to come to the country.
527
 
Secretary for the Colonies Lord Knutsford sent a telegram to the conference, calling for any 
restrictive legislation to be non-discriminatory for the sake of Great Britain’s relations with 
China.528 He said the Chinese would not like being singled out by oppressive laws, so any 
new legislation should apply to everyone, with ‘power to admit those whom we liked’.529 The 
colonial representatives rejected Lord Knutsford’s call, refusing ‘to say that they would 
exclude Europeans by any law’.530 South Australian Premier Sir Thomas Playford 
successfully moved that ‘the desired Australasian legislation’ should apply to ‘all Chinese’, 
with, critically, no distinction ‘between Chinese who are British subjects and those who are 
not, both because of the difficulty of distinguishing individuals, and because the objection is 
to race’.531  
A ‘Committee of Chinese residents, Melbourne’ wrote to the conference complaining that the 
alarm about the ‘great influx of Chinese’ was ‘one of those poor hollow things that time and 
reflection will cause the generous British mind to feel heartily ashamed of’. However, in a 
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recognition of how Chinese Australians were perceived by the Anglo-Celtic community, the 
Committee acknowledged the conference was considering a significant matter which ‘touches 
most intimately international rights and obligations…dealing as it does with the stranger 
within your gates’.532  
The conference also received a memorial from businessman Quong Tart and other Chinese 
merchants in Sydney, noting the proposed new law would contravene the 1860 Convention of 
Peking533 giving members of the Chinese Empire liberty to travel to British colonies. Quong 
Tart offered his services to the conference as a ‘naturalised British subject…in arriving at the 
general opinion of the Chinese residents in Australasia’.534  The memorial objected to the 
severe restrictions agreed by the conference that would ‘effectively ban Chinese from 
entering Australia, regardless of whether they were British subjects’.535 The memorial noted 
that ‘Chinese whom may have become naturalised British subjects’ and who owned property 
in the Australasian colonies would suffer ‘hardship and injury’ if they were not allowed back 
into Australia.536 Tasmanian Premier Sir Philip Fysh agreed, refusing to accept the model bill 
for his colony since it ignored ‘the rights of such naturalized British subjects as may be at 
present absent from the colonies who… have accumulated property under the sanction of the 
colonial laws’ and because it made ‘no exception in favor of Chinese born under English rule 
in Hong Kong and elsewhere’.537 Similarly, Mr Horn noted in the South Australian 
Parliament that the model bill: 
...proposed further injustice to the Chinese in Hongkong, who were British subjects. All those 
Chinamen who were born under the British flag, of parents domiciled in British territory, and 
who obeyed no laws but those of Great Britain, were just as much British subjects as we were, 
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and we had no more right to exclude them than the children of French, German or Italian 
parents born in Australia.
538
 
In a cablegram reply to Lord Knutsford (drawn up principally by Deakin),539 Parkes – in his 
capacity as President of the inter-colonial conference - rejected arguments against the 
proposed new restrictions. He said the colonies had ‘reason to dread a large influx from 
China’. Therefore, he declared: 
…the several Governments feel impelled to legislate immediately to protect their citizens 
against an invasion which is dreaded because of its results, not only upon the labor market but 
upon the social and moral condition of the people.
540
 
Parkes said the conference was ‘most anxious’ that Great Britain should conclude a new 
treaty with China as soon as possible, under which ‘all Chinese…should be entirely excluded 
from the Australasian colonies’. In addition imperial authorities should induce the colonies of 
Hong Kong, Straits Settlements and Labuan to: 
…at once prohibit the emigration of all Chinese to the Australasian colonies [because] the 
Chinese who may claim to be considered British subjects in those colonies are very numerous, 
and the certainty that their migration hither was prevented would give great and general 
satisfaction.
541
 
As Parkes’ cablegram to Lord Knutsford indicates, Chinese settlers from British colonies 
were seen, because of their subject status, as a particular threat. As Helen Irving has said, the 
right of Chinese and other non-European British subjects to travel freely within the British 
Empire alarmed advocates for a white Australia.542 Quong Tart’s wife, Margaret, noted that: 
In 1888 a burning Chinese question arose – the Anti-Chinese League had roused a few 
thousand people in Sydney against an imaginary influx of Chinese. Several ships had left Hong 
Kong with a few hundred Chinese on board for the Colonies, under the then Poll Tax 
agreement.543 
When Parkes rushed further restrictive legislation544 through the New South Wales 
Parliament: 
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…its effect being to prevent any of these Chinamen from landing…Quong Tart set to work – he 
was determined to see what he considered a big wrong righted, as some of the men on board 
were British subjects. 545 
Despite the objections from Quong Tart, Premier Fysh, Horn and others that many ethnic 
Chinese were British subjects, Parkes and fellow colonial leaders persisted in penalising them 
as ‘aliens’. Notwithstanding his own recognition that ‘numerous’ Chinese settlers emigrating 
to Australia from British territories were subjects and therefore not ‘aliens’ under imperial 
law, Parkes declared that: 
…the Colonial Governments have felt called upon to take strong and decisive action … to 
prevent their country from being overrun by an alien race who are incapable of assimilation in 
the body politic, strangers to our civilization, out of sympathy with our aspirations, and unfitted 
for our free institutions, to which their presence in any number would be a source of constant 
danger.
546
 
In one sense Parkes and the other colonial politicians responsible for drafting the 1881 and 
1888 representations to the Secretary for the Colonies were merely describing how the 
Anglo-Celtic community in Australia saw the Chinese – as ‘different’ or ‘alien’, as having no 
place, as Parkes had said, in a democratic society of equal men and indeed as constituting a 
danger to it. But the repeated use of the terms ‘alien’ and ‘alien race’ by prominent colonial 
figures when referring to Chinese settlers complemented their refusal to respect the British 
subject status of the many Chinese who had emigrated from British colonies, had been born 
in Australia itself or had been naturalised in one of the Australian colonies. They did this to 
the extent of wilfully ignoring calls from imperial authorities, other colonial politicians and 
local Chinese Australians. In this way Parkes and his colleagues embedded a description of 
Chinese as ‘alien’ across all measures of comparison when they knew (as the warnings by 
Macrossan and Legislative Council President O’Connell to the Queensland parliament 
show)547 that in the most important respect, namely under the law, many were not ‘aliens’ at 
all.  
This lack of distinction between the legal and racial meanings of ‘alien’ has affected 
historical assessment of the two inter-colonial conferences. Charles Price, for example, 
despite noting that ‘many Chinese immigrants’ had been born in British territories,548 states 
that for colonial leaders: 
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 …it seemed so apparent that the Chinese were unassimilable aliens, who could never 
understand European systems of values and government, that it was pointless to give them 
citizenship or the vote; those few who did acquire some European notions and customs could 
be naturalised and enfranchised by a special Act of Parliament…549 
While this might accurately describe the perception of colonial leaders, Price does not point 
out that the ‘many Chinese immigrants’ born on British territory were not ‘aliens’ in a legal 
sense but subjects of the Crown who already possessed ‘citizenship’, i.e. British subject status 
under the common law. Far from being ‘unassimilable aliens’, they already ‘belonged’ under 
the law as much as any white settler. They had no need to be ‘naturalised’ under a special Act 
of Parliament or by any other method. By not addressing the misuse of ‘alien’, the historical 
analysis to date understates the extent of manipulation of the term by colonial leaders as part 
of a racist discourse about Chinese Australians.  
Parkes and the rule of law 
In a series of cases in 1888, the New South Wales Supreme Court granted writs of habeus 
corpus ordering the release of Chinese immigrants held on vessels in Sydney harbour.550 As 
Bennett notes, ‘Parkes was furious at the outcome and took steps to see that the court orders 
were defied and that the Chinese passengers were not allowed to land’.551 In Ex parte Woo 
Tin Chief Justice Darley noted that: 
…we find that the law so enunciated by us, is for the second time knowingly and of purpose 
disregarded and set at nought, and this too by those who, above all others in this community, 
are…bound to see that the law of their country as pronounced by the properly constituted 
authorities (the Judges of the land), is duly and faithfully carried into execution.
552
 
Only after the third case did Parkes comply with the Supreme Court’s orders, thus narrowly 
averting a ‘constitutional catastrophe’. As Bennett says: 
Parkes…had come close to fracturing the very foundations of Responsible Government and the 
rule of law. It is one thing for a government, dissatisfied with court adjudications, to nullify 
them for the future by legislating to the contrary. It is quite another thing for a government to 
bid defiance to court orders binding on it…553 
Similarly, by denying the equal legal status of the many Chinese Australians who were 
British subjects, Parkes was also defying the law. In Parkes’ view, the Chinese were an 
unwanted element in a British community whether they were subjects or aliens under the law. 
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When urging the New South Wales Parliament in 1888 to pass even more restrictive anti-
Chinese laws, Parkes made it clear that racial exclusion was more important than obeying the 
law. According to the Premier, the colony had to be protected from this ‘alien race’ by lawful 
or any other means as if it were a plague:  
You tell me about obedience to the law; you tell me that because I occupy the great place which 
I am permitted to occupy in this country, that I am to set an example of obedience to the 
law…Would you talk about a technical observance of the law if a plague was stalking in our 
midst—if a pestilence was sweeping off our population—if a famine was reducing the members 
of our households to skeletons?...Is it a safe, a wise, or a tolerable thing for us to have nearly 
60,000—I mean in all the colonies—of these men, belonging to an alien race, out of tone with 
us in faith, in law, in traditions, in everything that endears life—to have 60,000 of these men, 
with no natural companions, in the midst of society?
554
 
This statement indicates that those who professed a commitment to the rule of law in other 
respects were not committed to this principle when it came to an understanding or application 
of ‘alienage’. As the next chapter shows, the denigration of ethnic Chinese (and other non-
Europeans) as ‘aliens’ regardless of legal status set the stage for current uncertainties in the 
Constitution that make those seen as ‘outsiders’ vulnerable even if they do not formally have 
this status at law.555 
Parkes and ‘equality’ 
According to Fitzgerald, Parkes wanted to keep the Chinese out of New South Wales not 
because of racism but because he feared their ‘hierarchical’ culture would undermine the new 
‘egalitarian’ Australian society: 
No matter how eloquently they framed their case for equal treatment…Chinese residents were 
to be denied the equal bounty that only a free and equal people could enjoy because, it was 
assumed, they were culturally predisposed to be hierarchical…As far as Parkes was concerned, 
this was not a matter of racial equality or inequality…They were to be denied equal access to 
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Australian citizenship on the ethnographic claims of distinguished sinologists that they could 
not appreciate equality if it were offered to them on a platter.556  
However it is difficult to accept that Parkes’ repeated and consistent references to Chinese 
Australians as members of a ‘servile race’ who were ‘alien’ in ‘faith, in law, in traditions, in 
everything that endears life’ did not have a strong racist element. The way Parkes compared 
Chinese settlers to a ‘pestilence’ or a ‘plague’, deriding them as ‘swarms’ of a ‘human hive’, 
suggests that racism, as well as antipathy to their supposed ‘hierarchical’ nature, was an 
important motivation behind his vehement opposition to their presence.557 
‘Chinese aliens’ and the onus of proof  
Laws introduced in the colonial period reflected the attitude of Anglo-Celtic lawmakers such 
as Griffith and Parkes that the Chinese were intrinsically ‘alien’. In conflict with established 
common law, colonial legislation allowed officials to deem Chinese Australians as ‘alien’ 
because of their appearance, placing the onus on Chinese British subjects to prove otherwise. 
Some laws made it impossible for Chinese residents to establish their subject status.  
Cases from this period show that British subjects of Chinese origin faced similar problems in 
judicial proceedings. Courts wrongly presumed any person of Chinese appearance was an 
‘alien’. Judges either ignored the law or saw no need to record evidence supporting such a 
presumption. To date these errors have passed unnoticed in judicial and academic 
commentary. Modern cases on the ‘aliens power’ in the Constitution, for example, still rely 
on colonial judgments which failed to establish that ethnic Chinese applicants were ‘aliens’ 
under the law.   
Legislation 
(i) Queensland 
Clause 3 of Queensland’s Goldfields Act Amendment Bill 1876 provided that in any 
prosecution of an ‘Asiatic or African alien’:  
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…the averment in the information that any person named therein is an Asiatic or African alien 
shall be sufficient proof that he is an alien unless the defendant shall prove that at the time of 
committing the alleged offence such person was a naturalized British subject.
558
  
The Queensland Government thought it proper to place the onus on the person being 
prosecuted to prove he had been naturalised and was not an ‘alien’. The legislation also 
reflected the general belief that non-Europeans could only become ‘non-aliens’ through a 
formal process of naturalisation. White lawmakers found it difficult to comprehend that non-
Europeans, especially ethnic Chinese residents, might already be recognised under the 
common law as natural-born British subjects. As the Post Master-General said in the 
Legislative Council: 
If the Government had to prove that a Chinaman on a gold field who had not a miner’s right or 
a business licence was not a naturalized British subject, the task imposed upon it would be to 
prove a negative; this was practically impossible. All that was asked from the Chinaman…if he 
alleged that he was not an alien, was, to show that he had been properly naturalized. Let him 
produce his certificate of naturalization.
559
 
But as Colonial Secretary Lord Carnarvon observed, under the Goldfields Act Amendment 
Bill colonial officials could deem ‘natural-born’ subjects from British colonies in Asia to be 
‘aliens’ merely because they looked Chinese, and these people would then face the 
impossible task of proving that they were ‘naturalized’ British subjects to avoid prosecution:  
These persons preserve the Chinese dress and mode of wearing the hair, and it is not to be 
supposed that they would readily be distinguished by Queensland officials from the subjects of 
the Chinese Empire. Yet…in the event of one of these persons being, on account of his 
appearance, charged with an offence under this Bill, he would not only be subjected to the 
annoyance and inconvenience connected with the proceedings, but could not be in a position to 
produce such evidence as…would exempt him from its penalties, a natural-born subject of Her 
Majesty having no occasion to obtain, and being unable to show a certificate or other proof of 
his naturalization.
560  
Queensland’s Chinese Immigrants Regulation Act 1877 included another difficulty for 
settlers of Chinese ethnic origin from British colonies. Section 9 of the Act provided that: 
At the hearing of any prosecution under this Act, the justices may decide upon their own view 
and judgment whether any person charged or produced before them is a Chinese within the 
meaning of this Act.
561
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As Mr Thompson said in the Legislative Assembly, ‘So that the justices had to discover, by 
view and judgment, whether the party before them came within this definition. The thing was 
perfectly absurd’.562  
(ii) Victoria 
The same approach was adopted in legislation from Victoria. While not included in the final 
version of the law, the ‘Select Committee of the Legislative Council on the subject of 
Chinese Immigration’ recommended that the Chinese Regulation Act 1857 provide: 
That any person arrested under this Act as a reputed Chinaman, it shall be sufficient for the 
accuser to prove that the accused is reputed or is considered by the accuser to be a Chinaman. 
His oath, or the oath of one witness, shall be sufficient proof, unless the contrary be shown, to 
make such person amenable to the provisions of this Act.
563
 
In 1881 Victoria amended the Chinese Immigrants Act 1865 to prohibit Chinese Australians 
from voting at mining board, local government or parliamentary elections.564 As Premier and 
Attorney-General Sir Bryan O’Loghlen told the Legislative Assembly, every ‘court for 
revising citizen or burgess lists’ must expunge the names of all Chinese ratepayers unless 
they ‘prove to the satisfaction of the court that they are natural-born or naturalized subjects of 
Her Majesty’.565 As Premier O’Loghlen declared, the amended Act required every ‘collector, 
town clerk or secretary’ of every city, borough and shire in Victoria to ‘decide upon his own 
belief, or view, or knowledge or judgment whether any ratepayer is, or is not…an alien 
immigrant’.566  
(iii) Model bill from Inter-Colonial Conference on the Chinese Question 1888  
Similarly, at the 1888 ‘Inter-Colonial Conference on the Chinese Question’, colonial 
Governments endorsed uniform legislation (drafted by Alfred Deakin) to ‘effectively ban 
Chinese from entering Australia, regardless of whether they were British subjects’.567 The 
model bill limited the number of ‘Chinese’ arriving at Australian ports to no more than one 
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per 500 tons of a vessel’s tonnage. It defined ‘Chinese’ to include ‘every person of Chinese 
race’ (whether or not they were British subjects) and declared that: 
For the purpose of this Act, the Stipendiary or Police Magistrate, or the Justices, may decide, 
upon his or their own view and judgment, whether any person produced before them is a 
Chinese within the meaning of this Act’.568  
Cases 
(i) Lowe Kong Meng and the residence tax 
The 1859 case of Lowe Kong Meng demonstrates the presumption on the part of colonial 
authorities that any person who looked Chinese could not be a British subject. Born in the 
British colony of Penang,569 Lowe Kong Meng arrived in Victoria in 1853 and became a 
successful businessman, well-respected amongst the Chinese community and beyond.570 But 
as Mr Walsh said in the Victorian Legislative Assembly: 
…it would always be difficult to say of some men whether they were Chinamen or no. For 
example, supposing Kong Meng, the well-known merchant of Melbourne, presented himself 
here as a stranger, would he not be taken for a Chinaman? Yet he was, in fact, a British subject, 
born at Singapore [sic].
571
  
In 1859 Lowe Kong Meng was prosecuted in the District Court under the Chinese Emigration 
Act 1859 for not paying the monthly residence tax imposed on Chinese ‘immigrants’. The 
Argus said the case involved ‘a nice point of law, and also the compatibility of our 
restrictions upon Chinese immigration with the rights of persons of the Mongolian race who 
are born in the Chinese dependencies of Britain’. The paper noted that Lowe Kong Meng: 
…claims to be a British subject, and, therefore, exempt from the residence tax. A document, 
bearing a notarial seal, testifies that he was born in the island of Penang; that his mother was 
born in the same island; that his father was a contractor to the British Government, and was 
possessed of considerable property in land in that dependency.
572  
The prosecution objected to Lowe Kong Meng’s claim that his British subject status entitled 
him to an exemption from the residence tax, stating that ‘there were thousands of Chinese in 
the colony who if this exemption were allowed would claim the same privilege’.573 The Argus 
agreed, arguing that:  
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To admit Kong Meng to be a British subject…would be, as everyone possessing any 
knowledge of the Chinese on the gold-fields must be aware, to admit a multitude of others to 
the same privileges, as a very large proportion of the Chinese in the colony are, or profess to 
be, natives of the islands in the Malacca Straits.574  
As the Argus reported, after a long discussion the Court held, contrary to the law, that ‘the 
mere fact of Kong Meng having been born in a British settlement did not constitute him a 
British subject, without collateral evidence of his parents being British subjects also’.575 
Under the rule in Calvin’s Case, however, even if the parents were foreigners, any person 
born within the allegiance or jurisdiction of the English Crown was a natural-born British 
subject. The only exceptions to this rule were children born to foreign invaders or diplomatic 
representatives living on British soil.576 
Having wrongly decided that Lowe Kong Meng was not a British subject, the Court did not 
need to consider whether his subject status might have exempted him from the residence tax 
imposed on ‘immigrants’. The Court held that Lowe Kong Meng ‘was a Chinese immigrant 
within the meaning of the Act’.577 Under the Chinese Emigration Act, an ‘immigrant’ meant 
‘any male adult native of China, or its dependencies, or of any islands in the Chinese Seas, 
not born of British parents, or persons born of Chinese parents’.578 Lowe Kong Meng 
produced evidence to the Court that his mother was a British subject, being a ‘native of 
Penang, born after its occupation by the British’.579 He also pointed out, as the Argus noted, 
that Penang was not ‘in the Chinese Seas’.580 However under the Chinese Emigration Act the 
court could decide on its ‘own view and judgment’ whether a person was an ‘immigrant’.581 
As Kathy Cronin has explained, ‘the magistrate decided that Kong Meng’s physical 
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appearance showed him to be Chinese’582 and therefore held that he was an ‘immigrant’ 
under the terms of the Act.583  
Modern accounts still categorize Lowe Kong Meng on the basis of his ethnic Chinese 
appearance rather than his subject status under British law. Paul Macgregor, for example, 
states that by the time Lowe Kong Meng was born in Penang, ‘it had been British for forty-
five years’ and that earlier generations of his family had carried on business there for a 
century.584 Macgregor lists the things that were ‘British’ about Lowe Kong Meng, including 
being ‘raised in the British style, with his perfect English’,585 having ‘characteristics of a 
British gentleman’, being ‘taught modern subjects of the English schooling system’, and 
associating ‘socially and commercially with the British in the settlement’.586 Yet Macgregor 
says he was still a ‘Chinese born in British Penang’. Macgregor notes that ‘Lowe Kong Meng 
always claimed he was a British subject, by right of birth and upbringing in a British colony’, 
and that he self-defined ‘simultaneously as both a subject of the British Empire and an official 
of the Chinese Empire’.587 However, contrary to the suggestion from Macgregor, Lowe Kong 
Meng’s subject status was not a matter of a mere ‘claim’ or ‘self-definition’. There was no 
question that according to the longstanding rule from Calvin’s Case, Lowe Kong Meng was a 
‘natural-born’ British subject.  
Similarly, Marilyn Lake observes that Lowe Kong Meng ‘was proud of his Chinese standing, 
his status as a British subject and success as an international trader’.588 But she also notes his 
statement (in a joint petition to the visiting Chinese Imperial Commissioners in 1887) that a 
colonial poll tax could only be avoided ‘if we choose to expatriate ourselves by becoming 
naturalised British subjects’.589 Lake does not take issue with this statement. Had the 
established law been applied, Lowe Kong Meng and the ‘thousands of Chinese’ in the colony 
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of Victoria who claimed the ‘same privilege’ would have been accepted as British subjects 
with no need to consider naturalisation.  
These historians have not properly taken into account the legal principles about ‘subjecthood’ 
and ‘aliens’. Hence they have not recognised that the Victorian District Court acted contrary 
to the law.590 This is not only important for the historical record. In terms of legal 
foundations, it is also fundamental to current accounts of the scope of the Commonwealth’s 
power over aliens. As discussed below, colonial era cases are still cited in relation to this 
issue – but without proper scrutiny of their use of the term ‘alien’. 
 (ii) Ex parte Ah Tchin and ‘Chinese Aliens’ 
In Ex parte Ah Tchin (1864) the New South Wales Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a 
number of ‘Chinese aliens’ for unlawfully mining for gold outside prescribed areas.591 
According to the Chief Justice: 
The words of the statute mean that a Miners’ Right in the hands of a European gives a right to 
mine over all the gold fields, but in the hands of a Chinese alien it gives a right to mine only on 
a prescribed and limited portion of that gold field.
592
  
The Chief Justice said it was ‘conceded that these applicants are Chinese aliens’, without 
questioning that assumption.593 Under the relevant New South Wales legislation, however, a 
‘Chinese’ included ‘any male person born of Chinese parents’.594 The definition of ‘alien’ in 
the legislation was consistent with the common law, namely ‘any person not being a British 
subject or naturalized subject of Her Majesty’.595 Under this statute, therefore, miners born in 
Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements or other British possessions were not ‘Chinese aliens’ and 
could not validly be convicted for unlawful mining. But the court did not consider this 
possibility. Instead, the court appeared to think of ‘aliens’ at least partly in racial terms. It 
took no account of the fact that some Chinese were not aliens either under the common law 
or on the terms of the legislation itself, nor that ‘Europeans’ not born or naturalised as British 
subjects were aliens under the law.  
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(iii) Ah Toy and the SS Afghan 
In Chung Teong Toy v Musgrove (1888),596 the Victorian Supreme Court held that the 
prerogative of the Crown to exclude ‘aliens’ did not exist as part of responsible government 
in Victoria - in other words there was no inherent power of the executive, without a law 
passed by Parliament, to prevent ‘aliens’ entering the colony. As Justice Williams said: 
I have come to the conclusion at which I have arrived with great reluctance. I fully recognise 
the importance of our decision, and of its possible effect upon the future of this colony. I do not 
hesitate to say that, if the conclusion at which I have arrived be a right one, we have no legal 
means of preventing cargoes of alien convicts, if they were sent here to-morrow, from landing 
on and polluting our shores.
597
 
Toy had been refused entry under Victoria’s 1881 law limiting the number of Chinese able to 
land in the colony to one for every 100 tons of a ship’s weight. The Supreme Court upheld 
his claim that despite this law he had a right to enter on payment of the ten pound poll tax. 
But on appeal the Privy Council overturned the Supreme Court’s decision, declaring that it 
could not: 
…assent to the proposition that an alien refused permission to enter British territory could, in an 
action in a British court, compel the decision of such matters involving delicate and difficult 
constitutional questions affecting the respective rights of the Crown and Parliament.598 
As Kim Rubenstein says, ‘one of the most important devices of citizenship was set at this 
early stage, the right to exclude aliens’.599 Toy v Musgrove was cited in the constitutional 
convention debates in the 1890s as justification for not including a power to confer 
citizenship in a federal constitution. At the 1898 Convention, Mr Bernhard Wise from New 
South Wales said such a power was not needed because Ah Toy’s case indicated the 
Commonwealth would be able to determine ‘citizenship’ in a practical or ‘inherent’ sense by 
excluding aliens: 
I do not think Dr. Quick’s amendment is necessary. If we do not put in a definition of 
citizenship every state will have inherent power to decide who is a citizen. That was the 
decision of the Privy Council in Ah Toy’s case.600 
In neither the Victorian Supreme Court nor the Privy Council was there any analysis of 
whether Chung Teong Toy was an ‘alien’ under the common law. In the Privy Council the 
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Lord Chancellor said ‘the plaintiff was a subject of the Emperor of China and owed 
allegiance to him and was not a British subject’,601 repeating Chief Justice Higinbotham’s 
statement in the Supreme Court,602 which in turn copied the argument of Victoria’s Attorney-
General Mr Wrixon who led the case for the defence.603 Nowhere in the 130 pages of 
recorded argument before the Supreme Court604 or in the actual judgments of the Supreme 
Court or the Privy Council is any evidence cited which might support this statement. Chung 
Teong Toy is described merely as ‘a Chinese’, an ‘alien Chinese’ or a ‘Chinese immigrant’. 
There is no record of any evidence put to either court as to his place of birth – critical in 
determining if he was an ‘alien’ or a British subject under the law. Instead, there seems to 
have been a presumption that Toy was an alien because he was ethnically Chinese. Mr Box 
for the defence said the 1881 Victorian legislation treated all people of Chinese origin as 
‘foreigners’ to be excluded from the colony: 
The Chinese Acts in effect say this ‘We don’t like you Chinese; we won’t have you come here. 
We will do something more to restrict your immigration into this colony than we do to restrict 
any other class of foreigners. You foreigners say you have a right to come here, but as far as 
you Chinese are concerned we will fine the captain of any vessel heavily who brings to this 
colony more than one Chinese passenger for every 100 tons of his ship’s burthen and we will 
make every Chinese who comes here pay £10 for the privilege of entering the colony’.605 
The Victorian Legislative Assembly had been told in 1881 that ‘almost every Chinese 
immigrant to Victoria’ came from the British colony of Hong Kong.606 This was true of 
Chung Teong Toy. As Justice Wrenfordsley said, he ‘was an immigrant on board the British 
ship Afghan, a vessel trading between Hong Kong and certain ports in the Australian 
colonies’.607 Toy may have come from some other part of China and merely boarded the 
vessel in Hong Kong. But as Victoria’s Government Statist observed a few years before Toy v 
Musgrove, officials often failed to distinguish between migrants from ‘British China’ and 
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those from ‘China proper’.608 Both the Supreme Court and the Privy Council treated Toy as 
an ‘alien’ merely on the basis that he was ‘Chinese’, with no reference to legal criteria for 
alien status set down in Calvin’s Case, and with no evidence put to either Court as to his 
actual origin or place of birth.  
(iv) Ex parte Lo Pak and habeus corpus 
In the same year as Toy v Musgrove, there were three similar cases in the New South Wales 
Supreme Court. Each involved an application for habeus corpus to secure the release of 
Chinese arrivals prevented by the New South Wales Government under Premier Sir Henry 
Parkes from disembarking in Sydney.609 In the leading case, Ex parte Lo Pak, lawyers for the 
Parkes Government asserted that the applicant was an ‘alien’ and therefore not entitled to 
habeus corpus.610 As in Toy, there is no indication in the case report of any evidence as to Lo 
Pak’s origin or place of birth to support the claim that he was an ‘alien’ under British law. 
Chief Justice Darley did not question this assertion, merely stating ‘I assume it to be a fact 
that he is an alien, and has no letters of naturalisation’.611 Justice Windeyer went further, 
declaring that ‘he is a native of China’, without explaining the basis for that statement.612 
However, in contrast to the Privy Council’s decision in Toy, Lo Pak’s legal status was not 
critical for the outcome of the case. The Supreme Court ordered his release, declaring there 
were ‘abundant authorities’ to show that habeus corpus was available whether Lo Pak was a 
subject or an alien.613 
Ah Toy’s case and the New South Wales habeus corpus matters continue to be cited in the 
modern era in relation to a sovereign power to exclude ‘aliens’. In Ruddock v Vardalis 
(2001)614 (the Tampa case) the Federal Court said ‘the power of a State under international 
law to remove aliens’ had been recognised by the Privy Council’s approval of the dissenting 
judgment in Toy v Musgrove.615 The Court also referred to Lo Pak’s case for ‘the contention 
that the Governor of the Colony of New South Wales had power independent of statute to 
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exclude foreigners from the colony’.616 But there was no consideration as to whether the 
applicants in the colonial era cases were aliens under the law and hence whether these matters 
could validly be cited in this way. Academic commentary has also failed to consider this 
fundamental starting point.617  
(v) James Toro and the writ of inquisition 
In 1902 the Queensland District Court was required under a ‘writ of inquisition’618 to 
establish whether James Toro, granted state land in Rockhampton in 1864, was an ‘alien’. If 
so the grant would be invalid under Queensland’s Aliens Act 1867 and the property would 
‘escheat’ or revert to the Crown. Witnesses called by the court were unable to say whether 
Toro was dead or alive but willingly gave their opinion as to his background and legal status. 
John Muir, an engine driver, ‘deposed he had been in Rockhampton since 1865. He had 
known a man named James Toro. He was a Chinaman’.619 James Foran, an accountant: 
…deposed that he came to the town in 1860. He knew James Toro, he was an alien, a Tartar, 
Mongolian, or Chinaman, or something of that sort…He was always looked upon as a 
Chinaman.620  
Affidavits were tendered to the court showing there was no record of Mr Toro being 
naturalised in Queensland. The judge summed up the issue for the jury: 
The next question was as to whether Toro was an alien. A Chinaman was prima facie an alien. 
That was to say it was taken for granted he was an alien unless he showed he was not… as far 
as the jury had evidence, Toro had not been naturalised, and being a Chinaman, prima facie he 
was an alien.621 
As the local paper reported: 
The jury found— (1) that James Toro was the registered proprietor of the land in question; 
(2) that he was an alien; (3) that he had not been naturalised as a British subject. His Honour 
certified accordingly.
622
 
                                                 
616
  Ibid. Justice French also noted another of the 1888 habeus corpus cases, Ex parte Leong Kum 
(1888) 9 NSWLR(L) 250.  
617
  See for example John Waugh, ‘Chung Teong Toy v Musgrove and the Commonwealth Executive’ 
(1991) 2 Public Law Review 160. Apart from Ah Toy’s case, the article also refers to the 1888 
habeus corpus cases in the New South Wales Supreme Court (172 n 75). Again, however, there is 
no consideration as to whether the courts hearing these matters had properly established key facts 
such as the place of birth of the applicants to determine if they were British subjects or aliens under 
the law.  
618
  Issued by the Supreme Court of Queensland under section 5 of the Escheat (Procedure and 
Amendment) Act 1891 (Qld).  
619
  ‘Civil Sitting’, Capricornian (Rockhampton) 26 April 1902, 38. 
620
  Ibid. 
621
  Ibid. Emphasis added.  
622
  Ibid.  
128 
 
The Toro case exemplifies how the ‘rule of law’ had evolved in this area by the end of the 
colonial period in Australia. The Court accepted evidence (for example from Mr Foran) that 
Toro appeared or looked ‘alien’ in a general, non-legal sense in deciding whether he was an 
‘alien’ under the common law.623 Mr Toro was presumed by the Court to be an ‘alien’ 
because witnesses said he looked something like a Chinese person and ‘a Chinaman was 
prima facie an alien’. The Court understood that a naturalised British subject was not an 
‘alien’. But it reversed the onus of proof, ‘taking for granted’ that Mr Toro was an ‘alien’ 
unless shown otherwise. While the Court searched Queensland’s naturalisation records, it 
made no inquiry as to the more likely possibility that Toro may have been a natural-born 
British subject, with no need to be naturalised. Indeed there is no indication from reports of 
the case that the Court understood that a person of non-European ethnic origin born in 
Australia or another British possession was a British subject by birth.  
More generally, the Toro case demonstrates that it was difficult if not impossible for those 
seen as ‘aliens’ or ‘outsiders’ by the Anglo-Celtic community to alter such perceptions. Mr 
Toro was a freehold land owner for some 30 years.624 Given the significance of land 
ownership in colonial society, there was little more he could have done to be accepted as a 
‘member’ or ‘belonging’. Yet witnesses who gave evidence to the Court and claimed they 
had known Toro for all of that time still described him as an ‘alien’ in their midst. 
Conclusion: ‘alien’ discourse in colonial Australia 
As these cases show, the perception that Chinese residents were ‘alien’ in a general or racial 
sense became so embedded in colonial Australia that it affected their treatment in the legal 
system. Notwithstanding the lack of any reliable evidence, courts assumed Chinese 
Australians were ‘aliens’ under the law because they were ‘alien’ in appearance and way of 
life. Colonial leaders had, after all, regularly and prominently proclaimed that the Chinese 
were ‘aliens’ across all measures of comparison with Her Majesty’s subjects. This had been 
formally stated in official communications to the Imperial government after inter-colonial 
conferences on the ‘Chinese question’. Key political figures were aware - and indeed fearful 
of - the numerous British subjects of Chinese ethnic origin in Britain’s Asian colonies. They 
had been told by imperial authorities and their parliamentary colleagues that many Chinese 
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arrivals were subjects and not aliens. Yet as Parkes himself said, application of the law took 
second place when it came to exclusion of the Chinese. Legislation allowed magistrates and 
judges to use their ‘own view and judgment’ as to the legal status of Chinese Australians. 
Even census enumerators assumed Chinese residents were not British subjects. As with 
indigenous Australians, some lawmakers thought Chinese residents were barely human, 
comparing them to animals or pests. Consistent with this broader prejudice, ethnic Chinese 
were ‘prima facie’ aliens for colonial courts. In Kong Meng’s case the Victorian District 
Court ignored the law on subject status. The Privy Council in Ah Toy’s case thought it 
unimportant to record any evidence showing that Ah Toy was legally an alien. The Chief 
Justice of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Ex parte Lo Pak assumed the Chinese 
applicant was an ‘alien’. The onus fell on ethnic Chinese British subjects to prove their legal 
status. But as Lord Carnarvon pointed out, most were unable to do so, since, as in the Toro 
case, the proof generally required was a naturalisation certificate, which natural-born subjects 
had no reason to obtain. 
In colonial Australia racial discourse about ‘aliens’ in Anglo-Celtic society fed into, and in 
turn was reinforced by, attitudes of the executive, legislature and judiciary. The role of 
individuals such as Parkes, Griffith and other colonial leaders was critical. Their racial use of 
‘alien’ played into legislative activity, in turn requiring attention by the judiciary.   
The failure by colonial lawmakers in the second half of the nineteenth century to respect the 
legal meaning of the word ‘alien’ led to its further misuse in the watershed constitutional 
convention debates of the 1890s. In turn this meant that after federation the Australian states 
(not least Queensland) wrongly applied the term to exclude Chinese British subjects from key 
occupations, leaving them, in many cases, with little way to make a living.    
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CHAPTER THREE Constitutional conventions and ‘the power 
to deal with aliens’ 
‘How can a liberal democratic constitution still allow race-based laws against its 
citizens? How can it still contemplate barring citizens from voting on account of race? 
The truth is the founding fathers abandoned liberal democratic principles with respect 
to race. It was an error reflecting the thinking of the time, but it needs to be 
rectified’.625 
The description of non-Europeans as members of an ‘alien race’ - embedded in the political 
discourse of the Australian colonies by prominent figures such as Griffith, Parkes, Playford 
and Gillies - continued at the constitutional conventions in the 1890s. As Rubenstein says, the 
public and political debate in colonial Australia about the exclusion of Asian, particularly 
Chinese, immigration ‘informs an understanding of the [convention] Debates themselves’.626 
However it was not just the Chinese who were a source of anxiety for convention delegates.  
Several legal writers have examined the Constitutional Convention debates in relation to 
citizenship.627 This chapter extends their analysis to highlight a point yet to be made 
prominently – that use of the term ‘alien’ in its non-legal, racial sense underpinned the 
different purpose envisaged for legislative powers linked to ‘outsiders’ and should be woven 
into interpretation of the extent of those powers today. 
There were extensive references throughout the constitutional conventions about the danger 
posed by ‘alien races’ to the emerging federation. At the 1890 Australasian Federation 
Conference, South Australian Premier Dr Cockburn said colonial governments should 
exclude those ‘alien races whose presence would we think be detrimental to our 
development’.628 At the 1891 Convention Samuel Griffith referred to the ‘burning question’ 
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of ‘black labour’ in Queensland, declaring that the new federal parliament should have sole 
power to legislate about ‘the affairs of people of any race’ because:  
…the introduction of an alien race in considerable numbers into any part of the Commonwealth 
is a danger to the whole of the Commonwealth, and upon that matter the Commonwealth 
should speak, and the Commonwealth alone.
629  
In March 1898 Alfred Deakin, in a major concluding speech to the last of the conventions 
emphasising the importance of federation, stated that: 
At a time like this, when the question of the control of alien races and the influx of alien 
populations has become…a still more burning question…it is…not idle to remind our critics 
that without union we must remain exposed to that and many similar dangers.
630  
Without exception, delegates to the various conventions used the phrase ‘alien race’ to refer 
to anyone of non-European origin, including British subjects. There was no explanation at 
any of the conventions of the legal meaning of ‘alien’. This led to misunderstanding as to 
who might be covered by key lawmaking powers in the new constitution, including the ‘races 
power’ in what became section 51(xxvi) and the ‘naturalization and aliens’ power, now in 
section 51(xix). It also meant that a proposal for federal citizenship was considered by 
delegates with a partial understanding at best of concepts fundamental to membership status 
under British law such as ‘alien’ and ‘natural-born subject’.  
The failure to explain the proper meaning of ‘alien’ under the law at any of the convention 
debates is also significant because key delegates - including Griffith, Edmund Barton, 
Richard O’Connor, Isaac Isaacs and Henry Higgins – were later appointed to the High Court 
of Australia to be the final arbiters on the meaning of the new constitution. As discussed in 
Chapter Five, the misuse, misunderstanding and manipulation of the word ‘alien’ at the 
conventions contributed to a defective decision in at least one of the High Court’s 
foundational cases, namely Robtelmes v Brenan (1906),631 which misinterpreted the ‘aliens 
power’ in section 51(xix) of the Constitution. 
The convention debates of the 1890s are now accepted as an important source for interpreting 
the Constitution. In Cole v Whitfield (1988) the High Court overturned previous practice, 
declaring that:  
Reference to the [convention debates] may be made, not for the purpose of substituting for the 
meaning of the words used [in the Constitution] the scope and effect if such could be 
established which the founding fathers subjectively intended the section to have, but for the 
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purpose of identifying the contemporary meaning of language used, the subject to which that 
language was directed and the nature and objectives of the movement towards federation from 
which the compact of the Constitution finally emerged.632 
While it is not a purpose of this thesis to delve into the debate over the use of convention 
records in constitutional interpretation,633 this chapter explains how references to ‘aliens’ in 
those records should be interpreted if a court chooses to refer to them.  In addition, it is 
historically illuminating to investigate what the delegates meant when they were using this 
term. 
Whatever one’s view on the proper use of the convention debates, the speeches at the 
conventions remain, as Helen Irving has noted, ‘the primary source for doing history’ for the 
High Court.634 However, when citing references to ‘aliens’ at the conventions (for example, 
in relation to the constitutional basis for Australian citizenship), the High Court has not 
identified that the ‘contemporary meaning’ of ‘alien’ and ‘the subject to which that language 
was directed’ was contrary to the rule of law. As a consequence, the High Court has not 
properly understood the roles delegates envisaged for key lawmaking powers - especially the 
‘races’ and ‘naturalization and aliens’ powers - as part of the ‘nature and objectives of the 
movement towards federation’.  
This chapter begins by noting the anxiety at the conventions about ‘British Indians’. Far from 
prompting acceptance, their status as subjects of the British Crown made them a major focus 
of efforts to exclude ‘coloured aliens’ from a white Australia. The chapter then looks at the 
debate on the proposed ‘races power’, during which the term ‘alien’ was most extensively 
(and incorrectly) used. It counters the suggestion that aboriginal Australians were correctly 
excluded from the power over ‘alien races’ because they were regarded as not ‘aliens’ in a 
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legal sense. Next the chapter considers the ‘naturalization and aliens’ power, concluding that 
this was seen, in contrast to its expansive modern interpretation, merely as a technical 
provision about the process of naturalisation.635  
The chapter then examines proposals for a ‘citizenship’ power in the Constitution, noting 
delegates’ misunderstanding of key membership concepts under British law, including 
‘subject’ and ‘alien’. Finally, the chapter highlights the incorrect use of ‘alien’ in Australia’s 
constitutional ‘bible’, the Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, authored 
by John Quick (himself a delegate at the conventions) and Robert Garran (first Secretary of 
the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department and first Solicitor-General of the 
Commonwealth). Given its authoritative nature,636 identification by this work of the misuse 
of ‘alien’ at the conventions may have prevented further misapplication. Instead the authors 
helped perpetuate this mistake by also using the word ‘alien’ in a racial sense when 
explaining major lawmaking powers in the Constitution.   
‘British Indians’ and the Australian Constitution 
Nothing demonstrates the misuse of the word ‘alien’ better than its application to those of 
Indian origin acknowledged by convention delegates as subjects of the British Crown. 
‘British Indians’ had a significant influence on the development of Australia’s federal 
constitution – not as a result of the small number already in Australia but due to fear of the 
millions who could potentially emigrate to the country. 
Parry notes that the origins of British rule under the East India Company meant the 
nationality of inhabitants of the sub-continent remained uncertain until the nineteenth century 
or later. He observes that ‘the Crown was in a sense the overlord of the Company, and the 
latter the agent of the former as respected the acquisition of territory within its sphere’. In an 
1813 English statute the ‘undoubted sovereignty of the Crown of the United Kingdom’ was 
asserted and in 1814 the French and Dutch conceded British sovereignty over India.637 The 
British Raj was divided into the states of ‘British India’ directly ruled by the United Kingdom 
and the ‘Indian Native States’ ruled by their own princes under the supervision of the British 
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Crown. The latter ‘did not form part of the Dominions of the Crown at any time prior to the 
commencement of the Indian Independence Act 1947’. As Parry says in relation to India, ‘a 
possible view is that the inhabitants of some States were as such British subjects though those 
of others were not’. Inhabitants of the Native States were at the least, however, ‘British 
protected persons in the older and broader sense’.638  
Marie de Lepervanche notes that Indian settlers in Australia: 
…mostly originated in the Punjab or elsewhere in the north and north-west of the sub-
continent…The majority of immigrant Punjabis settled in Queensland or northern New South 
Wales; though most were Sikhs or Moslems, Australians called them ‘Hindoos’.639 
The Punjab was a province of ‘British India’ and settlers originating from there were British 
subjects under the common law. The British subject status of Indian settlers prompted 
occasional calls for favourable treatment in Australia, but more often this was a cause of fear 
and concern. The first Commonwealth census in 1911 recorded 3,299 ‘full-blood’ and 399 
‘half-caste’ Australian residents of ‘Hindu’ race, of whom 3,137 (or more than 95 per cent) 
were listed as British subjects - and therefore not ‘aliens’ - either by birthplace, parentage or 
naturalisation. 640 The 1921 census listed 6,918 Australian residents born in British India.641  
In contrast to his alarm about the rush of ‘alien Chinese’ into northern Australia,642 the 
Government Resident of the Northern Territory reported in 1887 that ‘the Tamil coolie from 
India, who belongs to our own Empire, would be a better labourer’, proposing that - with the 
agreement of the Imperial and Indian governments - the Government Resident himself could 
be the ‘immigration agent-general’.643 A more common attitude, however, was expressed by 
the Illustrated Sydney News in 1893:  
A large number of aliens, consisting of Cingalese,644 Hindoos, and other Indians, appeared at 
the Central Licensing Court on Monday as applicants for hawkers’ licenses…These hawkers 
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are of an extremely treacherous disposition, and no lonely woman in the bush is safe from their 
detestable advances…We have no means of knowing the history of these aliens who are daily 
landing on our shores. In their own country, many may have been criminals…It is high time to 
rank them with the Chinamen, and poll-tax them out of the country.
645
 
In the same year the Capricornian expressed fear that ‘Asiatic aliens’, including thousands of 
Indians and Ceylonese, might use their standing as British subjects to settle in Australia: 
…in Sydney there exists a colony of Asiatic aliens whose numbers it is said amount to fifteen 
hundred... not only are the aliens numerous, but…they form an objectionable element in our 
communities. They are of filthy habits, and have been driven from one part of Sydney to 
another…If, as we suspect, they are really Cingalese646 and Indians there may be some 
difficulty encountered in dealing with them. As natives of the British dominions…they may 
claim the right to settle in any part of the Empire. If this right is recognised then the door may 
be opened to the introduction of aliens by the thousand. Is that a state of affairs Queenslanders 
can regard without apprehension?
647
 
As the above extract shows, despite recognition of their British subject status, the ‘Hindoos’ 
or Indian settlers were commonly labelled as ‘aliens’. A 1901 report to Australia’s first Prime 
Minister, Edmund Barton, from the director of sugar policy for the Queensland Government 
stated that:  
An inquiry into the numerical relations of white and alien labour engaged in sugar production 
in New South Wales led to some approximate results…It was thought possible that some 
proportion of aliens in New South Wales had recently moved North. Inquiries made by the 
writer with the several shipping companies revealed the circumstance that ‘the only shipment of 
aliens (Hindoos) for the North was direct from Melbourne’. The Hindoos in question were 
noted by the writer in Mackay, where it was ascertained that they had finally gone to Cairns.
648
 
Consistent with the author’s assumption that people were either ‘white’ or ‘alien’, the report 
noted the presence of German and Scandinavian canegrowers but did not include them in the 
number of ‘aliens’ recorded in the sugar industry.649  
Delegates to the constitutional conventions were alarmed by the realisation that British India 
was populated by hundreds of millions of ‘natural-born’ subjects with the right to travel 
freely to Australia and other parts of the Empire. As Helen Irving has observed, ‘proponents 
of a white Australia found this an uncomfortable reality’.650  
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Delegates took comfort, however, from the proposed new federal powers. At the 1898 
Convention, Sir Edward Braddon, Premier of Tasmania, said inclusion in the new 
constitution of a power over immigration would secure to the Commonwealth: 
…that its citizens shall not be people of alien races to any considerable extent. There are in 
India some 150,000,000 British subjects, but…very few…could stand the test applied by the 
Natal Immigration Restriction Act (which)…will be effective in keeping from our shores the 
natives of India who cannot pass the education test that is applied under the Natal Act.
651
 
Samuel Griffith also said the ‘immigration and emigration’ power652 would enable the new 
federal parliament ‘to keep out Chinese, Hindoos or other aliens’.653  
The misuse of the term ‘alien’ by delegates to the Conventions was exemplified at the 1898 
Convention by William Trenwith from Victoria who said that delegates were ‘intimately 
acquainted with constitutional law’ and were ‘experts upon the exact definition of terms’, but 
then himself referred to ‘the difficulty…in dealing satisfactorily with British subjects coming 
from Hindostan’, expressing alarm about the potential ‘influx of this alien population into 
Tasmania’.654 
Section 51(xxvi): the power over ‘alien races’  
At the 1891 National Australasian Convention, Sir Samuel Griffith - Premier of Queensland 
and chairman of the constitutional drafting committee – first proposed what became the 
‘races’ power in section 51(xxvi) of the Australian Constitution.655 Griffith argued that the 
new federal parliament should have exclusive legislative power in relation to ‘alien races’, 
declaring that: 
The intention of the clause is that if any state by any means gets a number of an alien race into 
its population, the matter shall not be dealt with by the state, but the Commonwealth will take 
the matter into its own hands…What I have had more particularly in my own mind was the 
immigration of coolies from British India, or any eastern people subject to civilised powers…I 
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maintain that no state should be allowed, because the federal parliament did not choose to make 
a law on the subject, to allow the state to be flooded by such people as I have referred to.
656  
It is worth noting that despite his leading role in preparing the draft constitution, Griffith had 
no hesitation in labelling British Indians as an ‘alien race’, even though they were legally 
British subjects.  
In the main debate on the ‘races power’ in Melbourne in January 1898, delegates ignored the 
legal meaning of ‘alien’, employing the term in its social or racial sense on numerous 
occasions as a default expression for ‘people of a non-European race’. Indeed, delegates used 
the word ‘alien’ in this way during the debate more often than they employed the term ‘race’ 
itself.657 Chairman of the judiciary committee and former South Australian Attorney-General 
Josiah Symon QC - explaining how the legislative power over ‘people of any race’ and the 
power over ‘immigration’ might work together - said the Federal Parliament:  
…may say that they will admit the coloured races - those whom we describe, as aliens - to the 
full advantage of the citizenship of Australia…or they may give a limited citizenship …What I 
understood my honorable friend to desire was, that the power of regulating these coloured 
races…shall be left entirely with the states.658  
Richard O’Connor QC, later appointed to the High Court, also referred to ‘the races for 
whom it is necessary to make special laws’ as ‘aliens’. In the debate on the ‘races power’ in 
January 1898, O’Connor stated that: 
I think it is generally admitted that there should be uniformity of law with regard to the races 
for whom it is necessary to make special laws…Otherwise one state may deal with some 
particular class of aliens upon specially favourable terms, the effect of which would be that 
aliens from all parts of Australia would congregate in that state and make the difficulty of 
dealing with the whole question very much greater.
659 
 
When O’Connor then contrasted ‘the making of a law preventing aliens from entering the 
state’ with ‘the making of a law to control their mode of living while in that state’,660 he was 
comparing use of the ‘immigration power’ in what became section 51(xxvii) of the 
Constitution with the ‘races power’ in section 51(xxvi). He was not discussing the power to 
make laws with respect to ‘naturalization and aliens’ in what became section 51(xix) of the 
Constitution. In a similar way, Dr John Quick from Victoria, joint author of the definitive 
                                                 
656
  Official Report of the Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 3 April 1891, 701, 703. Emphasis 
added. 
657
  There were 84 references to the word ‘alien’ in the debate on the races power at the Melbourne 
Convention compared with 66 references to the word ‘race’. See Official Record of the Debates of 
the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 27-28 January 1898.  
658
  Ibid 28 January 1898, 249-250. Emphasis added. 
659
  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 27 January 
1898, 234. Emphasis added.  
660
  Ibid 234-235. Emphasis added.  
138 
 
1901 work on the Australian Constitution, said the Federal Parliament should have ‘control 
over the immigration of aliens’ because he was ‘anxious to equip the Commonwealth with 
every power necessary for dealing with the invasion of outside coloured races’.661    
Misuse of the term ‘alien’ during the ‘races power’ debate at the conventions has remained 
unchallenged. In Kartinyeri (1998) Justice Gaudron of the Australian High Court observed 
that: 
There are two matters with respect to s 51(xxvi) which are beyond controversy. The first is that 
the debates of the Constitutional Conventions relevant to the provision which ultimately 
became s 51(xxvi) reveal an understanding that it would authorise laws which discriminated 
against people of ‘coloured races’ and ‘alien races’.662 
Similarly, in the same case Justice Kirby noted that the constitution of Canada ‘contained no 
equivalent race power’ but did have a ‘naturalization and aliens’ power exclusive to the 
federal parliament which the Privy Council said in 1899 ‘rendered invalid a Provincial statute 
disqualifying Chinese aliens from working underground in mines’.663 Neither judge 
questioned the way ‘alien’ was used in these phrases in its racial not legal sense.  
Justice Kirby also noted the importance of the debates on the ‘races power’ at the 
conventions for establishing the original purpose of section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution: 
Although there were differences about whether par (xxvi) was ambiguous and, if it was, as to 
the use that might be made of the Convention Debates of the 1890s…no objection was raised 
by any party to the Court's going to these materials in order to secure a general understanding 
of the purpose of the race power in its original form...664 
A recognition that delegates used the word ‘alien’ in its racial not legal sense is essential for 
any such understanding. Otherwise the extensive references to ‘aliens’ and ‘alien races’ 
during the ‘races power’ debate would suggest they intended this provision to apply merely to 
people of various races who were not subjects of the British Crown. 
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In her discussion of the races power debate, Jennifer Clarke notes that: 
Samuel Griffith proposed an exclusive Commonwealth ‘race’ power against a background of 
extensive use of ‘coloured’ (Polynesian and Melanesian) labour in Queensland maritime and 
agricultural industries…Griffith proposed that the Commonwealth be able to deal with ‘alien 
races’ in Australia. The power would extend to British subjects.665 
Clarke notes Professor Sawer’s observation that the races power debate ‘tended to be in terms 
of “aliens”, but Barton showed clearly that…the persons coming under it might well be 
British subjects. Nor need they be migrants; they could be born in Australia.’666 Sawer’s 
analysis suggests that the term ‘alien’ was misused during the races power debate but, like 
Clarke, he does not state this outright.  
Indigenous Australians and the ‘races power’  
Chesterman and Galligan refer to Griffith’s statement in 1891 that the ‘races power’ would 
allow the new federal parliament to regulate ‘alien races’ in Australia, particularly ‘coolies 
from British India’. They state that: 
In other words, this was a power to deal with, including to protect, alien races allowed into 
Australia. Aboriginal people were not in that category and were quite properly excluded from 
its application…The power was for dealing with people of other races such as the Kanakas in 
Queensland or Chinese, Indian or Malays who might be brought to Australia as indentured 
labourers.
667 
However it is not the case that Australia’s indigenous people were ‘properly excluded’ from 
the application of the races power by Griffith and other delegates to the conventions because 
they were regarded as not ‘alien’ in a legal sense. As the above extracts show, delegates did 
not use the phrase ‘alien race’ to refer to those from another race who were not British 
subjects. As this thesis has demonstrated, by this time ‘alien race’ was a standard phrase used 
by Anglo-Celtic lawmakers in Australia to refer to those who were different, foreign or ‘not 
one of us’ in a non-legal, racial sense. British Indians, Malays, Chinese from Hong Kong, the 
Straits Settlements and other colonies, as well as ‘Kanakas’ (Pacific islanders) from British 
possessions in the South Pacific were all included, despite their legal status as subjects of the 
Crown. Chesterman and Galligan note that ‘at Federation there was no doubt of their 
[aborigines] status as subjects of the Queen’.668 But as Chapter One has shown, aboriginal 
Australians could also be regarded as an ‘alien race’ in this general, non-legal sense. 
Australia’s indigenous people were excluded from the races power not because it was 
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recognised they were subjects (and not aliens) under the law, but simply because their 
regulation was to be left to the States.669 
Chesterman and Galligan are confronted with the same issue in relation to section 25 of the 
Constitution (‘Provision as to races disqualified from voting’).670 They say that it was ‘not 
clear from the federation debates whether it was intended that Aborigines should be included 
in this broader race disqualification’.671 They note Barton’s comment that ‘A race not entitled 
to vote is such an alien race as may exist in the community to whom the state in which they 
live has not conceded the privilege of voting’.672 They observe that: 
Barton affirmed that it was a matter for determination by the States, but equated ‘race’ with 
‘alien race’, a category that could not apply to Australian aborigines...On this analysis, and 
indeed on the reasoning that had seen Australian Aborigines excluded from the race power 
conferred by section 51(26), Australian Aborigines ought not to have been caught by 
section 25. But the adjective ‘alien’ did not appear in section 25, theoretically making the 
phrase ‘persons of any race’ applicable to Australian Aborigines.673 
However like other delegates Barton used ‘alien race’ as a default description for all those of 
non-European origin, whether or not they were British subjects. Contrary to Chesterman and 
Galligan’s interpretation, ‘alien race’ was not a legal term. Under British law ‘races’ or ethnic 
groupings were not divided into ‘aliens’ and ‘non-aliens’. As Professor Salmond observed in 
1902, ‘subject’ or ‘alien’ status was not determined by ‘blood’ or race but by place of birth.674 
From the perspective of Anglo-Celtic lawmakers such as Barton, Australian aborigines could 
be an ‘alien race’. It follows that there was nothing in Barton’s remarks indicating that 
aborigines ‘ought not to have been caught by’ the racial disqualification in section 25.   
This shows the importance of appreciating the racial use of ‘alien’ when considering the role 
convention delegates envisaged for different constitutional powers. The exclusion of 
                                                 
669  
As noted above (n 655), clause 53(i) of the 1891 draft constitution stated that ‘this power shall not 
extend to authorise legislation with respect to the affairs of the aboriginal native race in Australia 
and the Maori race in New Zealand’. With the omission of New Zealand from the new 
Commonwealth, in its final version the exclusion in section 51(xxvi) referred merely to races ‘other 
than the aboriginal race in any State’. Section 51(xxvi) was amended by the Constitution Alteration 
(Aboriginals) Act 1967 (Cth) by exclusion of the phrase ‘other than the aboriginal race in any 
State’.  
670
  Section 25 states: ‘…if by the law of any State all persons of any race are disqualified from voting 
at elections for the more numerous House of the Parliament of the State, then, in reckoning the 
number of the people of the State or of the Commonwealth, persons of the race resident in that State 
shall not be counted’.  
671
  Chesterman and Galligan, Citizens without rights, above n 235, 73.  
672
  Citing Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Sydney 1897, 453. 
Emphasis added. 
673
  Chesterman and Galligan, Citizens without rights, above n 235, 73. Emphasis added.  
674
  Salmond, ‘Citizenship and Allegiance’, above n 81, 53. See above p 17. 
141 
 
aborigines from the original coverage of section 51(xxvi) cannot be linked to a ‘proper’ legal 
application by Griffith of the phrase ‘alien race’. And Barton’s use of that phrase does not 
suggest any desire to include indigenous Australians - contrary to their exclusion by a State - 
when determining quotas for the Commonwealth parliament. 
Section 51(xix): naturalization of aliens? 
Consideration of this section at the conventions shows that an understanding of who the 
delegates meant by ‘aliens’ is essential for appreciating the respective roles they envisaged 
for key lawmaking powers in the Constitution. As the above comments indicate, delegates 
saw the ‘immigration and emigration’ and ‘races’ powers as key weapons for preservation of 
a ‘white Australia’ since these would enable exclusion and regulation of all ‘coloured aliens’, 
i.e. non-Europeans.  
In comparison to the extensive references to the immigration and races powers in enabling 
the forthcoming federation of Australia to exclude and regulate ‘aliens’, the proposed power 
with respect to ‘naturalization and aliens’ received only cursory attention during the 
constitutional conventions. Ironically, it is now accepted that the power to make laws with 
respect to ‘aliens’ in section 51(xix) is one of the most far-reaching in the Constitution, 
conferring extraordinary capacity on the Federal Parliament to constrain the activities of any 
‘alien’ as well as providing the constitutional foundation for Australian citizenship.675  
As Australia’s High Court said in Re Patterson (2001), the ability of the Commonwealth 
Parliament to pass laws with respect to ‘aliens’ under section 51(xix) of the Constitution is a 
‘plenary’ or ‘full’ power.676 The High Court has rejected the idea that laws made under 
section 51(xix), including for the deportation of aliens and immigration detention, need to be 
‘proportionate’677 or limited to what is ‘reasonably capable of being seen as necessary’.678 As 
long as such laws are sufficiently connected with the ‘aliens’ or immigration powers in the 
Constitution, it does not matter whether they are ‘unjust or contrary to basic human rights’,679 
contravene the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights680 or infringe the 
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common law’s ‘fundamental and ancient’ protection of personal liberty.681 Provided the law 
deals with the subject of ‘aliens’682 and does not impose ‘punishment’ - which under Chapter 
III of the Constitution can only be imposed by courts after determining guilt for a particular 
crime683 - it will be valid. As Chief Justice Gleeson noted in his dissenting judgment in Al-
Kateb (2004), this means, for example, that a failed asylum seeker (i.e. an ‘alien’) can be kept 
in immigration detention indefinitely ‘regardless of personal circumstances, regardless of 
whether he or she is a danger to the community, and regardless of whether he or she might 
abscond’.684  
In contrast to the current expansive interpretation of section 51(xix), delegates at the 
constitutional conventions in the 1890s did not perceive more than a minor role for this 
provision. The ‘naturalization and aliens power’ was not formally discussed at any of the 
conventions. Quick and Garran note that section 51(xix) ‘was introduced in its present form 
in 1891, and was adopted in 1897-8 without debate’.685   
While the delegates to the constitutional conventions were concerned that the Constitution 
should contain necessary powers to control membership of the new Commonwealth - for the 
purpose of ensuring a ‘white Australia’ - a supporting role only was envisaged for 
section 51(xix). The immigration power in section 51(xxvii) would restrict or entirely 
exclude the entry of undesirable races, the races power in section 51(xxvi) would regulate the 
activities of members of such races already in Australia and the ‘naturalization and aliens’ 
power in section 51(xix) would be concerned merely with the process of naturalisation. As 
Samuel Griffith said in 1891, the provision with respect to ‘naturalization of aliens’ in the 
draft Constitution was one of the powers requiring ‘no comment - at any rate, not at the 
present moment’.686 Similarly Edmund Barton in 1897 thought this was one of the technical 
provisions requiring no debate, asking ‘who wants a national or dual referendum as to these: 
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Bankruptcy and insolvency, copyrights and patents of inventions, naturalization and aliens, 
that is the naturalization of aliens…’.687 Barton did not see this power as going beyond the 
process of naturalisation. He explained that ‘we give [the Federal Parliament] power to make 
persons subjects of the British Empire. Have we not done enough? We allow them to 
naturalize aliens’.688 Other prominent delegates such as future Prime Minister George Reid 
also said the provision merely covered the ‘naturalisation of aliens’.689  
Griffith in particular was familiar with a power with respect to the ‘naturalisation of aliens’. 
This was one of the functions conferred on the Colonial Secretary of Queensland in 1862.690 
In addition, the Federal Council of Australasia Act 1885 (Imperial)691 conferred legislative 
authority on the Federal Council in relation to various matters that might be referred to it by 
two or more Australasian colonies, including the ‘naturalisation of aliens’.692 When Griffith 
as Premier of Queensland first attended the Federal Council in 1886, he complained that the 
power in relation to ‘naturalisation of aliens’ should not be left to the Council693 (because, as 
he said, ‘one of the colonies at least encourages the introduction of Chinese into a certain 
portion of its territory’,694 again suggesting that Griffith considered any person of Chinese 
appearance to be an ‘alien’ for lawmaking purposes).  
As John Williams explains, in 1890 Griffith wrote a constitution for a federal Queensland 
divided into three provinces. When Griffith presented his draft to the Queensland Legislative 
Assembly he said that the proposed ‘Legislature of the United Provinces’ (i.e. the overall 
Parliament for a federal Queensland) should have power with respect to the ‘naturalisation of 
aliens, and the status of foreign corporations’.695 The proposed legislature would have 
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lawmaking power over the legal status of foreign corporations and the process for altering the 
status of ‘aliens’, but no authority – and certainly no ‘plenary’ power  - to regulate, restrict or 
exclude ‘aliens’ in other ways. At the 1890 Federation Conference in Melbourne, Griffith 
explained the division of power appropriate for an Australasian federation by referring to 
powers in the Canadian Constitution, including ‘naturalization and alienage’.696 This was a 
lawmaking power about the legal status of ‘alienage’ and the process of converting that status 
into ‘non-alienage’, not a power to make any conceivable law about natural persons who 
happened to be ‘aliens’.   
Attorney-General of Tasmania Inglis Clark’s draft constitution prepared in 1891 gave the 
federal parliament the power ‘to regulate the immigration of Aliens into any part of the 
Federal Dominion of Australia’ and ‘to make an [sic] uniform law for the naturalization of 
Aliens throughout the Federal Dominion of Australasia’.697 This indicates a similar approach 
to other delegates at the conventions in relation to the provisions needed in the Constitution 
to protect a ‘white Australia’ (although without reference to the ‘races power’). If people 
regarded as ‘aliens’ could be excluded from the new federation using a legislative power over 
‘immigration’, there would be no need to have a specific and dedicated power to legislate 
with respect to ‘aliens’. It would be sufficient in this context if the Constitution contained a 
provision authorising the federal parliament to make laws with respect to the ‘naturalization 
of aliens’.  
In Plaintiff P1/2003 v Ruddock (2007),698 the plaintiff (an asylum seeker from Afghanistan 
seeking to avoid deportation under the Migration Act 1958) argued in the Federal Court that a 
law passed under the ‘naturalisation and aliens’ power in section 51(xix) of the Constitution 
must show a sufficient connection both to ‘naturalisation’ and to ‘aliens’. The plaintiff 
contended that on the plain words of the provision, the framers of the Constitution could not 
have intended that it should extend to aliens, such as the plaintiff, having no further 
connection with the Commonwealth following their removal. The defendant argued that this 
wrongly assumed that the word ‘and’ could not have a ‘disjunctive’ rather than a 
‘conjunctive’ meaning and that such an interpretation would have startling consequences for 
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other heads of power in the Constitution, for example section 51(xv) (‘weights and 
measures’). In addition, the defendant said this would be contrary to a long line of High Court 
authority establishing that section 51(xix) supports laws that relate to aliens and have no 
connection to naturalisation. However, while Justice Nicholson did not decide this issue, he 
refused to strike out the plaintiff’s claim, saying that it was not ‘obviously futile’ and was not 
‘precluded from argument by the authorities’.699 As indicated above, the convention debates 
and other historical material provide support for the plaintiff’s contention that to be valid 
under the ‘naturalization and aliens’ power in the Constitution, the law in question should be 
about the process of naturalisation.   
The narrow role perceived by delegates for the future section 51(xix) of the Constitution was 
consistent with their repeated reference to people of non-European race as ‘aliens’. In the 
delegates’ view the ‘races power’ allowed full regulation of those they regarded as ‘aliens’ - 
namely members of undesirable races (i.e. non-Europeans) - so there was no need to discuss 
whether section 51(xix) conferred an additional plenary power over ‘aliens’ as well as a 
power over naturalisation.700 After federation, in his capacity as Chief Justice of the High 
Court, Griffith said that section 51(xix) gave the Commonwealth ‘power to make whatever 
laws it may think fit…with respect to aliens’,701 but this was not consistent with his 
description at the 1890s conventions and on other occasions of the relevant power as one 
conferring legislative authority only in relation to the naturalisation of aliens.   
Citizenship and ‘aliens’ 
John Quick’s proposal 
In Singh v Commonwealth (2004) Justice McHugh noted, in relation to whether section 
51(xix) provides a constitutional foundation for Australian citizenship, that at the 1898 
Melbourne Convention:  
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Dr John Quick proposed that the Constitution should confer power on the Parliament to make 
laws with respect to citizenship. But the delegates rejected the proposal. Mr Richard O’Connor 
QC said ‘It appears to me quite clear, as regards the right of any person from the outside to 
become a member of the Commonwealth, that the power to regulate immigration and 
emigration, and the power to deal with aliens, give the right to define who shall be citizens, as 
coming from the outside world’. Mr O’Connor’s reference to immigration and emigration and 
aliens was a reference to what became sections 51(xix) and (xxvii) of the Constitution.
702
 
As the above discussion on use of the term ‘alien’ at the 1890s constitutional conventions 
indicates, however, when Richard O’Connor referred during the 1898 convention to the 
‘power to deal with aliens’, he was not referring to section 51(xix) of the Constitution but to 
the ‘races power’ in section 51(xxvi). Contrary to Justice McHugh’s suggestion in Singh, 
therefore, O’Connor’s statement does not support the view that the ‘aliens’ power in section 
51(xix) provides constitutional authority for the creation of Australian citizenship. O’Connor 
did not mean that section 51(xix) together with section 51(xxvii) of the Constitution would 
provide the power to define legal membership of Australia. What he was saying was that a 
combination of the immigration and races powers would give the Commonwealth the ability 
to determine in practical terms who was to have rights and freedoms as a ‘citizen’ in 
Australia, by controlling entry to the country and by enabling restrictions to be placed on 
those regarded as ‘aliens’ in a racial sense (i.e. non-Europeans) who had already arrived here. 
Justice McHugh’s misunderstanding in a 2004 decision shows the continuing importance for 
modern constitutional law of the historical misuse of ‘alien’ in Australia.  
The debate at the 1898 convention on Dr Quick’s proposal for a power over citizenship 
provides further examples of the focus of delegates on racial rather than legal criteria for 
membership of the new Commonwealth. Dr Quick proposed that: 
All persons resident within the Commonwealth, being natural-born or naturalized subjects of 
the Queen, and not under any disability imposed by the Parliament, shall be citizens of the 
Commonwealth.
703
 
The critical point from Quick’s perspective was that only those not under a ‘disability 
imposed by the Parliament’ would become citizens under this definition. By ‘disability’ he 
meant restriction or regulation on the basis of race. As he said: 
Such a disability might be imposed under the clause which we put into the Bill some time ago, 
empowering the Federal Parliament to deal with foreign races and undesirable immigrants. The 
Federal Parliament is empowered to declare that these races shall be placed under certain 
disabilities, among which might be that they shall not be capable of acquiring citizenship. The 
definition which I have suggested would not open the door to members of those undesirable 
races, and it would empower the Federal Parliament to exclude from the enjoyment of and 
                                                 
702
  (2004) 222 CLR 322, 345-346. Original emphasis removed. Emphasis added.  
703
  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 3 March 1898, 
1788. Emphasis added.  
147 
 
participation in the privileges of federal citizenship people of any undesirable race or of 
undesirable antecedents.
704
  
Attorney-General of Victoria and future Chief Justice of the High Court Isaac Isaacs drew 
attention to the flaw in Quick’s proposal in relation to preservation of a ‘white Australia’, 
noting that conferral of citizenship on any subject of the Queen resident within the 
Commonwealth would ‘deprive Parliament of the power of excluding Chinese, Lascars, or 
Hindoos who happened to be British subjects’.705 Similarly, South Australia’s Premier and 
Attorney-General Charles Kingston noted that it was not only natural-born subjects of 
English birth who would obtain the benefit of citizenship under Quick’s proposal: 
…we must not forget, that there are other native-born British subjects whom we are far from 
desiring to see come here in any considerable numbers. For instance, I may refer to Hong Kong 
Chinamen. They are born within the realm of Her Majesty, and are therefore native-born British 
subjects…Hong Kong is undoubtedly a British possession, and a Hong Kong Chinaman is 
undoubtedly a native-born British subject. Thus, honorable members will see what difficulties 
might arise if the privileges of citizenship of the Commonwealth were extended to all British 
subjects.706 
Like Justice McHugh, Chief Justice Gleeson in Singh also misinterpreted the references to 
‘aliens’ during the debate on Quick’s citizenship proposal at the 1898 convention. He stated: 
It is impossible to discern in the record of the Convention Debates any specific reason for the 
rejection of Dr Quick's ambiguous proposal. The discussion throws no light on the purpose or 
object of s 51(xix), except to the extent that it suggests that a broad, rather than a narrow, 
power with respect to aliens was in contemplation.707  
This also appears to refer to O’Connor’s statement about the ‘power to deal with aliens’. 
Once it is understood that delegates to the conventions used the term ‘alien’ entirely in its 
racial sense, the record of debate on Quick’s proposal suggests a broad view not of the 
‘naturalization and aliens power’ in section 51(xix) but of the ‘races power’ in section 
51(xxvi). Moreover, contrary to Chief Justice Gleeson’s contention, it is possible to discern 
from the convention debates the reason for rejection of Dr Quick’s proposal. As the debates 
show, Quick’s proposal was rejected because delegates thought it would allow British 
subjects of ‘undesirable race’ (i.e. ‘aliens’ in their view) to become citizens of the new 
Commonwealth.  
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The Inglis-Clark alternative 
As Helen Irving has recognised, ‘the problem which arose from being subjects of the Empire 
was that Australians shared this status with a class of people whom they did not wish to 
regard as citizens of the Commonwealth’.708 Concern over British Indians, Hong Kong 
Chinese and other non-European British subjects led to the defeat of an alternative proposal 
from Tasmanian Attorney-General Inglis Clark for a federal citizenship (with protection of 
rights for citizens) based on the 14
th
 amendment to the United States Constitution. Reactions 
to Inglis Clark’s proposal again showed that delegates to the conventions thought of 
citizenship in a racial not legal context, with little regard to basic concepts of membership 
under British law. Inglis Clark’s proposed clause 110 declared that: 
The citizens of each state, and all other persons owing allegiance to the Queen and residing in 
any territory of the Commonwealth, shall be citizens of the Commonwealth, and shall be 
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the Commonwealth in the several 
states, and a state shall not make or enforce any law abridging any privilege or immunity of 
citizens of the Commonwealth, nor shall a state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
its laws.
709
 
The response to Inglis Clark’s proposal from Josiah Symon – Queen’s Counsel, chairman of 
the convention’s judiciary committee and former first law officer for South Australia – again 
demonstrated how pre-eminent legal figures in colonial Australia manipulated the term 
‘alien’, including in critical debates about formal membership of the Commonwealth: 
I would much prefer, if there is to be a clause introduced, to have the amendment suggested by 
Tasmania, subject to one modification, omitting the words – ‘and all other persons owing 
allegiance to the Queen’. [If those words were included] That would re-open the whole 
question as to whether an alien, not admitted to the citizenship here - a person who, under the 
provisions with regard to immigration, is prohibited from entering our territory, or is only 
allowed to enter it under certain conditions - would be given the same privileges and 
immunities as a citizen of the Commonwealth. Those words, it seems to me, should come out, 
and we should confine the operation of this amendment so as to secure the rights of citizenship 
to the citizens of the Commonwealth.
710
  
Symon did not want ‘persons owing allegiance to the Queen’ to have the ‘same privileges 
and immunities as a citizen of the Commonwealth’ because such persons, in his 
understanding, included ‘aliens’. Under the common law, an ‘alien’ could not ‘owe 
allegiance to the Queen’, so Symon can only have been referring to ‘aliens’ in a racial sense. 
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This is demonstrated by Symon’s description of an ‘alien’ as ‘a person who, under the 
provisions with regard to immigration, is prohibited from entering our territory’ – in other 
words, any non-European person prevented from entering Australia under the existing 
immigration restriction Acts of the colonies.  
The response from Western Australia Premier Sir John Forrest similarly showed no concern 
for the proper meaning of key common law membership terms such as ‘alien’: 
…it seems to me that there will be a difficulty in regard to coloured aliens and to coloured 
persons who have become British subjects. In Western Australia no Asiatic or African alien can 
get a miner’s right or go mining on a gold-field…it seems to me that the word ‘citizen’ should 
be defined…It is of no use for us to shut our eyes to the fact that there is a great feeling all over 
Australia against the introduction of coloured persons. It goes without saying that we do not 
like to talk about it, but still it is so…It seems to me that should the clause be passed in its 
present shape, if a person, whatever his nationality, his colour, or his character may be, happens 
to live in one state, another state could not legislate in any way to prohibit his entrance into that 
state.711 
Forrest did not define ‘alien’ and there is no indication he understood that under the common 
law applying in colonial Australia an ‘alien’ (in a legal sense) could not be a ‘citizen’ or a 
‘subject’. Forrest wanted ‘citizen’ defined so it would not include ‘coloured aliens’ or 
‘coloured persons who had become British subjects’ and seemed to think coloured persons 
who had become ‘subjects’ were still ‘aliens’. He did not understand that the protections in 
Inglis-Clark’s proposed clause 110 for ‘citizens of the Commonwealth’ could not by 
definition apply to someone of another ‘nationality’ because he thought of ‘nationality’ in 
racial not legal terms. His lack of understanding of common law membership concepts was 
shown when he asked – as part of an exchange in this debate with Edmund Barton - ‘would 
citizen mean an alien?’712 He was asking whether people of non-European race would be 
covered by Inglis-Clark’s equal protection clause. The question indicates that he had no 
awareness of the legal meaning of ‘alien’.  
While Inglis Clark was not present for the debate on his own proposal at the 1898 Melbourne 
convention, he set out his response to the debate in a letter to one of the delegates: 
I have observed in the reports of the debates in the Convention that some objections have been 
made to the Tasmanian amendment which provides for a citizenship of the Commonwealth, on 
the grounds that it would confer citizenship upon Hindoos and other Asiatic subjects of the 
Queen. This danger (if it is one) can be easily met by a provision which will exclude from the 
benefit of the amendment all persons of Asiatic blood who have not been specially naturalised. 
At the present time there are many Chinamen and other persons who have been naturalised in 
one colony, and who are therefore British subjects with all the rights of citizenship in that 
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colony, but who are aliens in all other parts of the Empire to which they may emigrate and in 
which they have not been naturalised. There would not therefore be any new practice 
introduced by providing that persons of Asiatic blood who may be British subjects in India or 
elsewhere shall not have the rights of citizenship in the territory of the Commonwealth without 
being naturalised.
713
 
This letter indicates that even Inglis Clark misunderstood key common law membership 
terms. The central point about the debate at the 1898 convention which he failed to appreciate 
was that critics of his proposal, including Symons and Forrest, gave no recognition to the 
common law standing of natural-born British subjects such as ‘British Indians’ and subjects 
of Chinese ethnic origin born in Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements or other British colonies. 
As Clark said, it had long been accepted that the naturalisation of aliens in one British colony 
or dominion only had effect in that territory. However the main issue was not exclusion from 
Australian citizenship of (the relatively few) non-Europeans who had undergone a formal 
process of naturalisation in another colony or dominion. Instead, as Isaacs and Kingston 
noted in relation to Quick’s proposal, the real question for proponents of a ‘white Australia’ 
was how to exclude the many natural-born subjects of non-European origin who had no need 
to be ‘specially naturalised’. Under the common law such people gained subject status at 
birth and retained this status when they migrated to another British territory. Contrary to 
Inglis Clark’s view, it would indeed have been a ‘new practice’ - as well as being inconsistent 
with the imperial policy against open discrimination - if the Australian Constitution had 
denied persons ‘owing allegiance to the Queen’ the same right to citizenship as other British 
subjects living in the country merely because they were ‘persons of Asiatic blood’.714  
According to Professor John Williams, opposition to Quick and Inglis-Clark’s proposals for 
recognition of Australian citizenship in the Constitution was driven by the desire of 
individual colonies to exclude and restrict the activities of ‘aliens’: 
Even those, like Reid and Forrest, who consistently raised arguments of states’ rights did so 
because ‘Commonwealth citizenship’, ‘due process’ and ‘equal protection’ all affected a 
‘state’s right’ to discriminate against aliens of ‘undesirable race’.715 
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It is important to note that the ‘aliens of undesirable race’ who colonial Premiers wished to 
discriminate against were not ‘aliens’ in a legal sense but simply those of non-European 
origin, including many who were subjects under British law.  
Professor Kim Rubenstein notes that despite the omission of a power over citizenship, 
convention delegates were ‘comfortable about depriving some people of their citizenship, 
namely aliens. They were satisfied that this was provided for under the “naturalisation and 
aliens” power’.716 She cites the following statement from Josiah Symon in support of this 
view:  
We must rest this Constitution on a foundation that we understand, and we mean that every 
citizen of a state shall be a citizen of the Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth shall 
have no right to withdraw, qualify, or restrict those rights of citizenship, except with regard to 
one particular set of people who are subject to disabilities, as aliens, and so on.717 
As Symon’s comments mentioned above indicate, however, when he referred to people 
‘subject to disabilities, as aliens’ he meant non-Europeans, not any white or other person who 
was an ‘alien’ in a legal sense. As Symon himself said:  
You have given the Federal Parliament power to deal with the question of aliens, immigration, 
and so on, to prevent the introduction of undesirable races. Under that provision you enable the 
Federal Parliament to legislate within certain limits, and in a certain direction. Under that they 
may, within those limits, take away, or they may restrict, the rights of citizenship in a particular 
case’. 718 
For Symons and other delegates, it was the ‘undesirable races’ who were the ‘aliens’. As 
O’Connor said, under the ‘immigration power’ the Commonwealth could ‘define who shall 
be citizens’ by preventing such people entering the country. And as Quick said, under the 
‘races power’ those already in the country could be ‘placed under certain disabilities, among 
which might be that they shall not be capable of acquiring citizenship’. In other words, the 
delegates thought ‘aliens of undesirable race’ could be dealt with under the immigration and 
races powers, including by withdrawing or restricting their rights of citizenship. This was not 
a role they envisaged for the ‘naturalization and aliens’ power in section 51(xix) of the 
Constitution.  
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Constitutional conventions and the rule of law 
During the constitutional conventions, many delegates including Griffith, Braddon, Symon, 
Quick, Deakin, Barton, O’Connor, Forrest, Trenwith, Cockburn and others misused the word 
‘alien’ with its racial and not its legal meaning as a shorthand description for a person of non-
European race. This was the default term for non-white people employed not only in 
discussions on the ‘races’ power but also in the very debate about future legal membership of 
the forthcoming Commonwealth of Australia where it might have been expected (especially 
given the legal pre-eminence of many delegates) that the word ‘alien’ would have been 
employed - to use Trenwith’s language - according to ‘the exact definition of terms’.  
There was no explanation at any of the conventions, even in the debates on proposals for 
Australian citizenship, of the fundamental distinction under the law between a ‘subject’ (or 
‘citizen’) on the one hand and an ‘alien’ on the other. The consequence was that delegates 
applied the word ‘alien’ in its racial sense in the same way that Griffith, Parkes and other 
colonial politicians had in the decades before.  
Used with its racial meaning the term ‘alien’ played an important role at the conventions. The 
convention records show that a primary concern of delegates was to exclude ‘aliens’, 
‘coloured aliens’ or ‘alien races’ from the forthcoming federation. Any person not of 
European descent would not be permitted to belong to the new Commonwealth of Australia. 
Under the ‘immigration power’ the Commonwealth would stop ‘aliens’ entering the country 
in the same way the Australian colonies had done in earlier exclusionary legislation. Under 
the ‘races power’, members of ‘alien races’ already in Australia would be regulated and 
restricted. Since these two powers were envisaged as the main constitutional weapons for a 
‘white Australia’, there was no substantive debate about the ‘naturalisation and aliens’ power. 
To the extent it was mentioned, it was envisaged merely as a technical power about the 
process of naturalisation.  
The embedded belief amongst convention delegates that British subjects of non-European 
origin were still ‘aliens’, ‘outsiders’ and ‘not one of us’ also led to defeat of proposals for 
inclusion of citizenship in the Constitution. As Western Australian Premier Forrest said, 
delegates were alarmed by the idea that a ‘citizen’ in the new federation ‘would mean an 
alien’.719 Accepting all who ‘owed allegiance to the Queen’ as citizens would mean 
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recognising non-European subjects as full members under the Constitution, entitled (as in 
Inglis Clark’s proposal) to all the privileges and immunities enjoyed by white British 
subjects.  
Australia’s High Court has not identified the incorrect use of ‘alien’ at the conventions 
contrary to the rule of law. This is best shown by Justice McHugh’s statement in Singh that: 
The makers of our Constitution enacted s 51(xix) knowing that the principle that a person who 
did not owe permanent allegiance to the Crown was an alien was an entrenched rule of the 
common law, a rule as central to the unwritten constitution of the United Kingdom and its 
colonies as could be found. They also knew that, upon birth in any part of the Crown's 
dominions, the new born child immediately owed permanent allegiance to the Crown... In 1900, 
no-one in Australia who knew anything about the subject would think for a moment that a 
person, born in any part of the Crown's dominions, was an alien…720 
This passage seems to be an expectation of what delegates at the conventions (including some 
of the most highly qualified and experienced lawyers in colonial Australia) should have 
known about the law on ‘alienage’. But it is not consistent with analysis of the convention 
records themselves. As this chapter has shown, despite being engaged in debate on the 
appropriate language for the new constitution, delegates  employed the term ‘alien’ entirely in 
its general or racial sense, paying no regard at all to its correct meaning under the law.  
It is reasonable to assume that many delegates (especially those with legal training) did 
understand the common law meaning of ‘alien’ that had remained unchanged for centuries. 
But those who knew the law stayed silent while British subjects of non-European origin were 
denigrated as ‘aliens’. Even such a pre-eminent lawyer as Josiah Symon said ‘persons owing 
allegiance to the Queen’ included ‘aliens’, meaning, as he said, the ‘coloured’ or ‘undesirable 
races’. And of those in Australia ‘who knew anything about the subject’, Samuel Griffith 
stood out. Yet he ignored birth in the Crown’s dominions when labelling ‘Hindoos’, ‘coolies 
from British India’, ‘black labour’ and ethnic Chinese (wherever born) as members of an 
‘alien race’.   
The misuse of the term ‘alien’ in the constitutional conventions set out in this chapter also 
highlights how successive High Court decisions have relied on a misunderstanding of the 
historical use of ‘alien’. This is significant in the development of modern constitutional law 
in Australia. As noted above, contrary to Justice McHugh and Chief Justice Gleeson’s 
suggestions in Singh, the convention records do not, in fact, indicate that section 51(xix) was 
originally envisaged as a source of authority over citizenship. O’Connor’s statement that the 
‘power to deal with aliens’ would help give the new federal government ‘the right to define 
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who shall be citizens’ was another use of ‘alien’ in its racial sense and is properly understood 
as a reference to the ‘races power’ in section 51(xxvi), not the ‘aliens power’ in section 
51(xix).  
Aftermath: Quick and Garran 
John Quick and Robert Garran’s 1901 work, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth, remains a definitive source for constitutional interpretation in Australia. As 
Garran himself said, ‘it did cover the subject, became the standard work on the Constitution, 
and for many years was indispensable to the practising constitutional lawyer’.721 Quick and 
Garran’s work was still being cited in High Court judgments a hundred years after it first 
appeared - including in relation to the meaning of ‘alien’ under section 51(xix) of the 
Constitution.722  
As noted above, John Quick was one of many delegates at the 1890s constitutional 
conventions who ignored the legal meaning of ‘alien’, using the word as a synonym for the 
‘coloured races’ he wished to see excluded from membership of the new Commonwealth. 
Quick and Garran continued to misuse the term ‘alien’ in their 1901 work, particularly in 
their remarks on the ‘races’ power in section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution and the ‘aliens’ 
power itself in section 51(xix). They also used ‘alien’ in a racial sense when commenting on 
the ‘immigration power’ in section 51(xxvii).  
Section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution (as originally enacted) allowed the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth to make laws with respect to ‘the people of any race, other than the 
aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws’.723 In 
their brief comments on the ‘races power’, Quick and Garran twice said that it enabled the 
Commonwealth to make laws with regard to any ‘alien race’.724 As Geoffrey Sawer has 
observed, their use of the phrase ‘alien race’ was ‘unfortunate’. In his view: 
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…probably they did not mean ‘alien’ in any precise sense of nationality law, but merely people 
of a ‘race’ considered different from the Anglo-Saxon-Scottish-Welsh-Cornish-Irish-Norman 
(etc. etc.) mixture, derived from the United Kingdom, which formed the main Australian 
stock.
725
 
While Sawer is correct, what he does not identify is that for many years the phrase ‘alien 
race’ had been the default description used in Australia for non-Europeans. When referring to 
an ‘alien race’ Quick and Garran were using the word ‘alien’ in the same way that Quick and 
other delegates at the constitutional conventions did, that is to say in its ordinary, non-legal, 
‘racial’ sense (someone who is not ‘one of us’, particularly someone ‘from another race’) 
rather than with the meaning we might have expected such leading constitutional authorities 
to have employed in a commentary on the Constitution, namely its proper legal meaning.  
The failure of Quick and Garran to restrict the use of ‘alien’ to the legal sense of the word 
meant they did not properly distinguish between the coverage of the ‘aliens’ and ‘races’ 
powers in the new Constitution. In their section on the ‘aliens’ power in section 51(xix), 
Quick and Garran considered a Privy Council decision on the equivalent power in the 
Canadian Constitution. As with the Australian provision, section 91(25) of the British North 
America Act 1867 (UK) authorised the federal parliament of Canada to make laws with 
respect to ‘naturalization and aliens’ - although in the Canadian case the power was expressly 
declared to be ‘exclusive’. As Quick and Garran noted,726 the Privy Council held in Bryden 
(1899) that the Canadian province of British Columbia had infringed upon exclusive federal 
power by prohibiting ‘Chinamen who were aliens or naturalized subjects’ from working in 
underground coal mines within the province.727 Looking at the Australian situation, Quick 
and Garran stated that ‘under the Constitution of the Commonwealth, sec. 51-xix., the 
Federal Parliament will be able to prohibit Chinamen, whether naturalized or not, from 
working in mines’.728  
This statement makes no logical sense unless they were applying the word ‘alien’ as they did 
in relation to section 51(xxvi), i.e. in its non-legal or racial sense rather than with its correct 
legal meaning. As Quick and Garran themselves said, ‘naturalization is the process…by 
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which an alien…is converted into a subject or citizen’.729 People of Chinese descent who had 
been naturalised were therefore no longer ‘aliens’ in a legal sense. Instead they received the 
status of ‘British subjects’ under the law and were beyond the Commonwealth’s power under 
section 51(xix) of the Constitution to legislate with respect to ‘aliens’.  
Quick and Garran may have considered that a prohibition on mining and other activities 
could be imposed as a condition of naturalisation -  making it valid under the ‘naturalization’ 
arm of section 51(xix). Even if this was so, however, their statement above ignores those 
Chinese who by birth in the former Australian colonies, the new Commonwealth or 
elsewhere in the British Empire were ‘natural-born’ British subjects and therefore neither 
‘aliens’ nor valid objects of the ‘naturalization’ arm of section 51(xix). 
Apart from confusing the racial meaning of alien with its constitutional or nationality 
meaning, Quick and Garran - perhaps misled by the Canadian Bryden case - also misstated 
the intended role of the ‘aliens’ power in the Australian Constitution. Contrary to their 
statement that section 51(xix) could be used to ‘prohibit Chinamen’ from activities within 
Australia such as mining, the power to make laws with respect to ‘aliens’ in the Constitution 
was not intended to play a major role in maintaining a white dominated society in Australia. 
At least in relation to internal controls for achieving this aim, the ‘races’ power in section 
51(xxvi) was assigned this task.
730
 As noted in another authoritative source for constitutional 
interpretation in the first half of the twentieth century, W. Harrison Moore’s The Constitution 
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paralyse the Commonwealth unless “immigration” covers it’ (at 556).  
731
  W Harrison Moore, The Constitution and the Commonwealth of Australia (Maxwell, 2nd ed, 1910), 
464.  
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Harrison Moore also refers to Bryden, noting that while in Canada, at least according to the 
Privy Council’s decision in that case,732 a law prohibiting ‘all Chinamen’ from a particular 
activity might be authorised under the ‘aliens’ power in the federal Constitution, in Australia 
‘the class of law in question…appears rather to be embraced’ by section 51(xxvi).733  
As Harrison Moore’s comments indicate, since the Canadian Constitution does not contain an 
equivalent power to section 51(xxvi) - enabling the federal parliament to legislate with 
respect to the ‘people of any race’ - there was a greater need in Canada, for the purpose of 
imposing restrictive laws on non-Europeans, to consider whether such laws could validly 
come within the ‘aliens’ power. In Australia, the inclusion of the ‘races power’ circumvented 
the need to debate whether people ‘from another race’ could validly be subject to laws made 
under the ‘aliens’ power. As Sawer has observed: 
Australian section 51(xxvi) seems in terms designed to avoid in similar contexts the necessity 
for agonising about the scope of the ‘aliens’ power (xix), which is in identical terms with the 
Canadian and involves similar difficulties of interpretation.
734
 
There was no need in Australia, therefore, to argue that the range of Commonwealth 
legislation passed after federation which discriminated against people of non-European 
background was valid on the basis that the power to make laws with respect to ‘aliens’ in 
section 51(xix) of the Constitution included people ‘belonging to another race’, and not 
merely those with another nationality. Instead, such laws were authorised under section 
51(xxvi) as being with respect to ‘people of any race’.735 
In their comments on the ‘immigration’ power in section 51(xxvii) of the Constitution, Quick 
and Garran again used the term ‘alien’ in its racial sense, noting that at the 1897 Jubilee 
celebrations in London, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, 
‘expressed entire sympathy with the determination of the Australian colonies to prevent the 
influx of people who were alien in civilization, in religion, and in customs’.736  
                                                 
732
  See above n 663. Harrison Moore also refers to the conflicting Privy Council decision in another 
Canadian case shortly afterwards, Cunningham v Tomey Homma [1903] A.C. 151. See summary of 
Bryden and Tomey Homma decisions (and discussion of Harrison Moore’s commentary) in Sawer, 
‘The Australian Constitution and the Australian Aborigine’, above n 627, 21-22. Sawer notes that 
these two decisions ‘have since puzzled and divided Canadian judges’ (at 21). 
733
  Harrison Moore, above n 731, 464.   
734
  Sawer, ‘The Australian Constitution and the Australian Aborigine’, above n 627, 22.  
735
  See Chapter Four for Commonwealth legislation imposing domestic racial exclusion which could 
have been justified under section 51(xxvi). 
736
  Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, above n 131, 626. 
Emphasis added.  
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In his autobiography, Robert Garran indicated that Quick was by far the more dominant of 
the two authors: 
I soon found out what it was for a young man - he was fifteen years my senior - to be the junior 
partner of a steam-roller. We were always on first-rate terms as collaborators and the only fault 
I had to find with him was his excessive thoroughness…Claude McKay observed that my 
‘lively mind’ had been overweighted in this ‘monumental tome’.737  
This suggests that mistakes in their commentary on the use and application of the term ‘alien’ 
in relation to the ‘races’, ‘aliens’ and ‘immigration’ powers were not due to any laxity in 
research or consideration on the part of Quick or Garran. Instead it indicates - particularly 
given the dominant role Garran ascribes to Quick – that misuse of the word ‘alien’ stemmed 
from Quick’s belief, as expressed at the 1890s conventions, that non-Europeans were ‘aliens’ 
and that the Commonwealth should control the ‘immigration of aliens’ to prevent an 
‘invasion of coloured races’. In Quick’s view, the ‘aliens’ were the ‘undesirable races’ and 
such people included ‘Chinamen, Japanese, Hindoos, and other barbarians’.738 Because of 
this subjective perception as to who ‘belonged’ in Australia, Quick and Garran - when 
approaching the task of constitutional analysis in relation to the races, aliens (and 
immigration) powers in the new Constitution - ignored formal legal markers of nationality 
such as subject status and naturalisation, instead using the normal or ‘racial’ meaning of 
‘alien’ in place of its correct legal meaning.  
Quick and Garran’s misuse of ‘alien’ is significant. As authors of the country’s constitutional 
‘bible’, they were important actors in Australia’s legal history, not mere commentators. A 
correct explanation of the legal meaning of ‘alien’ in their 1901 work may have prevented 
misuse of this term by the High Court (see Chapter Five). In turn this could have lessened the 
extensive misapplication of the word by State authorities, not least in Queensland739 (see 
Chapters Four, Six and Seven). 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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  Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth, above n 152, 137-138. 
738
  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 3 March 1898, 
1784. Emphasis added.  
739
  For evidence that Queensland legal authorities were misled by Quick and Garran’s commentary in 
relation to ‘aliens’, see the brief from Crown Solicitor H J H Henchman in Brown v See Chin, ex 
parte See Chin (1923) 17  QJP 130; 1923 QWN 38. The Crown Solicitor cited Quick and Garran as 
authority for the view that section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution (the ‘races power’) conferred on the 
Commonwealth ‘power to make laws for aliens’, arguing that Queensland had an equivalent 
legislative power. Queensland (State Archives), Briefs etc in the case of Herbert F Brown v See 
Chin re use of Chinese labour, Item ID7898. 
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CHAPTER FOUR Aliens, the Commonwealth and the States  
‘The existence of a category of citizenship requires the existence of a category of non-
citizen or alien…Research into the Commonwealth's treatment of aliens is essential for 
the study of citizenship in Australia, since the Commonwealth's policies governing 
aliens are just as significant as its more positive civic policies’.740 
As this thesis has demonstrated, use of the word ‘alien’ as the default description for people 
of non-European origin by prominent colonial figures spilled over into the convention 
debates of the 1890s, infecting even Quick and Garran’s iconic constitutional commentary. It 
is not surprising then that misuse of the term continued after federation. Employment of the 
word ‘alien’ with its racial meaning was in particular an important language tool in national 
implementation of the White Australia policy.741  
Continued misuse of ‘alien’ at the federal level reinforced discriminatory use of the word by 
the Australian States. While federation enabled the Commonwealth to determine exclusion 
(and therefore ‘belonging’) at a national level, the States retained substantial power to deny 
participation in the community to people regarded as not ‘one of us’. As Henry Reynolds has 
observed, after 1901 a proliferation of discriminatory legislation continued in the Australian 
States.742  
This chapter highlights the new Commonwealth Government’s exclusion of ‘undesirable 
coloured aliens’ using its Immigration or ‘Alien’ Restriction Act, prohibiting naturalisation 
and restricting voting and other domestic activities. It then examines legislation in South 
Australia and Western Australia imposing restrictions on ‘Asiatic or African aliens’. It also 
discusses use of the derogatory term ‘white aliens’ for ‘non-Aryan’ and other ‘undesirable’ 
Europeans. Later chapters consider the more extensive range of exclusionary laws in 
Queensland, which (in contrast to its State counterparts) was careful to remove any overt 
‘colour line’, at least in high profile statutes subject to imperial scrutiny and veto.  
The Commonwealth and ‘undesirable coloured aliens’ 
At the Commonwealth level, legislation prevented non-Europeans entering Australia 
(Immigration Restriction Act 1901), removed some of those already in the country (Pacific 
                                                 
740
  National Archives of Australia, Citizenship in Australia: A Guide to Commonwealth Government 
Records, http://guides.naa.gov.au/citizenship/chapter3/aliens.aspx.   
741
  As noted above at n 373, for an official account of the White Australia policy, see Commonwealth, 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Fact Sheet 8 – Abolition of the White Australia 
Policy, https://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/08abolition.htm. See also above n 79.   
742
  Reynolds, North of Capricorn, above n 216, 179.  
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Island Labourers Act 1901) and denied non-Europeans naturalisation (Naturalization Act 
1903). Notwithstanding the tight legal barriers against non-white immigration put in place by 
federal legislation, hundreds of pieces of domestic law were also introduced by the 
Commonwealth and the States to prevent the small number of non-Europeans officially 
recorded as remaining in Australia from participating in key aspects of national life.     
The ‘Alien’ Restriction Act 
The main weapon of the White Australia policy after federation was the control on non-
European immigration imposed by the Commonwealth, primarily through use of the 
‘education’ or ‘dictation’ test introduced by the first federal parliament in the Immigration 
Restriction Act. In the High Court in 2001, Justice Kirby observed that:  
Many British subjects were “non-white”. Yet they could not be excluded at the borders of 
Australia on the ground that they were “aliens”… Relying on the immigration power, rather 
than the aliens power, that Act prohibited immigration into the Commonwealth of certain 
persons without differentiation as to nationality, including those who failed a dictation test in a 
European language…there was no general exemption from the Immigration Restriction Act on 
the basis of nationality, British or otherwise.
743 
However in 1901 the new Commonwealth parliament understood that the education test 
under the Immigration Restriction Act would keep Australia ‘white’ by preventing ‘coloured 
aliens’ – people belonging to ‘undesirable’ or ‘alien races’ – from entering the country. 
Introducing the proposed law, Richard O’Connor, in his capacity as leader of the Government 
in the Senate and Vice-President of the Executive Council, proclaimed: 
The mandate of Australia is that we shall secure the exclusion of coloured aliens at the earliest 
possible moment…it will be a proclamation to the world that coloured aliens are no longer to 
be admitted into Australia.
744
 
Western Australian Senator Staniforth-Smith applauded the exclusion of ‘coloured aliens’, 
but objected to the ‘subterfuge’ of the education or dictation test: 
I was pledged to the absolute exclusion of every coloured alien from Australia…I want to do it 
honestly, and to say frankly that for ethnological reasons we do not desire the coloured races to 
come into Australia. Instead of that, legislation is proposed in which it is suggested that there is 
no bar to the coloured races whatever, and that we only desire to see that our immigrants are 
educated people.
745
  
In an election speech in 1903, Prime Minister Alfred Deakin declared that the Immigration 
Restriction Act had greatly diminished the number of ‘colored aliens’ entering Australia: 
The alien colored population is being steadily reduced. Now, as to the test. Of course this is not 
much applied, because ship-owners know that if they bring colored aliens to this country who 
                                                 
743
  Re Patterson; ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391, 483-484. Emphasis added.  
744
  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 1901, 8305. Emphasis added. 
745
  Ibid 6 December 1901, 8379-80. Emphasis added. 
162 
 
are not legally entitled to land, they will have the pleasure of taking them back to their native 
land.
746
 
As Deakin’s speech indicates, use of the term ‘alien’ in a racial sense (as in ‘coloured alien’) 
remained a central element after federation in the discourse depicting non-white people as 
‘undesirable’, justifying their exclusion as a fundamental part of national policy: 
We protect ourselves against undesirable colored aliens, why not against the products of the 
undesirable alien labor? (Cheers) A white Australia is not a surface, but it is a reasoned policy 
which goes down to the roots of national life, and by which the whole of our social, industrial, 
and political organisations is governed.
747
 
A 1948 article in Brisbane’s Courier Mail observed that the White Australia policy 
implemented through the Immigration Restriction Act was intended to prevent ‘aliens’ 
settling in the country:  
The ‘White Australia’ policy — although not specifically so called in the legislation — was 
embodied in one of the first Acts of Federal Parliament in 1901. The legislation was the 
Immigration Restriction Act. It arose from economic conditions following the entrance of 
aliens, particularly Asiatics, to Australia in the previous century. It established the language, or 
dictation, test as the key to an alien’s admission.748 
Consistent with the intention of delegates to the constitutional conventions (discussed in 
Chapter Three) that ‘coloured aliens’ should be kept out of Australia using the ‘immigration’ 
power in section 51(xxvii) of the new Constitution, the Immigration Restriction Act was 
commonly known as the ‘Alien Restriction Act’ or the ‘Alien Immigration Act’. In 1902, the 
Worker declared that ‘by the Alien Restriction Act, the flood of immigration from degenerate 
Asia has been checked, and a grave menace to the material and moral welfare of our race 
averted’.749 In 1905 the Sydney Morning Herald reported that Chinese from Hong Kong were 
exchanging ‘naturalisation papers’ to evade the ‘Alien Immigration Act’: 
Alien Immigration Act. Chinese Wiles To Circumvent It. Hong Kong, Jan. 23. The instance 
referred to the admission of aliens into Australia, and the regulations regarding the restriction 
thereof. Ever since the bill for the restriction of alien immigration was passed in Australia, the 
Chinese desiring to reside in or gain admittance to the Commonwealth without complying with 
the law have been constantly endeavouring to invent a means to circumvent the conditions 
imposed by the Act. That many have been successful, unfortunately, it must be admitted, is 
certain, for a peculiar trade has grown here, the commodity sold being naturalisation papers.
750
 
In the same year the North Western Advocate and Emu Bay Times, under the heading 
‘Evasion of Alien Restriction Laws’, reported that: 
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  Museum of Australian Democracy, Election Speeches, Alfred Deakin (Speech Ballarat 29 October 
1903), http://electionspeeches.moadoph.gov.au/speeches/1903-alfred-deakin. Emphasis added. 
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  ‘First Parlt. set policy’, Courier-Mail (Brisbane) 21 October 1948, 1. Emphasis added. 
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  Editorial, ‘A Campaign of Triumph’, Worker (Brisbane) 18 October 1902, 2.  
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  ‘Alien Immigration Act’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) 16 February 1905, 3. Emphasis added. 
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An astonishing discovery of Celestial stowaways was made to-day, when 23 Chinese were 
found secreted in tanks on the German steamer Prinz Waldemar. The officers, when 
interviewed by the authorities, stated they were ignorant of their presence on board. They were 
apparently fed by the Chinese crew. The aliens are being kept under surveillance till the vessel 
leaves the port.
751
  
In 1915 the Morning Bulletin from Rockhampton reported that at the local Police Court: 
…the sub-collector of Customs…charged Tognosuiosaki, a Japanese, with having failed to pass 
the dictation test. [The prosecutor] applied to have the complaint amended by adding the words 
‘being a prohibited Immigrant within the meaning of the Alien Immigration Act’.752 
Under the Immigration Restriction Act it was an offence for ‘prohibited immigrants’ to enter 
the Commonwealth.753 But alleged offenders were invariably referred to as ‘aliens’. A 1908 
report in the Register stated: 
Prohibited Aliens. Chinese in the Territory. Port Darwin…Three Chinese were prosecuted last 
week on a charge of being aliens within the meaning of the Restriction Act. They wished to 
proceed south in the steamer Changsha, and posed as old residents. The suspicions of the 
customs authorities were aroused, and they were arrested…They were each sentenced to two 
months imprisonment at Fannie Bay, and to be then deported.
754
 
As this shows, the public discourse in relation to the central mechanism for implementing the 
White Australia Policy continued to promote an understanding of the term ‘alien’ purely in its 
non-legal, racial sense.  
Effect of ‘Alien Restriction Act’ 
Application of the ‘education’ or ‘dictation’ test under the Immigration or ‘Alien’ Restriction 
Act limited the officially recorded number of non-Europeans resident in Australia to no more 
than one per cent of the total population throughout the period 1901 to 1939. The first 
Commonwealth census in 1911 recorded 37,789 non-Europeans of ‘full blood’ in Australia 
(excluding ‘full-blood’ indigenous Australians who were not counted for official census 
purposes until section 127 of the Constitution was repealed after the 1967 referendum) as 
well as 14,554 ‘half-caste’ non-Europeans (a figure which included those whose ancestry was 
partly indigenous because these people were not regarded as ‘aboriginal natives’ for the 
purpose of section 127). 13,302 of the ‘full-blood’ non-Europeans had British subject status, 
along with 14,505 ‘half-caste’ non-Europeans (mainly those with an Australian aboriginal 
heritage, but also more than 3,000 with a Chinese background) - so in theory laws intended to 
prevent non-white participation in the national community had to apply to more than ‘aliens’ 
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  ‘Evasion of Alien Restriction Laws’, North Western Advocate and the Emu Bay Times (West 
Devonport and Burnie) 27 May 1905, 2. Emphasis added. 
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in the legal sense to exclude them.755 By the time of the 1933 census, the number of ‘full-
blood’ non-Europeans had declined to 22,780, while ‘half-caste’ non-Europeans had 
increased to 27,066. Unlike the 1911 figures, the 1933 census did not record the subject status 
of the different races.756 
As Barry York has noted, analysis of the returns tabled in the Commonwealth Parliament 
from 1901 to 1957 on use of the dictation test under the Immigration Restriction Act reveals 
that ‘the Chinese were the chief target of the Act’.757 As York says: 
The test was chiefly used against the Chinese between 1902 and 1913. After that, few Chinese 
attempted to come to Australia unless confident of admission (as former domiciles with re-
entry permits or as holders of Certificates of Exemption from the Dictation Test)…The 
effectiveness of the test lay not only with its almost total guarantee of successful exclusion but 
in its deterrent effect on shipping companies. Under the Immigration Act, the owners, agents, 
charterers and masters of ships could be fined the huge sum of ₤100 for each prohibited 
immigrant they carried to Australia.
758
  
Naturalisation: ‘the process by which an alien is converted into a subject or citizen’
759
  
Ironically, those regarded as ‘aliens’ in a racial or non-legal sense had little access to the 
formal process of naturalisation in post-federation Australia. Naturalisation of non-Europeans 
had already been strictly circumscribed under colonial laws. For example, under section 4 of 
the Aliens Act 1861 (Qld), a male ‘Asiatic or African alien’ could be naturalised, but only if 
he was married and had resided in the colony for three years. In addition, his wife had to 
reside with him at the time of naturalisation.760 Section 8 of the federal Naturalization Act 
1903 purported to confer equal rights on all people (including non-Europeans) who became 
subjects through the process of naturalisation.761 As noted in Chapter Two, however, the 
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ability of non-European residents to move beyond the legal status of ‘alien’ through 
naturalisation was prevented under section 5 which prohibited ‘aboriginal natives of Asia, 
Africa, or the Islands of the Pacific, excepting New Zealand’ from becoming subjects.   
The debate in 1903 in the Commonwealth Parliament on the Naturalisation Bill reflected the 
enduring mistrust of Australia’s Anglo-Celtic colonisers towards naturalised non-European 
subjects. As well as doubts about their loyalty and allegiance, there was a belief that Chinese 
Australians in particular could not be distinguished from each other, which allegedly opened 
the door to fraud. Senator Pearce said that in the recent prosecution of two Chinese men in 
the Melbourne Police Court, one of the men ‘told the magistrates…that he and his companion 
had bought their naturalization papers at Singapore’, adding that:   
…one of the defendants possessed a certificate of naturalization which was issued to a man 40 
years ago…if the Chinese who produced it had been its rightful owner, he should have been 70 
years of age. As a matter of fact he was about 30 years of age.
762
  
According to Senator Higgs, many Chinese men: 
…claim to have been in the Commonwealth before, and there is the greatest difficulty in 
disproving their statements, on account of the resemblance they bear to each other, and because 
a Chinaman of 20 usually looks quite as old as one of 60.
763
 
In the Nationality Act 1920 the Commonwealth Parliament inadvertently removed the 
prohibition on naturalisation of non-Europeans.764 However both the Naturalization Act and 
the Nationality Act authorised the Governor-General, acting on the advice of the federal 
government, to withhold a certificate of naturalisation without giving a reason.765 It remained 
the policy of Australian governments until 1957 not to allow the naturalisation of people from 
a non-European background. Consistent with this policy, no more than forty-five Asian 
settlers were naturalised as British subjects and nationals of Australia between 1904 and 
1945.766 But equal rights were not assured even for the few non-Europeans who managed to 
become naturalised. Section 11 of the Nationality Act allowed the Commonwealth and the 
States to restrict the ‘rights, powers and privileges’ of naturalised British subjects.   
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Domestic exclusion 
There were also exclusionary laws at the federal level on internal issues within the 
Commonwealth’s lawmaking power in the Constitution. In these laws the treatment of aliens 
(in the legal sense), people of non-European race and indigenous Australians overlapped or 
was explicitly linked together, with little if any distinction in terms of the practical effect of 
the legislation. Examples include the Post and Telegraph Act 1901 stipulating that contracts 
or other arrangements for delivery or carriage of mail entered by the Commonwealth must 
contain ‘a condition that only white labour shall be employed in such carriage’; the Invalid 
and Old-Age Pensions Act 1908, which prohibited ‘aliens, Asiatics (except those born in 
Australia and Indians born in British India) and aboriginal natives of Australia, Africa, the 
islands of the Pacific and New Zealand’ from receiving pensions; and the Commonwealth 
Franchise Act 1902, which provided that ‘no aboriginal native of Australia, Asia, Africa or 
the islands of the Pacific (except New Zealand)’ was entitled to be an elector unless such a 
person already had the right to vote under State law.767  
Repeating a theme from earlier colonial laws, there was no recognition in the Commonwealth 
franchise laws that coloured residents of Australia might have equal legal status with white 
settlers because of their place of birth. In 1925 voting rights were extended to ‘natives of 
British India’768 and people naturalised under Commonwealth or State law.769 According to 
the Museum of Australian Democracy, this amendment ‘extended the right to vote in 
Commonwealth elections to all naturalised Australians regardless of their race’.770 But as 
noted above, from 1904 non-Europeans could not be naturalised under Australian law.  Even 
more significantly, the right to vote was not extended to natural-born subjects of non-
European origin.771 This reflected an enduring view that coloured or ‘alien’ people (in the 
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racial sense) - even if they were already British subjects and moreover even if they had been 
born in Australia - should undergo a formal process such as naturalisation before they were 
considered to ‘belong’ and entitled to exercise rights such as voting that accompanied 
‘belonging’.    
Alien legislation in the States 
While the Commonwealth Parliament imposed significant domestic restrictions on non-
European inhabitants and indigenous Australians during the period between federation and 
the Second World War, it was predominantly State legislation that prevented the full 
participation of these people in the national community. The lawmaking power of the 
Commonwealth was restricted to specific subject matters under section 51 of the 
Constitution. Section 107, however, preserved the ‘plenary’ or full legislative power of the 
States, subject to section 109 which provided that a Commonwealth law would prevail over 
the law of a State on the same topic and that the State law would ‘to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be invalid’. After the enactment of the Commonwealth’s Nationality Act 1920 
which defined an ‘alien’ as ‘a person who is not a British subject’, any State law which 
treated a British subject as an ‘alien’ could, in theory, have been challenged on the basis of 
inconsistency with Commonwealth law.772 
After federation, the States used their extensive legislative power to impose a broad range of 
restrictions on those regarded as not ‘belonging’ in the new Commonwealth. For example, 
State laws prevented non-European inhabitants from voting in Queensland, Western Australia 
and Victoria,773 becoming public servants in Western Australia,774 receiving widows pensions 
in New South Wales,775 leasing irrigated land in South Australia,776 working in a factory in 
Western Australia or for more than a certain number of hours in a factory in Victoria,777 
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selling gold in Victoria,778 manufacturing or selling margarine in Queensland,779 serving on a 
jury in the Northern Territory,780 selling gold or pearls in the Northern Territory,781 or 
employing aborigines in Western Australia or female aborigines in the Northern Territory.782  
Various phrases were used to describe the people on whom these restrictions and prohibitions 
were imposed, including ‘Asiatic and African aliens’, ‘persons of any Asiatic race’, 
‘Aboriginal natives of Australia, Asia, Africa or the Islands of the Pacific’, ‘Chinese or 
people of other Asiatic race’ and ‘persons other than those of European descent’. In 
Queensland, to avoid further rejection by imperial authorities, there was deliberate use of the 
word ‘alien’ on its own without explicit reference to people of another race, but nevertheless 
with a clear intention to target non-Europeans, especially those of Chinese background. This 
is discussed further in Chapter Six. 
Of some 217 acts, regulations and ordinances introduced across the country between 1901 
and 1939 restricting the participation of ‘aliens’, non-Europeans and indigenous people in the 
Australian community, the vast majority (173) were enacted at State or Territory level. When 
added to laws enacted before federation by the States (as British colonies), the first as early as 
1828, there were at least 300 formal legal barriers to full membership of the community at 
various times in Australia before World War Two.783 The number and extent of these laws 
helped entrench the perception amongst the Anglo-Celtic community that non-Europeans in 
Australia were different or ‘alien’ in a racial or social sense. As Peter Bayne said in relation 
to State legislation ‘protecting’ aborigines: 
…once they were treated differently by the law, it became easy to argue that they should be 
treated differently for many other reasons. Different treatment thus supported the view that they 
were different.784  
Restrictions on non-Europeans varied considerably between States. For example, all non-
Europeans were prevented from voting in Queensland and Western Australia, but in Victoria 
only Chinese residents were excluded from the electoral roll. In other States there was no 
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restriction. As the Argus noted in 1909, this meant that in parts of the country ‘coloured 
aliens’ could be enrolled to vote: 
Aliens as Voters. Chinese Registered…At Port Darwin today, the assistant returning officer for 
the Territory (Mr. Halton) has stated that the first Chinese was registered on the Northern 
Territory electoral roll this week. This man was born in the Territory of Chinese parents, and 
there is apparently nothing in the law to prevent him and all other Chinese born in the country 
from claiming all the rights of Australian citizenship. There is also nothing in the law to prevent 
the aborigines being registered.
785
 
From the perspective of the Argus, a Chinese man born in Australia (and therefore a British 
subject) was still an ‘alien’. It perplexed the paper that such a person could have the same 
right to vote as a (white) Australian ‘citizen’. The paper was also surprised that indigenous 
Australians could register their names on the electoral roll. As the Museum of Australian 
Democracy notes, however, ‘even though Indigenous people in other States were in theory 
able to vote…few could actually do so’.786 
‘Asiatic and African aliens’ 
As noted, by the late nineteenth century use of the word ‘alien’ with its non-legal or racial 
meaning (someone who was ‘not one of us’, a person ‘from another race’) had been 
embedded by key Anglo-Celtic colonial figures in the discourse about people of non-
European background. The examples that follow show how, contrary to the rule of law, the 
racial discourse about ‘aliens’ influenced State laws after federation. The parliamentary 
debate on South Australia’s Northern Territory Mining Act 1903 demonstrated ignorance of 
the legal meaning of ‘alien’ and both ‘colour’ and ‘labour’ racism on the part of State 
lawmakers. In the case of Western Australia’s Firearms and Guns Act 1931, the legal 
difference between an ‘alien’ and a ‘subject’ was understood but ‘alien’ was nevertheless 
used in its racial sense in the legislation. As discussed in Chapter Six, the misuse of ‘alien’ in 
Queensland following federation was even more pervasive, occurring in acts of parliament, 
subordinate legislation and prosecutions under those laws. In addition, ostensible use of the 
word ‘alien’ in its racially neutral legal sense in high profile Queensland laws involved a 
level of deception not found in South Australia or Western Australia.   
In the South Australian and Western Australian laws discussed below, the expressions 
‘Asiatic aliens’ and ‘Asiatic or African aliens’ were used to describe people subject to various 
restrictions and prohibitions. The phrase ‘Asiatic or African aliens’ seems to have first 
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appeared in Queensland’s Aliens Act 1861 which barred such people from naturalisation.787 
While this expression may have been intended originally as a racially qualified description of 
people who were ‘aliens’ under the law, it quickly became a redundant or repetitive phrase, 
referring to those classified from the perspective of Anglo-Celtic colonisers as the ‘aliens’ or 
the ‘Other’ in a racial sense, namely people of non-European race, especially and most 
particularly Chinese settlers and workers, regardless of their actual legal status.788 In the 
Mineral Lands Act 1882 the Queensland Parliament prohibited ‘Asiatic or African aliens’ 
from holding mining licenses or engaging in other mining work. As a report on parliamentary 
proceedings in The Queenslander indicated, however, this was not just a ban on non-British 
subjects of Asian or African origin: 
The adoption of this clause is significant, as showing that legal means can be taken to prevent 
the competition of Chinese and other Asiatics with our own working men, and to confine 
coloured labour to specified callings in which cheap labour will be advantageous to the 
community in general without being injurious to any class or member of it.
789
 
In 1886 South Australia and Western Australia borrowed language from Queensland for their 
own mining legislation. Under the Gold Mining Act 1886 (SA), an ‘Asiatic alien’ could not 
work on any newly discovered goldfield in South Australia.790 Price notes that the aim of the 
law was to exclude ‘Chinese miners’ from new goldfields.791 Similarly, after gold was 
discovered in its northern Kimberley region, Western Australia enacted the Goldfields Act 
1886 (WA) which excluded ‘Asiatic and African aliens’ from newly discovered goldfields for 
5 years.792 According to Price, it was ‘clear that, as in Queensland, most colonists were 
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worrying very little about Malays, Indians or Africans and were concentrating almost entirely 
on keeping out “Chinamen and Mongolians” ’.793  
South Australia and the Northern Territory Mining Act 1903 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the importation of Chinese workers for mining projects and 
railway construction in the Northern Territory in the 1880s caused anxiety amongst Anglo-
Celtic political establishments elsewhere in Australia, prompting the South Australian 
government to organise the 1888 inter-colonial ‘Conference on the Chinese Question’ and 
leading to colonial legislation further restricting the entry of Chinese settlers. After 
federation, South Australia continued to administer the Northern Territory until responsibility 
was transferred to the Commonwealth on 1 January 1911.794  
In 1903, South Australia passed the Northern Territory Mining Act consolidating seven 
existing statutes about mining in the Northern Territory into a single new law.795 Section 21 
prohibited ‘Asiatic aliens’ from working on any new goldfield, stating that: 
No miner’s right shall be issued to any Asiatic alien for working on any new goldfield, nor shall 
any Asiatic alien work any new goldfield: Provided that this section shall not apply to any 
goldfield of which the first discoverer was an Asiatic alien.796  
Under section 144, any ‘Asiatic alien’ found mining on a new goldfield could be removed by 
order of a warden, fined ten pounds and imprisoned for a month ‘with or without hard labor’. 
Other provisions prevented ‘Asiatic aliens’ from obtaining or having any interest in a mining 
lease797 and limited the areas in which such people could exercise any of the normal rights or 
privileges granted to miners.798 There was no definition in the Mining Act of ‘Asiatic alien’ 
but a note in the legislation made it evident who was caught by this term. Section 17 
stipulated that ‘All miners’ rights, except those issued to Asiatic aliens, shall be available for 
the whole of the Northern Territory’. An explanatory side note said ‘Miner’s right to 
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European available’, making it clear that an ‘Asiatic alien’ was simply a person of non-
European racial background. 
The Mining Act was initiated as a private member’s bill, supported by the South Australian 
Government.799 The member in the House of Assembly responsible for drafting the bill, Mr 
Herbert, was complimented on the clarity of the legislation.800 The main debate on the new 
law occurred in the Legislative Council where the restrictions on ‘Asiatic aliens’ were the key 
issue. However, there was no discussion about who might properly be covered by that phrase 
if the correct legal interpretation was applied. The established use of the term ‘alien’ in a 
racial sense meant both supporters and opponents of the bill assumed, in ignorance of the 
common law, that the word referred not to non-British subjects but merely to people of non-
European origin. They all accepted without question use of the racially descriptive phrase 
‘Asiatic alien’ as appropriate in the legislation. 
The debate in the Legislative Council focussed on the benefits or otherwise of using coloured 
labour in the Northern Territory’s tropical climate. Supporters of the restrictions on ‘Asiatic 
aliens’ cited a report by Mr J.V. Parkes, former Inspector of Mines for South Australia,801 
‘who had lived in the Territory and knew the conditions there obtaining’, which said that a 
chief cause of the failure of the mining industry in the Northern Territory was the ‘unwise 
introduction of a low type of Chinese by the Government, and subsequent permission to them 
to mine on their own account’.802 The Parkes report said that the Chinese ‘have been allowed 
to take out miners’ rights and to hold mining leases, and they are now practically in 
possession of the gold mines of the Northern Territory’.803 Mr Bice, later Minister for the 
Northern Territory,804 agreed with the Parkes report, stating that: 
Another prolific cause of the downfall of mining was the granting of leases to Asiatics. It was 
well known that aliens would not work below water level, or that they could not be induced to 
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develop properties systematically. In every case where the free gold was worked out and water 
was struck the Asiatics stopped further development.805 
According to both the Parkes report and Legislative Council member Mr Lewis, the Chinese 
labourers in question were recruited from Singapore in the mid-1890s to work in Territory 
goldmines.806 Any person born in the British colony of Singapore was, of course, a British 
subject and not an ‘alien’ under the law applying in Australia in 1903.   
Opponents of the bill said the restrictions on ‘Asiatic aliens’ excluded ‘the only class of labor 
that could work in such a climate, so making failure inevitable’.807 As Mr Riddoch observed: 
It was admitted by all intelligent people that white races could not work in the tropics…the Bill 
contained too many restrictions on the only people suited for working in those parts of the 
Northern Territory where gold had been discovered…All agreed that in the richest and most 
valuable parts of the Northern Territory white men could not do regular manual labor, more 
particularly in the open, and that much of the land granted would on that account be of no 
value.
808
 
Mr Riddoch called for the restrictions on ‘Asiatic aliens’ to be lifted to allow the employment 
of Australia’s ‘Indian fellow subjects’, saying he hoped the Parliament ‘might be able to 
remove some of the disabilities placed by the Bill upon the employment of Indian or other 
colored labor’.809 Mr Brookman agreed, stating that ‘advantage should be taken of alien labor 
on new [gold]fields as well as on old ones’, asserting that ‘No matter how many aliens might 
be employed there would still be sufficient work for white men’. Therefore he asked: 
In the Northern Territory why could they not avail themselves of the labor they could get in 
India…They could employ a large number of the best class of Indians in the Northern Territory 
under engagement. He was quite against allowing them to overrun the country, but was 
prepared to take the responsibility of introducing a certain number to do work under proper 
supervision. Nature intended that the black man should work in the tropics.
810
 
Under the common law, Indian ‘fellow subjects’ were, by definition, not ‘aliens’. If the 
phrase ‘Asiatic alien’ in the Mining Act had been understood with its correct legal meaning – 
i.e. a non-British subject of Asian ethnic origin – there would have been no need for Mr 
Riddoch and Mr Brookman to call for amendments allowing British Indians to be engaged for 
mining work in the Northern Territory.  
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Both supporters and opponents of the legislation, however, thought an ‘Asiatic alien’ 
included anyone regarded by the Anglo-Celtic establishment as an ‘alien’ in a racial sense; in 
other words any non-European, whatever their actual legal status and even if they had been 
born in a British colony or dominion as a subject of the Crown. Mr Lucas, for example, said 
that ‘in the name of common humanity he objected to the drastic provisions against aliens 
such as those introduced in the Bill’, urging that ‘the clauses dealing with aliens should either 
be eliminated from the Bill altogether, or be modified’. He even quoted the statement by 
Secretary for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain that imperial authorities had ‘always objected, 
both as regards aliens and as regards British subjects, to specific legislative discrimination in 
favour of or against race and color’.811 But Mr Lucas showed no awareness of the difference 
under the common law between a British subject and an alien. When objecting to clause 17 of 
the Bill, which restricted the coverage of a miners’ right issued to an ‘Asiatic alien’, Mr 
Lucas noted that ‘a man who was a natural born subject of his Majesty’ could buy one 
miners’ right covering all districts in the Northern Territory but that a miners’ right issued to 
‘a man…of a little darker hue’ covered one district only.812 For Mr Lucas, therefore, a 
‘natural born subject’ was someone who was not of a ‘little darker hue’. There was no 
understanding on his part that a person of a ‘little darker hue’ might be a natural born British 
subject and not an ‘Asiatic alien’ if that term had been correctly interpreted according to the 
law.  
Mr A.A. Kirkpatrick and his Labor Party colleague Mr R. S. Guthrie strongly disputed the 
claim that coloured labour was required in the tropics and said the restrictions in the Mining 
Act on ‘Asiatic aliens’ would protect the interests of the white working man. Mr Kirkpatrick 
noted that his opponents wished to prevent ‘Asiatic aliens’ owning or leasing mines but 
would allow European mine owners to employ such people for the actual mining work. Mr 
Lucas, he said, ‘wanted to allow the Chinaman to compete with the white laborer, but to 
prevent the Celestial from competing with the white capitalist’.813 ‘How could it be in favor 
of the European’, asked Mr Kirkpatrick, ‘when blackfellows and Chinamen competed against 
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him, and accepted a fourth of the wages of the white?’814 Mr Guthrie (Secretary of the South 
Australian branch of the Federated Seamen’s Union of Australasia)815 said: 
The whole object of Mr Lucas was to bring the white man into competition with the Chinese so 
as to bring down wages; but under no circumstances to allow a Chinaman to enter into 
competition with a capitalist.
816 
After Mr Riddoch admitted that he would not ‘allow the aliens to own the mines’,817 Mr 
Guthrie declared:  
Mr Riddoch had said that he would not favor [sic] black men owning the mines, and that 
translated meant, “Don’t interfere with me as a capitalist; use the blackfellow as much as you 
like to compete against the white laborer, so long as you don’t touch me”. Was there any logic 
in that?
818
 
Mr Guthrie said that in his own practical experience: 
…a white man could always work wherever a black man could. He had worked in Bombay and 
Rangoon, and had humped bags of rice alongside the nigger…The only reason why black 
labour was suitable in the Northern Territory was because it was cheap, and being cheap it was 
nasty…Australia was a grand country, and let them keep it white. Mr Riddoch wanted aliens to 
come here for a while, and then to turn them adrift…A white Australia would ever have his 
advocacy, and he would not support any measure which would make the Commonwealth any 
blacker than it was.
819
 
Mr Guthrie objected to the presence of ‘Asiatics’ anywhere in Australia, even in sparsely 
settled areas such as the Northern Territory: 
White men would settle the country, but Asiatics never, and even if they did of what value were 
they to the community? If the Northern Territory was to be settled it must be by a population 
that would assist the producer, and not be parasites.
820
 
The above extracts indicate that lawmakers in the South Australian parliament believed the 
restrictions on ‘Asiatic aliens’ in the Northern Territory Mining Act applied to all persons of 
non-European background, including, to use their words, a ‘low type of Chinese’, 
‘Chinamen’ and ‘Celestials’; ‘Asiatics’ and men ‘of a little darker hue’; ‘niggers’, 
‘blackfellows’, ‘black men’ and ‘black labour’; and even ‘Indian fellow subjects’.821 The 
debates show that parliamentarians routinely used the term ‘alien’ as shorthand for people 
described in this way.  
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The record of debate in the Legislative Council also shows that discourse about aliens at the 
federal level contributed to misuse of the term ‘alien’ in State legislation such as the Northern 
Territory Mining Act. Mr Bice, who moved the second reading of the Mining Act in the 
Legislative Council,822 reminded his colleagues that the Act complemented restrictions on 
‘coloured aliens’ enacted by the new Federal Parliament: 
The 19
th
 subsection of the Commonwealth Act, which dealt with colored labor, and the Alien 
Restriction Act, had apparently been forgotten by members…If aliens were shut out from the 
Territory [under the ‘Alien’ Restriction Act]…then it was only fair to put restrictions on those 
already there…823 
Mr Bice therefore repeated the misdescription of the Commonwealth’s Immigration 
Restriction Act 1901 as the Alien Restriction Act (consistent with the intention behind the 
federal law to prevent ‘coloured aliens’ entering Australia). Mr Bice also referred to the 
‘aliens power’ in section 51(xix) of the Commonwealth Constitution, stating (wrongly) that it 
dealt with ‘colored labor’, considering this relevant to the debate on the new mining 
legislation. This is in line with Quick and Garran’s 1901 constitutional commentary 
indicating incorrectly that section 51(xix) would allow the Federal Parliament to exclude 
Chinese settlers, whether or not they had  subject status, ‘from working in mines’.824   
The restrictions on ‘Asiatic aliens’ in the Northern Territory Mining Act were intended to 
apply to all non-Europeans and were imposed by lawmakers in the South Australian 
parliament in ignorance of the proper legal meaning of the term ‘alien’. A similar approach 
was taken after transfer of the Northern Territory to the Commonwealth at the beginning of 
1911. Section 10 of the Commonwealth’s Tin Dredging Ordinance 1911825 declared that in 
the Northern Territory ‘No tin dredging lease shall be granted to any Asiatic alien, and no 
Asiatic alien shall be entitled to acquire or hold any tin dredging lease or any interest 
therein’.826 This provision remained part of Commonwealth law until 1963.827 In contrast, 
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section 11 of the Pearling Ordinance 1930 (directed at employment of Japanese indentured 
labourers in the pearling industry in the Northern Territory) provided that: 
A licence other than a diver’s, diver’s tender’s or pearl dealer’s licence shall not be granted, 
transferred or renewed to or in favour of any person who is not a natural-born or naturalized 
British subject. 
On its terms, this section contained no express discrimination. However an official list of 
restrictive legislation prepared by the Prime Minister’s Department said that under the 
Pearling Ordinance, ‘No Asiatic alien is entitled to a licence to deal in pearls and mother of 
pearl shells’.828 Despite its non-discriminatory wording,829 therefore, federal officials 
assumed the Pearling Ordinance imposed restrictions on the same people that the Mining Act 
and Tin Dredging Ordinance did, namely ‘Asiatic aliens’ - in other words, all those with an 
Asian background, whether or not they had British subject status. Other Commonwealth 
regulations for the Northern Territory continued to impose explicit discrimination. Under 
section 6 of the Gold Buyers Ordinance 1935, for example, a gold buyer’s licence could be 
issued only ‘to a bank or to any person of European race or extraction’. 
Western Australia and the Firearms and Guns Act 1931 
After South Australia enacted the Northern Territory Mining Act, in 1904 Western Australia 
also introduced new mining legislation, preventing ‘Asiatic or African aliens’ obtaining a 
Miner’s right or having any interest in such a right. The prohibition also applied to ‘persons 
of Asiatic or African race, claiming to be British subjects’, unless they obtained the 
Minister’s approval.830 As the Prime Minister’s Department later commented, ‘As a matter of 
policy, the Minister has not agreed to the issue of mining rights to Asiatics for many 
years’.831 As the following example shows, three decades later the same statutory formula 
was still being used for exclusionary legislation in Western Australia. 
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Amongst the many discriminatory laws passed by the Australian States before World War 
Two, one of the most bizarre was Western Australia’s Firearms and Guns Act 1931. 
Section 8(3), which remained in force until 1971,832 stated that: 
No Asiatic or African alien or person of Asiatic or African race claiming to be a British subject 
shall hold a license under this Act, unless with the express consent of the Commissioner of 
Police, who may in his absolute discretion withhold such consent… Provided that this 
paragraph shall not apply to any person of the Jewish or Lebanese races.
833
 
Leaving aside the exemption for people of the ‘Jewish or Lebanese races’,834 it is plain that 
section 8(3) aimed to prohibit all people with an Asian or African background from 
possessing a firearms licence. As the Minister for Police explained when the new law was 
debated in the Legislative Assembly of Western Australia, ‘if there is anyone on earth who 
ought to be prevented from carrying weapons concealed on his person it is the Asiatic or the 
man of Asiatic temperament’.835 Mr Marshall from the Murchison electorate objected, saying 
that he did not know why ‘only African and Asiatic aliens are precluded’ and not ‘other 
foreigners who are still more highly-strung and more in the habit of using firearms’.836 As he 
said: 
…there are in Broome and along the North-West coast Asiatics, principally of Chinese origin, 
who have been naturalised and are carrying on big business, and have shown themselves 
worthy citizens in every sense. But such Asiatics would not be eligible for licenses needed to 
protect their lives or property.837 
According to the Minister, however: 
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… the member for Murchison misunderstands the temperament of Asiatics…The hon. member 
has been so much among them that he does not understand them. If he had stood further off 
from them he would have been able to see them with a better comprehension.838 
Since, as the Minister made clear, the legislation was intended to prevent all Asians (and 
Africans) from owning a gun, the question arises as to why section 8(3) did not simply 
prohibit all persons ‘of Asiatic or African race’ from holding a firearms license, avoiding the 
need to use the word ‘alien’. The answer appears to be that those with an Asian or African 
background were regarded not merely as ‘from another race’ but were seen, because of their 
race, as ‘outsiders’ or ‘foreigners’, as people who were ‘not one of us’ from the perspective 
of white Australian society during this period. Hence use of the word ‘alien’ with its normal 
or ‘racial’ meaning - a person belonging to another family, race, or nation; a stranger, a 
foreigner - matched the perception that those of Asian or African race were ‘strangers’ or 
‘foreigners’ who did not ‘belong’ in European dominated Australian society at the time. 
The wording of section 8(3) indicates an understanding of the distinction between an ‘alien’ 
(in the legal sense of the word) and a ‘British subject’ (or ‘non-alien’). It suggests a fear on 
the part of Western Australian lawmakers that Asians or Africans who were British subjects 
by birth or naturalisation might avoid any prohibition directed at ‘aliens’ by asserting their 
status as ‘non-aliens’. So for good measure the provision expressly prohibited ‘any person of 
Asiatic or African race claiming to be a British subject’ from owning a firearm without the 
consent of the Police Commissioner. 
However any suggestion that the phrase ‘Asiatic or African alien’ in section 8(3) of the 
Firearms and Guns Act merely referred to an ‘alien’ in the legal sense is countered by 
section 4(2) which declared that ‘The Act…shall apply…to any person who is an Asiatic or 
African alien, or who is an Asiatic or African alien claiming or deemed to be a British 
subject’.839 Under Australian law at least until 1949 any person ‘deemed to be a British 
subject’ could not by definition be an ‘alien’ in the legal meaning of the word. So section 4(2) 
only makes sense if Western Australian lawmakers intended the word ‘alien’ to be used with 
its normal or ‘racial’ meaning.840 The provision then refers to people regarded by the 
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dominant Anglo-Celtic community in Australia during this period as ‘from another race’, in 
this case all those with an African or Asian background, even if they claimed to be or actually 
were British subjects. Under section 4(2), therefore, the Firearms and Guns Act applied to all 
those regarded as ‘aliens’ in the normal or ‘racial’ meaning of the word because they were of 
Asian or African race, even if they were British subjects and not ‘aliens’ in a legal sense at 
all. As the Minister for Police said, the Act ‘excludes them even though they are 
naturalised’.841  
Mr Marshall summed up the effect of the legislation: 
Even though the Asiatic applying for the license be a naturalised subject, if the Commissioner 
thinks he is not a fit and proper person to hold the license, the Commissioner may refuse him a 
license, and there is no appeal…So a Chinese born in Australia, no matter how successful he 
may be in business, no matter what property he may have, he will not be permitted to take out a 
license…it is altogether too drastic to declare that a boy born of Chinese parents in this country 
may be denied a gun license by the Commissioner of Police.842  
As indicated by this extract, parliamentarians such as Mr Marshall seemed to think a 
‘Chinese born in Australia’ was a ‘naturalised’ subject. More importantly, the comments 
from the Minister and Mr Marshall again show the prevailing attitude amongst lawmakers in 
Australian parliaments that non-Europeans such as the Chinese had to be ‘naturalised’ to be 
regarded as subjects, even if they were born in Australia or another British territory and had 
no need under the common law to undergo any such process to become subjects of the 
Crown. Moreover, as section 4(2) shows, even those whose status as subjects was accepted 
(those ‘deemed to be British subjects’) were still regarded and treated as ‘aliens’ (whether 
they were ‘naturalized’ or ‘natural-born’).843   
‘White aliens’ 
As well as ‘Asiatic or African aliens’, ‘coloured aliens’ and ‘alien races’, another label used 
by Australia’s Anglo-Celtic community was the term ‘white alien’. This was mainly applied 
to settlers from southern Europe but was also employed as a derogatory description of 
‘undesirable’ ‘non-Aryan’ immigrants from other parts of the continent. The first references 
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in Australia to ‘white aliens’ appeared in the early 1870s,844 but it was more commonly used 
after federation. An editorial on ‘The Alien Question’ published in many papers across 
eastern Australia in 1902 stated that: 
We know at any rate the danger of permitting a large influx of people, alien to ourselves not 
merely in color, but in thought, traditions, religions, and the aspirations and moral impulses of 
our race. Now any steps that the Federal Government may take to secure a ‘white Australia,’ 
must mean the exclusion of Chinese and Japanese. It must also involve the perplexing dilemma 
of the exclusion of British subjects; for as matters stand the Hindoo trader and the Sikh hawkers 
have as much legal right to be here as any other British subject… the white man has this just 
grievance that, while he spends what he earns, and so disseminates his gains among his fellows, 
the other fellow— the pariah and alien— holds on to his money with the grip of a cuttlefish. 
But the same argument can be advanced against the white aliens who now infest our society. 
The Greek and the Italian, the Russian and Polish Jew subsist under conditions which would 
appal a Chinaman or a Japanese. And our contention is that if we bar the one we ought to keep 
out the other.
845
  
In a 1925 editorial entitled ‘The Alien Within Our Gates’, the West Australian noted that 
amendments to the Immigration Restriction Act had been introduced in federal parliament 
providing ‘power …to deport, in certain eventualities, white aliens, who are, or who are 
expected to become, a menace to the well-being and safety of the Commonwealth’. The paper 
observed that the new law was: 
…plainly aimed at the Communist, whose spiritual home is Soviet Russia, where, although the 
Communists are but a handful of three or four hundred thousand in a population of 
150,000,000, their commissaries, a narrow oligarchy, rule the land with a rod of iron.
846
 
In 1928 Sir Neville Howse, the Federal Minister for Home and Territories, described as the 
Minister responsible for ‘alien’ migration, said that the 1925 changes to the Immigration 
Restriction Act had allowed the Commonwealth Government to respond to a ‘marked 
increase in the migration of Southern Europeans’ by limiting the number of visas issued to 
such people. He commented generally that: 
… in the light of the situation which the United States of America and South Africa are facing 
to-day, one cannot but extol the sagacity of that great statesman the late Sir Henry Parkes, in  
declaring for a White Australia policy.
847
 
Sir Neville said that the number of visas had been reduced for ‘Greeks, JugoSlavs and 
Albanians’ as well as for ‘Poles, Estonians and Czecho-Slovaks’, adding that ‘other white 
alien nationals, such as Russians, Syrians and Palestinians, are required both to possess the 
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prescribed landing money of £40 and to obtain from the Minister permission to enter 
Australia’. On the other hand, he said, ‘no specific numerical restriction is placed on 
Scandinavians, French and Germans; they are regarded as desirable types of immigrants, they 
are readily assimilable and they have not been coming here in large numbers’.848  
As with the term ‘coloured alien’, whether groups of people were included in the phrase 
‘white alien’ was defined largely by their (un)desirability in the eyes of Anglo-Celtic society 
rather than by their legal status as non-British subjects. As Langfield says, the very term 
‘white aliens...must have been invidious to those to whom it was directed, mainly Italians, 
Greeks, Yugoslavs and Poles’.849 Even used as a general non-legal description, however, the 
label ‘white aliens’ was imprecise, with the nationalities referred to above more accurately 
coming within the description of ‘non-Aryan aliens’. But unlike many of the Australian 
residents labelled as ‘coloured aliens’, those called ‘white aliens’ were (with little exception) 
‘aliens’ under the law applying in Australia. So whilst ‘white alien’ was employed as a 
derogatory description of settlers regarded as ‘undesirable’ (or at least less desirable than 
‘Aryan’ northern  Europeans), the people described in such a way were not wrongly regarded 
and treated under the law as ‘aliens’. The fact that the term ‘white alien’ was at least a correct 
legal description - with the exception being the Maltese850 - of ‘white’ people who were not 
British subjects, reinforces the conclusion that the real meaning of ‘alien’ in a legal sense was 
appreciated by many Anglo-Celtic lawmakers and to some extent within white Australian 
society generally but was simply ignored when it came to non-European settlers, who were 
all more or less classed as ‘coloured aliens’ even if they were British subjects and not ‘aliens’ 
at all under the common law.  
Conclusion: entrenched misuse 
This chapter has shown how deeply entrenched misuse of the word ‘alien’ was in Australian 
lawmaking after federation. The new Commonwealth parliament thought the dictation test 
under the Immigration or ‘Alien’ Restriction Act would ensure the exclusion of ‘coloured 
aliens’. Under the Naturalization Act, the process for transforming an ‘alien’ into a British 
subject was closed to those regarded as ‘aliens’ in a racial or non-legal sense. People labelled 
as ‘coloured aliens’ but who were natural-born subjects of the Crown were denied voting and 
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other rights that should have accompanied their formal legal status. At the State level a vast 
number of acts, regulations and ordinances treated ‘coloured aliens’ differently, reinforcing 
the perception that they were ‘different’, the ‘outsiders’ or not ‘one of us’.  
The parliamentary debate on South Australia’s Northern Territory Mining Act 1903 showed 
no understanding on the part of lawmakers as to which persons of Asian ethnic origin would 
be covered by the term ‘Asiatic alien’ if that phrase was applied with its correct legal 
meaning. Chinese mine workers from Singapore, many if not all of whom would have been 
British subjects, as well as potential recruits from British India (correctly described as ‘Indian 
fellow-subjects’) were wrongly assumed by parliamentarians to be caught by the restrictions 
in the new law. While lawmakers in Western Australia appeared to appreciate the legal 
meaning of ‘alien’, they chose to disregard this, instead using the phrase ‘Asiatic or African 
alien’ - as section 4(2) of the Firearms and Guns Act 1931 shows - in its non-legal, ‘racial’ 
sense. That Act demonstrated that those thought of as ‘alien’ in the normal or racial meaning 
of the word could be caught by this term when they would not have been subject to the 
legislation if the word was applied in a strict legal sense. It also showed that the word ‘alien’ 
was particularly useful for legislators of the day because, unlike a phrase such as ‘people 
from another race’, it incorporated the idea of ‘foreignness’ or ‘otherness’, matching the 
attitude of ‘White Australians’ towards non-European residents of the new Commonwealth.   
The South Australian and Western Australian legislation shows how the term ‘alien’ was 
used in State laws to refer not only to ‘foreigners’ in a formal legal sense, i.e. citizens or 
subjects of another nation or country, but also to those seen as ‘foreigners’ or ‘outsiders’ 
merely in the sense of ‘not belonging’ or ‘being different from’ mainstream society of the 
day. As this thesis has shown, employment of the word ‘alien’ to refer to non-Europeans was 
part of the established discourse amongst the Anglo-Celtic establishment about who 
‘belonged’ in Australia. Those who were regarded, because of colour and/or labour racism, as 
not ‘belonging’ in white Australia were referred to as the ‘aliens’ (amongst other 
descriptions). Settlers who were of Chinese origin became a particular target. From the 
perspective of an Anglo-Celtic society focussed on issues of race and colour it may have been 
accurate linguistically (but not legally) to describe those of a different racial or ethnic 
background as ‘aliens’. However, had key Anglo-Celtic political and legal figures focussed 
on factors of similarity not difference – for example, a shared commitment to building the 
institutions and economy of a new Australia – settlers of non-European background may not 
have been labelled by white society in this way. Nevertheless, as these examples show, 
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because use of the word ‘alien’ in its racial sense was part of the accepted discourse in 
relation to non-Europeans in Australia, this racial use was incorporated into legislation, 
contrary to the law applying at that time.  
The next chapter shows how the embedded misuse of the term ‘alien’ at the Commonwealth 
and State level resulted in a failure to apply the rule of law in the High Court of Australia. 
This was in relation to a key event in modern Australian history - the expulsion of Pacific 
islanders under the ‘naturalization and aliens’ power in section 51(xix) of the Constitution. 
___________________________________________________________________________  
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CHAPTER FIVE Pacific Islanders: the ‘alien’ deportation? 
‘…any law which purports to give the minister the power to interpret who is an alien is 
certainly beyond the power of the Parliament…For centuries we have reined in 
executive power by imposing judicial oversight. It is called the rule of law’.851  
Pacific islanders and the rule of law 
A further group targeted as ‘aliens’ in Australia was the Pacific islander or ‘Kanaka’ 
community. Their expulsion from Australia under one of the first Commonwealth statutes 
was a key element of the White Australia policy of the new federal government. In 1906 the 
High Court of Australia - comprising Chief Justice Sir Samuel Griffith and Justices Barton 
and O’Connor, all delegates to the 1890s constitutional conventions - upheld this expulsion as 
a valid use of the ‘aliens power’ in section 51(xix) of the Constitution. 
Between 1863 and 1904852 around 62,000 men, women and children were recruited from the 
islands of the South Pacific to work in Queensland. As Tracey Banivanua-Mar notes, they 
‘labored for bonded periods of at least three years’, mainly in the burgeoning sugar 
industry.853 Price and Baker note some incompleteness and uncertainty in surviving 
Queensland records regarding the origins and numbers of islanders.854 However the records 
indicate that the majority came from the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu) with a large number 
also from the Solomon Islands and some from New Guinea as well as other islands in the 
South Pacific.855 
As Clive Moore observes, while many ‘first-indenture labourers’ served out their three year 
contracts and returned to the islands, there was also a large proportion who ‘re-engaged 
without leaving Queensland’. Some became ‘ticket-holders’ on the basis of residency for five 
years or more.856 Figures tabled in the Queensland Legislative Assembly in 1877 show that 
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out of nearly 11,000 islanders who had arrived since 1868, less than half returned to their 
home islands.857 Moore notes that by the mid-1880s, ‘ticket-holders’ and re-engaging 
labourers comprised 40 to 60 per cent of the islander population, ‘in reality becoming a 
Melanesian segment of the general working class’. Many islanders ‘had substantial 
possessions and bank accounts. Some owned property and married outside’ the islander 
community. By the late nineteenth century, ‘the Islander elite had become colonists and were 
no longer short-term circular migrants in servile bondage’.858 According to Banivanua-Mar, 
‘having established a core of permanently settled communities in Queensland, by the turn of 
the nineteenth century Islanders had also begun to establish familial links and ties to 
Queensland’.859  
As Philip Griffiths says, ‘it was not just Chinese people who were judged incapable of 
assimilating’ in colonial Queensland. He notes this badge of exclusion was extended to 
Pacific islanders as well.860 As an editorial in the Brisbane Courier in 1880 said: 
…they are alien particles intruded into our body politic, which cannot preserve its democratic 
character unless composed of individuals on whom there rests no bar of race or color that may 
operate to prevent them from mingling with the general body of citizens, exercising all their 
privileges and social opportunities.
861 
This was another recurring theme in colonial and post-federation Australia: only those 
already regarded as equal could be admitted to a new democratic society built on 
egalitarianism and equality. Those of non-European race were, by definition, excluded.  
Notwithstanding their established position in the Queensland community, Pacific islanders 
were routinely described as ‘aliens’, whether this was legally accurate or not. As 
Rockhampton’s Morning Bulletin observed in 1898: 
The persistence of the Opposition extracted from the Government a census of the coloured 
population in the colony, exclusive of aborigines, and the result, which has just been presented 
to Parliament, is a little disquieting. The census was taken by the police, who found on the 31st 
of October last that there were 24,336 coloured aliens in the colony. If the word ‘alien’ was 
taken literally it may happen that there were considerably more coloured people in the colony 
on that date than the total given. But in all probability the police included all coloured people, 
whether aliens or British subjects, in their return. If the different races are taken, the Chinese 
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come first with 10,004, the Pacific Islanders next with 8,428 and the Japanese third with 
3,281.
862
 
As this article indicates, in the same way that colonial census figures failed to identify the 
British subject status of many ethnic Chinese residents (see Chapter Two), the 1898 
Queensland police census appears to have listed all ‘Pacific islanders’ as ‘coloured aliens’, 
whatever their actual status under the law.   
This chapter begins by looking at the Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901 which authorised the 
expulsion of Pacific islanders from Queensland,  before turning to the legal status of the 
islander community in Queensland, noting protests that they ‘belonged’ as much as other 
groups. Apart from ‘natural-born’ islander children and married women with British subject 
status, many islanders came from British territory in the South Pacific. The chapter considers 
in particular the status of islanders from British protectorates. As a modern Australian case 
concluded, inhabitants of such protectorates were neither subjects nor aliens. The chapter also 
looks at evidence that even ‘islanders’ born in Queensland were wrongly categorised as 
‘aliens’. Finally the chapter considers the High Court’s decision in Robtelmes v Brenan 
(1906),863 which upheld deportation of the islanders as ‘aliens’ and is still cited today to 
support far-reaching use of the ‘aliens power’ in Commonwealth legislation.  
Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901  
Soon after Pacific islanders first arrived in the 1860s, pressure from missionary societies 
forced the Queensland and Imperial governments to enact legislation to control kidnapping 
and other mistreatment.864 Abuses continued, however, and further protective laws were 
passed in the 1880s amid calls to end recruitment of islanders altogether.865 But the interest of 
plantation owners in a cheap source of tropical labour prevailed, with the islander workforce 
remaining important for the Queensland economy for the rest of the colonial era.866 
                                                 
862
  ‘The Coloured Population’, Morning Bulletin (Rockhampton) 20 December 1898, 5. Emphasis 
added.  
863
  (1906) 4 CLR 395. 
864
  Polynesian Labour Act 1868 (Qld); Pacific Islanders Protection Act 1872 (Imp); see Charles Price, 
The Great White Walls are Built, above n 165, 148-149; see also Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Representatives,  2 October 1901, 5495 (Barton).  
865
  Pacific Islanders Labourers Act 1880 (Qld), Pacific Islanders Labourers Act Amendment Act 1884 
(Qld). See also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 October 1901, 
5495 (Barton).  
866
  A. Douglas Graham, The Life of The Right Honourable Sir Samuel Walker Griffith (John Murtagh 
Macrossan Lecture, University of Queensland 1938) 43-44.  
188 
 
In December 1901 the new federal parliament enacted the Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901 
(Cth) as part of a ‘package of legislation which marked out the racial boundaries of the new 
nation’.867 The new law prohibited entry of ‘Pacific Island Labourers’ into the 
Commonwealth of Australia after 31 March 1904. Islanders without a current labour 
agreement found in Australia before the end of 1906 could be brought before a court of 
summary jurisdiction and deported. After that date they would be deported by the Federal 
Minister for External Affairs. A ‘Pacific Island Labourer’ included ‘all natives not of 
European extraction of any island except the islands of New Zealand situated in the Pacific 
Ocean beyond the Commonwealth’.868 There were a number of exemptions, including for 
‘ticket-holders’ registered before 1 September 1884, ship crews and people with an 
exemption certificate under the Immigration Restriction Act.869 
At the end of 1904, there were 7,879 islanders still in Queensland, of whom two-thirds were 
from the Solomon Islands, with the remainder mainly from the New Hebrides.870 Henry 
Reynolds estimates that 4,269 islanders were removed from Australia in 1906-07.871 1,654 
islanders were granted exemptions allowing them to remain.872 Banivanua-Mar observes that: 
When the anti-islander sentiments that predominated in Queensland culminated at the turn of 
the nineteenth century in abolition and the compulsory deportation of Islanders, it was widely 
assumed that this simply meant a disconnected and temporary population would be returned to 
their homes.  But for the bulk of the Islander population, deportation meant uprooting settled 
communities that had had a presence in Queensland for upwards of twenty years.873 
Reynolds notes similarly that: 
…the deportation was a traumatic event.  Extended families were pulled apart with some 
members remaining in Queensland and others returning.  Friendships were brought to an end. 
The rigidity of immigration policy and induced Islander poverty prevented the travel to and 
from Queensland that might have kept friendships alive and networks of kin viable.
874
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As Moore suggests, Pacific islanders remaining in Queensland, who brought up families and 
owned land and other property, ‘belonged’ in a general sense as much as other settler groups. 
In addition, however, many islanders belonged legally because they were British subjects and 
not ‘aliens’ under the common law. But there was no exemption on this ground under the 
Pacific Island Labourers Act. As the Commonwealth Parliament was told in October 1901, 
the British subject status of some islanders would not save them from expulsion. Mr Higgins 
(later Justice Higgins of the Australian High Court) repeatedly asked: ‘Are there not some 
British subjects among the Pacific Island labourers?’875 Leader of the Opposition George 
Reid said basic principles would be infringed by the new law with regard to these ‘coloured 
aliens’ because the term ‘Pacific Island Labourer…will include any British subjects’. Reid 
said it had previously been accepted that ‘when a man of any colour gets beneath the British 
flag he is safe. Now, however, we must add the proviso - except he be black and born in the 
South Seas’.876  
While there was no exemption for British subjects in the actual legislation, the legal status of 
Pacific islanders was a critical factor in their deportation. As discussed below, in 1906 the 
High Court of Australia declared that they were ‘aliens’ and that the Pacific Island Labourers 
Act could validly apply to them as a law ‘with respect to aliens’ under section 51(xix) of the 
Constitution. 
Legal status of Pacific islanders 
‘Natural-born’ children and married subjects 
In response to the new legislation, a Pacific Islanders Association was formed which fought a 
‘valiant, but futile battle against the 1901 Act’.877 According to Banivanua-Mar, the islander 
communities ‘protested hard and emphasised…their distinct identities…as Queensland South 
Sea Islanders’.878 Their protests noted in particular that many islander children had been born 
in Australia. A petition in 1902 to King Edward VII proclaimed that:  
Many of us have been continuously resident in Queensland for upwards of twenty years…we 
love the land in which we live, and all our friends are here…Many of us have children, who for 
years have attended the State schools of Queensland and the Sunday schools. They are free 
                                                 
875
  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 9 October 1901, 5829, 5830.  
876
  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 9 October 1901, 5831.  
877
  Clive Moore, ‘Good-bye, Queensland’, above n 856, 24, 28.  
878
  Banivanua-Mar, Violence and Colonial Dialogue, above n 146, 101. Emphasis added.  
190 
 
born, and we thought that we had attained at least such freedom as is enjoyed by other coloured 
aliens who came to Australia.879 
In Rockhampton in 1903 some fifty islanders, ‘many of the number being children’, made a 
personal appeal to the Governor of Queensland. They were led by ‘a Kanaka of thirty years 
residence in the State’ who pointed out that islanders brought to Queensland should have 
been returned to their homes after three years, but instead had to enter fresh agreements with 
plantation owners. ‘If the Government had stuck to the law’, he said, ‘we would not have had 
to bother them now. The Government let us settle down in this country’. A ‘tastefully attired 
Kanaka girl’ then read a petition to the Governor, signed by forty islander children: 
The undersigned being natives of Queensland desire to approach you as the appointed 
representative of our King… We regret that the Pacific Island Labourers Act… provides…for 
the deportation of all islanders…Some of our own parents have been registered exempt. Some 
of our fathers are exempt, but mothers are not and in some cases neither parent is exempt. 
Many of them desire to remain here. We therefore appeal to you that representations be made to 
the proper authorities that separation of families may not take place and that all our parents may 
be permitted to live in this, the country of our birth. We are his Majesty’s dutiful subjects.880 
The Governor appeared to recognise that the children belonged legally in the new 
Commonwealth by virtue of their birth in Australia. The Brisbane Courier said that ‘His 
Excellency made inquiries to ascertain if the Kanaka children born in Australia were not 
technically a part of the Commonwealth’. But, as the paper noted, ‘he could elicit no 
authoritative reply.’881 In other words no-one was prepared to confirm for the Governor that 
under the law applying in Australia, birth in the country gave islander children the same right 
to legal membership as locally born Anglo-Celtic children.   
As Banivanua-Mar says, government authorities were especially concerned about settled 
islander families with children because of the threat they posed to the White Australia policy. 
She notes that ‘by the 1890s the nature and makeup of Islanders’ families was a source of 
great anxiety such that extensive…information was collected’.882 The 1901 census, for 
example, recorded nearly 600 locally born islander children living in Queensland.883 As well 
as those who were still children in the early 1900s, there were also adult islanders who were 
natural-born subjects (and therefore not ‘aliens) because of their birth in Queensland. In 1906 
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the Royal Commission heard testimony, for example, from one Noah Sabbo who had been 
born in Queensland and did not want to be deported.884 
Apart from the children born in Queensland, the 1901 census also recorded some 300 islander 
men and 200 women who had married local residents.885 Under Queensland’s Aliens Act 
1867, a woman who married a British subject acquired subject status herself.886 This rule 
remained unchanged after federation.887 Any islander woman in Queensland who had married 
a British subject therefore moved beyond formal ‘alien’ status.888 
Islander origins  
More significantly, the various origins of the Pacific islander community in Queensland also 
raise questions about the legal status of islanders deported under the Pacific Island Labourers 
Act. While the surviving records may not be comprehensive, they indicate nevertheless that 
the islanders came from locations under varying degrees of British control in the period 
before 1906.  
As noted above, the majority of Pacific islanders who arrived in Queensland between 1863 
and 1904 came from the New Hebrides. Great Britain established a protectorate over the New 
Hebrides as early as 1824 (although this was disputed by France). The island group was then 
included in the British colony of New Zealand in 1840, before being returned to protectorate 
status.889 In a debate in the Federal Council of Australasia in 1891, the Attorney-General of 
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Under section 5 of the Naturalization Act 1903 (Cth), no person who was 
‘an aboriginal native of Asia, Africa, or the Islands of the Pacific, excepting New Zealand’ could be 
naturalised (emphasis added). 
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Victoria William Shiels noted that ‘…at one time the New Hebrides formed a portion of the 
dominion of Australasia. In the charter of 1840, granted to New Zealand, we find that the 
New Hebrides were embraced’.890 The British protectorate ended in 1878. As Premier of 
Victoria Sir George Turner said at another meeting of the Federal Council of Australasia in 
1897: 
In 1878 and 1883 arrangements were made between the two nations [Great Britain and France] 
whereby the islands were placed under a kind of joint control. The Commission consisted of 
naval officers who…have to take care that there is no breach of the peace, and that the 
regulations, whatever they may be, are fully observed.
891
 
Under the 1887 Anglo-French Paris Convention, a joint ‘Naval Commission’ was established 
with responsibility for protecting French citizens and British subjects in the territory.892 As 
Sir George Turner said in 1897, ‘the islands are now under the joint protection of Great 
Britain and France’.893 In 1906 a formal Anglo-French condominium was established over the 
New Hebrides, ‘partly to enable policing of the return of the Islanders’.894  
The Solomon Islands had a more straightforward colonial history, with Germany claiming the 
northern portion of these islands and Great Britain the southern part in 1886, before the 
formal declaration of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate in 1893, followed by 
Germany’s transfer of most of the northern islands to Britain in 1899.895  
Kay Saunders notes that in the 1880s a shortage of ‘recruits’ from the Solomon Islands and 
the New Hebrides meant Queensland sugar plantation owners looked to New Guinea ‘to 
                                                                                                                                                        
the limits of that Colony at a more recent date’. Hugh Edward Egerton, A Short History of British 
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maintain an expanding supply of cheap, coloured, servile servants’.896 Records examined by 
Price and Baker show that 2,808 islanders were transported from islands in New Guinea 
between 1883 and 1887.897 Queensland annexed Papua (the southern part of New Guinea) 
and nearby islands in 1883, purportedly on behalf of Britain. The British government quickly 
renounced this action, but pledges of financial support from the Australian colonies 
convinced imperial authorities to proclaim a protectorate over the territory in 1884.898 After 
an Imperial Conference in 1887 the administration of Papua was entrusted to Queensland899 
and in 1888 it was formally annexed by Great Britain as the colony of British New Guinea. In 
1905 it was transferred to Australia as the Territory of Papua.900 
Queensland records also indicate that 191 Gilbert islanders were brought to the colony 
between 1893 and 1897 to work as labourers.901 Great Britain proclaimed a protectorate over 
the Gilbert Islands (now known as Kiribati) in 1892. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands became a 
British colony in 1916.902 
Price and Baker do not refer to any islanders recruited from Fiji for work in Queensland. 
However Moore notes that the founder of the Pacific Islanders Association formed in Mackay 
in 1901 to fight deportation was Tui Tonga, ‘a Fijian of chiefly status’ who had lived in 
Queensland since 1876.903 Banivanua-Mar also refers to labourers from Fiji.904 And in 
preparing for the expulsion of islanders to their places of origin, the Queensland and 
Commonwealth governments liaised not only with British Western Pacific High Commission 
officials in the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides, but also with the British colonial 
government of Fiji.905 The Fiji islands became a British colony in 1874.906 Any Fijian 
islanders who came to Queensland after that date were British subjects and not aliens under 
the law applying in Australia.  
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While Pacific islanders from British colonies such as Fiji (and British New Guinea after 
1888) clearly had British subject status, the legal position of islanders from British 
protectorates in the South Pacific – including the Solomon Islands, British New Guinea from 
1884 to 1888, the Gilbert Islands and the New Hebrides (at least until 1878) - was more 
complex. In the case of the New Hebrides, there was the further complication of joint control 
by France and Britain from 1878 onwards, not to mention its early history as part of the 
colony of New Zealand.  
The inhabitants of British protectorates were the exception to the common law rule that the 
world was divided into ‘subjects’ and ‘aliens’. In Re Ho (1975)907 the South Australian 
Supreme Court held that a man from the British protectorate of Brunei was neither a British 
subject ‘nor, for many purposes, anyhow, an alien’: 
He is, as his counsel… said, in a grey area. Another way of putting it is to say that he possesses 
some, but not all, of the status of a British subject. He possesses at least so much of it as results 
from his not being an alien for the purposes of the nationality legislation. And it has been said 
by an eminent authority that “for the purposes of international law the distinction between 
‘British subject’ and ‘British-protected person’ is irrelevant”.908  
Chief Justice Bray set out the history of protectorates under British common law, stating: 
The national status of persons born in a British protectorate or a British Protected State and not 
qualified for British nationality by reason of the nationality of their ancestors is obscure. Much 
no doubt depends on the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the protectorate or 
protected State in question.
909
 
The Chief Justice noted the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Sekgome’s 
Case (1910)910 where the court was uncertain about the legal status of a chief from the 
Bechuanaland protectorate, who it described as ‘not being in the strict sense of the term a 
British subject’.911 While the inhabitants of such protectorates may not have been subjects, at 
the same time - because they owed ongoing and not merely temporary obedience to the 
Crown in return for the formal conferral of protection - they were not ‘aliens’ in the proper 
legal sense of that term. According to Wade and Phillips, citing Sekgome (in the 1947 edition 
of their book on constitutional practice in the British Commonwealth): 
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Protectorates are foreign countries, and their inhabitants, known as British protected persons, 
are not British subjects, though they may in return for protection owe unlimited duties of 
allegiance.912 
In the 1955 edition, Wade and Phillips amended this statement to read: 
Strictly speaking they [the inhabitants of British protectorates] do not owe allegiance to the 
Crown, but as an equivalent for its protection the duty of obedience may be implied to a 
practically unlimited extent.
913
  
Such ‘practically unlimited’ obedience to the British Crown seems little different to the type 
of loyalty to the sovereign described by Sir Edward Coke in Calvin’s Case, where he used the 
words ‘obedience’ and ‘allegiance’ as equivalent terms.914 On this basis the occupants of 
British protectorates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were outside the 
common law definition of an ‘alien’ as someone who owed allegiance (i.e. unqualified 
loyalty or obedience) to a foreign sovereign power.  
In addition to inhabitants of formal protectorates, Andrew Grossman notes, with particular 
relevance to the New Hebrides, that ‘British jurists were not so certain of the status of the 
inhabitants of British mandates, trust territories and condominiums: they were not aliens’.915 
The uncertainty about the legal status of people living in protectorates, condominiums and 
similar territories under the supervision of the United Kingdom was recognised – and 
resolved - by drafters of the watershed nationality legislation enacted in Britain and Australia 
after World War Two. The common law position that such people were somewhere between 
‘subjects’ and ‘aliens’ was reflected in the British Nationality Act 1948 which defined an 
‘alien’ as a person who was not ‘a British subject, a British protected person or a citizen of 
Eire’.916 Similarly, Australia’s Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 defined an ‘alien’ as 
someone who was ‘not a British subject, an Irish citizen or a protected person’.917 ‘Protected 
persons’ under the British Act were also deemed to have this status under the Australian 
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legislation.918 A ‘protected person’ included any inhabitant of a ‘protectorate, protected state, 
mandated territory or trust territory’ declared by Order in Council.919 Solomon Islanders were 
listed as protected persons by a 1949 United Kingdom Order in Council,920 which also 
directed that the British Nationality Act applied to the New Hebrides as if it were a protected 
state.921 Inhabitants of both territories were therefore outside the legislated definition of 
‘alien’ under the 1948 British and Australian laws. Consistent with this statutory acceptance 
that such people were not ‘aliens’ or ‘foreigners’, the definition of ‘foreign countries’ under 
both laws did not include Britain’s protectorates or protected states, or ‘the New Hebrides or 
Canton Island’.922  
While the 1948 legislation was not in force when Pacific islanders were expelled from 
Australia in 1906 (under a law purportedly authorised by the ‘aliens power’ in section 51(xix) 
of the new Constitution), the 1948 British and Australian statutes recognised that there was 
an existing relationship between Great Britain and protectorates such as the Solomon Islands 
and the condominium of the New Hebrides which justified acceptance of their inhabitants as 
beyond ‘alien’ status.  
The relationship with Great Britain had its origins at different points in the nineteenth century 
for the various Pacific island territories. A difficult issue is when this relationship became 
sufficiently established in the case of particular territories to invoke an enduring (and not 
merely temporary) obligation of obedience or allegiance on the part of the inhabitants in 
return for the protection of the British Crown. The New Hebrides involves particular 
complications given its changing legal relationship with Britain: initially a protectorate, then 
part of the colony of New Zealand, then a protectorate again, followed by a period under joint 
French-British control and finally a formal condominium. Nevertheless there are strong 
arguments that by the late nineteenth century the protection provided by Britain to inhabitants 
of the two main sources of islander recruitment, the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides, 
was formalised enough to invoke reciprocal and enduring obligations of obedience - thus 
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moving their inhabitants beyond ‘alien’ status under the common law. In addition, of course, 
there is no question about the non-alien status of islanders recruited from British colonies 
such as Fiji after 1874, British New Guinea from 1888 and the Gilbert Islands from 1892 
onwards.  
There was little appreciation during the colonial and early post-federation era that the status 
of these territories as British protectorates and colonies might affect the legal standing of their 
inhabitants under Australian law. Pacific islanders continued to be regarded as ‘aliens’ 
because of their racial appearance, irrespective of their actual origins. As Adelaide’s Register 
said in 1901 in relation to the proposed acquisition of British New Guinea by the new 
Commonwealth of Australia: 
The new nation does not seek to raise the Papuans to the rank of Australians. The dusky 
denizens of what was geographically part of this continent will be ruled from a land to the 
wealth of which they will be expected, in trade at least, to contribute, but on account of their 
dark pigmented skins they will be regarded as aliens and not be permitted even to visit it.923 
There were rare occasions, however, when a lawmaker noted that people denigrated as 
‘coloured aliens’ were not in fact ‘aliens’ under the law applying in Australia because they 
were British subjects. In the Queensland Legislative Assembly in October 1901, Home 
Secretary Foxton – a ‘keen advocate of black labour for developing northern Australia’924 - 
drew attention to a particular issue about the origins of some inhabitants of Queensland 
regarded as ‘Pacific islanders’. In reply to criticism from Opposition Labor members about 
the number of ‘coloured aliens’, including Pacific islanders, in Queensland’s prisons and 
asylums, Foxton said his opponents: 
…spoke of coloured aliens when many of them, as a matter of fact, were British subjects. With 
regard to the Pacific Islanders, he would like to point out that a large number of those who were 
included in that category had not been brought to Queensland under the Pacific Island Labour 
Act, but were men who had drifted in from the Islands of Torres Straits.925 
As Foxton indicated, since the Torres Strait islands were formally part of Queensland,926 any 
‘Pacific islander’ who had come from there was a natural-born British subject under the 
common law and could not be an ‘alien’ in a legal sense.  
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An official list prepared in 1913 by the office of the Chief Secretary of Queensland entitled 
Coloured labour and Asiatic aliens in Queensland supports Foxton’s contention that Torres 
Strait islanders – born as British subjects by virtue of their birth in Queensland – were 
incorrectly labelled as ‘coloured aliens’. Some individuals on the Chief Secretary’s list whose 
birthplace was recorded as mainland Queensland were correctly described as ‘British 
subjects’.927 However those born on islands in the Torres Strait had their status wrongly 
recorded merely as ‘not naturalized’.928 In addition, some people with Pacific islander 
background born in mainland Queensland were also given this incorrect status, including a 
man described as a ‘Knaka’ [sic] born in Brisbane in 1868 who had ‘lived in Queensland 
since birth’,929 as well as eight members of an extended islander family aged one to 39 all 
born in Bowen or Ayr in north Queensland.930 Once again, the list demonstrates a lack of 
understanding of the different ways a person might become a British subject. The only option 
on the list for indicating legal status was whether an individual was naturalised or not. There 
was no recognition on this official list that people of non-European ethnic background – 
including Pacific islanders - might be ‘natural-born’ British subjects. 
Similarly, when the Commonwealth’s Pacific Island Labourers Bill was debated in the Senate 
at the end of 1901, Senator Neild proposed an exemption for ‘any Pacific Island labourer who 
is a naturalized British subject’ because in his view ‘it would be unreasonable to take power 
to deport them if they are naturalized British subjects’.931 This ignored the fact that under the 
Aliens Act 1867 (Qld), Pacific islanders could not be naturalised932 and also that there were 
islanders resident in Australia who legally possessed the status of ‘natural-born’ British 
subjects by virtue of their birth either in Queensland itself or in another territory under the 
allegiance of the British Crown.  
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Robtelmes v Brenan  
In 1906 the High Court of Australia unanimously upheld the deportation of Mr Robtelmes 
under the Pacific Island Labourers Act.933 Chief Justice Griffith and Justice Barton said this 
was a valid use of the ‘aliens’ power in section 51(xix) of the Constitution. Justice Barton 
found the expulsion of Pacific islanders was also valid under the ‘immigration’ power in 
section 51(xxvii), the ‘external affairs’ power in section 51(xxix), and possibly also the 
‘races’ power in section 51(xxvi). At first impression, a reading of Justice O’Connor’s 
judgment suggests he also endorsed the deportation under the ‘aliens’ power. Analysis of the 
historical context, however, indicates he was saying that islanders were members of an ‘alien 
race’ who could be deported under the ‘races power’ in the Constitution.  
As discussed in Chapter Three, in their capacity as delegates to the 1890s constitutional 
conventions all three judges employed the term ‘alien’ in its non-legal, racial sense, referring 
to ‘coloured aliens’ and ‘alien races’, by which they did not mean non-British subjects but 
rather any people with a non-European background. Many delegates used the word in the 
same way. None explained the proper legal meaning of the term. This was consistent with 
routine misuse of the word since the 1860s by prominent political and legal figures in 
colonial Australia. In their seminal 1901 work on the Constitution, Quick and Garran also 
failed to restrict the use of ‘alien’ to its legal meaning.  
All of this was important background to the High Court’s decision in Robtelmes. This is not 
to suggest that the High Court justices necessarily misunderstood the common law concept of 
an ‘alien’ (although, as explained below, Justice O’Connor’s judgment justifies some strong 
doubts in this regard). What does appear to be the case, however, is that the view of the three 
High Court judges recorded during the 1890s conventions - that non-Europeans were ‘aliens’ 
in a racial sense - affected their judgment in Robtelmes as to who could be subject to the 
Commonwealth’s power over ‘aliens’ in a legal or constitutional sense. 
On 21 September 1906, Police Magistrate R.A. Ranking of the Court of Petty Sessions 
Brisbane, exercising federal jurisdiction under the Pacific Island Labourers Act, ordered the 
deportation of Mr Robtelmes as an islander found in Australia with no current labour 
agreement.934 Robtelmes, a native of Vanua Lava in the New Hebrides, had arrived in 
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Queensland in 1897.935 The case attracted attention as the first under the ‘deportation clause’ 
of the Act.936 The prosecution agreed not to enforce the expulsion order until the High Court 
had considered the matter.937 There is no indication from the High Court file that Robtelmes 
had any interest in the appeal.938 Instead it appears the Commonwealth was seeking an 
endorsement from the High Court of the validity of expulsions under the Pacific Island 
Labourers Act.   
Sitting in Brisbane, the High Court heard arguments in the case on 1 October 1906, a mere 
ten days after Magistrate Ranking issued his deportation order. The High Court’s judgment 
was handed down the very next day, on 2 October 1906.939 The submission prepared on 
behalf of Robtelmes asserted that the Pacific Island Labourers Act was ‘ultra vires’ the 
Constitution and noted that he came from a territory ‘under the joint protection of England 
and France’. But it raised no arguments about his legal status let alone the significance of this 
for the legality (or otherwise) of his deportation. Instead the submission merely quoted from 
Queensland’s 1906 Royal Commission,940 referring to the established nature of islander 
communities in Queensland, ‘many of whom are married and have families, the children 
attending a State school’.941 The submission made no claims about what this may have meant 
for the status of Pacific islanders or the validity of their expulsion (for example that the Act 
might not have lawfully applied to islanders born in Queensland or those married to British 
subjects). 
The High Court failed to apply any of the principles of the common law in considering 
whether Robtelmes and other Pacific islanders could validly be subject to a statute based on 
the ‘aliens’ power in section 51(xix) of the Constitution. By the time of the Robtelmes case, 
Chief Justice Griffith’s misuse of the term ‘alien’ dated back thirty years to 1876. In 
Robtelmes, he did not maintain his position at the conventions that section 51(xix) was only 
concerned with ‘naturalisation of aliens’. Instead he declared that:   
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Sub-sec. xix authorizing laws as to aliens implies that the Commonwealth may make any laws 
with regard to aliens that a sovereign power can make…The power to make such laws as 
Parliament may think fit with respect to aliens must surely, if it includes anything, include the 
power to determine the conditions under which aliens may be admitted to the country, the 
conditions under which they may be permitted to remain in the country, and the conditions 
under which they may be deported from it.
942
 
Griffith’s judgment reflected an understanding that alien status was a matter of nationality not 
race. He gave the example: 
…of an alien, whom, for instance, the Swiss Confederation desired to expel from Switzerland. 
Suppose he was a Russian, or an Englishman, or a Spaniard…that they have the power to expel 
him from Switzerland is beyond all doubt.
943
 
With respect to Pacific islanders, however, Griffith said merely that their expulsion under the 
Pacific Island Labourers Act was a valid use of the ‘aliens’ power because: 
What is the status of Pacific Islanders? What are they? They are aliens: that is indisputable. 
Not only are they aliens, but by the law of Australia, so far as I know it, it is impossible for 
them to become anything else. If that is so, the power resides somewhere of excluding them 
from Australia, whenever the proper authority determines that they shall be excluded.
944
 
Griffith appreciated that the case before him was not just about Robtelmes but a test of the 
Commonwealth’s power to expel Pacific islanders generally. As the Brisbane Courier 
reported when summarising the arguments before the High Court, ‘the Chief Justice said the 
case was one of considerable importance, and they would consider their judgment, which 
would very likely be given in the morning’.945 As the same paper reported the next day: 
The court considered that…legislation with regard to Pacific Islanders came within the 
authorisation of the Constitution Act. It followed, therefore, that the order for deportation in the 
case in question was declared to be valid, and generally the power of the Commonwealth to 
deport Kanakas from Australia was affirmed.946 
Griffith was correct when he said it was impossible for Pacific islanders who were aliens in a 
legal sense to be naturalised under the law applying in Australia.947 But otherwise his 
statement about the legal status of Pacific islanders ignored the possible ways such people 
may have been British subjects - or at least not aliens - under the common law. The Chief 
Justice offered no analysis to support his assertion that all Pacific Islanders were 
‘indisputably aliens’. In terms of the specific case before the Court, neither Griffith nor the 
other judges mentioned where Robtelmes came from, nor did they examine the colonial 
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history of the New Hebrides or how that might have affected the Commonwealth’s power to 
deport him as an ‘alien’.  
More than anyone else, Chief Justice Griffith had the political and legal background to enable 
a careful analysis of the status of Pacific islanders. The Pacific islander issue was a central 
one for Griffith throughout his political life, especially as Queensland Premier from 1883 to 
1888 and 1890 to 1893. As Douglas Graham said in a 1938 lecture about Griffith, apart from 
defeating the power of the ‘squattocracy’, his other great political struggle concerned ‘White 
Australia, or…the Kanaka question’.948 As Griffith himself said when President of the 
Federal Council of Australasia in 1891, ‘I have probably had more experience than any man 
in Australia of the administration of the law relating to the Pacific Islanders, and I can speak 
with some knowledge of the subject’.949  
In 1901 Barton, then Prime Minister, told federal parliament that ‘in introducing the [Pacific 
Island Labourers Bill], the Commonwealth Government is carrying out only what has been 
the declared policy of Queensland for the last 20 years at least’.950 He highlighted Griffith’s 
central role as Premier in attempts to replace islanders with white men, especially in 
Queensland’s profitable sugar industry.951 Griffith’s opposition to islander labour stemmed 
partly from humanitarian concerns but also had a strong element of racism. According to 
Douglas Graham, ‘if the squatters and planters hated Griffith’ (because he planned to remove 
black labour), ‘the White Australia party loved, admired and almost worshipped him’.952 
Griffith strongly opposed the use of coloured labour in northern Australia. As he said: 
If, then, tropical Australia is to be inhabited by a coloured population, not only will a new form 
of government be required, so that there will be two distinct and probably antagonistic forms of 
government on the Australian continent, but ultimately the standard of comfort for the working 
population of all Australia will be in danger of being reduced to that of the coloured races. If, 
on the other hand, the faith of those who believe that tropical Australia can become the 
permanent home of the white races turns out to be well founded, a future which most people 
will regard as fairer and happier is open for that part of the continent…953 
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Just as Henry Parkes believed that ‘inferior’ Chinese had no place in a society where all men 
were equal before the law, Griffith declared in relation to Pacific islanders that ‘the 
permanent existence of a large servile population amongst us, not admitted to the franchise, is 
not compatible with the continuance of our free political institutions’.954  
After receiving reports in 1884 of the deaths on a plantation in Mackay of a large number of 
islanders, mainly from New Ireland, Griffith instructed all Government agents sailing from 
Queensland that ‘no islanders were to be brought from New Ireland or New Britain, as the 
natives were totally unfit for the work, and only came to the colony to die’.955 In the same 
year, after further revelations of the inhumane recruitment and treatment of islanders, the 
Griffith government passed legislation effectively abolishing the use of ‘black labour’ in 
Queensland from the end of 1893.956 However a financial depression and a shortage of white 
labour forced Griffith to rescind this decision in 1892, delaying the prohibition on islander 
labour for a further ten years.957 While even his critics admitted that Griffith ‘saved the 
valuable sugar industry of Queensland’, Graham believes that Griffith ‘never ceased 
regretting that he had ever…turned aside from the path in which he had set his feed’ (i.e. the 
removal of Pacific island labour from Queensland).958  
Griffith was also very familiar with, and indeed played an important role in, the colonial 
history of the South Pacific. Graham points out that while the British Government at first 
disavowed the action of Queensland Premier McIlwraith in 1883 in raising the British flag in 
New Guinea, this action ‘paved the way for annexation which Sir Samuel later forced on the 
vacillating Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Derby’.959 Similarly Roger Joyce notes in 
relation to British New Guinea that ‘Griffith was at the centre of planning for the protectorate 
and eventual colony’.960 Colonial rivalry in the South Pacific was also a key issue in the 
1880s and 1890s for the Federal Council of Australasia, in which Griffith had a central 
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role.961 As President of the Federal Council in 1891, Griffith presided over a long debate on 
the New Hebrides, in which he observed that the Anglo-French Paris Convention of 1887 had 
established a joint Naval Commission ‘charged with the duty of maintaining order, and of 
protecting the lives and property of British subjects and French citizens in the New 
Hebrides’.962   
Apart from Griffith’s familiarity with both the history of Pacific islanders in Queensland and 
the colonial status of the various islands they originated from, there was no shortage of other 
relevant information. There was the Royal Commission that had taken evidence earlier in 
1906, including from islanders born in Queensland, the protests and petitions on behalf of 
islanders and official census figures on their numbers. There had also been statements in the 
Queensland parliament, for example from Home Secretary Foxton, about the subject status of 
islanders incorrectly labelled as ‘coloured aliens’. Notwithstanding the speed of the hearing 
and judgment in Robtelmes, there was considerable information available to Griffith (albeit 
not put forward in the submission by Robtelmes’s lawyer) which, had it been presented to the 
Court, would have shown that Pacific islanders living in Queensland were not ‘indisputably 
aliens’.  
Justice Barton in his judgment said the Commonwealth had power to legislate for the 
deportation of Pacific islanders under ‘the 19th sub-section of sec. 51’.963 He identified the 
fundamental issue in relation to use of the ‘aliens’ power, referring to a case where ‘it was 
decided that the status of a person residing in Mauritius, then and now a British colony or 
possession, that is to say, whether he is an alien or not, must be determined by the laws of 
England’.964 However Justice Barton failed to apply the relevant principles of English law 
with regard to ‘aliens’, either in relation to Robtelmes or Pacific islanders generally. Instead 
he concluded merely that: 
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…if the power to legislate exists with respect to the conditions of entry or residence of the 
subjects of civilised powers, it would be idle to attempt to deny that it is also included with 
respect to Pacific Islanders.965 
As this statement shows, in Justice Barton’s view a ‘Pacific islander’ could not be a ‘subject 
of a civilised power’ such as Great Britain. Moreover the above extract indicates that Justice 
Barton saw Pacific islanders as a single racial and legal group, leaving no room for 
consideration of the particular circumstances of Robtelmes or the different origins of the 
various islander communities in Queensland.  
In Justice O’Connor’s judgment, he concluded that: 
…the power to legislate with regard to aliens and to immigration, given to the Commonwealth 
Parliament under the Constitution, includes the power to deport an alien under such 
circumstances as the Commonwealth Parliament may think to enact.
 966
 
At first glance this seems be a reference not only to the ‘immigration and emigration’ power 
in section 51(xxvii) of the Constitution but also to the ‘aliens power’ in section 51(xix). 
However O’Connor did not specifically refer to section 51(xix) in his judgment. Instead he 
used the word ‘alien’ consistently with the way he and fellow delegates had employed the 
term during the 1890s constitutional conventions – as a synonym for ‘people of another race’. 
For example, he stated in Robtelmes that: 
Many years before the establishment of the Commonwealth several of the Australian Colonies 
had passed Acts for regulating the admission of aliens into their several territories. In relation to 
the immigration of Chinese they enacted not only conditions of admission but also those under 
which they should be absolutely excluded.
967
 
This was a reference to the colonial legislation of the 1880s, directed (especially the new laws 
enacted after the 1888 Inter-colonial conference) not at ‘aliens’ in a legal sense but at people 
of Chinese origin, even if they were British subjects. Similarly, in relation to Pacific 
islanders, Justice O’Connor stated that: 
Those Acts in the different States dealing with aliens remained in force under the State 
Constitutions until the Parliament of the Commonwealth entered the same field of legislation, 
and in regard to Pacific Islanders the Commonwealth legislated by the Act which is now under 
consideration.
968  
In 1901, as a Senator and Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council, O’Connor used 
similar language to describe the background to the Immigration Restriction Bill:  
When the representatives of the various States of Australia met in London on the occasion of 
the interview with Mr. Chamberlain in 1896, they had all passed Bills prohibiting the 
introduction of these coloured aliens. Those Bills set out in plain language that the persons 
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therein described, and they included all coloured aliens, were to be prohibited from entering 
Australia, and they were all reserved.
969
 
When another Senator said a tax on ‘aliens’ should be part of the Bill to prevent ‘hordes of 
Hindoos, Chinamen, and other Asiatics…concentrating in the northern portion of 
Queensland’,970 O’Connor replied:  
This Bill is to regulate immigration, and it seems to me that it would be a very unnecessary and 
harsh proceeding to place under special disabilities aliens who are already in the 
Commonwealth. If it is found that, in carrying on the business of the Commonwealth, it is 
necessary to make special laws dealing with any particular class of coloured aliens, there will 
be power to do so under sub-section (26) of section 51 of the Constitution [the ‘races’ 
power].
971
 
In his judgment in Robtelmes, Justice O’Connor identified people of Chinese and Pacific 
islander origin as ‘aliens’ because of their race. As with the decisions of his two colleagues, 
there was no analysis in O’Connor’s judgment as to whether Mr Robtelmes or the various 
groups of Pacific islanders to be expelled from Australia were ‘aliens’ in a legal sense. Justice 
O’Connor assumed that Pacific islanders were ‘aliens’ because of their non-European ethnic 
origins and on that basis declared they were validly subject to the Commonwealth’s 
legislative power. There is no proof from the words of his judgment that he did not mean that 
the lawmaking power over ‘aliens’ was to be found in section 51(xix) of the Constitution. 
However the way he used the term ‘alien’, especially when seen in the light of his own 
remarks and those of his colleagues at the constitutional conventions and in Federal 
Parliament, indicates that by ‘the power to legislate with regard to aliens’ he meant the 
‘races’ power in section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution. In Robtelmes Justice O’Connor stated 
that: 
On the establishment of the Commonwealth the powers of dealing with aliens, the 
naturalization of aliens, and emigration and immigration, passed to the Commonwealth, and 
[are] amongst the powers with which the Commonwealth legislature was invested under 
sec. 51.
972 
 
At the constitutional conventions O’Connor and other delegates (including Griffith and 
Barton) envisaged an expansive role for the immigration and ‘races’ powers (in controlling 
the entry of non-Europeans and in regulating the activities of those already within Australia) 
but only a narrow role for section 51(xix) (limited to the naturalisation function). It is 
consistent with the respective roles that delegates at the conventions saw for these powers 
that in the above extract from Robtelmes, O’Connor was referring to the races power in 
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section 51(xxvi), the naturalization arm of section 51(xix) and the immigration power in 
section 51(xxvii). 
In summary, none of the judges in Robtelmes properly examined the constitutional status of 
Pacific islanders, assuming or at least pronouncing  that all were ‘aliens’ for the purposes of 
section 51(xix) of the Constitution, without analysis as to whether this was actually the case. 
Chief Justice Griffith said all islanders in Queensland were ‘indisputably aliens’ despite 
published evidence that this was not so; Justice Barton said they ‘could not be subjects of 
civilised powers’ when many were in fact British subjects; and Justice O’Connor considered 
all were ‘aliens’ simply because they belonged to another race. The High Court upheld the 
deportation provisions of the Pacific Island Labourers Act as within the scope of the ‘aliens’ 
power in the Constitution, with no consideration of the extent to which the power in section 
51(xix) validly applied either to Robtelmes specifically or to Pacific islanders living in 
Australia more generally. At the constitutional conventions in the 1890s, each of the judges in 
Robtelmes supported the view that non-Europeans, including Pacific islanders, were members 
of an ‘alien race’. This suggests that because the judges saw Pacific islanders as ‘aliens’ in 
racial terms, they thought the islanders were validly within the Commonwealth’s law making 
power over ‘aliens’ in the Constitution. Griffith and Barton believed this brought islanders 
within the scope of the ‘naturalisation and aliens power’ in section 51(xix), whereas Justice 
O’Connor appeared to think the relevant authority in the Constitution was the provision 
intended by Convention delegates to apply to ‘aliens’ in a racial sense, namely section 
51(xxvi) (the ‘races power’).  
Apart from deficiencies in the High Court’s constitutional analysis in Robtelmes, there is also 
the question of conflict of interest. Until the mid-nineteenth century, a direct financial interest 
in a matter being heard was the only basis for judicial disqualification under the common law. 
However in 1866 the Court of Queen’s Bench laid down the rule that ‘wherever there is a real 
likelihood that the judge would, from kindred or any other cause, have a bias in favour of one 
of the parties, it would be very wrong [for] him to act’.973 
In late 1901 Barton, as Australia’s first Prime Minister and O’Connor, as leader of the 
government in the Senate, secured the passage through Parliament of the Pacific Island 
Labourers Bill. Barton told the House of Representatives that: 
This measure… embodies the policy, not merely of the Government, but of all Australia, for the 
preservation of the purity of the race and the equality and reasonableness of its standard of 
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living… I hope to be able to say before this year closes that Australia will have this measure to 
accompany the [Immigration Restriction Bill] which we had in committee yesterday, the two 
together being not merely the realization of a policy, but a handsome new year’s gift for a new 
nation.
974
 
Barton explained to the House how section 8(1) of the Bill, the provision later challenged in 
Robtelmes, would operate, noting that it would: 
…empower an officer, having authority for the purpose, to bring before a justice of the peace 
any Pacific Island labourer found in Australia during that period whom he has reason to 
suppose is not employed under agreement. Upon the justice being satisfied that he is not thus 
employed, and has not been so employed for one month prior to that date, he may be returned 
to the place from which he was originally brought into Australia.
975
 
When Mr Solomon questioned whether the Commonwealth had the power to expel Pacific 
islanders in such a way, Barton replied ‘I think we have the power, and …I will take the risk. 
It is clear that no Pacific Islander ought to be in Queensland after 1906’.976 In Robtelmes 
Barton sat in judgment on the legislation he had introduced, supporting the view he had 
expressed in 1901 that the Commonwealth had the constitutional power to expel Pacific 
islanders from Australia. 
The long standing determination of Sir Samuel Griffith to rid Queensland of Pacific island 
labour has been set out above. As Barton told the House of Representatives when introducing 
the Pacific Island Labourers Act, Griffith declared to the Queensland Parliament in 1884 that 
‘when the time had arrived for the prohibition of black labour, the Government would take 
the responsibility for doing it’.977 In Robtelmes, Chief Justice Griffith returned to - and 
asserted the validity of - the path that he and the colonial government of Queensland had 
followed for over two decades.  
Conclusion: future use of Robtelmes 
The 1911 Commonwealth Census recorded 2,068 ‘full-blood’ and 174 ‘half-caste’ 
‘Polynesians’ resident in Australia. 978 The term ‘Polynesian’ had been used for many years 
to refer, inaccurately, to persons of ethnic Pacific islander origin.979 1,183 of the ‘full-blood’ 
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and 169 of the ‘half-caste’ Polynesians were listed as British subjects  – or over 65 per cent of 
the total.980 In other words, based on the census figures, a high percentage of the Pacific 
islanders remaining in Australia in 1911 were not ‘aliens’ in a legal sense. Since British 
subject status was not a valid ground for claiming an exemption from expulsion under the 
Pacific Island Labourers Act, it could not be argued that the islander community remaining in 
Australia after 1906 included a higher proportion of British subjects than before this date. It is 
valid to conclude, therefore, that in Robtelmes the Australian High Court authorised the 
involuntary expulsion under the ‘aliens’ power in section 51(xix) of the Constitution of many 
Australians of Pacific islander origin who were not ‘aliens’ under the law applying in 
Australia at the time. 
The High Court of Australia’s decision in Robtelmes v Brenan continues to be cited as a 
foundational precedent on the extent of the ‘aliens power’ in section 51(xix) of the 
Constitution, including in significant recent cases such as Ruddock v Vardalis (2001) (the 
Tampa case)981 and Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and 
Citizenship (2013) (the indefinite detention case).982 According to Justice Drummond of the 
Federal Court in Li (2000), citing the High Court in Chu Keng Lim (1992), ‘Robtelmes 
remains good law’.983 Apart from citing the case in support of an expansive use of 
section 51(xix), Australian courts also wrongly endorse the conclusion in Robtelmes that 
‘deportation of kanakas’ generally was within the ‘aliens power’.984 There is no appreciation 
in current Australian case law that many Pacific islanders were beyond this power because 
they were not ‘aliens’ under the law.  
The material in this chapter could therefore be drawn on in future constitutional matters 
involving the aliens power. It could be used to argue that Robtelmes should no longer be seen 
as a precedent but should be identified as a case illustrating the violation of the rule of law. 
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The following two chapters concern misuse of the term ‘alien’ contrary to the law in 
Queensland after federation. They illustrate how the racial meaning of the word was so 
embedded in that State that it became the law, in place of the correct legal meaning. This 
culminated after World War One in numerous prosecutions of ‘coloured aliens’, with little or 
no regard to whether those brought before the courts were British subjects or not.       
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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CHAPTER SIX Alien and dictation test legislation in 
Queensland 
‘In 1881, the British colony of Queensland was home to more migrants from Asia than 
from Europe… Today, that diversity defines Australia almost everywhere except 
Queensland. People born in Asia are the largest ethnic group in the country, 
accounting for 10 per cent of the total population. In New South Wales and Victoria 
they are closer to 12 per cent, and the only mainland state below 6 per cent is 
Queensland’.985 
After federation, the most systematic misuse of the term ‘alien’ occurred in Queensland. The 
State was a major focus of efforts to ensure a ‘White Australia’ through expulsion of Pacific 
islanders and removal of Chinese settlers and other ‘coloured aliens’ from key agricultural 
industries such as dairy, sugar and bananas. Of the various Australian States and territories, it 
was Queensland which enacted the largest number of laws between federation and the 
Second World War restricting participation in the community of those regarded as not 
‘belonging’. Thirty-six laws were approved by the Queensland Parliament in this period 
restricting the access of various groups of people to key aspects of the economic and social 
life of the State.
986
 These laws were predominantly aimed at those considered to be ‘aliens’ in 
the broader non-legal sense, especially people ‘from another race’.  
Since the British Colonial Office had made it clear that high profile laws openly 
discriminating along racial lines would not receive Royal Assent, Queensland chose the 
fiction of an education or dictation test as the main tool of exclusion. This copied the 
approach set out in the Commonwealth’s Immigration Restriction Act, with the explicit 
approval of the Australian Prime Minister. The new Queensland legislation also employed 
the word ‘alien’ as an ostensibly neutral legal term to assist the aim of racial exclusion.  
These new laws were directed towards Chinese Australians, including British subjects, 
categorised by the majority of lawmakers in the Queensland Parliament as ‘aliens’ because 
they did not ‘belong’ in the mainstream society of the day. The reduction in the number of 
persons of Chinese ethnic origin resident in Australia in Commonwealth census records after 
federation has been noted earlier. However, as Barry York has observed: 
The historian’s reliance on census data…conceals the numerical significance of the Chinese 
presence…the annual returns on Chinese persons admitted into Australia during…1921 to 1933 
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inclusive, reveal that 19,344 Chinese admissions took place. In other words, there was 
considerable flux, the coming and going of individuals under special circumstances.
987 
Importantly, as York says, ‘perhaps the figures suggest that the Chinese presence in Australia 
was more substantial during the post-federation White Australia era than is generally 
understood’.988  
Queensland’s alien and dictation test legislation was directed towards the involvement of 
ethnic Chinese in agricultural production. As May identifies, it was not until federation ‘that 
agricultural labour, the main Chinese undertaking, began to engage the attention of 
legislators’.989 In common with much of Australia, agriculture was the mainstay of the 
Queensland economy at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As the 
Secretary for Public Lands explained in 1910 when introducing new legislation to consolidate 
land laws in Queensland: 
We have some of the best wheat areas in Australasia, and the day will come when they are 
largely availed of. Our sugar areas will also be extended; and the same may be said of tobacco; 
and, as for fruit, we hardly know how far that may be developed. The most sanguine of us can 
scarcely picture what may be in the womb of the future. One need only notice the big steamers 
lying at our wharves and the large warehouses being erected at the present time to recognise 
how big an element in our progress are our primary industries. We are not secondary producers; 
we are primary producers, as is evidenced by the bulk of goods produced for export across the 
sea. Our prosperity depends on land settlement…990 
This chapter explains the pressure from the Imperial government leading Queensland to adopt 
the ‘alien’ and dictation test devices in discriminatory legislation. It notes open statements by 
Government ministers that ‘alien’ would be used for racial exclusion, contrary to the law, 
before examining misuse of the term ‘alien’ in legislation for the sugar industry, which was 
critical to Queensland’s economy. It highlights how an Imperial veto on use of the sugar laws 
against European settlers displayed the shallowness of Britain’s concern about 
discrimination. It notes that as well as residents of ethnic Asian origin, ‘swarthy’ Sicilians 
and southern Europeans were labelled as ‘coloured aliens’ in a 1925 Royal Commission on 
the sugar industry. The chapter also examines banana industry laws aimed at excluding 
‘coloured aliens’. Parliamentary debates on these laws reveal racial motives similar to those 
for the colonial era legislation discussed in Chapter Two. Finally this chapter looks at 
exemptions from the alien and dictation test laws confirming the racial basis of the 
legislation, notwithstanding its supposedly neutral wording.  
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Chapter Seven then considers the many prosecutions of ‘coloured aliens’ in north Queensland 
after World War One.  
These two chapters show the contamination of Queensland law with the racial version of 
‘alien’, to the extent that northern Europeans who were legally ‘aliens’ were considered 
beyond the reach of this term, while ethnic Chinese and other non-European inhabitants 
(many of whom were British subjects) were automatically treated as ‘coloured aliens’ 
whether they lawfully came within this phrase or not.  
Imperial oversight 
Queensland used the alien and dictation test mechanisms in legislation as a central device to 
maintain a white-dominated society. In doing so, Queensland lawmakers were concerned 
primarily to avoid rejection by British imperial authorities. Until the 1926 Imperial 
Conference, which established ‘equality of status from a constitutional…as distinct from a 
legal point of view…between Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions’,991 the 
Colonial Office kept watch on behalf of the British Government over the legislation of the 
Australian States.992 All Australian State constitutions gave State governors power to reserve 
bills passed by parliament for the monarch’s personal assent. They also empowered the 
monarch to disallow State Acts assented to by governors within one or two years of their 
enactment.993  
Imperial scrutiny and the possibility that royal assent would be withheld was more of a factor 
in the drafting of colonial and State legislation than some commentators say. In Sawer’s The 
Australian Constitution, Guy Aitken and Robert Orr note that the right of State governors to 
reserve bills for the monarch’s personal assent was not repealed until the Australia Act 1986, 
but state that ‘after 1880, no colonial Act was disallowed, and after 1900 no bill was reserved 
under [this] discretionary power’.994 However, this PhD research has identified that after 
                                                 
991
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federation assent continued to be withheld for openly discriminatory State legislation. Not 
only in 1900 but also in 1904, imperial authorities refused royal assent for Queensland laws 
in the agricultural sector which contained express racial restrictions on the face of the 
statutes.
995
 An earlier version of Queensland’s Sugar Cultivation Act 1913 (Qld) was also 
reserved for royal assent.996  
The Queensland legislation denied royal assent concerned agricultural production, central to 
the local economy and individual advancement within the State, giving it a high profile, not 
least with imperial authorities. Laws with similar racial restrictions in lower profile fields – 
railway regulation, for example – were not rejected.997  
Queensland’s exclusionary legislation had a prominence for the Colonial Office in London 
which is perhaps difficult to appreciate a century or more later. As Marilyn Lake and Henry 
Reynolds explain, the British Government was acutely aware that exclusionary legislation in 
its dominions and colonies was regarded, particularly in Asia, as a statement about the 
relative merits of different races in the world.998 Quick and Garran note that at the 1897 
Jubilee celebrations the assembled Australian Premiers were told by Colonial Secretary 
Joseph Chamberlain that ‘exclusion of all Her Majesty’s Indian subjects, or even of all 
Asiatics, would be so offensive to those people that it would be most painful to Her Majesty 
to sanction it’.999 Royal assent for a number of openly discriminatory immigration restriction 
Acts passed by Australian colonial parliaments was withheld around this time not only ‘out of 
consideration for the feelings of Her Majesty’s Indian subjects’ but also under pressure from 
Japan (which was soon to become, in 1902, a formal ally of Great Britain).1000  
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Quarterly 19, 20. William Pember Reeves noted the acceptance by colonial Premiers of the 
alternative method of exclusion using the education test in the Natal Act. As he said, ‘the Premiers 
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Laws concerning employment in Queensland’s sugar and other agricultural industries 
attracted particular attention.1001 In 1901 Richard O’Connor as leader of the federal 
government in the Senate noted that before federation ‘the Queensland Sugar Works 
Guarantee Act Amendment Bill was reserved, and that, as we all know, provided a direct 
prohibition on the ground of a colour line’. As Senator O’Conner noted, the Imperial 
despatch refusing Royal assent declared that: 
An attempt to impose disqualifications on the base of such distinctions, besides being offensive 
to a friendly power, is contrary to the general conceptions of equality which have been the 
guiding principle of British rule throughout the Empire. Disqualification by educational 
tests…is not a measure to which the Government of Japan or any other Government can take 
exception...
1002 
In 1905 Queensland Premier Arthur Morgan, speaking in the Legislative Assembly, 
presented a short history of the rejection by Imperial authorities of discriminatory Queensland 
legislation. He said the Secretary of State for the Colonies had objected to clause 3 of the 
Agricultural Bank Act Amendment Bill of 1904 (which was similar to a provision in the 
Sugar Works Guarantee Act Amendment Bill) that read ‘No advance under the principal Act 
or this Act shall be made to any aboriginal native of Asia, Africa, or the Pacific Islands’. 
According to the Premier: 
…the Imperial Government hoped that we would see our way to repealing clause 3 and 
substituting for it a provision making all aliens alike, irrespective of race or colour…. a bill was 
already drawn amending clause 3 by making all aliens ineligible for advances.
1003
 
Mr Morgan noted that the Queensland Parliament was considering a new Land Bill which 
disqualified ‘an alien who by lineage belongs to any of the Asiatic, African or Polynesian 
races’ from owning land. He said if this clause was passed in its original form, ‘the inevitable 
result would be that the measure would be reserved for the royal assent’.1004 The Minister for 
Lands, Mr Beal, agreed that ‘the words in the bill - bearing in mind what had happened to 
other enactments - would probably lead to the reservation of the bill for the consideration of 
the Colonial Office authorities’.1005 Mr Beal said that:  
At the present time there was a possibility of Austrian immigrants coming in who were aliens 
and could not under the Federal Government, be naturalised for two years. He proposed to 
allow aliens to select in Queensland, but to bar as far as possible Asiatic aliens, and to do it and 
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carry out the wishes of Parliament he proposed the educational test of the Federal 
authorities.
1006
 
This statement by the Minister for Lands shows an understanding of the legal meaning of 
‘alien’, i.e. someone who was not a British subject. Mr Beal wanted to allow ‘Austrian aliens’ 
to own land in Queensland but to prevent ‘Asiatic aliens’ doing so. Unlike delegates to the 
1890s constitutional conventions and other Australian lawmakers, he did not use the word 
‘alien’ merely as shorthand for any person of non-European race. Instead, as the Minister 
admitted, there were Europeans who were ‘aliens’ and, as Premier Morgan had said, there 
were also ‘aliens’ who were ‘Asiatics’. Since ‘alien’ in its legal sense was a racially neutral 
term, a prohibition could be applied in legislation to ‘all aliens alike, irrespective of race or 
colour’ without offending the ‘general conceptions of equality which have been the guiding 
principle of British rule throughout the Empire’. The prohibition could then be administered 
to exclude only aliens of non-European race without having to state this expressly. For 
example, section 3 of the Advances to Settlers Act 1905 stated that ‘No advance…shall be 
made to any alien’. The 1904 version of this statute had ‘discriminated against certain 
nationalities’ and had been refused royal assent, hence it had been amended so the prohibition 
on advances, at least on the terms of the legislation, applied to ‘aliens’ generally. 1007 
However, as Premier Morgan pointed out in the Queensland Legislative Assembly in 1905, 
legislation with the latter form of words would achieve the original discriminatory aim: 
…exception had been taken by the Imperial Government to a discrimination against Asiatic and 
African aliens and Pacific Islanders in the Agricultural Bank Act Amendment Bill of 1904, and 
a new bill was drafted, and would be submitted to Parliament this session, omitting the 
objectionable feature, but at the same time achieving the original object.1008 
This material helps explain how the British policy against open discrimination in legislation 
encouraged obfuscation about the meaning and application of the term ‘alien’. As 
Queensland discovered, the word could not be used in its correct legal sense together with a 
racial disqualification (for example ‘aliens of Asiatic or African lineage’). So it had to be 
employed on its own with no accompanying reference to race. The prohibition on ‘aliens’ 
was then on its face racially neutral. However it was understood to apply to any ‘non-
European’. Hence British policy inadvertently encouraged greater discrimination since 
Queensland amended bills submitted to Parliament which originally applied only to persons 
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of Asian or African lineage who were also ‘aliens’ (non-subjects) so they applied in their 
final form to ‘aliens’ generally, understood to mean all people of Asian or African origin, 
including those who were British subjects. 
According to Paul Jones, ‘British protests and threats to withhold Royal Assent for bills 
employing racial terminology, evident in the immediate post-federation years, had been 
short-lived’.1009 However, this understates the role of imperial oversight in Queensland’s 
post-federation legislation. Fear of imperial repudiation influenced the drafting of 
Queensland legislation until the late 1920s at least.1010 For legislation supporting key 
agricultural and other primary industries, Queensland found methods of racial exclusion that 
did not contravene the imperial edict against open discrimination. The main legal mechanism 
was the ‘education’ or ‘dictation’ test, suggested by Chamberlain himself to Australian 
Premiers in 18971011 and adopted in the Commonwealth’s Immigration Restriction Act 1901. 
The dictation test was then specifically endorsed by Australia’s Prime Minister for use in 
Queensland’s exclusionary legislation.1012 As Prime Minister Deakin said, this mechanism 
ensured equality of treatment for all imperial subjects ‘only on the surface’ so that ‘in fact, 
and in effect, our colourless laws are administered so as to draw a deep colour line of 
demarcation between Caucasians and all other races’.1013   
Some Queensland laws enacted between federation and the Second World War did prescribe 
a ‘colour line’ in the actual legislation. For example, the Elections Act 1915 (Qld) prohibited 
‘Aboriginal natives of Australia, Asia, Africa or Islands of the Pacific’ from voting in 
elections for the Queensland Legislative Assembly.1014 There was a similar exclusion in the 
City of Brisbane Act 1924 (Qld) in relation to the entitlement to vote for the Brisbane City 
Council.1015 Openly discriminatory Queensland legislation from the colonial era also 
remained on the statute books, being replaced only in some cases by an education or dictation 
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test.1016 But in relation to the key employment and money-making agricultural industries, the 
prohibitions and exclusions enacted by the Queensland Parliament after federation were 
primarily imposed through the mechanism of the dictation test.  
The term ‘alien’ was an important device used in Queensland legislation in conjunction with 
the education or dictation test to avoid imperial rejection. The dual meaning of ‘alien’ 
increased its value as an exclusionary language tool. Employed in a legal context, the term 
‘alien’ could be presented, like the dictation test, as racially neutral and hence consistent with 
imperial policy. As debates in the Queensland Parliament and prosecutions under various 
Queensland laws show, however, the word was understood both by lawmakers and those 
administering the legislation as a reference to non-Europeans, not least settlers of Chinese 
ethnic origin. While deferring to imperial authorities when drafting the legislation, therefore, 
Queensland lawmakers targeted the laws at ‘aliens’ in a racial sense, purposely closing their 
eyes to centuries of established law on use of this term.   
Alien and dictation test laws 
The Queensland Parliament passed eighteen Acts between 1910 and 1938 prohibiting 
involvement in an industry or occupation - or access to land and finance - without a 
certificate showing that a person was able to read and write from dictation not less than fifty 
words in any language determined by the relevant Minister or head of the particular 
organisation. These laws were aimed in particular at excluding Chinese settlers from 
opportunities to earn money in key agricultural industries. Penalties could be severe: growing 
sugar cane or bananas without a certificate, for example, incurred a £100 fine (a huge sum for 
the time) plus confiscation of the entire crop.1017 
The Land Act 1910 (Qld) prohibited ‘aliens’ from owning land in Queensland unless they had 
first passed a dictation test in any language that the Secretary for Agriculture might 
specify.1018 Whatever the proper legal meaning of ‘alien’ for the purpose of the Act, members 
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of the Queensland Parliament were in no doubt who the law should be directed against. As 
one member of the Legislative Assembly declared in 1910: 
The colour line should be drawn in regard to anyone taking up land in Queensland…We want 
our own British subjects…and we will welcome all Scandinavians and all Europeans to take up 
land, but what we object to is the bringing in of Asiatics, Japanese and Chinese. We do not 
want these people here - we want men who are up to the standard of white living…I have 
travelled through most of northern Europe, and I know that their conditions of life are far 
higher and of far more benefit to the general community than is the case in connection with any 
of the Asiatic races. Therefore the languages [for the dictation test] should be designated with 
strict reference to the colour line.
1019
  
The Land Act was followed by the Leases to Aliens Restriction Act 1912 (Qld), preventing 
any ‘alien’ leasing a parcel of land greater than 5 acres without first passing a dictation test in 
any language the Secretary for Public Lands might direct.1020 This was enacted because of a 
belief that Chinese ‘aliens’ had circumvented the prohibition on land ownership through 
leasing arrangements with white property owners. As May explains, the Act ‘was a direct 
result of agitation against the leasing of land to Chinese at Atherton’ (in north 
Queensland).1021  According to future Premier E.G. Theodore: 
The leasing of land to aliens in North Queensland has been a very great evil…It amounts 
almost to a public scandal – the number of Chinese who occupied land in that district to the 
exclusion of white people.1022 
The Attorney-General claimed there were several places in northern Queensland where this 
had happened, for example at Freshwater near Cairns: 
…where about 5,000 acres had been leased to Chinese, who went in for growing bananas, rice, 
and maize. They exhausted the fertility of the soil, and now the place was a wilderness. Then, 
there was Green Hills, a very rich estate, near Cairns, where the same thing had happened…The 
result was that a very considerable quantity of fertile land had got into the hands of aliens, who 
had not cultivated the land, but had robbed it of its fertility, and the land had been abandoned, 
and was now overgrown with weeds.1023 
Some of the Queensland legislation prohibited ‘aliens’ from involvement in an industry or 
occupation without having passed a dictation test;
1024
 other statutes excluded all ‘persons’ 
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who had not passed the test.
1025
 These terms appear to have been used interchangeably in the 
various statutes,1026 with no particular date signalling a change from one to the other, 
although ‘persons’ became more common in the later post-World War One legislation.1027 
The legislation making it unlawful for ‘aliens’ to participate in an industry or occupation 
without passing a dictation test contained no definition of ‘alien’.1028 As a matter of statutory 
interpretation this meant that the common law meaning of ‘alien’ - a citizen or subject of a 
foreign state - should apply, including in any court proceedings where this might be in issue. 
In practice, by not specifically restricting the application of the dictation test legislation to 
non-British subjects, the legislation allowed those administering the laws to apply the more 
common, broader meaning of the term - i.e. those who did not ‘belong’, particularly those 
‘from another race’ - in deciding which people should be required to pass a dictation test.  
None of the dictation test legislation, with one exception, specifically imposed a ‘colour line’ 
in the statute itself.1029 Whatever their actual intention, the terms of the statutes appeared to 
treat all ‘aliens’ or ‘persons’ equally, thus satisfying the demands of the Colonial Office to 
avoid open offence to non-European powers. This caused lively debate in the Queensland 
Parliament about who the legislation was really directed at. In 1913 a member of the 
Legislative Council observed that the Sugar Cultivation Bill ‘was certainly very drastic, and 
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would mean that no farmer in Queensland could grow so much as a half-acre of cane for his 
dairy cattle without being liable to be called upon to submit to a language test’.1030 The 
Attorney-General, however, noted that the new law:  
…had been submitted confidentially to the Federal Prime Minister, who had approved of its 
present terms …The wide scope of the Bill had been fully recognised, but it was necessary, in 
order to secure the Royal assent, that there should be no discrimination against any race or 
colour.
1031
 
As with its use in the federal Immigration Restriction Act 1901, the dictation test mechanism 
allowed the Queensland Government to assert that the relevant legislation contained no 
discrimination on its face. In 1910, the Queensland Attorney-General explained the 
importance of adopting such a measure. The intention of the dictation test clause, he said: 
…was only to exclude Asiatic or African aliens, but not to exclude others …a bill which was 
passed a few years ago differentiating against Asiatic aliens so as to exclude Japanese was 
refused the Royal assent.1032  
As the Townsville Daily Bulletin observed in 1912: 
Under the provisions of the Sugar Works Act (1911) Aliens are debarred from growing cane for 
the New Central Mills and if the much debated Liquor Bill be passed by the Denham 
Government in April, the Aliens will (to use a vulgarism) be fired out of the Hotels. These 
expulsions will be worked by that cunningly contrived trap the “Education test”: and the same 
will also be applied to future Alien lessees.
1033
  
A mere façade of non-discrimination seemed sufficient to satisfy the Colonial Office. While 
the dictation test laws did not exclude non-Europeans directly, there was little attempt beyond 
this to disguise the aim of the legislation. The long title of the Sugar Cultivation Act 1913 
stated that the purpose of the new law was ‘to prohibit the employment of certain forms of 
labour in the production of sugar’. As Professor of Public Law at the University of 
Melbourne, K.H. Bailey, later Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth,1034 explained in 1937 
in an article entitled ‘The Legal Position of Foreigners in Australia’:  
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The dictation test is clearly traceable to the Commonwealth Immigration Acts, and it is 
understood that, though general in form, the Queensland legislation was in fact directed against 
the employment of coloured labour…(T)he legal discriminations against resident aliens in 
Australia are really the corollary of the immigration policy of the Commonwealth. And it is this 
which, of course, explains the fact that most of the restrictions operate specifically, in fact if not 
in form, against Asiatic labourers.1035 
The discrimination was justified, according to Bailey, in order to protect the labour 
conditions of white workers: 
Most of the disabilities of aliens in Australia … are devised to preserve Australian wage 
standards, and to prevent Australians being driven out of certain avenues of employment by the 
competition of people who would undercut them if not prevented. The discriminations against 
aliens are scarcely the product of a systematic and general policy of attrition directed against 
the alien population, and more particularly the Asiatic part of it. The protection afforded to 
Australian labour has resulted (as is indeed suggested irresistibly by an examination of the 
haphazard patchwork of disabilities already discussed) simply from the urgent pressure of local 
interests. 
1036
  
Professor Bailey’s choice of language when writing an article on the legal position of certain 
people in Australia is interesting in itself. While he recognised that the ‘Asiatic part’ was only 
one element of the ‘alien population’ in the country, it is unclear whether in his view the 
other parts included non-British subjects of European origin or merely other coloured 
Australian residents of various backgrounds besides Asian. What these statements do 
indicate, however, is that despite the article’s pretensions as an authoritative analysis from an 
eminent legal figure, Professor Bailey automatically categorised ‘Asiatic labourers’ as 
‘resident aliens’ with no recognition that some of these workers were in fact British subjects 
and not aliens as a matter of law. In other words,  Professor Bailey did not consider the 
significance of their actual legal or constitutional status. 
Professor Bailey’s observations indicate the important role of Queensland’s alien and 
dictation test laws as part of the domestic arm of the White Australia policy. However 
Professor Bailey downplayed the significance of these laws: 
It is believed, however, that some at least of the Acts are not really being enforced, and are 
retained in the statute book not so much for the sake of the policy they embody, as because they 
afford a means of dealing with troublesome cases.1037 
This statement belies the importance to Queensland of this legislation. Contrary to Professor 
Bailey’s view, the alien and dictation test laws were ‘the product of a systematic and general 
policy of attrition’, directed in particular against Chinese Australians, and they were 
enforced. Backed by prosecutions in the Queensland court system (see Chapter Seven), the 
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laws imposed a significant barrier against non-European participation in key industries and 
occupations in the State.  
The enactment of the Miner’s Homestead Leases Act 1913 shows the success of the ‘neutral’ 
dictation test and ‘alien’ formula in gaining royal assent for discriminatory legislation. Under 
this Act, ‘homestead leases’ (granted to encourage permanent residency on goldfields and 
other places of mineral prospecting)1038 could not be granted to an ‘alien’ who had not passed 
the dictation test.  As the Worker reported in 1914:  
A despatch has been received by the Government notifying that the King has been advised not 
to exercise his power of disallowance with regard to the two Acts passed last session to deal 
with miners’ homesteads. When the original Act was passed some question arose regarding the 
provision relating to aliens and an Amending bill was at once submitted so as to remove any 
likelihood of the bill being disallowed by his Majesty on the ground that it contravened the 
terms of the existing treaties and regulations.
1039 
Open manipulation of the law 
While accepting the need, in deference to the sensibilities of the imperial authorities, to avoid 
a specific ‘colour line’ in the actual legislation, the Queensland Government openly stated the 
racial basis of the alien and dictation test laws. In 1921 the Secretary for Agriculture declared 
(in relation to new banana industry legislation) that ‘white men…will be exempt’ from the 
test.1040 As one of the Minister’s parliamentary colleagues said, only ‘Asiatics or persons of 
Polynesian origin’ would be excluded through the dictation test mechanism.1041 Consistent 
with the Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act, the Queensland dictation test would 
not be applied to people of European race.    
In response to objections that the Leases to Aliens Restriction Bill applied on its face to 
European as well as non-European ‘aliens’, the Secretary for Public Lands explained the 
constraints imposed by the British Colonial Office. While the terms of the legislation 
indicated that all ‘aliens’ in a legal sense would have to pass a dictation test, in fact people of 
European descent who had yet to become British subjects would not be targeted. But the 
exemption for European settlers could not be stated in the legislation itself: 
We cannot legislate for a particular set of aliens. If we attempt to do so, assent to the Bill will 
probably be withheld. We have therefore to deal comprehensively with the subject of aliens, 
making no distinction against any particular race. There are persons in the community who 
come under the description, persons of European descent who have not obtained letters of 
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naturalisation, and until they do obtain letters of naturalisation they remain aliens. It would not 
be suggested that it would be an improper thing to grant a lease or enter into an agreement with 
those particular aliens.1042 
In this instance, the Minister responsible for the new legislation endorsed the use of ‘alien’ in 
the Leases to Aliens Restriction Act as an exclusionary language tool contrary to the rule of 
law. The Secretary for Public Lands clearly understood the legal meaning of ‘alien’ and that 
this status was not determined by the race or colour of the individual. As his comments 
indicate, however, the Queensland Government was not concerned with a proper legal 
interpretation of the new provisions. Instead, it intended the legislation to be applied on a 
racial basis contrary to the law under the pretence of being non-discriminatory. 
The member for Fassifern, Mr Wienholdt, was re-assured by the explanation of the Minister 
that the new law would not apply to ‘desirable aliens’ such as German settlers: 
I do not believe at all in aliens, undesirable aliens, being allowed to come into the country…But 
it seems to me that there is just a possibility that a German may come out here and get a lease 
of a small area…(and when a) new owner comes into possession, that man may be told to clear 
out, because, according to this measure, that agreement is null and void…That is all right so far 
as the Minister is concerned. He is not going to prosecute anyone who is a desirable alien.1043 
There had been a longstanding view in Queensland that settlers from Europe – especially 
those from northern Europe – should immediately be accepted as full members of the 
community. As Queensland Attorney-General Byrnes said during the debate on the Aliens 
Naturalisation Bill at the 1897 Federal Council of Australasia in Hobart:  
We encourage the inoffensive, hard-working Scandinavians and Germans, who take up and 
settle on the Crown lands of the colony, to become British subjects. So we could not possibly 
take up a law which said they must be there three years before they were naturalised.
1044
 
In Queensland’s Legislative Assembly in 1910, Mr Mann, the member for Cairns, objected to 
the ostensibly non-discriminatory nature of the proposed dictation test in the Land Bill, 
reminding members of his alternative proposal: 
...under this clause a German, a Frenchman, or a Dane must come in under it. My amendment 
only precluded undesirable aliens - natives of Asia, Africa or Polynesia. This clause puts all 
aliens on the same footing…I prefer myself to discriminate against undesirable aliens, but I 
believe in allowing Germans and other Europeans to take up land without let or hindrance. I 
have no objection to them taking up land as long as they become naturalised subjects.1045 
Labor’s Mr O’Sullivan was also concerned that on its face the legislation appeared to apply 
to all those who were aliens in a legal sense, including settlers from Europe: 
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They ought to take a lesson from what they saw as taking place in California in connection with 
the Japanese and Asiatics and guard against such a thing as that happening in 
Queensland…They should do something to enable the white aliens from Northern Europe to 
become full citizens and have the full rights of taking up land.1046  
As the member for Moreton, Mr Forsyth, said, ‘it would be a very great hardship for men 
coming from European countries, who are not aliens in the general acceptance of the term, if 
they were not allowed to take up land’.1047  
Queensland’s Attorney-General at the time of the Leases to Aliens Restriction Bill, Thomas 
O’Sullivan, while not using the language of ‘desirable’ versus ‘undesirable’ aliens, advocated 
exactly this type of distinction for the legislation. Parliamentary records show that the 
Attorney-General appreciated the legal significance of naturalisation and understood the 
formal legal concept of ‘alien’. They also show, however, that like his colleagues he believed 
non-Europeans were ‘aliens’ in a racial sense and that this racial meaning should be used in 
place of the legal meaning in Queensland’s dictation test legislation.  
In reciting the alleged abuses of agricultural land which Chinese settlers were supposedly 
responsible for (and which were the declared motive behind the Leases to Aliens Restriction 
Bill) the Attorney-General, like other members of parliament, used the words ‘aliens’ and 
‘Chinese’ interchangeably. The Attorney-General noted that he: 
…was informed that the Chinese had not troubled to cultivate the land. They did not use the 
plough, but simply cultivated with the hoe…As far as sugar-growing was concerned, prior to 
the passage of the Commonwealth excise and bonus legislation, aliens were able to compete 
with white men, who were very seriously handicapped, and, if the Federal Parliament should 
remove the excise and bonus there would not be sufficient protection for white men, and the 
same thing would happen again.
1048
 
In response to concerns about the fate of naturalised Chinese Australians under the Leases to 
Aliens Restriction Bill, the Attorney-General said that a person was ‘not an alien if he is 
naturalised.’1049 But he rejected a call to amend the legislation to exempt naturalised Chinese 
residents from the dictation test, stating that he ‘could not accept an amendment, because it 
would open the door to evasion, as it would be very hard to prove identity, although 
personally he had no objection to such an amendment’.1050 This shows that while the 
Attorney-General understood the legal significance of naturalisation, he thought it was not a 
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workable test of whether a person was an ‘alien’ for the purpose of the new law. As noted 
earlier in this thesis, a recurring theme in colonial and post-federation Australia was a 
mistrust of the ‘naturalised’ non-European. The Attorney-General suggested that if 
naturalised persons were exempt from the dictation test, Chinese settlers might pass 
themselves off as a naturalised relative or friend. In other words, contrary to the law, 
naturalisation as a British subject was not regarded, even by Queensland’s first law officer, as 
having any effect on whether Chinese and other non-Europeans should be treated as ‘aliens’ 
under the dictation test legislation. Instead, government authorities would use racial 
appearance not legal status to distinguish ‘aliens’ from ‘non-aliens’. 
The belief that non-Europeans could do nothing to change their ‘alien’ status was perhaps 
best expressed by the Hon C.S. McGhie in the debate on the Leases to Aliens Restriction Bill. 
Mr McGhie understood that a person naturalised under Australian law had formally gained 
nationality of the state and was legally a British subject, observing that if a Chinese settler 
had been ‘naturalised, he is in as good a position as you or I’.1051 But having successfully 
gone through the naturalisation process made no difference to Mr McGhie in relation to how 
Chinese Australians should be regarded under Queensland legislation. When Mr Gray called 
for naturalised Chinese to be excluded from the operation of the Bill, Mr McGhie retorted 
bluntly, ‘You can never make a Britisher of a Chinaman’.1052  
Even for leading legal figures such as the Attorney-General whose business it was to 
understand the legal definition of ‘alien’ and how people could (theoretically) move beyond 
this term, the prohibition in the legislation on the leasing of land over 5 acres to ‘aliens’ was 
directed not at aliens in the correct legal sense but at those regarded by Queensland society as 
‘aliens’ in the ordinary, non-legal or racial meaning of word, namely any people with an 
Asiatic or other non-European background, especially Chinese migrants to Australia. 
The statements by the Secretary for Public Lands and the Attorney-General demonstrate how 
ethnic appearance was used instead of the law to determine who would be prohibited as 
‘aliens’ from owning or leasing land. This identifies clearly how senior ministers in the 
Queensland government had no hesitation in discarding or ignoring the law for the purpose of 
racial exclusion.  
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Aliens, the dictation test and sugar  
The sugar industry was a particular focus of Queensland’s alien and dictation test legislation. 
The new State laws were a practical consequence of the federal White Australia policy. The 
deportation of Pacific islanders under the Commonwealth’s Pacific Island Labourers Act 
threatened the supply of cheap coloured labour for the industry. Queensland Premier Philp 
warned Prime Minister Barton in 1901 that this might ‘entirely destroy the sugar industry’ in 
the State.1053 The Commonwealth subsequently imposed an excise on sugar manufacturers to 
allow a rebate or bounty to be paid to cultivators of ‘white-grown’ sugar.1054 As Evans, 
Saunders and Cronin note, this ‘provided a bounty payment to planters employing European 
labourers, and thus made it too expensive for them to take on coloured workers’.1055 
According to May, the effect on Chinese Australians was twofold: 
By subsidising the employment of white labour, [Commonwealth bounty laws] directly 
discouraged Europeans from employing Chinese. Secondly, as growers were themselves 
classified as labour used in sugar production, Chinese growers were automatically debarred 
from receiving the rebate. However the Acts were not a complete deterrent to the employment 
of Chinese, as indicated by the substantial number of Chinese who took up sugar work after the 
banana industry declined.
1056
  
In 1910 Dr Walter Maxwell, director of government policy for the Queensland sugar 
industry, reported that the excise and bounty system ‘had almost exactly reversed the 
situation as between the relative amounts of sugar produced by white and coloured labour 
respectively’, from over 85 per cent grown by coloured labour in 1902 to almost 88 per cent 
grown by white labour in 1908.1057 Nevertheless, he said: 
Notwithstanding the increase of bounty on white-grown sugar, and notwithstanding the 
deportation of all able-bodied kanakas, a very considerable proportion of all Australian grown 
sugar is still being produced by coloured labour. Queensland still produces over 10 per cent of 
its sugar by alien labour...1058 
As this statement indicates, by ‘alien labour’ Dr Maxwell meant simply ‘non-European’. 
Queensland cane-growers and mill-owners had earlier warned that ‘considerable areas of land 
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in tropical Queensland are already passing into the occupation of Chinese and other Asiatics 
for the purpose of sugar-growing’ and that ‘the whole of the tropical portion of Australia will 
eventually pass into the hands of Asiatics’.1059 
Sugar growers were unhappy with the bounty for employing white workers because it was 
less than the excise extracted from them.1060 In 1911 a Royal Commission into the sugar 
industry appointed by the Commonwealth Government recommended that: 
…the bounty and excise be abolished provided that the Commonwealth Government, by co-
operation with the States or otherwise, take whatever steps may be necessary to promote the 
white labour policy and to ensure the maintenance of a living wage in the sugar industry 
generally.
1061
 
As Alan Birch states, ‘the way was open for the total banning of “coloured” sugar and this 
was to be legislated by the Queensland parliament’.1062 The Townsville Daily Bulletin noted 
that the Queensland Premier had already told the Commonwealth Government that ‘if the 
Excise and Bounty Act were repealed he would be prepared to submit legislation for the 
exclusion of coloured labour’.1063 Consequently the Queensland Parliament introduced new 
laws to exclude non-white labour from the sugar industry. Under the heading ‘Alien labour on 
sugar works’, the Sugar Works Act 1911 prohibited ‘any person…who has not passed a 
dictation test in English’ from employment in or in relation to any sugar works managed or 
worked under the Act.1064 The Sugar Cultivation Act 1913 likewise prohibited ‘any person 
who has not first obtained…a certificate of having passed the dictation test in any language 
directed by the Secretary for Agriculture’ from cultivating or being employed in, or in 
connection with, the cultivation or manufacture of sugar cane.1065 As the Bulletin commented, 
however: 
The object of this Act was to shut out certain coloured labour or aliens as might be required, or 
to prevent such persons from owning or cultivating land for sugar-growing - all this in 
furtherance of the growing of cane by white labour.
1066
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According to Birch, the Sugar Cultivation Act ‘imposed a dictation test and persons of 
European descent were, of course, exempt from this’.1067  
When a member of the Queensland Legislative Assembly suggested that ‘naturalised aliens’ 
should be exempt from the Sugar Cultivation Act, the Attorney-General replied, 
disingenuously, that the dictation test would apply ‘to every one of any race or colour’, even 
‘natural born subjects’, and in particular that it would apply ‘no more to Chinese than to 
white men’.1068 However, as Rockhampton’s Morning Bulletin reported, the Act ‘was drafted 
with the express object of making the sugar industry one in which only white people could 
engage’. In tabling the legislation: 
…the Premier was fulfilling an agreement with the late Prime Minister of the Commonwealth-
that in return for legislation which would comply with the wishes of the canegrowers on the 
excise and bounty question, the State Parliament would make every provision humanly possible 
to prevent the employment of coloured labour in the industry… The Sugar Cultivation 
Bill…totally excludes coloured people from being employed in either the cultivation or the 
manufacture of sugar in Queensland. It thus ensures that both farming and milling shall be 
white man’s work and heavy penalties are provided for any infringement of the Act. The   
coloured alien who has been growing sugar is to be retired from this branch of agriculture.1069 
The paper noted that the Government  used the ‘education test’ mechanism to remove ‘alien 
Asiatic’ labour from the sugar industry to ensure Royal assent for the legislation: 
…some members of the Labour party tried to resurrect the old black labour cry: the bill did not 
expressly declare that no coloured person could engage in the industry; and after all what good 
was the education test? In moving the second reading of the bill Mr. Blair had given a full 
explanation of the reason for the education test. If specific disqualification of coloured labour 
such as Hindoo or alien Asiatic were mentioned there was danger that the bill would not 
receive the Royal assent. The dictation test had been sanctioned by the Imperial authorities in 
connection with the Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act, and that was the safest plan 
to follow in order to make certain that no trouble would be experienced in obtaining the 
signature of His Majesty’s representative.1070  
Representatives of white workers had little faith that the legislation would achieve its aim of 
excluding ‘coloured aliens’ from the sugar industry. When the new law was enacted, the 
Worker published the report of one union organiser: 
During my travels I have noticed the C.S.R. Co. dearly loves the coloured alien. One day I met 
five Chinamen working on the tramline near the Hambledon mill, at the same time the 
Company is employing a number of coloured aliens in the mill. Dictation tests, equal pay for 
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coloured aliens, will not get rid of them, for their [sic] can be no doubt that the Company dearly 
loves the coloured person.
1071 
The Attorney-General’s assertion that the dictation test for the sugar industry would apply to 
everyone regardless of race was refuted in a 1915 letter to the Cairns Post from a writer 
claiming to be ‘in close touch with the inside working of this whole business’ with ‘inside 
and absolutely reliable sources’ within the Government. The writer said it was his ‘duty to 
give a word of warning to those who contemplate using coloured alien labour in the 
cultivation, harvestings, or other handling of their cane crops’. He observed that the Sugar 
Cultivation Act provided for: 
…the dictation test in the Immigration Restriction Act applied in a new field for an identical 
purpose, the exclusion of coloured aliens without the necessity of hurting the susceptibilities of 
the nations to which those ‘aliens’ belong.1072  
As the writer observed, because the Act did not expressly prohibit coloured people from 
engaging in the sugar industry: 
…it is true that under the sweeping power which the Government is assuming it could, if it so 
chose, debar sugar produced from cane handled solely by European labour… but the whole 
world knew the avowed object of the clause which was to prevent aliens of certain nationality 
immigrating to Queensland, and it was the general knowledge that the test would be applied 
only to such undesired immigrants that had the effect required. If the Government used its 
powers to prevent desirable immigrants arriving here there would be such an uproar as would 
result either in a loss of that power or a stoppage of its misuse.
1073
 
In the 1920s when there was opposition to an influx of Italian workers on Queensland sugar 
farms, Mr Swayne proposed in the Legislative Assembly that: 
…if the Government objected to the presence of Italians or desired that Italians should not be 
allowed to enter Queensland, they had the power in their own hands under the Sugar 
Cultivation Act, which gave the Queensland Government power to apply a dictation test to 
everyone irrespective of colour engaged in the sugar industry.
1074
       
However the suggestion that the Sugar Cultivation Act could be used to exclude white 
Europeans from the sugar industry met a robust response from Premier William McCormack 
who said this would be contrary to an explicit agreement with the Imperial Government: 
The Premier said he rose to nail a second lie. That bill was reserved for the Royal assent, and as 
it was not allowed by the British Government until the [conservative Denham government] 
gave an undertaking that it would not be applied against Italians and other Europeans, the 
suggestion that the act in question could be applied to European nationals without the consent 
of the British Government was false. Did Mr. Swayne urge that they should exclude European 
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nationals from the sugar industry? Did he suggest that the Government should break an 
undertaking with the British Government and exclude Italians?
 1075
     
Premier McCormack’s statement raises a significant issue. It indicates that the Sugar 
Cultivation Act enacted in 1913 was originally reserved for royal assent, which was only 
given when the Queensland Government gave the undertaking referred to, namely that the 
dictation test would not be used to exclude ‘Italians or other Europeans’. This shows the 
superficial nature of Britain’s concern for non-discrimination. At the insistence of the 
Colonial Office, Queensland used the supposedly neutral mechanism of the education or 
dictation test in the Sugar Cultivation Act, applying this on the terms of the legislation only to 
‘aliens’ or ‘persons’ so there was no discrimination on the face of the law. At the same time, 
according to Premier McCormack, Britain refused to give assent to the legislation unless the 
Queensland Government gave an assurance that the test would not be applied to people of 
European race. In other words, imperial authorities insisted on non-discriminatory language 
on the face of the statute, otherwise royal assent would be refused, while requiring racist 
implementation of the legislation contrary to the law.   
More generally, the above discussion illustrates how pervasive the expression ‘coloured 
aliens’ had become in early twentieth century Queensland. The phrase was a derogatory label 
for non-European inhabitants, appearing in union reports on the sugar industry and ‘insider’ 
accounts of State Government policies. To meet the federal government’s condition for 
removal of the bounty and excise regime without offending imperial authorities, Queensland 
borrowed the Commonwealth’s education or dictation test mechanism, using this to exclude 
‘coloured aliens’ from the sugar industry at odds with the neutral language of the enabling 
legislation.  
This targeting of ‘coloured aliens’ under the sugar industry statutes provides further evidence 
of Queensland’s manipulation of the law during this period for the purpose of racial 
exclusion.  Chapter Seven sets out how these statutes were enforced through a range of 
prosecutions of ‘coloured aliens’ across north Queensland, with little attention to whether 
those brought before the courts were ‘aliens’ under the law.  
‘Foreigners’, sugar and aliens 
As further examples from Queensland show, while non-Europeans were regarded by the 
dominant Anglo-Celtic society as ‘aliens’ because of their race and white European settlers 
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were in general automatically accepted as ‘non-aliens’, there was not a strict nor absolute 
boundary on application of the term ‘alien’ in its non-legal, racial sense when used to refer to 
people who were ‘not one of us’.  
In 1920 the Australian Workers Union described workers of Asian origin as ‘aliens’ and 
those from southern Europe as ‘foreigners’ when giving evidence on the ‘alien labour 
question’ before Queensland’s Court of Industrial Arbitration. The AWU representative in 
North Queensland, Mr Morrissey said the amended Sugar Field and Sugar Mill Workers and 
Cooks Award:   
…had not had the effect of diminishing the numerical strength of the coloured sugar workers, 
who were principally Hindoos, Chinese, Japanese, Javanese, Malays, and kanakas. He 
estimated there were 600 Hindoos, and perhaps 1000 Chinese... Land was being leased to 
coloured aliens, and coloured aliens were employed in many instances because they would 
give their services for less than the award rates, and were content with indifferent living 
conditions...Inversely there were a number of white British labourers who were compelled to 
accept police rations in order to live. In the Babina, South Johnstone, and Herbert River 
districts cane cutting was performed by labour of which 75 per cent was foreign, an element 
composed of Spaniards, Greeks, Russians, and Maltese.
1076
  
In terms of the general, non-legal use of these terms, there was an imprecise and not 
necessarily consistent geographic border or cut off point between white ‘foreigners’ and 
coloured ‘aliens’.1077 The dividing line was around the middle of the Italian peninsula. Once 
the threat from the Chinese had been dealt with, primarily through the dictation test 
legislation, the ‘alien’ language tool was used against the next group of arrivals who 
threatened ‘white’ interests in the North Queensland sugar industry, namely non-Aryan 
‘southern Europeans’.  
The arrival of labourers from southern Italy and Greece in 1924 and 1925 caused particular 
concern for white labour representatives. As with the Chinese, the new arrivals were seen as a 
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threat to the employment and labour conditions of white workers. The Brisbane Courier 
reported in 1925 that:  
Representatives of the Australian Workers’ Union have called on the Premier and urged upon 
him the need for State action in respect of the large arrivals in the North of Southern 
Europeans. They maintained that the arrival of hundreds of aliens in the North would mean 
starvation and misery either for them or for those whose employment they would take.
1078
 
Premier Gillies said he had already telegraphed the Prime Minister warning that ‘serious 
industrial trouble may eventuate in the sugar industry in the coming season’ unless the 
Commonwealth Government took action ‘to check or regulate the flow of aliens to North 
Queensland’. Gillies said there had been a ‘recent great increase in the number of alien 
migrants arriving in North Queensland’ who had been ‘sent out against the advice of local 
Italians’ and that he would make a ‘public protest against the introduction of any further 
batches of Southern Europeans’. In addition, a Royal Commission would be ‘appointed 
forthwith to inquire into the whole question of alien migration to North Queensland, and its 
social and economic effects’.1079 In June 1925 the Royal Commissioner, former magistrate 
T.A. Ferry (with experience in prosecuting ‘coloured aliens’ in the sugar industry)  1080 
reported that over the previous three and a half years the migration to Australia of Italians and 
Greeks ‘had been greater than at any period during the last 40 years’. He noted that: 
The population of Italy however, was divided into two distinct groups - the Northern and the 
Southern Italians. The latter are shorter in stature and more swarthy. In Southern Italy the 
wages of all classes were very low and living conditions harder than in the North and, 
consequently, there was a greater desire to emigrate.
1081
  
Commissioner Ferry ‘emphasised the point that, unfortunately, the majority of the new 
arrivals in Queensland happened to be of the Southern Italian and Mediterranean type, many 
of them being Sicilians’. As the Brisbane Courier said (under the headline ‘Aliens in the 
North. Are they a Menace?’), ‘the point was stressed that the present alien influx was largely 
Sicilian - not of the desirable class of Northern Italian, who had participated in the 
development of the sugar industry’.1082 In relation to Greek settlers, Mr Ferry noted that: 
Whether as employer or employee, the Greek as seen in North Queensland was equally 
undesirable. Evidence was furnished that constant complaints were being received from girls 
employed in Greek restaurants of improper suggestions having been made to them by their 
employers, and that this was frequently the cause of them having to leave their employment.1083  
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Commissioner Ferry concluded that ‘the immediate effect of the present rapid increase in the 
number of aliens in North Queensland was the creation of an anti-foreign feeling that was 
likely to increase in intensity if such migration was not controlled or regulated’.1084  
Therefore, in addition to Asian, African and Pacific islander settlers, ‘non-white’ southern 
Europeans were also denigrated as ‘aliens’ by Anglo-Celtic society. This was part of the 
attempt to exclude them from the economic and other benefits of full membership in post-
federation Australia. Yet, and importantly, unlike Chinese, Indian and Pacific islander settlers 
from British colonies and dominions, most southern Europeans, including Italians and 
Greeks, were ‘aliens’ under the law applying  in Australia at the time. The exception were 
settlers from Malta, which was a British colony from 1800 to 1964. Along with Sicilians and 
Greeks, Maltese settlers in North Queensland, despite their legal status as British subjects, 
were also a focus of the 1925 Royal Commission into ‘alien’ migration.1085  
Bananas and aliens 
Apart from sugar production, Queensland’s banana industry was also a particular target of the 
State’s alien and dictation test legislation. While not as significant as the sugar industry, 
banana production was nevertheless important for the Queensland economy.1086 Especially in 
north Queensland it was a crucial source of employment and income for a number of decades. 
According to historian Cathie May, at the end of the nineteenth century the banana trade was 
‘essential to the general prosperity of Cairns and Innisfail’. In some years the value of banana 
exports from north Queensland actually exceeded that of sugar.1087  
In 1921 the Queensland Government, dissatisfied with indirect measures for excluding non-
Europeans from the banana industry by restricting access to land, introduced the Banana 
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Industry Preservation Act 1921. This prohibited any ‘person’ from carrying on or being 
employed in the cultivation of bananas unless they had first passed a dictation test in any 
language that the Secretary for Agriculture might direct.
1088
 In May’s view, while the Banana 
Industry Preservation Act affected north Queensland, it ‘was actually an attempt to halt the 
movement of Chinese growers into Southern Queensland’.1089 Despite the neutral language of 
the statute,1090 Queensland lawmakers again made it plain who the legislation was aimed at. 
As one parliamentarian said: 
The Chinamen … are trying to make the industry a Chinese industry, and consequently we look 
on them as a far greater menace…We do not want those people there. We want a white man’s 
industry and we stand for a white Australia.
1091
 
Observing that it was his party that ‘first started the White Australia cry’, a Labor member 
expressed the hope that ‘one of the immediate effects of the Bill will be a stimulation of the 
banana industry and the total elimination of the coloured alien’.1092 Another member agreed 
that the legislation addressed ‘a very pronounced danger – coloured aliens growing 
bananas’.1093 The aim of the new law, therefore, was to make the banana industry ‘safe for 
white men – for co-operators…We are going to work the industry on a co-operative basis, 
and we are going to deal with the coloured aliens’.1094  
The attitudes expressed by Queensland parliamentarians during the banana industry debates 
reflect the racial prejudice inherent in the White Australia era. Moreover, as in colonial 
Australia, a bigoted view of Chinese Australians (and other non-Europeans) affected 
perceptions of their legal standing. According to one member of the Queensland Legislative 
Assembly, speaking in 1911:  
…what the Chinaman termed ‘soup’, and applied to his vegetables, was composed of blood, 
urine, nightsoil, and water…the Chinese were a menace to the banana trade, and there was no 
opportunity for the white man to buy bananas unless it was through the Chinese.1095 
Another parliamentarian remarked that ‘personally, he would rather go without vegetables 
than eat one he knew to have been grown by a Chinaman’.1096 These statements reveal a view 
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amongst Queensland lawmakers of the day that the Chinese engaged in practices, including in 
the banana industry, which were unacceptable to the ‘modern white man’. As with colonial 
era laws discussed in Chapter Two, they indicate a belief not only that the Chinese were less 
than equal, but perhaps even that they were less than human. This belief supported the view 
that the Chinese (and other non-Europeans) did not ‘belong’ in an ‘advanced’ white man’s 
society - in other words, that they were inherently ‘alien’ in the common, non-legal sense of 
this word. Consistent with this view, the Chinese in Australia were treated as if they were 
‘aliens’ in legislation restricting their participation in the banana industry (and other 
agricultural occupations), whatever their formal legal status at the time.  
As well as ‘colour racism’ of this sort, Queensland lawmakers also exhibited the type of 
‘labour racism’ integral to the national make-up of the new Commonwealth. The 1907 
Harvester decision has legendary status in Australian industrial relations history because it 
entrenched the right of Australian workers to receive a ‘fair living wage…sufficient to 
provide frugal comfort’ for the worker and his family.1097 At the same time, however, the 
Harvester judgment has also been described as ‘the keystone of the White Australia 
policy.’1098 As the Queensland parliamentary debates show, lawmakers of the day did not 
believe that Chinese settlers and other non-Europeans were entitled to a ‘fair living wage’. 
There was no comprehension that Chinese workers might aspire to the same conditions as 
white Australians.1099 To the contrary, Chinese workers were seen as a threat to the standard 
of living of real ‘Australians’ who should be the only ones able to earn profits behind a tariff 
wall. As Mr Brand from Burrum said in 1921 during the debate on the Banana Industry 
Preservation Bill: 
I am in favour of carrying on the banana industry with our own Australians…The banana 
growers in Queensland urgently need that duty. We desire to make this a white man’s industry. 
If we allow the Chinese to come in now, it will only be a few years before it will be extinct as 
an industry. We know that the conditions under which the Chinese live make it impossible for 
white men to compete with them.1100 
The fear that low cost production by ‘alien’ Chinese would undermine the achievement of the 
Harvester case and the entitlement of white men to a fair living wage to support their families 
was a specific motive for the introduction of a dictation test for the Queensland banana 
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industry. Mr Barber from the Bundaberg electorate said he was ‘not so much concerned about 
the coloured aliens as I am for the white growers that are likely to be engaged in this 
business’. He read out a letter from the South Coast Fruitgrowers’ Association, which said: 
Chinese companies will hop in, and by the time we have worked up to fixed prices for various 
grades of bananas and have got the selling end of the game on a business-like footing, ‘Chink’ 
will be well enough established to keep a lot of good men out of this very important and 
interesting industry. I do hope that you will succeed in preserving this fine industry for our 
white men and their families.1101 
Land for returned soldiers 
After the First World War, there was another reason for excluding ‘alien’ non-Europeans 
from the banana industry using the mechanism of the dictation test. As Mr Brand observed in 
the Queensland Legislative Assembly: 
The Commonwealth Government (has) spent a large amount of money through the State 
Government, to settle returned soldiers on the land cultivating bananas. Seeing that the State 
and Commonwealth are spending these large sums of money, it is necessary that we should 
pass this legislation, and do all we can to protect the industry.
1102
 
As Evans, Saunders and Cronin note in Race Relations in Colonial Queensland, in 1920 ‘the 
Returned Soldiers Association petitioned to have Asiatics excluded from the banana industry 
altogether and their farms turned over for soldier settlement schemes’.1103 Yong also notes 
that white growers, including some returned soldiers, were active after the First World War in 
campaigns against the involvement of ethnic Chinese people in the banana industry. As Yong 
says, ‘the returned soldiers, in particular, were dissatisfied with the rising price of land caused 
by strong Chinese competition’.1104  
Anxiety about the security of northern Queensland was one reason parliamentarians wanted 
Chinese banana farmers replaced by returned soldiers. Mr Brand told the Legislative 
Assembly in 1921 that northern Australia would be more secure if white men took the place 
of ‘alien’ Chinese: 
The sooner we get rid of all the aliens in the banana industry the better it will be for the white 
population. If we have white farmers with their wives and families living on the banana 
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industry, it will be much better for Queensland, and they will form a bulwark for the defence of 
Australia.1105 
But for Queensland lawmakers, this was about more than military defence. The belief that 
Chinese Australians were members of a foreign race who could do nothing to alter their 
status as aliens was accompanied by a perception that their very presence in Australia was in 
some way a threat to the security of the country. The view that Chinese settlers were ‘aliens’ 
in the sense of being ‘foreign’ and not belonging meant they were also considered to lack 
loyalty or allegiance to Britain and the new Australian federation, regardless of the length of 
time they had spent in the country or whether they had been naturalised or born as British 
subjects. As Mr Adamson said in 1911, when supporting a call to force Chinese settlers out of 
the banana industry by reducing the maximum area an ‘alien’ could lease to only three acres: 
It was desirable to make the banana industry a white man’s industry, and to get the Federal 
Government to make it possible for white men to grow bananas. The restriction of the area to 
3 acres was one way of getting them out of the country, and on the ground of higher patriotism 
it was better for them to be in China, and give us the chance to develop the country on the lines 
of ‘Australia for the Australians’.1106  
After the Great War, therefore, what better proposal could there be than to replace ‘alien’ 
Chinese in the banana industry with soldiers who had fought for King and country defending 
Britain and the Empire?   
The banana industry debates emphasise the failure of the rule of law in Australia regarding 
‘aliens’. Non-Europeans, especially Chinese settlers, were considered ‘aliens’ for social not 
legal reasons, continuing a theme from early indigenous cases in New South Wales and 
colonial parliamentary debates. As in those examples, there were strong elements of bigotry 
and racism, including a view that non-white inhabitants  were less than human. Moreover, in 
direct conflict with the law, ‘allegiance’ was judged by skin colour not formal nationality 
status. Lawmakers ignored the allegiance required of British subject Chinese, refusing to 
accept their loyalty to the Crown under the law, insisting on the ground of ‘patriotism’ that 
returned soldiers take over their banana farms. Above all, the debates in the Queensland 
parliament on the banana industry laws again show that contrary to the rule of law, legislation 
which was ‘racially neutral’ on its face was directed against those regarded as ‘aliens’ in a 
racial sense, especially Chinese Australians, regardless of their actual legal status. As shown 
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in the next section, this was confirmed by the various exemptions under Queensland’s alien 
and dictation test laws.  
Exemptions  
The exemption provisions ensured that settlers with a white European background would not 
be prosecuted as aliens, even if they had not been naturalised and remained aliens under the 
law. The exemptions were set out in regulations made by the Governor of Queensland on the 
advice of the State Government’s Executive Council.1107 The lower profile of such 
subordinate legislation removed the impetus for imperial intervention. While racial 
distinctions could not be included in the primary legislation, they were clearly evident on the 
terms of the regulations. This façade of non-discrimination was generally sufficient to satisfy 
the Colonial Office.1108 
The detailed exemptions were similar under different dictation test laws. The exemptions in 
the Banana Industry Preservation Regulations 1921, for example, were modelled on those 
developed for the sugar industry under the Sugar Cultivation Act 1913.
1109
 The exemptions 
were primarily determined on the basis of race, including: 
 ‘all native-born residents of Australia of European descent’1110  
 ‘all residents of Australia of European parentage’ 
 ‘all residents of Australia…descended from any resident of the Continent of North 
America other than from any aboriginal native thereof, or negroes or aboriginals of 
African or Asiatic race’.1111 
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In other words, all residents of Australia with a white European or North American 
background were automatically exempt from the dictation test requirements, even if they 
were not British subjects and remained ‘aliens’ in a legal sense. In contrast, with few 
exceptions there was no exemption from the dictation test for non-European residents of 
Australia, even if they legally ‘belonged’ as British subjects. All people of non-European 
race, even if they were subjects by birth or naturalisation and therefore not ‘aliens’ in a legal 
sense, were subject to the full effect of the legislation, including harsh penalties if they failed 
to obtain a certificate of having passed the dictation test. Apart from other ‘non-aliens’ such 
as British subject Chinese Australians, the dictation test requirement also applied under the 
sugar and banana industry legislation to indigenous Australians.1112 
‘Aliens’ versus ‘persons’ 
There was a more extensive list of exemptions under the Sugar Cultivation Act 1913 and the 
Banana Industry Preservation Act 1921 than for other dictation test laws such as the Land 
Act 1910 and the Leases to Aliens Restriction Act 1912. This was linked to the different 
wording of the parent legislation.  
The Land Act and the Leases to Aliens Act specifically prohibited ‘aliens’ from either 
acquiring land or leasing parcels of land over 5 acres without passing a dictation test. It was 
made clear in the Queensland Parliament that this legislation was directed at those regarded 
as ‘aliens’ in the racial sense, i.e. all non-Europeans, especially Chinese Australians. It was 
also made clear that people ‘of European descent’ would not be subject to the new laws. 
Those administering the legislation understood that European settlers, even if they were 
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‘aliens’ in a legal sense, were already ‘exempt’ from the dictation test requirement. Hence it 
was not necessary to include specific exemptions for them. There were no exemptions under 
the Land Act when it was enacted and the only significant exemption under the Leases to 
Aliens Restriction Act covered subjects of foreign countries with a ‘most favoured nation’ 
treaty with Great Britain.
1113
 
In contrast, the Sugar Cultivation and Banana Industry Preservation Acts merely prohibited 
‘any person who had not first obtained a certificate of having passed the dictation test’ from 
participation in these industries. Unlike the word ‘alien’, ‘person’ did not have an everyday 
meaning which could be used to target Chinese settlers and other non-Europeans. While it 
was still evident (as stated in Queensland Parliament) who the real targets of the new statutes 
were, use of the term ‘persons’ did not give those administering the legislation or the courts a 
basis for discriminating against non-white people. Hence specific exemptions were needed to 
ensure these laws applied only to people with an Asiatic or other non-European background 
and not to white European settlers. 
‘Enemy aliens’  
Another example of the dominance of race over the law for Queensland lawmakers is the 
favourable treatment given to ‘enemy aliens’ from Germany under the State’s dictation test 
laws.   
At the end of the First World War, thousands of ‘enemy aliens’ (those originally from 
Germany and other countries which had been at war with Great Britain) were deported from 
Australia under Commonwealth law. The largest group of over 6,000 were expelled in 1919. 
According to David Dutton: 
This group of deportees was interned and expelled principally because of assumptions about 
their allegiance and the Commonwealth-sponsored climate of anti-German hysteria…With its 
paranoid attitude towards aliens and dissent of most kinds, the Commonwealth government 
during the latter stages of, and shortly after, the Great War deported thousands of aliens on 
political grounds, including many who had been naturalised, and hundreds more British 
subjects.
1114
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As Helen Irving notes, during the war ‘British subjects of German origin were interned…as if 
they were enemy aliens. From their confinement they protested that their ‘citizenship’ – 
expressly using the word – was hollow’.1115  
In contrast to the Commonwealth’s harsh treatment of German Australians (including those 
who were British subjects), ‘enemy aliens’ from Germany were exempt under Queensland’s 
1921 banana industry regulations. The exemption provisions for the banana industry were 
adopted word for word from those promulgated for the sugar industry in 1913. Despite the 
traumatic experience of the First World War in the intervening years - and notwithstanding 
that one motive for the banana industry legislation was to provide land for returned 
servicemen - no consideration was given in the 1921 debates in the Queensland Parliament to 
excluding those with a German background from the industry. This meant that German 
settlers who had not been naturalised and legally remained aliens were treated more 
favourably than Chinese Australians and other non-Europeans who were British subjects and 
not ‘aliens’ under the law.  
The preferential treatment given to ‘enemy aliens’ from Germany shows the degree to which 
racial factors displaced nationality and allegiance for Queensland lawmakers in determining 
who should be allowed practical membership of the community through participation in key 
agricultural occupations such as the banana industry.   
British Indians   
As Lake and Reynolds explain, imperial authorities in Britain were urged by leading Indian 
figures, not least Mahatma Gandhi, to dissuade governments in their dominions from 
discrimination against British Indians.
1116
 The 1921 Imperial Conference recognised the 
‘incongruity between the position of  India as an equal member of the British Empire and the 
existence of disabilities upon British Indians lawfully domiciled in some parts of the 
Empire’.1117 In 1922 prominent Indian politician Srinivasa Sastri was sent to Australia to 
investigate this issue. He reported that British Indians in Australia faced discrimination under 
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various Commonwealth and State laws.1118 Sastri highlighted Queensland’s dictation test 
legislation, including the Sugar Cultivation Act and the Banana Industry Preservation Act, 
which had the effect, he observed, of ‘excluding all Asiatics from these trades or 
occupations’.1119  
After assuring his hosts that the Government of India was not seeking changes to Australia’s 
restrictive immigration laws, he received a pledge that disabilities imposed on Indian subjects 
under domestic laws would be reconsidered. After his visit to Brisbane, the Queensland 
Government amended regulations under the Banana Industry Preservation Act, allowing 
‘British subjects of any native race of India, who were lawfully domiciled in Queensland at 
the commencement of the Act’ to participate in the banana industry.1120 
Even in providing this exemption, however, the regulations show the preference given by 
Queensland lawmakers to racial over nationality considerations in determining which groups 
of people should have the opportunity of unrestricted access to key agricultural occupations. 
In contrast to the absolute exemption for people of European or white North American origin 
- even if not naturalised and hence legally aliens - Queensland residents with an Indian 
background received no more than a qualified exemption, despite their status as British 
subjects with full membership under the law. The exemption for British Indians only applied 
to those who were ‘lawfully domiciled in Queensland at the commencement of the Act, and 
who have continuously remained so domiciled’.1121 Should such a person cease to be 
‘domiciled’ in Queensland, even temporarily, they would no longer be exempt from the 
operation of the legislation. Under the terms of this ‘exemption’, therefore, Australian 
residents of Indian origin risked being unable to resume work in the Queensland banana 
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industry if, for example, they visited friends or family in India for an extended period.1122 
Importantly, moreover, even this type of limited exemption was not provided for British 
subjects of Indian origin for the purpose of the sugar industry, Queensland’s most profitable 
agricultural undertaking.  
The exemption provisions were contrary to the rule of law in a different way to the primary 
legislation. They arbitrarily excluded certain groups from key activities in Queensland society 
on a racial basis, ignoring existing law on membership. Unlike the primary legislation, the 
exemption provisions did not employ misleading and deceptive terms such as ‘alien’ and 
‘person’ which were deliberately misapplied. As subordinate legislation unlikely to be 
reviewed by the Colonial Office, the exemption regulations could operate according to their 
openly discriminatory wording. Nevertheless, they highlight how nationality or alien status 
under the law was disregarded in favour of racial considerations in determining who could 
participate in the banana, sugar and other industries free of the dictation test requirement. 
Europeans who were aliens or outsiders in a legal sense, even ‘enemy aliens’, were treated 
more favourably under the exemption provisions than non-European British subjects with full 
legal membership of the Commonwealth of Australia.  
Conclusion: alien legislation and the rule of law 
Queensland parliamentary debates on the dictation test legislation confirm the abrogation of 
the rule of law regarding ‘aliens’. Central to the attitude of members of the Queensland 
Parliament was their belief that not all ‘aliens’ were to be regarded equally. They understood 
that anyone who had not become a British subject, even someone of European origin, was 
within the legal category of ‘alien’. But it did not follow that non-British subjects from 
Europe should be treated as aliens in Queensland legislation. In their view, European settlers 
were within the category of ‘desirable’ aliens, in contrast to Chinese and other races who 
were ‘undesirable’. Any restriction on the participation of ‘aliens’ in key agricultural 
occupations such as the sugar and banana industries should not apply, in their opinion, to 
European migrants who had settled in Queensland.  
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In contrast to the obstacles faced by non-Europeans, white European settlers, especially those 
from northern Europe, were automatically accepted as ‘non-aliens’ by Queensland 
lawmakers. Whatever their actual legal status, they were regarded as naturally ‘belonging’ to 
Queensland society. From the perspective of Queensland parliamentarians there were no legal 
or other obstacles to overcome before white Europeans could move beyond ‘alien’ status. 
Naturalisation as a British subject was not essential and their integration into the community 
was taken for granted. Even if white European settlers were aliens in the legal sense, it was 
impossible for Queensland parliamentarians to see them as ‘aliens’ in the normal or common 
meaning of the word or to accept that they could be treated as aliens under Queensland law.  
For Queensland lawmakers, the alien and dictation test legislation needed to reflect the 
dominant view in Queensland society during the White Australia era that Europeans were not 
aliens ‘in the general acceptance of the term’. The legal meaning of ‘alien’ - a citizen or 
subject of a foreign state - could not be used in applying the legislation since this would catch 
European as well as non-European settlers. Instead, the normal or racial meaning of ‘alien’ 
(someone who was not ‘one of us’, especially someone ‘from another race’) should be 
applied in place of the actual legal meaning. The alien and dictation test laws could then 
achieve their primary aim - the exclusion of non-Europeans, especially the Chinese, from the 
sugar, banana and other agricultural industries.  
The debates on the alien and dictation test laws again illustrate the paradoxical attitude 
towards naturalisation on the part of Anglo-Celtic lawmakers in Australia. Parliamentarians 
appeared to believe that non-Europeans had to be naturalised to move beyond the legal status 
of alien. There was little awareness that non-Europeans might be born as British subjects, nor 
that many Chinese living in Australia were natural-born subjects. Moreover, while 
understanding the process of naturalisation, many parliamentarians refused to accept that 
naturalised non-Europeans could have become ‘British’, insisting they be treated as ‘aliens’ 
under the dictation test laws. 
Given its sustained history of misuse in Australia dating back to early indigenous cases in the 
New South Wales Supreme Court, it is unsurprising - at least from an historical perspective - 
that after federation Queensland lawmakers saw no issue with using the racial meaning of 
‘alien’ as the law. They deliberately included the word ‘alien’ in legislation as a neutral legal 
term to avoid rejection by imperial authorities, but always intended - and openly stated - that 
the new laws would only be used against non-Europeans or ‘coloured aliens’. Even 
legislation which applied on its terms to ‘persons’ without further qualification was only 
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intended to operate against ‘coloured aliens’, those whose racial appearance made them the 
‘aliens’ or ‘the Other’ from the perspective of the Anglo-Celtic community.  
The records of debate show, therefore, that many Queensland parliamentarians understood 
both the legal concept of ‘alien’ and the significance of naturalisation for formal nationality 
status, but ignored this in advocating that the dictation test legislation should be directed only 
at those who were ‘aliens’ in the normal or racial sense of the word. This was not a case of 
misunderstanding or confusing the common understanding of ‘alien’ with the strict legal 
meaning of the term. Instead the proper legal meaning of ‘alien’ was both understood and 
intentionally disregarded by Queensland lawmakers who advocated that the non-legal, 
normal or racial meaning of the word be applied as the legal meaning for the purpose of the 
legislation.1123  
The following chapter sets out how the term ‘alien’ was used in its racial sense contrary to 
the rule of law after the First World War in a range of prosecutions in north Queensland 
under the dictation test legislation and other subsidiary rules.  
_____________________________________________________________________  
                                                 
1123
  In Queensland misuse of the word ‘alien’ spread beyond prosecutions under agricultural legislation 
and subsidiary laws. The term was also used as an official means of racial segregation in the State’s 
welfare and health system, especially in hospitals but also in aged care homes. The use of ‘alien 
wards’ in Queensland from 1900 until at least the 1950s is the subject of a separate article by the 
author. The Queensland Government approved funding for ‘alien wards’ and gave official 
endorsement to less favourable treatment for their occupants, for example during a bubonic plague 
outbreak in 1921. See eg ‘Hospital Committee’, Cairns Post (Cairns) 21 October 1921, 2. For an 
account of alien wards in aged care,  see ‘Life In Dunwich, III’, Brisbane Courier (Brisbane) 
15 March 1906, 6. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN Prosecuting coloured aliens in Queensland 
‘The major questions…must be whether the business of having an efficient, impartial 
law enforcement service in Queensland is being properly attended to…and whether 
probity in the police force is any longer either a reasonable hope or a serious 
proposition…’1124 
This chapter demonstrates that Professor K.H. Bailey’s 1937 claim that Queensland’s alien 
and dictation test laws were ‘not really being enforced’ (see Chapter Six) was misleading. As 
the chapter establishes, after World War One Queensland actively enforced laws barring 
‘coloured aliens’ from key occupations and industries. Contrary to the rule of law, legislation 
that was racially neutral on its face was used for racial exclusion.  
The dictation test legislation was employed to exclude ‘coloured aliens’, especially in the 
sugar industry, with the main basis for prosecution being failure to obtain a ‘certificate of 
exemption’ from the test. This avoided the bureaucratic challenge of widespread 
administration of an actual dictation test, potentially in a multitude of languages.1125 
Subsidiary rules, especially industrial awards, were also used to exclude non-Europeans from 
various occupations. In these rules a more explicit discriminatory approach could be adopted 
since they were not submitted to the Governor for assent or reserved for approval by the 
Colonial Office. These secondary laws prohibited ‘coloured aliens’ from engaging in various 
activities and means of earning a livelihood and were used to prosecute non-white people 
(and their employers) with little regard for the proper legal meaning of ‘alien’.   
                                                 
1124
  Article in The Australian (undated), Hugh Lunn, Joh. The Life and Political Adventures of 
Johannes Bjelke-Petersen (University of Queensland Press 1978) 248. 
1125
  Prosecutions under the alien and dictation test legislation were largely effective without the expense 
and difficulty of administering the dictation test itself, although such a test does appear to have been 
applied occasionally. However, as a 1928 report in the Brisbane Courier headed ‘Dictation Test and 
Banana Culture’ indicates, this was not necessarily with the exclusionary outcome intended by 
Queensland lawmakers:  
 ‘The question of restricting the ownership or leasehold of banana land…has been exercising 
the minds of those in authority for some time past. It was felt that there was a grave risk of 
owners leasing their land in 10-acre blocks to certain classes of Asiatics…a partial solution at 
least has been discovered under the Banana Preservation Act of 1921. Section 3…makes it 
unlawful for ‘any person who has not… passed the dictation test to engage in or carry on the 
industry or culture of bananas’. The first application under this section …recently came before 
Mr. H. Clegg, J. P., the applicant being an Indian. The applicant had no difficulty in writing 
the dictation test correctly’. ‘Dictation Test and Banana Culture’, Brisbane Courier (Brisbane) 
24 October 1928, 12. 
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This chapter also examines the case of See Chin, leaseholder of the largest sugar plantation in 
north Queensland. In another failure of the rule of law, the Queensland Supreme Court in 
1923 endorsed his prosecution for employing ‘coloured aliens’.1126  
Finally the chapter considers the overall effect of Queensland’s alien and dictation test laws 
and prosecutions, highlighting the detrimental consequences for Chinese Australians and 
other non-European communities in the State.  
Prosecutions under statute 
Sugar Cultivation Act 
The Sugar Cultivation Act 1913 was used to exclude non-Europeans or ‘coloured aliens’ 
from the sugar industry in Queensland. The first prosecutions did not occur until some years 
after the passing of the Act. Under section 8, prosecutions were not to be instituted ‘except by 
the direction of the Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, or Minister of Justice’.1127 It was 
later claimed that: 
When the sugar industry was receiving the first measure of protection…a Tory Government 
passed an Act of Parliament which empowered the Government to apply a dictation test to 
people engaging in the sugar industry and thus prevent aliens from taking any part in it. The 
Government…allowed that Act to lie in abeyance whilst the sugar industry to a large extent 
passed into the hands of aliens.1128 
By 1919, however, as Constable Nugent of Babinda told the Industrial Arbitration Court, 
prosecutions were being pursued in North Queensland at the ‘direction of the Attorney-
General…for breaches of the Sugar Cultivation Act by the employment of colored aliens 
[sic] without permits’.1129 Section 4 of the Act prohibited ‘any person’ who had not passed a 
dictation test or who did not have a certificate of exemption ‘from being employed in or in 
connection with the cultivation of sugar cane and the manufacture of sugar’. Despite the non-
discriminatory wording of the statute, there was no attempt to hide the racial focus of 
prosecutions under the Act. After receiving the Attorney-General’s direction, the police 
diligently pursued ‘colored [sic] aliens’ in the north Queensland sugar fields. As the Cairns 
Post reported: 
                                                 
1126
  Brown v See Chin, ex parte See Chin (1923) 17  QJP 130; 1923 QWN 38.   
1127
  See also ‘The New Sugar Bill’, Townsville Daily Bulletin (Townsville) 27 June 1913, 10. 
1128
  ‘Correspondence’, Townsville Daily Bulletin (Townsville) 24 February 1927, 4. Emphasis added. 
As Neville Meaney explains, in 1915 Australian Prime Minister Andrew Fisher pressured 
Queensland Labor Premier Thomas Ryan not to implement the racially exclusive provisions of the 
Sugar Cultivation Act following protests from Japanese Consul-General Shimizu. Neville Meaney, 
Australia and world crisis, 1914-1923 (Sydney University Press 2009) 107-108.   
1129
  ‘The Sugar Case’, Worker (Brisbane) 22 May 1919, 17. Emphasis added.  
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Constable Nugent, of Babinda, and Constable Mullins, of Edmonton, initiated 27 prosecutions 
against employers and employees for contraventions of the Sugar Cultivation Act of 1913, 
concerning the employment of colored aliens not in possession of certificates that they had 
passed the dictation test.
1130
 
To avoid prosecution, those regarded as ‘colored aliens’ had to obtain either an exemption 
certificate or a certificate of having passed the dictation test and were also required to present 
their certificates to the local Clerk of Petty Sessions. As the Townsville Daily Bulletin 
reported in 1925:   
CAIRNS, January 15. Mr A. H. Scott, C.P.S. notifies those holding certificates of exemption 
and certificates of having passed the Dictation test under the Sugar Cultivation Act, that they 
must lodge same at the C.P.S. Office, Cairns, not later than 31st March next, otherwise they 
will be liable to a penalty not exceeding £10.
1131
 
Prosecutions under the Sugar Cultivation Act seem to have been most frequent for several 
years after the First World War. In 1918 Constable Mullins told the Cairns Summons Court 
that:  
He went to a farm on 21st June occupied by C. Butler. There were eleven Hindoos there cutting 
cane. He said to them:  ‘Have you got a certificate of exemption under the dictation test to 
allow you to work in the sugar field’.  Six produced their certificates and five said they had 
none. The five stated they had been working for a number of years cutting cane and never had 
certificates, and they did not intend to get them.
1132
 
The lawyer for the plantation owner, Mr Butler, pointed out to Magistrate T.A. Ferry that the 
men were working as contractors and were not in contravention of legislation that merely 
prohibited the ‘employment’ of a person who had not passed the dictation test.1133 
Nevertheless Magistrate Ferry convicted Butler and the men without exemption certificates 
of offences under the legislation. Moreover, as the Northern Miner reported: 
…a large number of similar prosecutions were adjourned to the Circuit Court at Cairns on 
October 16th, pending appeals against the convictions. There are indications for a far-reaching 
effect from the prosecutions and if the appeals are not upheld there is a probability of a strong 
fund being collected by both employers and employees to contest the action.
1134
 
Similarly in December 1918 the Brisbane Courier noted that: 
                                                 
1130
  ‘Edmonton Hindus’, Cairns Post (Cairns) 22 October 1918, 4. Emphasis added. 
1131
  ‘Cairns Chronicles’, Townsville Daily Bulletin (Townsville) 28 January 1925, 7.  
1132
  ‘Working Without a Permit’, Cairns Post (Cairns) 17 August 1918, 3.  
1133
  Ibid. 
1134
  Northern Miner (Charters Towers) 20 August 1918, 2. Emphasis added. The matter was appealed to 
the full bench of the Queensland Supreme Court which upheld the convictions but given the 
consequences of its decision for the sugar industry gave leave to appeal to the Privy Council. ‘An 
Important Appeal’, Brisbane Courier (Brisbane) 6 December 1918, 6. The Privy Council dismissed 
the appeal, noting that the term ‘employment’ in the Sugar Cultivation Act had the same meaning as 
in the Industrial Arbitration Act 1916 (Qld) where it was defined to include those working under 
contract only. Addar Khan v John Mullins [1920] AC 391, [1919] UKPC 118 (2 December 1919).  
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…a large number of persons engaged in the industry were affected by this, the number in the 
Cairns district being estimated at about 1500, comprising Indians, Malays, Japanese, Chinese, 
and other Asiatics.
1135 
In 1919 the Australian Workers Union told a Royal Commission into the sugar industry that 
there were 20,898 people employed in the industry, of whom an estimated 2,500 to 3,000 
were ‘colored aliens’. However only 1,558 certificates of exemption had been granted under 
the Sugar Cultivation Act. The Southern District Secretary of the AWU, Frederick Martyn, 
said the ‘different nationalities’ to whom certificates of exemption had been granted were:  
Chinese 506, Indians 161, Javanese 107, Malays 71, Native-born (sons of Kanakas, Indians 
etc.) 46, Japanese 357, Polynesians 166 , others  36; total 1,750 (less 192 returned from Clerks 
of Petty Sessions as not being claimed).1136 
This indicates that the AWU’s register of ‘colored aliens’ in the sugar industry included 
workers who were most likely British subjects through birth in British colonies or dominions 
- Indians, Malays and an unknown proportion of ‘Chinese’ and ‘Polynesians’ - as well as 
‘native-born’ workers who were without question subjects by birth in Australia. While the 
prohibitions in the Sugar Cultivation Act applied to all ‘persons’ without the relevant 
certificate of exemption, ‘colored aliens’ were the focus of police prosecutions as lawmakers 
in the Queensland Parliament had intended. Despite the neutral language of the legislation, it 
was enforced entirely on a racial basis. Those regarded as ‘aliens’ in a racial sense were the 
target of the laws. It is probable, however, that a substantial proportion of workers prosecuted 
under this legislation were not ‘aliens’ in any legal sense.   
It appeared to be of no concern to the police whether the ‘colored aliens’ they prosecuted 
under the Sugar Cultivation Act were ‘aliens’ under the law. Constable Nugent told the 
Arbitration Court of a case where two white men who had been refused work on a sugar 
farm: 
…found that a gang of Hindoos had been at work on the Sunday. This meant a loss to the white 
workers of four or five days. It was obvious that these Hindoos cut for less than the 1s. rate, and 
obviously had done the work on Sunday, and the employers acquiesced in their so doing. He 
had seen white men carrying their swags through the district while colored aliens were 
employed.
1137
 
If the term ‘Hindoos’ was an accurate description of the ethnic background of the particular 
workers, it is likely they were British Indians (as the 1911 and 1921 Commonwealth censuses 
indicated) and not ‘aliens’ under the law in Australia.  
                                                 
1135
  ‘An Important Appeal’, Brisbane Courier (Brisbane) 6 December 1918, 6. Emphasis added.   
1136
  ‘Complete Summary of the Sugar Industry’, Worker (Brisbane) 12 June 1919, 11.  
1137
  ‘The Sugar Case’, Worker (Brisbane) 22 May 1919, 17. Emphasis added.  
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Prosecutions of ‘colored aliens’ and their employers under the Sugar Cultivation Act 
continued at least until the mid-1920s. As the Townsville Daily Bulletin reported in 1924: 
On Monday, at the Cairns Summons Court Alfred James Broughton pleaded guilty to three 
charges of having employed colored aliens without their having passed the dictation 
test…Delger Singh, Radja Singh, Gowad Singh and Brahu Singh were each fined 30/- with 3/6 
costs, in default two weeks imprisonment, for an infringement of the Sugar Cultivation 
Act…1138 
Again, it is likely that the workers in question were British subjects of Indian descent and not 
‘aliens’ under Australian law.    
Sugar Works Act 
Owners of Queensland sugar farms were also prosecuted under the Sugar Works Act 1911 for 
unlawfully employing ‘colored aliens’. As noted above, section 9(8) of the Act excluded 
‘Alien labour on sugar works’. The provision prohibited ‘any person from employment in or 
about the construction, maintenance, management or working of any sugar works managed or 
worked under the Act who has not passed a dictation test in English’. In the Innisfail 
Summons Court in March 1924: 
Lorocco, charged with unlawfully employing a colored alien contrary to the Sugar Works Act, 
pleaded guilty. Inspector Watt visited the defendant’s farm and saw a Malay driving horses. 
The Malay admitted that he was working for Lorocco. Malay said that he was receiving a white 
man’s wages.1139 
As this indicates, while the heading of section 9(8) referred merely to ‘alien’ labour and the 
text to any ‘person’ who had not passed a dictation test, the provision was understood and 
applied as a prohibition on the employment of any ‘colored alien’ - namely any non-
European - in or about any sugar works, with no consideration as to whether or not the 
employee was an ‘alien’ in the legal sense of the word. In this case, the term ‘Malay’ was 
another of the ambiguous, generic descriptions applied to people of Asian origin who had 
settled in Australia. It may have referred merely to someone from the vast ‘Malay 
archipelago’ to Australia’s north – including the Dutch East Indies (later Indonesia) – or it 
could have been a more specific reference to a person from the Federated Malay States, at 
that time a British colony. If the latter, then the employee was a British subject and a ‘non-
alien’ under the law applying in Australia at the time. The 1911 Commonwealth census 
                                                 
1138
  ‘Cairns Chronicles’, Townsville Daily Bulletin (Townsville) 28 May 1924, 10. Emphasis added.  
1139
  ‘Innisfail Cases’, Cairns Post (Cairns) 8 March 1924, 5. Emphasis added. See also Queensland, 
Bench Record and Summons Book, Court of Petty Sessions, Innisfail, 8 March 1924, 80.  
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recorded 1,161 ‘Malays’ in Australia, 772 or 66 per cent of whom were listed as British 
subjects.1140 
Prosecutions under industrial awards 
Sugar Workers Award  
The fiction of the dictation test was unnecessary for prosecutions under subordinate rules not 
subject to imperial scrutiny, including Queensland’s industrial awards made and amended by 
the Court of Industrial Arbitration. Since imperial approval was not required, there was also 
no attempt in these laws to hide the discriminatory use of the term ‘alien’ in its racial sense. 
In North Queensland in the 1920s there was a long list of prosecutions under the Sugar Field 
and Sugar Mill Workers and Cooks Award (Sugar Workers Award) for employing ‘coloured 
aliens’ on sugar farms and for failing to pay ‘coloured aliens’ working on such farms in the 
presence of an authorised officer. The Sugar Workers Award was made by Queensland’s 
Court of Industrial Arbitration under the Industrial Arbitration Act 1916.  
Clause 4 of the Sugar Workers Award prohibited ‘coloured labour’ in cane cutting or the 
cultivation of sugar cane. Prosecutions under this provision were commonly reported as 
convictions for employing ‘colored aliens’. Clause 12 of the award, headed ‘Payment to 
Aliens’, said that ‘all persons being aboriginal natives of Asia, Africa or the islands of the 
Pacific, or substantially of that origin’ employed as sugar-field workers should be paid their 
wages ‘in the presence of an officer of police, clerk of petty sessions, or other officer in that 
behalf duly authorised and appointed by the Government’. As the Cairns Post reported in 
1921:  
A remarkable feature of the Cairns Court proceedings during the past few weeks has been the 
number of offenders being proceeded against for breaches of the Industrial Arbitration Act in 
the matter of employing colored aliens and failing to pay such aliens in the presence of an 
officer authorised to witness such payments...W.W. Mason was the latest offender. He came 
before [Industrial Magistrate] Mr.W. Simpson, and, for failing to pay his colored alien 
employees in the presence of an authorised officer, was fined £5.1141 
Clause 12 of the award appears to have been beyond the authority of or ‘ultra vires’ its parent 
legislation. Section 8 of the Industrial Arbitration Act allowed the Arbitration Court, in 
making any award, to regulate any ‘industrial matter’. This included ‘the question whether 
                                                 
1140
  Commonwealth Census Bureau, Census of the Commonwealth of Australia 3
rd
 April, 1911 (1917), 
Vol 1 Part 1, Statistician’s Report, 227-228.  
1141
  ‘An Expensive Oversight.’, Cairns Post (Cairns) 12 October 1921, 4. Emphasis added. The 
prosecution of William W. Mason is also recorded in the Queensland Industrial Gazette, 
10 November 1921, 741 (listed as a breach of clause 21 of the award).   
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any persons shall be disqualified for employment’ and any claim ‘to dismiss or to refuse to 
employ any particular person or persons or class of persons’.1142 While the prohibition on 
‘coloured labour’ in the Sugar Workers Award was therefore within the scope of the Act, 
nothing in the statute authorised discrimination in relation to payment on racial grounds. 
Another feature of clause 12 of the Sugar Workers Award was its heading. Unlike primary 
legislation there was no attempt to hide the racial use of ‘alien’. The ‘aliens’ caught by the 
provision were ‘aboriginal natives of Asia, Africa and the islands of the Pacific’, including 
natural-born subjects from British colonies and dominions who were not ‘aliens’ in a legal 
sense. In the heading ‘Payment to Aliens’ we see, therefore, that the racial meaning of ‘alien’ 
had become the (de facto) law. This is confirmed by the numerous prosecutions about 
‘colored [sic] aliens’.  
Also in 1921, the Cairns Post reported under the heading ‘More Colored Alien Employers’:  
Samuel Christensen, charged with failing to pay Hindoo laborers employed by him in the 
presence of an authorised officer, was fined £5, in default levy and distress, in default three 
weeks in gaol.
1143
   
While the labourers in question may have been Sikh rather than ‘Hindoo’,1144 they were likely 
in either case to have been of ‘British Indian’ origin and therefore not ‘aliens’ under the law.  
Consistent with the heading of clause 12, magistrates hearing cases under this provision 
described coloured workers as ‘aliens’ whether or not that was legally correct. In 1922 the 
Cairns Post reported that Edward Earle was fined £7 10 shillings in the Cairns Summons 
Court for paying an ‘alien employee’ when an officer appointed by the Crown was not 
present. Mr Earle’s lawyer said his client was unaware of previous similar cases being heard 
in that Court, as he had been away for some time, and that in any event he had only acted out 
of kindheartedness:  
The Chinaman had pressed him for money and it meant either getting an officer out or going in 
four miles to the Police Station. In a weak moment, he had paid the man… Chinamen were 
fearfully persistent in the matter of payment and worried the employer. 1145 
Police Magistrate Mr W. Simpson rejected Earle’s defence, stating: 
He must know that a good deal of publicity has been given to these matters. He can hardly 
plead ignorant and that he could not understand … I think it was made fairly public. The cases 
have been extending over six months … A number of cases have been dealt with in this Court 
                                                 
1142
  Section 4. 
1143
  ‘More Colored Alien Employers’, Cairns Post (Cairns) 6 October 1921, 5.  
1144
  The Queensland Industrial Gazette 10 November 1921, 741, records that Samuel Christensen was 
fined £5 for ‘failing to pay Ball Singh, coloured labourer, in the presence of an officer’.  
1145
  ‘Fearfully Persistent’, Cairns Post (Cairns) 25 February 1922, 3.  
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for neglecting to pay aliens before an authorised officer. I have pointed out that I intended to 
inflict a severe penalty for such breaches.
 1146
 
No discussion was reported as to whether the ‘Chinaman’ in this case was an ‘alien’ under 
the law. However clause 12 was not intended to restrict payments only to ‘aliens’ in a legal 
sense. The provision used race as a criterion for prosecution not nationality or legal alienage 
status. Once again, the racial meaning of ‘alien’ was used instead of the correct legal meaning 
to enforce a discriminatory law.  
Industrial Arbitration Court  
Hearings before the Queensland Court of Industrial Arbitration in 1919 about amendment of 
the Sugar Workers Award to exclude ‘colored aliens’ from the sugar industry show the 
complicity of legal figures in misuse of the term ‘alien’. When a witness from the Australian 
Workers Union (AWU) said that in his view preference in sugar industry employment should 
go to ‘white labor first, returned soldiers second, and British and Australian-born aliens 
next’,1147 the presiding judge, Justice McCawley, failed to explain that people born in the 
British Empire (including Australia) were ‘natural-born subjects’ owing allegiance to the 
sovereign and could not be ‘aliens’ in a legal sense. Moreover, when AWU officials and 
other witnesses referred repeatedly to ‘colored aliens’ and ‘colored labour’ as equivalent 
terms,1148 there was no explanation from Justice McCawley that a coloured person born or 
naturalised as a British subject was not an ‘alien’. Indeed the judge was guilty of the same 
misuse himself. When AWU representative Mr Martyn presented a telegram stating that 
‘alien gangs’ were being engaged at a particular sugar plantation, Justice McCawley 
promised that he would ‘absolutely…prohibit the employment of colored gangs in 
harvesting’.1149 True to its word, the Court amended the Sugar Workers Award by prohibiting 
coloured labour in the harvesting of sugar cane, and severely restricting use of such labour in 
cultivation of the crop.1150 
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  ‘Industrial Court’, Cairns Post (Cairns) 30 May 1919, 8. Emphasis added.  
1148
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Further hearings before the Court in 1923 confirm that Justice McCawley did not understand 
the legal meaning of ‘alien’ and the role of this term in determining membership of the 
community. Following its success in excluding ‘coloured aliens’ from the sugar industry, the 
AWU argued such people should also be prohibited from working as ‘hotel, cafe and 
restaurant employees in all divisions of Queensland, excepting the southern division’. Mr W. 
Dunstan, for the AWU: 
…based his argument on the principle of a White Australia. Women and young girls, through 
the cowardice of legislature, were compelled to associate with aliens. He had come to the court 
to ask for some measure of relief.1151 
Justice McCawley refused the AWU’s application, saying that ‘an alien could not change his 
caste and to throw him right out of employment was absolutely prohibited by legislature’. 1152 
While this decision contradicted his 1919 ruling for the sugar industry where he ‘absolutely 
prohibited’ the employment of ‘alien gangs’ in sugar harvesting, it also shows that Justice 
McCawley understood the term ‘alien’ in a racial not legal sense, declaring that an ‘alien’ 
would always remain an ‘alien’ because of his ‘caste’ or race. As well as confusing the legal 
and racial concepts of ‘alien’, there was no comprehension on Justice McCawley’s part that 
an ‘alien’ could move beyond this status under the law, for example through naturalisation or 
marriage to a British subject.  
McCawley’s lack of understanding of the legal concept of ‘alien’ was later repeated as Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Queensland in Brown v See Chin (1923), discussed below.  
Station Hands Award 
It was not just sugar and other primary production industries in Queensland where 
prosecutions were used to exclude ‘coloured aliens’. Clause 7 of Queensland’s Station Hands 
Award 1917 declared that: 
No coloured alien shall be employed…or continued in employment…at any of the work for 
which rates of pay are prescribed by this Award, except cooking, gardening and prickly pear 
cutting. Provided that in future engagements in cooking, gardening and prickly pear cutting, 
preference shall be given to competent white workers.
1153
 
In 1923 the manager of Corona Station appeared before the Industrial Magistrates Court in 
Longreach charged with employing a ‘coloured alien’ as a cook when a white man was 
available. Industrial Inspector Lomas gave evidence that a white cook was denied a position 
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1152
  ‘Aliens In Hotels’, Townsville Daily Bulletin (Townsville) 10 November 1923, 5. Emphasis added.  
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by the manager because a ‘Chinaman’ had been engaged in this role a few days earlier. The 
prosecutor argued a white cook should have been preferred ‘notwithstanding any 
arrangement…between the employer and any alien’.1154 The Inspector said he went to the 
station and found that a cook named John Jimmy had commenced work there, telling the 
court ‘this man is a Chinaman’. The Inspector said that he: 
…saw a man cooking in the kitchen. He was a coloured man. He could not state what his 
nationality was until he had a conversation with him. As a result of the conversation, he 
concluded that he was a coloured alien.1155 
The defence objected that ‘this evidence was inadmissible as it was hearsay and witness was 
not an expert in nationality’.1156 The prosecutor complained, asking whether it was 
‘necessary to go to China to obtain the necessary qualifications for the proof of a Chinaman, 
as there was no registration certificates of birth’. He requested that the magistrate give: 
…an ex parte opinion as to whether he would be satisfied upon the evidence given by the 
Inspector that John Jimmy was a coloured alien without the necessity of calling the alleged 
alien.1157   
When the magistrate said the cook had to be called before the court to prove he was a 
‘Chinaman’, based on ‘the usual rule of evidence that the Court would not be safe in 
accepting evidence which was only of a secondary nature when primary evidence could be 
produced’, the prosecutor stated that the magistrate’s approach:    
 …amounts to this - that, without the production of the coloured alien, no prosecution could be 
successful under this section…The defendant is shielding himself behind a quibble as to the 
nationality of John Jimmy…In face of the fact that we are unable to produce the Chinaman to 
prove that he was a coloured alien, I do not intend to tender further evidence.1158 
As this shows, contrary to the rule of law, those enforcing the prohibition on ‘coloured aliens’ 
in the Station Hands Award regarded a person’s nationality as a mere ‘quibble’. There was 
some recognition that nationality was an issue and that a coloured person was not necessarily 
an ‘alien’. Nevertheless, the prosecution wanted the court to accept, as in the Toro case in 
1902, that a person of non-European appearance, in this case a ‘Chinaman’, was prima facie 
an alien under the law and there should be no need to prove his actual legal status.  
In this matter the prosecutor was surprised to come up against a magistrate who demanded 
proof the cook was a ‘coloured alien’. However, while the magistrate refused to accept 
‘hearsay evidence’ from the Inspector and wanted Mr Jimmy to appear in court to establish 
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his ‘nationality’, even the magistrate seemed to think that if Mr Jimmy was a ‘Chinaman’, 
this would be sufficient to show he was a ‘coloured alien’. The report of the case does not 
indicate that Mr Jimmy’s status as ‘subject’ or ‘alien’ in a legal sense was put to the Court or 
considered by the magistrate.  
In the Corona case the defence pointed out that the Industrial Inspector was ‘not an expert in 
nationality’ and his evidence could not be accepted without question.1159 There was no such 
competent defence, however, in a similar matter in 1935 when the Australian Workers Union 
complained that the manager of the Stanhope station in the Aramac district had hired a 
‘coloured alien’ as station cook contrary to the Station Hands’ award. Compelled to dismiss 
the cook, the manager had to lay off his other employees as well. The Industrial Court 
instructed a Longreach magistrate to investigate the matter, but only as to the ‘unfair 
dismissal’ of the other employees and not as to whether the dismissed cook was a ‘coloured 
alien’ under the law.1160  
See Chin’s case 
In 1923 one of the biggest employers in the Australian sugar industry, Jan See Chin1161 (the 
former leaseholder of the largest sugar farm in Queensland, at Green Hills near Cairns)1162 
was convicted on numerous charges of ‘employing coloured aliens’ contrary to the Sugar 
Cultivation Act 1913. As noted above, the statute prohibited ‘any person’ who had not passed 
the dictation test or did not have a certificate of exemption from being employed in the sugar 
industry.1163 See Chin’s case demonstrates the endemic misuse of ‘alien’ in Queensland at 
this time (not least by the legal profession), although it also shows how exceptional 
individuals who offered employment opportunities and business to the white community 
might rise above the derogatory alien label.  
In 1911 Queensland’s Attorney-General said the Green Hills plantation was ruined after 
being leased to Chinese ‘aliens’ who left it abandoned, ‘overgrown with weeds’.1164 However 
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only a few years later, as the Townsville Daily Bulletin reported in 1916, See Chin had turned 
the farm into a highly profitable enterprise: 
Take Green Hills for instance. Grubs ruined a Chinaman named Ah Tong, as it did several 
Europeans before him. Then another Chinese resident comes along in the person of See Chin, 
who acquires a long lease of the property. This man, for two years running, cleared £7,600 a 
year, through the grubs suddenly disappearing for that period. On top of this, See Chin sold the 
remainder of his lease, and standing crop to a syndicate for £10,000 - thus his bank balance 
smiled to the extent of £25,000, in, say, three years.
1165
  
Sandi Robb notes that the Cairns Branch of the Australian Workers Union was unhappy that 
Queensland’s restrictive legislation ‘did not go far enough to protect European workers’ and 
‘kept a constant eye on Chinese labour in the district’ for breaches of the laws. As she says, 
this ‘vigilante attitude’ may have been responsible for allegations against See Chin.1166 In 
December 1922 See Chin was charged at the Cairns Summons Court with unlawfully 
‘employing coloured aliens’ under the Sugar Cultivation Act.1167 As the Queensland Supreme 
Court was informed when it heard an appeal by See Chin against his conviction: 
The offence with which See Chin was charged was that: on his farm at Smithfield, near Cairns, 
he employed Sun Chun; a prohibited person by the [Sugar Cultivation] Act, whereby aliens 
were prohibited from working in the sugar industry, unless they had passed the dictation test, or 
held a certificate of exemption under section 4 of the Act.
1168
 
See Chin’s lawyer argued that the Sugar Workers Award gave him a complete defence.1169 
The award prohibited ‘coloured labour’ on sugar farms, but clause 4(3) said nothing in the 
award ‘shall prevent the owner of a sugar-cane farm from employing his own countrymen on 
such farm’. The prosecution said this did not assist See Chin, claiming, despite the wording 
of the clause, that it ‘does not give a Chinaman a free hand to employ his countrymen. The 
whole object of the award is to restrain a man from employing colored labor’.1170   
The term ‘countrymen’ in clause 4(3) provides another example of the confused use of 
nationality related terms in this period of Australian history. The provision had already 
provoked hostility from white workers. Delegates of the Australian Workers Union 
complained in January 1922 that ‘under the present system of preference a Chinaman grower 
could employ his own countrymen’, citing ‘a case at Innisfail where a Chinese grower 
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employed twenty countrymen with permits and ten without’.1171 The AWU passed a 
resolution calling for ‘absolute preference’ in any award for (white) industrial unionists and 
financial members. Seconding the resolution, an AWU delegate declared that: 
..something would have to be done during this year to exclude the aliens from the sugar   
industry. He suggested a conference with employers with a view to excluding colored aliens 
from the industry’.1172     
As the AWU’s 1922 complaints indicate, the term ‘countryman’ – as with the word ‘alien’ - 
was used as a racial description, i.e. it did not mean men from the same country whatever 
their race or ethnic origin but men of the same race whatever country they were from. The 
AWU wanted clause 4(3) of the Sugar Workers Award repealed because it permitted ‘colored 
aliens’ to employ their own ‘countrymen’, in particular because it allowed Chinese employers 
to hire workers of the same race. 
In Brown v See Chin (1923) the full Supreme Court upheld See Chin’s conviction, without 
considering the legal status of See Chin or his employee, finding merely that the prohibition 
in the Sugar Cultivation Act ‘was not affected by the sugar workers’ award’.1173 Once this 
case was decided, See Chin was prosecuted in the Cairns Summons Court in 1923 on an 
additional 26 charges of ‘employing colored aliens’. Police Magistrate Simpson said See 
Chin was guilty of ‘a flagrant breach of the Act…which deserves a heavy penalty’.1174 As the 
Cairns Post reported: 
Mr. V. Tabart, who appeared for the prosecution, said he had been instructed to press for a 
heavy penalty… ‘It is a very serious offence,’ he added, ‘and one against the whole principle 
upon which the Sugar Cultivation Act is based’.1175 
However the Sugar Cultivation Act had been drafted so that on its face it contained no 
discrimination against non-Europeans or ‘coloured aliens’. In practice it was administered 
through the mechanism of the dictation test so that such people (and especially those of 
Chinese ethnic origin) were excluded from the sugar industry. But there was nothing in the 
wording of the statute itself to indicate this was the objective of the Act. The prohibition in 
the legislation applied merely to any ‘person’ who had not obtained a certificate of having 
passed the dictation test, with no reference to ‘aliens’ or ‘colour’. For the prosecutor to argue, 
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with the magistrate’s concurrence, that the principle behind the Sugar Cultivation Act was to 
prevent the employment of ‘colored [sic] aliens’ in the sugar industry shows the extent to 
which lawyers and members of the judicial profession, contrary to the rule of law, adopted 
the racial aims behind the supposedly non-discriminatory legislation. This applied also to the 
full Supreme Court led by Chief Justice McCawley which endorsed See Chin’s conviction for 
employing ‘coloured aliens’ despite there being no such offence in the Act itself.1176 The 
Supreme Court’s finding was consistent with McCawley’s lack of understanding of the law 
with respect to ‘aliens’ demonstrated earlier in the Court of Industrial Arbitration.  
Beyond the alien frontier? 
Notwithstanding his conviction for employing ‘coloured aliens’, See Chin was an example of 
how (in extraordinary cases) a ‘coloured alien’ might move beyond this status in the eyes of 
the local white community. As Helen Irving says, ‘an exceptional coloured person might be 
transformed into an Australian citizen’ (using the word ‘citizen’ in its general, non-legal 
sense).1177 By the time Queensland passed restrictive legislation aimed at excluding ethnic 
Chinese from major agricultural industries, See Chin had already established himself as a 
major employer in North Queensland. He was also prominent in the development of the 
Cairns community. Local papers reported his donations to the District Hospital1178 and his 
role as a founding member of one of the first cricket clubs in the area.1179  
The consequence of this leading role in the local economy and society was that See Chin was 
not himself regarded or treated as a ‘coloured alien’. For the Anglo-Celtic community a 
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major employer such as See Chin provided important economic opportunities. As Henry 
Reynolds explains, in north Queensland wealthy Chinese merchants such as See Chin: 
…were treated as honorary Europeans, living in ordinary residential areas and travelling first-
class on the trains. They often had extensive dealings with local banks, law firms, insurance 
companies and shipping agents.1180  
See Chin continued to run his sugar plantations after the enactment of the Sugar Cultivation 
Act in 1913. There is no indication that he was required to obtain a certificate of exemption 
from the dictation test to remain in business.1181 He returned to Hong Kong for the last years 
of his life, but his death in 1928 was noted with a short but magnanimous obituary in the 
local Cairns newspaper praising his contribution to the development of the sugar industry in 
Queensland.1182  
Alien prosecutions and the law 
The ‘coloured alien’ prosecutions in North Queensland were an important weapon for ‘white 
Australia’. The motive behind Queensland’s alien and dictation test legislation was to 
exclude ‘aliens’ in a racial sense, especially Chinese Australians, from profit-making 
agricultural industries. Prosecutions after World War One gave these laws teeth.  
Legislation such as the Sugar Cultivation Act and Sugar Works Act merely prohibited 
‘persons’ from engaging in the sugar industry without passing the dictation test. In contrast, 
industrial awards such as the Sugar Workers Award and Station Hands Award, safe from 
imperial scrutiny, were explicit about racial exclusion. But prosecutions under both 
legislation and awards were directed at ‘coloured (or colored) aliens’. ‘Hindoos’, Malays and 
Chinese were automatically categorized as ‘colored aliens’ even if they were British subjects. 
Contrary to long established legal principle, there was no recognition that many were natives 
of British dominions or colonies, let alone that this was significant in terms of their legal 
status. The Queensland legal system at both the local and superior court level, including the 
Court of Industrial Arbitration and the full Supreme Court, was complicit in this failure of the 
rule of law. Even the Chief Justice showed little understanding of the law with respect to 
‘aliens’. The Corona case was an exception where a competent defence lawyer insisted that 
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admissible evidence as to nationality – and not merely the casual observations of an industrial 
inspector – would be required to establish that a person was a ‘coloured alien’.  
In short, prosecutions in Queensland after World War One under the dictation test legislation 
and industrial awards confirm that at a practical level the racial meaning of ‘alien’ became 
the law. The prohibitions under these statutes and rules were enforced against those regarded 
as ‘aliens’ in a racial sense with no regard to the proper legal meaning of the word established 
under British law centuries before.  
Aftermath: Effect of alien and dictation test laws 
The effect of Queensland’s alien and dictation test laws on the various non-European 
communities living in the State was substantial. In 1930 the Consul-General for China, Mr. 
F.T. Sung, wrote to Queensland Premier Arthur Moore complaining that Chinese Australians 
had suffered greatly under the State’s exclusionary laws which wrongly singled them out as 
‘aliens’. He said in 1913 there were over 10,000 Chinese in Queensland but that presently 
‘the number does not exceed 2,000’. Official census figures support this observation.1183 The 
Consul-General blamed this decline on: 
…the hardships inflicted by the terms of the Act to Restrict the Leasing of Land to Aliens, 
assented to in January 1912, the Sugar Cultivation Act of 1913, and the Banana Industry 
Preservation Act of 1921. Close study has convinced the Consul-General that, although these 
Acts, to outward appearances, seem to be directed against aliens in general, the term ‘alien’ is 
used in such a restricted sense as to refer exclusively to Chinese nationals.1184 
While seemingly unaware that many ethnic Chinese in Australia were British subjects and 
not aliens under the law, the racist impact of the supposedly non-discriminatory legislation 
was quite apparent to the Consul-General.  
The Consul-General said the Chinese belonged in Australia just as much as other settler 
communities, noting that ‘the Chinese now living in Queensland and against whom these 
laws discriminate are residents of long standing, having come there before federation’. 
Moreover they had contributed greatly to the development of the State: 
In the North of Queensland in particular there is ample evidence of the great pioneering work of 
the Chinese labourers and gardeners, while at the various centres that I visited men of standing 
in the community paid high tribute to the patience and endurance of these fine men…I would 
earnestly request that your Government show more consideration and give them their due - at 
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least, the right to enjoy such privileges as enjoyed by aliens of other nationalities. My nationals 
by long residence have merged themselves into the life of the community. All their interests are 
in Australia, since they have no homes in China, while they have proved themselves honest, 
peaceful and hard-working members of the community of which they are a part.
 1185
 
Mr Sung particularly objected to the expulsion of Chinese farmers from agricultural land 
under the alien and dictation test laws, observing that ‘many, who had spent years in the 
development of their acres, were deprived of the results of their life-work, and turned out of 
their homes’.1186 Many of these expulsions made way for returned soldiers after World War 
One. As the Governor of Queensland declared in 1919, ‘In the Atherton district no fewer than 
14,000 acres of freehold land…occupied by coloured aliens, have been resumed, and are 
being made available for soldiers.1187 Cathie May has noted that around Atherton in North 
Queensland, ‘the main Chinese activity was maize-growing. To a slightly lesser extent than 
the banana industry, this was also a Chinese preserve’.1188 As she observes, however, ‘after 
the First World War, a soldier settlement scheme finally forced Chinese farmers out of maize 
growing on the Atherton Tablelands, ending the last major Chinese agricultural initiative in 
Queensland’.1189  However returned soldiers’ associations continued to complain about the 
engagement of ‘aliens’ in the Queensland agricultural sector. As Rockhampton’s Morning 
Bulletin reported in 1924 under the heading ‘Returned Soldiers. Objection to Aliens’: 
When the State Executive of the Returned soldiers’ and sailors’ Imperial League resumed its 
sittings to-day strong views were expressed, particularly by the northern members, on the 
number of alien immigrants…Figures were quoted to show the preponderance of aliens 
employed in certain work in the northern cane fields. A motion was carried to the effect that the 
conference deplored the lack of supervision regarding the entry of aliens...1190  
The Consul-General was wrong to suggest that Queensland’s exclusionary laws only affected 
ethnic Chinese. In 1936 Srinivasa Sastri’s former secretary P. Kodanda Rao also visited 
Australia to interview Commonwealth and State governments about conditions under which 
Indians lived in the country. He learned that ‘the status of British Indians in Australia had 
improved greatly’ since Sastri’s visit. He thought the various Australian governments 
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‘realised that Indians were members of the Empire and treated them as such’.1191 But he 
criticised Queensland’s continued exclusion of Indian Australians from various occupations, 
including the sugar industry, under its alien and dictation test laws: 
…in Queensland there was a dictation test from which Europeans were exempted, but to which 
Indians were submitted in order to disqualify them. This applied to the sugar industry among 
other industries. It would appear that there was no reason for discrimination, as it would not at 
this stage advantage the domiciled Indian or disadvantage any white Australian.
1192
 
In relation to Pacific islanders who avoided expulsion under the Pacific Island Labourers Act 
and remained in Queensland, Kay Saunders observes (referring to the Sugar Cultivation and 
Leases to Aliens Restriction Acts) that: 
For those who remained (given as about 3,000 in the 1947 Census), the future was hardly more 
optimistic or sustaining. Denied membership in the…Australian Workers’ Union…Pacific 
Islanders were thereby prohibited from working in many industries in which they had 
previously secured employment. Other legislation made it illegal for any resident alien to own 
or lease land for the purpose of cane cultivation. People built makeshift houses, worked 
intermittently and frequently illegally, and attempted to eke out a living. So they stayed for 
generations – despised, destitute and largely forgotten.1193 
As noted above, many Pacific islanders were not ‘aliens’ in a legal sense and should not have 
been subject to Queensland’s Leases to Aliens Restriction Act or prosecuted as ‘coloured 
aliens’ under the State’s other dictation test and alien laws.  
Queensland’s alien and dictation test laws and awards did not succeed in entirely excluding 
non-Europeans from the State’s agricultural industries. Despite its central role in encouraging 
the exclusion of ‘coloured aliens’, the AWU appeared to accept there would always be some 
non-European labour.  In 1926 the AWU successfully argued that the Sugar Workers Award 
should be amended to increase ‘protection for alien workers in the sugar industry against the 
exploitation to which they are at present subjected’.1194  
Moreover, despite their serious impact these laws and awards were applied in a somewhat 
haphazard manner. In 1933 the Townsville Police Court was told that a Japanese man 
charged with being a ‘prohibited immigrant’ under the Commonwealth’s Immigration 
Restriction Act arrived in Australia in 1906, ‘had registered as an alien, had worked at 
various sugar mills and had not attempted to evade the officials’. While he had recently been 
subject to a dictation test under Commonwealth law in order to deport him from the country, 
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there was no indication that Queensland’s dictation test laws for the sugar industry had been 
applied to him.1195 The same year the AWU complained to the Minister for Agriculture about 
the ‘increase in the number of Hindus as canegrowers and as laborers employed by these 
canegrowers’, protesting that: 
…no examination of the exemption certificates had been made in the Cairns district for many 
years, and many of those engaged in growing cane were probably in occupation of the land in 
contravention of the Sugar Cultivation Act of 1913…In connection with these exemption   
certificates, it has been stated that none has been issued to Asiatics, either as growers or 
laborers in the industry since 1914. It is understood that the certificates provide for the passing 
of a dictation test by the applicant.
1196
 
Notwithstanding that some non-Europeans remained in North Queensland, as the Consul-
General’s comments (and Commonwealth census figures) indicate, Queensland’s alien and 
dictation test laws and awards were an effective weapon for white Australia. The term ‘alien’ 
was a valuable language tool for Anglo-Celtic lawmakers in this context. The word was 
employed in the State’s dictation test legislation ostensibly in its non-racial legal sense as part 
of a façade of non-discrimination. But its use was a signal to exclude those derided as 
‘coloured aliens’ - especially (but not only) Chinese Australians. Subordinate industrial 
awards stated this objective explicitly.  
In a failure of the rule of law, the Queensland legal system (including prosecutors, 
magistrates and even the Supreme Court) accepted the use of ‘alien’ in its non-legal sense, 
endorsing the prosecution of Chinese and other non-Europeans as ‘coloured aliens’ when 
many were British subjects and not aliens under the law applying in Australia.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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CONCLUSION ‘Alien’ and the rule of law in Australia 
‘Citizenship really is a secure status that should be affirmed to create a sense of 
national cohesion and inclusion. But what governments are doing is actually the 
opposite. They’re using citizenship as a frame for creating the ‘other’ within our own 
society, and creating more division’.1197 
The journey through colonial and post-federation Australia in this thesis has lessons in three 
distinct and important ways: for ‘history’, for ‘law’ and for our understanding of the ‘rule of 
law’. In the context of history there is a need to appreciate legal as well as everyday meanings 
of a word like ‘alien,’ a term still used as a fundamental marker of ‘belonging’. For law there 
are lessons, not least the importance of ‘doing history’ properly. Finally there are conclusions 
for understanding the operation of the ‘rule of law’ in Australia. While this work is not about 
Australia’s overall compliance with that concept, it does reveal that an endemic misuse of 
‘alien’ occurred in breach of the ‘rule of law’. This must now be factored into the country’s 
historical and legal record, which could have far-reaching consequences. 
Lessons for history 
Why have existing secondary sources largely missed the essential point that the legal and 
racial meanings of ‘alien’ do not sit together and the rule of law ramifications that flow from 
this? The main cause seems to be the minimal overlap between legal and historical writing. 
As Helen Irving observes, ‘it would appear, indeed, that the “history” done by judges 
occupies a different hermeneutical space from the “history” done by historians’.1198  
Historical works – unlike legal judgments - are not subject to analysis in relation to precise 
use of terms according to the law. Hence descriptions in existing histories of Australia after 
1788 of all non-Europeans as ‘aliens’ without reference to the word’s legal meaning have not 
been criticised or yet corrected. Historians have not appreciated that the word ‘alien’ has a 
distinct legal meaning, nor that the extensive use of ‘alien’, ‘coloured aliens’, ‘alien races’ 
and similar phrases as part of the language or discourse of white Australia to refer to people 
of non-European ethnic origin was contrary to the law. This thesis adds to our history by 
showing that the commitment to ‘whiteness’ was more extensive than may have been 
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thought. This extended to defying the binding common law on nationality established 
centuries before.  
In addition to showing how race ‘trumped’ the rule of law in relation to the meaning and 
application of the term ‘alien’, this thesis also helps Australia confront its history in other 
ways. Chengxin Pan from Deakin University argues that Australia must face up to the 
anxieties of its past to engage with Asia with less anxiety now. Pan says ‘the antidote to 
anxiety about China’ in the twenty first century ‘is not the imagery of the China opportunity’. 
Instead, he argues that: 
What we need is a critical examination of Australia’s self-identity and self-knowledge as 
manifested in its historical construction of an Asian-Chinese Other…it requires confronting ‘a 
traditional Australian style of thought that is still unconsciously mired in some of the values of 
white Australia’…A concurrent, more fundamental debate should begin over the problematic 
historical configurations of Australian (and Asian) identity and difference…strategic analysts 
and international relations scholars equally need to engage more closely and critically with 
history in general and Australia’s Asian pasts in particular.1199 
An essential starting point in a debate over the ‘historical configurations of Australian and 
Asian identity and difference’ is that ‘construction of an Asian-Chinese Other’ in nineteenth 
and twentieth century Australia involved disrespect for the rule of law. Properly confronting 
Australia’s past means acknowledging that inhabitants of non-European ethnic background 
were often wrongly categorised as ‘aliens’ or the ‘Other’ contrary to the law, when they 
should have had equal legal membership under the law with white Australians as subjects of 
the British Crown.   
Lessons for law 
Turning to ‘law’, legal judgments and commentaries focus on doctrine and precedent rather 
than everyday historical use. If there is no definition in legislation, courts do turn to the 
‘ordinary and natural’, ‘grammatical’ or dictionary meaning.1200 But in the case of the term 
‘alien’, the Australian High Court has to date merely noted the word’s ordinary legal 
meaning (a ‘citizen or subject of another state’) without explaining its everyday racial 
meaning, let alone its standard use in a racial sense in the white Australia era.1201  
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As far as the validity of precedents used in modern constitutional litigation is concerned, the 
New South Wales habeus corpus cases (Ex parte Lo Pak,1202 Ex parte Leong Kum1203), the 
Privy Council’s decision in Ah Toy1204 and the High Court’s landmark judgment in 
Robtelemes1205 are still cited without acknowledging or even appreciating the racial use of 
‘alien’ at the time. In any future challenge to the use of section 51(xix) of the Constitution, 
this thesis would give counsel making submissions to a court the basis for arguments about 
whether those cases can validly support the extensive sweep of the ‘aliens power’. 
The thesis also enables more critical analysis of the constitutional conventions of the 1890s in 
relation to the role envisaged for key powers in the Constitution. As Irving writes about Cole 
v Whitfield1206 (the significant High Court case on the use of the convention debates in 
constitutional interpretation), ‘How well did the justices perform as historians?...the 
respectful answer must be: not brilliantly’.1207 If the debates are to remain the ‘primary source 
for doing history’ for the High Court,1208 it is important to look more carefully at how 
constitutional terms were used at the time when discerning what delegates to the conventions 
may have meant. This requires going back earlier in Australian history. As this thesis has 
demonstrated, an appreciation that key colonial figures in prior decades had embedded the 
racial use of ‘alien’ is critical for understanding how delegates used the term at the 
conventions. As Helen Irving writes, ‘This is not to suggest that the Debates give no 
historical guidance to the public meaning of constitutional provisions but, rather, that they 
should be treated as one source among others’.1209 This thesis provides many sources and 
further context for future use of the convention debates. 
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  Ex parte Lo Pak (1888) 9 NSWLR(L) 221.  
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1204
  Musgrove v Chung Teong Toy [1891] AC 272 [1891] UKPC 16.  
1205
  Robtelmes v Brenan (1906) 4 CLR 395.  
1206
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  Ibid 114. 
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  Ibid 112.  
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‘Alien’ and the rule of law 
The remarks by Justice Windeyer, Chief Justice Gleeson and Justice Kirby in the introduction 
to this thesis1210 emphasise that the ‘rule of law’ is still venerated as an unquestionable 
foundation of Australian society post-European settlement.  
Legal writers have placed weight on the observation by Marxist historian E.P. Thompson, 
who wrote: ‘the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the 
defence of the citizen from power’s all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an unqualified 
human good’.1211 Thompson also concluded, however, that ‘for many of England’s governing 
elite the rules of law were a nuisance, to be manipulated and bent in what ways they 
could’.1212  
In his 2007 article, Lord Bingham, Senior Law Lord of the United Kingdom, identified a 
number of ‘sub-rules’ in the ‘rule of law’, including:  
- the law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable 
(first sub-rule) 
- questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of 
the law and not the exercise of discretion (second sub-rule) 
- the laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective 
differences justify differentiation (third sub-rule), and 
- adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair (seventh sub-rule).1213  
The examples in this thesis show key institutions in colonial and post-federation Australia 
largely failing to comply with the rule of law even in the formal or ‘thin’ sense reflected in 
Lord Bingham’s first three sub-rules. Despite having Coke’s principles in Calvin’s Case in 
front of it, the New South Wales Supreme Court ignored the established law laid down by 
that case when failing to find that indigenous people were ‘subjects’ not ‘aliens’. Instead the 
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  E P Thompson, Whigs and hunters: the origin of the Black Act (Allen Lane 1975) 266. See Daniel 
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Court focussed on levels of ‘civilisation’ and other non-legal, social factors. Similarly the 
High Court authorised expulsion of Pacific islanders by pronouncing them ‘indisputably 
aliens’ contrary to the law. Legislation in South Australia and Western Australia treated 
British subjects as ‘Asiatic or African aliens’ at odds with established legal principle. 
Queensland’s alien and dictation test laws were the opposite of ‘intelligible, clear and 
predictable’. Designed for a White Queensland, they pretended to apply in a non-
discriminatory way to all ‘persons’ or legal ‘aliens’. Some dictation test laws were supported 
by racially worded exemptions, which at least made them compliant with the rule of law in a 
formal sense. But the discriminatory content of the exemptions - and Queensland’s 
subordinate laws and awards targeting ‘coloured aliens’ - fails Lord Bingham’s third sub-rule 
requiring equal treatment under a substantive conception of the rule of law.  
Prosecutions under Queensland’s alien and dictation test laws also contravened Lord 
Bingham’s second sub-rule. As he says, ‘there can…be no discretion as to the facts on which 
a decision-maker, official or judicial, proceeds’.1214 Contrary to this principle, Queensland 
magistrates and judges prosecuted ‘coloured aliens’ even if the authorising law did not refer 
to such people and without requiring proof they were ‘aliens’ under the law. The same was 
true of colonial legislation allowing officials to deem ethnic Chinese settlers to be ‘aliens’ 
merely because of their non-European appearance.    
Lord Bingham’s seventh sub-rule (fairness) requires: 
First and foremost…that decisions are made by adjudicators who… are independent and 
impartial: independent in the sense that they are free to decide on the legal and factual merits of 
a case as they see it, free of any extraneous influence or pressure, and impartial in the sense that 
they are, so far as humanly possible, open-minded, unbiased by any personal interest or partisan 
allegiance of any kind.
1215
 
Chapter Two shows how courts in colonial Australia were far from open-minded about the 
legal status of Chinese Australians. Judicial officers thought it unimportant to record 
evidence proving the status of Chinese settlers, presuming they were ‘aliens’ because they 
were ‘alien’ in appearance and way of life. In addition, as Chapter Five explains, it would be 
difficult to find a case with less impartial judges than Robtelmes.1216 Each had a pre-
determined position on the issue before the Court. Barton and O’Connor introduced the 
contested legislation in the new Commonwealth Parliament, advocating its constitutional 
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authority.1217 Griffith was famous for his twenty year campaign to expel ‘servile’ Pacific 
islanders.1218 The failure by the High Court in Robtelmes to properly consider whether Pacific 
islanders could be deported under a ‘power to deal with aliens’ also, therefore, contravenes 
Lord Bingham’s fairness sub-rule.  
It was not as if the law regarding ‘aliens’ and ‘subjecthood’ was unknown in Australia. Lord 
Glenelg directed that indigenous people could not be considered as aliens.1219 Justice Burton 
in the New South Wales Supreme Court said native people had to be ‘either subjects or 
aliens’1220 (but was unable to decide which). In 1876 Griffith was told by no less than the 
Colonial Secretary, the Queensland Governor, the President of the Legislative Council, the 
Opposition Leader and influential parliamentarian John Macrossan about the ‘large numbers 
of British subjects of Chinese origin’ from Hong Kong and other British colonies.1221 And 
Griffith, as the pre-eminent jurist of his day, could hardly claim ignorance of the law.1222 
Henry Parkes admitted that ‘Chinese who may claim to be considered British subjects in 
those colonies are very numerous’.1223 In the 1890s it was the very subject status of British 
Indians that caused consternation at the constitutional conventions (‘there are in India some 
150,000,000 British subjects’, warned Tasmanian Premier Braddon).1224 The Commonwealth 
and Queensland Parliaments were both told that Pacific islanders, described as ‘coloured 
aliens’, included many British subjects.1225 Queensland Government Ministers intentionally 
ignored the law about ‘aliens’, directing the word be used with its racial not legal meaning 
when administering the State’s dictation test legislation.1226 
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As Thompson said about England and the rule of law, it has to be concluded that for much of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the law about aliens was also, for Australia’s 
governing elite, ‘a nuisance, to be manipulated and bent in what ways they could’.1227  
Why did this happen? 
Why was the term ‘alien’ misused and manipulated in Australia contrary to ancient legal 
principle laid down by the revered champion of the rule of law himself, Sir Edward Coke?  
While the law about ‘aliens’ was a nuisance for the Anglo-Celtic elite, the opposite was true 
of the word with its racial meaning. For the white colonists, the term encapsulated their view 
of non-European races, especially (but not limited to) Chinese settlers, encompassing the 
sense of ‘not belonging’, referring in particular to those who because of their race and 
different culture (and supposedly lower work and labour standards) were seen as ‘not one of 
us’, as ‘outsiders’ or ‘foreigners’ who did not ‘belong’ in European-dominated Australian 
society at the time. 
‘Alien’ was also a useful term because it included a sense of ‘threat’. European society in 
nineteenth and twentieth century Australia saw itself as ‘threatened’ by other races: both in 
terms of the danger to its standard of living (from, as Mr Roberts told the Queensland 
Parliament in 1921, the ‘yellow races, who work such long hours and live so very 
cheaply’)1228 and in a vaguer but nevertheless palpable sense of a physical or military threat 
(replace the aliens in the banana industry with white farmers, said Mr Brand, and ‘they will 
form a bulwark for the defence of Australia’).1229  
At the hands of Griffith, Parkes, Gillies, Playford and other colonial lawmakers, the use of 
‘alien’ as a term of racial denigration became pervasive. Once the description of non-
Europeans as ‘aliens’ was embedded in the discourse of nineteenth century Australia, it 
became part of the mind-set of lawmakers. The inter-colonial gatherings on the ‘Chinese 
question’ in the 1880s and associated debates in colonial parliaments were particularly 
important, heavily influencing the subsequent constitutional conventions. Tasked with 
drafting the new constitution in precise terms, delegates employed ‘alien’ entirely in its non-
legal racial sense.  
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Queensland’s long-lasting and deliberate use of the term ‘alien’, ostensibly with its neutral 
legal meaning, to camouflage the exclusion and prosecution of those regarded as ‘aliens’ in a 
racial sense stands out in terms of institutionalised manipulation of the word. Queensland’s 
dictation test laws involved deliberate and calculated misuse of ‘alien’, and a measure of 
deception. The usefulness of the word as a discriminatory language tool was particularly 
evident in this legislation. Legislators understood the legal meaning of ‘alien’, assuming it 
would be read this way by the Colonial Office, making the new laws seem neutral and non-
discriminatory. As the Secretary for Public Lands said, ‘we have…to deal comprehensively 
with the subject of aliens, making no discrimination against any particular race’.1230 However 
lawmakers used ‘alien’ with one meaning when seeking royal assent and another when 
describing the real aim of the legislation (‘we cannot get the protection which is necessary 
simply because the areas are leased to Chinamen…That is … the object of the Bill – that the 
aliens won’t be allowed to lease these farms’).1231  
Behind the use of ‘alien’ in racial discourse was a refusal by the Anglo-Celtic elite to accept 
non-Europeans as part of an equal society entitled to the rule of law. As Griffith said, ‘they 
cannot be admitted to an equal share in the political and social institutions of the colony’. 1232 
Democracy and the rule of law were only for those already regarded as equal before the 
law.1233 Because of racial and philosophical prejudices, non-European and indigenous 
subjects were not accepted as equal. ‘I cannot place Chinese on a footing of equality with 
ourselves’, said Parkes.1234 Despite their birthright entitlement to subject status and protection 
of the common law, they were therefore excluded as racial ‘aliens’ from the rule of law.  
Another enduring theme behind the misuse of ‘alien’ was the view amongst significant 
elements of the white settler community that non-Europeans were less than human, 
equivalent to animals or pests who were, therefore, ineligible for an equal society. This was 
an important part of the discourse portraying non-white Australians as ‘alien’ in a general 
sense, flowing into use of the word in a legal context.  
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In contrast to the weight given to such non-legal factors, the legal concept of ‘allegiance’ - 
still used today to distinguish ‘aliens’ from those who belong under the law1235 - was ignored 
by the white British establishment in colonial and post-federation Australia. They especially 
discounted or disregarded allegiance and equal subject status obtained through birth in (non-
European) territory under British sovereignty. For Anglo-Celtic colonisers and lawmakers, 
shared ‘allegiance’ meant far less than racial, cultural, religious and other perceived or 
imagined differences – as well as perceptions of ‘threats’ to security, health and living 
standards - in determining whether some of Australia’s pioneering settler groups were 
regarded and treated as ‘aliens’. 
The incompatibility of the common law with intellectual and racial prejudice against non-
Europeans led to the law being ignored or manipulated in colonial and post-federation 
Australia. The idea that aboriginal people were too ‘barbarous’ and ‘uncivilised’ to share 
subject status was followed by the emergence of the modern form of racial discrimination 
directed against the Chinese and other non-European immigrant peoples. But there was no 
accompanying evolution (or perhaps ‘descent’) in the law about ‘aliens’ to accommodate this 
thinking. The common law remained firmly based on the concept of ‘allegiance’, with no 
allowance for ethnic origin or perceived level of civilisation. 
Aliens today 
‘To their minds, the outsiders, the aliens, are among us. They do not dress like us, they 
do not pray like us. They do not build churches. They build mosques’.1236  
The following statement by Chief Justice Gibbs in Pochi (1982) remains the starting point for 
judicial consideration of the limits on the Commonwealth’s power to make laws with respect 
to ‘aliens’: 
…the Parliament cannot, simply by giving its own definition of ‘alien’, expand the power under 
section 51(xix) [of the Constitution] to include persons who could not possibly answer the 
description of ‘aliens’ in the ordinary understanding of the word.
1237
 
In this statement Chief Justice Gibbs used very similar language to that of Mr Forsyth in the 
Queensland Legislative Assembly in 1911 who said settlers from European countries were 
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‘not aliens in the general acceptance of the term’.1238 It is unlikely, however, that the Chief 
Justice had in mind the same people as Mr Forsyth.  
The fact that the word ‘alien’ could be used by colonial and post-federation politicians, 
lawmakers and constitutional commentators as well as in legislation, cases and prosecutions 
with different, even multiple meanings and in many cases primarily with its non-legal ‘racial’ 
meaning should raise questions about continued use of the term in the Australian 
Constitution. The examples in this thesis illustrate dramatically that both in colonial Australia 
and after federation the word ‘alien’ was used in a legal context contrary to the rule of law. 
One reason for this misuse, at least after 1901, was the absence of specific membership 
criteria in the Constitution itself. Australia’s guiding legal document contains no rules 
requiring lawmakers to apply normal concepts of nationality law in deciding who should be 
treated as legal members of the nation with full protection before the law. The lack of a 
membership definition means there is no clear context against which to measure the scope of 
the ‘aliens power’.1239 Instead, any constitutional constraints as to who can be treated as an 
‘alien’ have to be inferred or implied from the meaning of the word itself - starting, according 
to current High Court authority, with Chief Justice Gibbs’ ambiguous concept of the 
‘ordinary understanding’ of the word.  
As this thesis has shown, the ‘ordinary understanding’ and application of the term ‘alien’ 
both in colonial times and between federation and the Second World War was inherently 
racial, with the word used to exclude non-white settlers and support the legal position of the 
dominant Anglo-Celtic community of the day. One important issue in any review of the 
Constitution, whenever that occurs, should be whether a word so infected with racial meaning 
in colonial and post-federation Australia - but which still determines constitutional 
membership of Australia and supports extensive, practically ‘unlimited’ Commonwealth 
power over individuals - should be replaced with a more inclusive concept without such 
negative historical baggage.  
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